



**Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient**

Förderungsgesellschaft Wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH

■ Dietrich Reetz

**Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful  
A British File on the Exodus of  
Muslim Peasants from North India  
to Afghanistan in 1920**

Arbeitshefte 5



Verlag Das Arabische Buch

**Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme**

**Reetz, Dietrich:**

**Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful. A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North India to Afghanistan in 1920**

**Dietrich Reetz. - Berlin: Verl. Das Arabische Buch, 1995**

**(Arbeitshefte / Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient,  
Förderungsgesellschaft Wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH; Nr. 5)  
ISBN 3-86093-075-3**

**NE: Förderungsgesellschaft Wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben <München> /  
Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient: Arbeitshefte**

**Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient  
Förderungsgesellschaft Wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH**

**Kommissarischer Leiter:  
Prof. Dr. Peter Heine**

**Prenzlauer Promenade 149-152  
13189 Berlin  
Tel. 030 / 4797319**

**ISBN 3-86093-075-3  
ARBEITSHEFTE**

**Bestellungen:  
Das Arabische Buch  
Horstweg 2  
14059 Berlin  
Tel. 030 / 3228523**

**Redaktion und Satz: Margret Liepach, Helga Reher**

**Druck: Druckerei Weinert, Berlin  
Printed in Germany 1995**

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
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## List of abbreviations

BL IOR	British Library India Office Records.
CC	Chief Commissioner - British head of provincial administration.
CID	Central Intelligence Department of the Government of India, controlling political opposition.
CW, Vol. No.	<i>Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi</i> , 90 Vols. Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958-1984.
DC	Deputy Commissioner.
Doc (No), p. (No)	Document No ..., page No ...; referring to the numbering of documents in the political committee file reproduced in the annex.
FID	Frontier Intelligence Diary.
FPD	Frontier Provincial Diary.
Home (Pol) D	Home (Political) Department of the Government of India.
IAR (year)	<i>Indian Annual Register (1921 tc.)</i> , edited by H. N. Mitra, Delhi: Gian, 1988 [Repr.].
IMDR, Vol. No.	<i>The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record 1900-1947</i> , edited by Shan Muhammad, 11 vols., Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1980-1992.
India in (year)	<i>India in 19...: A Report prepared for presentation to Parliament ...</i> , edited by L. F. Rushbrook Williams from 1918 to 1935, Delhi: Anmol Publications 1985 (Reprint).
JUH	<i>Jamiyyat al-Ulama-e-Hind</i> .
NAI	National Archive of India, Delhi.
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province.
Punjab Press (year)	<i>Punjab Press Abstract 1920-21</i> . Shelf-mark BL IOR L/R/5/202.
P&J	Public and Judicial (Department of the India Office), also indicating file group of papers.
Rs	Rupies.
Selections UP (year)	<i>Selections from newspapers published in the United Provinces in 1919-20</i> . Shelf-mark BL IOR L/R/5/95.


**Map 1:**

Events of the *Hijrat* and other local and Islamic resistance in the North-West Frontier Province and trans-border tribal territories of British India in 1920.



Sources: Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, 1965; Stephen Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns*, 1988; J. A. Schwartzberg, *A Historical Atlas of South Asia*; 1992. Redrawn.

Map 2: Peshawar District and Border Area of NWFP in 1920.



Adapted from Government of India, *Census of India. Vol. XIV. North-West Frontier Province. Part: I Report. Peshawar.* NWFP Government Press, 1922, p. vii.



## Introduction

It was an unexpected sight of some ferocity that astounded all those who witnessed the events of Saturday morning on 14 August 1920. An excited and highly 'truculent' wave of roughly 7,000 people moved from the small frontier town of Landi Kotal to the Khaiber Pass bent on crossing the border from India into Afghanistan against all resistance to fulfil their religious duty of emigration from the Land of the Infidels, the Land of War, *Dar-ul-Harb*, to the Land of Islam, *Dar-ul-Islam*, which to them Afghanistan seemed to be. They were chanting religious slogans and hymns to the tune of martial music, some of it Islamic and some profoundly British. 'One large company was played out of British India to the tune of the British Grenadiers, played on an old fife!'<sup>1</sup> Imbued with a holy spirit and a festive mood, they were not to be stopped by the Afghans who had blocked the road at the border with a guard of 50 men. The Afghans who first invited them now feared they would be swept off their feet by the storm which they had unleashed.<sup>2</sup>

The event which continued to intrigue the minds of researchers, of loyalists and opponents of the Muslim movement in British India was the spontaneous exodus of thousands of Muslim peasants from India to Afghanistan in 1920. The name *hijrat* derived from its famous forerunner when the Prophet Mohammed and his disciples left Mecca to go to Medina in 622 A.D. and set up the first Islamic state, or rather, local government. Emulating the prototype, Indian Muslims abandoned their hearth and home in the gruelling mid-summer heat, embarking on a journey to Afghanistan which they considered the abode of Islam. Yet this exodus was only a trickle compared to the coming flood of the Khilafat movement. The latter aimed at the preservation and restoration of the powers of the Ottoman *Khalifa*, the spiritual, and, for many centuries also, the temporal head of the world community of Muslims, i.e. of the Islamic *ummah*. The Ottoman Turkish Empire was defeated in the Great War as the World War I was known at the time after it had blindly sided with Germany. Turkey was stripped down to its Anatolian heartlands and its Imperial glory went the way the Austrian Habsburg Empire was going. About the only one who cared for the Turkish Sultan in his diminished constituency were the Indian Muslims, and for reasons which had very little to do with the Ottoman Empire, or with Turkey.

This manuscript came into being as part of my research on a long-term project on ethnic and religious conflict in pre-independence India. It may eventually be included into a larger manuscript on the *hijrat* reaching beyond the limited scope of this paper. The essay will introduce a file from the India Office, London, covering the events of this *hijrat*, discuss the background of the movement, the preparation stage, the actual beginning of the movement, its peak, decline and aftermath. In the end, it will offer an assessment.

The spelling of the proper nouns of Urdu, Arabic, Persian or Pashto origin follows the English transcription convention. They were kept in small letters and put in italics, except when they were commonly used in compound words

like Khilafat Committee, or when anglicized like Khilafatist, Sepoy, Maulvi. To make reading easier, diacritical marks were only applied in the glossary, except when they were given in quotations. The Arabic-knowing reader will kindly excuse that the usage of Arabic terms like *hijrat*, *Khalifa* and *Khalifat* follows the Urdu spelling current at the time of the movement in India.

I'm deeply grateful to my colleagues who have read the manuscript and provided me with valuable advice: Linda Schilcher from the History Department of Villanova University in the US and visiting fellow at our Center, who also improved the language of the manuscript, Peter Heine, Professor of non-Arabian Islam at Humboldt-University and acting director of this Center, and Raman Mahadevan, historian and economist from the Nehru-University in Delhi and visiting fellow at the Center. I'm fully clear, however, that the responsibility for any mistake in the manuscript rests entirely with me.

### Bibliographical background

The major standard works on the Khilafat movement mention the *hijrat* movement in passing only.<sup>3</sup> Documents published by Shan Muhammad in his documentary record on the Indian Muslim movement afford valuable insight into the background of political musings at the time.<sup>4</sup> There exist classical Urdu-language studies, by Ghulam Rasul Mihr and Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar.<sup>5</sup> A couple of articles treated the subject independently. The more extensive one is the article written by Lal Baha in 1979 which appeared in *Islamic Studies*, a publication of the Islamic Research Institute in Islamabad, Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> Though it is well-researched, it is somewhat short on evaluation and has difficulty to give a wider meaning to the mass of small and sometimes conflicting details. On some facts, Baha is inaccurate (which will be pointed out in the course of the exposition). A very knowledgeable and refined paper was done by M. Naeem Qureshi of the Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad in *Modern Asian Studies* of the same year.<sup>7</sup> He, however, limited himself with one aspect of the movement, the position of the *ulama*. Both articles emanated from larger studies. Baha Lal published a manuscript on the *mujāhidīn* movement in 1979, dealing with a local tradition of Islamic insurgency in the north-west of India, which, under the name of the 'Indian Wahhabites', had lingered on for almost a hundred years by then.<sup>8</sup> Qureshi had done his unpublished 1973 dissertation on the Khilafat movement.<sup>9</sup> A short contemporary account of a rather cursory nature is available from F. S. Briggs who lived in Peshawar at the time of these occurrences.<sup>10</sup>

The present essay, therefore, is one of the very few attempts to discuss these astonishing events in detail, apparently the only one in the West. The main purpose of this publication, however, is to introduce a file from the India Office collections and publish a substantial part of it as an annex to this manuscript.

The record in question is a subject file, No. 5703 of the year 1920, which under the title 'Hijrat in N. W. F. Province tc' was collected and filed by the Public and Judicial (hereafter P&J) Department of the India Office. It was bound in volume No 1701 of series 6 of the P&J record collections under the shelf-mark L/P&J/6/1701. Under the entries of 'NWFP' and 'Pol. ref.', it was indexed in volume Z/L/P&J/6/43. The series 6 contained the annual files of the departmental papers. As far as is known, the file has not been published before. In the sources mentioned above that deal with the *hijrat* one occasional reference was made to this file.<sup>11</sup> Since the P&J department's scope was broadly similar to the Home Department of the Government of India,<sup>12</sup> and papers were often filed in more than one context it is to be assumed that some documents or paragraphs may have been mentioned in publications with reference to other records. Source collections mentioned in this regard are the *Chelmsford papers*, Vol. 24, containing the personal papers of Lord Frederick J. T. N. Chelmsford (1868-1933), Viceroy and Governor-General in India from 1916 to 1921, the *Grant collection*, papers of Sir Hamilton Grant, a former Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, where he was in charge of relations with the Indian principalities and independent territories on the north-west and north-east frontiers as well as with neighbouring states of India, and Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) at the time of the *hijrat*, the *Home Political Proceedings* and the *Political and Secret Subject Files* for the years 1919-1920.<sup>13</sup> In comparison, P&J file 5703/20 is supposed to contain a rather comprehensive collection since it was prepared for deliberation by the political committee of the India Office which regularly dealt with political events in India that caused anxiety or merited some response in Britain. The political committee file consists of 65 documents, dated between 13 July and 24 August 1920. In addition, P&J file No. 5703/20, which includes 55 file pages, contains some double copies of telegrams, the draft version of one of the telegrams and one press cutting (the latter is also reproduced in the annex). There are also four minute papers attached, dated 18, 27 August, 6 October and 8 November, 1920. They show the manner of approaching the issue and the procedural wrangling over it. Apparently, the first formal request for information was sent by the Secretary of State for India, who was the minister in charge of the India Office, to the Viceroy on 27 July 1920.<sup>14</sup> At first, the subject was in the charge of the India Office's Political Department, whose secretary L. D. Walton, however, made over the papers to the P&J Department and its secretary, J. W. Hose on 18 August 1920. The committee file was sent in two instalments. The first part of twenty-four pages with 46 documents was sent on 6 October to the Committee, the second part of the remainder on 8 November, 1920.

Besides P&J file No. 5703/20, which in itself is presumably insufficient to explore the full extent of the events, additional source material will be introduced. Foremost among them are periodical publications of the time, the

*Aman-i-Afghan* (The Afghan People) and the *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* (The Eastern Unity) which were published from Afghanistan, apparently directly under the guidance of the Afghan Foreign Office and the War Office to wage its own propaganda campaign in India. Both started publication from February 1920. Complete translations of most of their 1920 issues were attached to the Frontier Intelligence Diaries, a running fortnightly newsletter for the India Office and the Government of India in which the resident British Indian intelligence network summarised its information, mostly on the situation in Afghanistan and the so-called independent territories.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously, the Frontier Province administration kept a Provincial Diary which contained official, political information on the Frontier Province, the independent territories and Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> The diaries contain much information on the flow of *muhajirs* across the frontier into Afghanistan. A third category of periodical information were the fortnightly personal letters written by the Chief Commissioners and Governors to the Viceroy and by the latter to the India Office. For this period they are scattered over various file groups.<sup>17</sup> A fourth series of running sources, relevant in this context, was constituted by the fortnightly review of the local press. Compiled by provinces, the frontier events for this period can best be followed through the review of the press from the Punjab and the United Provinces.<sup>18</sup> Among the periodical publications of source value one also has to mention the *Muslim Outlook*, a weekly published from London by the Islamic Information Bureau between 1920 and 1923 which was started in connection with the Khilafat delegation under Muhammad Ali visiting London from February to October 1920.

The essay which accompanies the file is a working manuscript. It was deliberately included in the Occasional Papers series of the Center for Modern Oriental Studies - i.e. *Arbeitshefte*. This underlines the preliminary nature of the comments and conclusions. It is intended to raise some points of doubt and incite discussions without being able yet to answer these questions in a definite way. The paper attempts to narrate the events and evaluate the actions and motives on the part of the three acting parties, the *muhajirin*/Khilafatists, the British and the Afghans. In this, it seeks to argue that even at a time, when Muslim politics concurred with the nationalist movement as never before and presumably never again afterwards, the rationale and reasoning of Muslim politics remained independent and separate from nationalist mainstream politics to the extent where it could move out of the nationalist orbit at any time or for any reason. The paper further assumes that the *hijrat* in its own way was a precursor to ethnic politics in the Pakhtun area of the North-West Frontier Province, that its course and direction was more shaped by local culture than by policy directives or objectives of the major political organisations.

To the South Asia historian the extensive treatment of the background of the Khilafat and non-co-operation movements of the time may seem expendable. Since this Center and the *Arbeitshefte* series addresses cross-regional and

multi-disciplinary issues it was felt that such additional information would help understanding the intricacies of Muslim politics in modern South Asian history.

As the subject is treated predominantly with reference to British files, a certain amount of caution is required regarding the innate tendencies of self-aggrandizement of British action and deprecation of political opponents. One cannot fail to consider the valid criticism that a history of India written through the eyes of its colonial masters must fall short of a truthful and objective historiography. A critical reading of the sources must take note of the goals of British rule in India. The major objective of British officials in India was not a truthful and complete description of events. The overriding concern, of course, was political stability, smooth administration, maximum public consent, minimum 'disturbances'. But within those tasks, any significant deviation from the real events in the reporting was self-deceptive and therefore self-defeating. The more farsighted representatives of the British administration in and for India would always want to have a more complete picture of the situation. These sources are British inasmuch as they include papers created by the colonial administration in India for administrative and information purposes. They make extensive use of Indian sources which, however, were presented at the time under the angle of preservation and perpetuation of British political and administrative power. Though this approach may and did indeed introduce an element of bias into the presentation of information, the sources may still be considered valuable and meaningful for the reconstruction of events. The character of recurring sources which are mainly used in this context somewhat prevents unlimited alteration of facts. The process of gathering and presenting information may still be selective. But a day-to-day reporting makes it difficult to leave out certain facts since it is hard to foresee which of them will become relevant in the future. Therefore, the factual account may be fairly reliable though its interpretive presentation will no doubt reflect the disposition of political and ideological loyalties.

### **The Khilafat grievances and non-co-operation**

The Great War of 1914-1918 turned out to be 'great' in another respect as well. It was the great divide in British rule over India. The War and its aftermath had sent the ground shifting under the feet of the British in India. Not only did the Indian elites feel more and more alienated from the British system. Its promises of increased participation in the business of legislation and administration rang dangerously hollow against the emergency measures of the Rowlatt Security Bill of 18 March 1919 and the shooting in the *Jallianwali Bagh*, a garden square in Amritsar, on 13 April 1919. The Indian masses which were shaken out of complacency by 'blood, sweat and tears', through the violent confrontation with the British colonial administration and the marked deterior-

ration of their living standards after the War. The Khilafat movement and Gandhi's call for non-co-operation were forms of expression of this general trend. Although the Rowlatt Bill was never applied, its provisions to confiscate arms and to tighten local security in cases of unrest were seen reflecting the deep distrust felt towards Indians. Today they were not seen fit to carry arms while yesterday they were welcome to use these very arms to fight for British interests during the War. The independence which the allied forces were supposed to bring to the oppressed nations of Europe was denied to India which had fought on the side of the Allies.<sup>19</sup>

### *The mentors of the movement*

All Indians felt betrayed by the English, and more so the Muslims. The young Muhammedans had come to see the British as double oppressors. Not only did Britain deny India self-government but it was also seen as intentionally emasculating Indian Muslims through its policies on the question of the Ottoman *khilafat*. Turkey had lost the Great War on the side of Germany. Peace conditions were proposed to reduce the Ottoman Empire to Turkish ethnic areas strictly applying the principle of ethno-national self-determination which had earlier been announced by US-President Wilson.<sup>20</sup> Turkey lost its Arab possessions and Armenia. It barely survived attempts to sever Constantinople from it. The Indian Muslims, or rather certain activists like the Ali brothers, Muhammad Ali (1878-1931) and Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), demanded the restoration of the temporal powers of the *Khalifa* which they saw as a pre-requisite to his function as the spiritual head of the Muslim *ummah*. This would have meant leaving all former Ottoman territories under Turkish rule, or at least control. They were particularly irked over the loss of control over the Arab peninsula, the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, as they called it. This removed control from the Sultan over the Holy Places of Islam in Mecca and Medina. Through various petitions and deputations to the Viceroy of India and to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George they tried to influence the course of events. Beginning in 1919, so-called Khilafat conferences started to coordinate political activity on this issue and quickly grew into a separate organization with provincial affiliations all over India which ran parallel to - and sometimes overlapped with - the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) and the Muslim League (founded in 1906), the two major political parties in India at the time. Many in India presumed the Khilafat movement was not only meant to defend the reign of the *Khalifa* but also directed *against* British rule over India. In Hindustani, it was translated as *khilāf*.<sup>21</sup> Soon it became the bedrock of the non-co-operation movement.<sup>22</sup>

The Ali brothers, who had been interned from May 1915 to December 1919 actively joined the campaign after their release.<sup>23</sup> The cause of Muslim Turkey

had remained close to their heart ever since they joined active politics in 1905-06. With the benefit of hindsight one could say that they correctly anticipated the demise of the Ottoman Empire through the Turco-Italian and Balkan wars, and through its entry into the Great War. This was the time when they feared the worst for Turkey. It induced them to take up pan-Islamism, for which Muhammad Ali gave a classical justification in his paper *Comrade* as early as 1911, the year when he started its publication from Calcutta,

'The progressive forces of modern civilization have no doubt produced a spirit of restlessness in the Mussalman population of the world. But this unrest is entirely the outcome of their consciousness about their intellectual and moral degradation. They want to reform their society, to grow in knowledge and self-respect and to enjoy all the amenities of an age of progress and freedom. Every Mussalman sympathizes with his brother Mussalman in this desire, be they as far apart as Morocco and China. Surely there is nothing dangerous and immoral in this aspiration.'<sup>24</sup>

In 1913 they founded an organisation with the object of preserving 'the sanctity of the sacred places from violation ... and safeguarding [them] from non-Moslem usurpation'<sup>25</sup>. It became known as the *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka'ba*, the Servants of Ka'ba Society, focusing on the central Muslim shrine of the sacred black stone in Mecca, the *Ka'ba*. In this organisation they were joined by prominent future Khilafatists like Abdul Bari of the Islamic seminary *Firangi Mahal* from Lucknow, Dr. Ansari and Mushir Husain Kidwai. It was from the remnants of this organisation that they started building the Khilafat conference network.

Beside the *Comrade*, the other 'subversive' Muslim paper of the time was started in 1912 under the title of *Al-Hilal* ('The Rising Crescent') and was edited by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The subscribers of both papers were carefully noticed by British intelligence and kept in the files of secret biographies as negative aspects of their political behaviour.<sup>26</sup> Both papers and the activists associated with them served as rallying points of radical Muslim public opinion before and during the World War I. They worked on the experiment of fusing traditional Muslim leadership and westernised Muslims on a profoundly theological and yet highly politicized ground which the status of Turkey and of the *Khalifa* for Indian Muslims proved to be.

### *Religious commandments*

Both, Qayyām al-Dīn Muḥammad 'Abd al-Bārī (1879-1926) and Abu'l-Kalām Muḥyī al-Dīn Aḥmad Āzād (1888-1958), turned into the pillars of the Khilafat movement and were in many ways instrumental in launching the *hijrat* campaign. Both were theologians who stood in the line of purist tradition started by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762).<sup>27</sup> For them, Islam was in a pitiful state. In order

to become a potent force again, Islam had to cleanse itself from all sorts of accretions by Hinduist and other 'alien' cultural influences on ritual and doctrine. Waliullah shared the need for a universal *khilafat* to defend Islam and to serve an exemplary role for other Muslim Monarchs. Opening up the possibility of *ijtihād* or the re-interpretation of Islamic law in the light of original sources, Waliullah demanded that Islam should return to the Holy Book and *hadith* through which everything else was to be explained cutting out the 'corrupting' influences of preachers and local saints who had flourished in south Asia within the Sufi culture. Waliullah made the Quran more accessible to non-Arabian Muslims. He translated it into Persian and his sons into Urdu.<sup>28</sup> Since 1919 Bari had vowed to create a unified body of *ulama* who were capable of representing a joint Muslim position on the *khilafat* despite their belonging to various schools of thought represented by the famous institutions of Muslim learning of India in Deoband, Bareilly, Badaun, Lucknow, and Aligarh. He succeeded in creating an organisation of *ulama* which later was to turn into a religious political party, the *Jamiyyat al-Ulama-e-Hind* (hereafter *JUH*) which was convened on 25 November 1919.<sup>29</sup>

Maulana Azad was interned from 1917 to 1919. Like the Ali brothers, he took up the challenge of the Khilafat issue when he was released.<sup>30</sup> His contribution was mainly conceptual. With his excellent formal religious education, he was inclined to argue every issue in a systematic theological way, scrupulously unearthing arguments from the *Quran* and the *hadith*, supporting one or the other course of action in political affairs. His speech at the Calcutta Khilafat Conference on 28-29 February 1920 summarised arguments for the theological interpretation of the Khilafat movement in a classical manner. His treatise *Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jazirat al-Arab*<sup>31</sup> (The Khilafat issue and the Holy Places of Islam [usually called the *Jazirat al-Arab* after their location on the Arabian Peninsula]) was the major Islamic document summarising the views of Indian Muslims on the *khilafat*.

Azad considered temporal powers for the *Khalifa* as absolutely essential since the *Khalifa's* task was to organise and lead the Muslim *ummah* on the right path, to establish justice, to bring about peace and to spread God's word in the world. In this he differed significantly not only from representative of Arabian Islam but also from classical theoreticians of the *khilafat* who had acknowledged the lack of temporal powers in the office of *Khalifa*. To Azad, the *khilafat* was a symbol of the unity of Islam which was promoted through congregational prayers, pilgrimage and institutions like the *khilafat*. He associated the Shias with the need for a *Khalifa* or Imam by assuming that both agreed on the need to obey him while they differed on the method of selection. The *khilafat* should be defended by *jihad* though that would not necessarily mean violence. He attacked the British for granting one kind of religious freedom like prayers and pilgrimage and denying another, to him even more important kind, like the temporal power of the *Khalifa*, his control over the

Holy Places of Islam. He distinguished between non-Muslims who like the British invaded Muslim lands and threatened the Muslim religion and those who like the Hindus lived in peace with Muslims. Azad suggested to the Indian Muslims to select an Imam of their own to unite and guide them in this ardent struggle.<sup>32</sup> For this position, he had himself in mind. However, when he faced opposition on this account, he dropped the pursuit of this aim.

Certain passages of the Quran were quoted in corroboration of this approach. They were repeated in Shaikat Ali's statement on behalf of the Central Khilafat Committee in August 1920 when he wanted to clarify the position of the committee *vis-à-vis* the *hijrat*. In support of co-operation with Hindus, the following verses were quoted:

'Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves the doers of justice.'<sup>33</sup>

To justify opposition to the British on religious grounds, he referred to another verse:

'Allah only forbids you respecting those who made war upon you on account of (your) religion, and drove you forth from your homes and backed up (others) in your expulsion, that you make friends with them and whoever makes friends with them, these are unjust.'<sup>34</sup>

And he concluded with the usual moral outcry:

'O, You who believe! do not take My enemy and your enemy for friends: would you offer them love?'<sup>35</sup>

In a similar vein, Ansari, in December 1920, quoted the *Sura-i Mumtahanah* (60: 8-9) from the Quran to argue that Indian Muslims should behave 'righteously, affectionately and in a friendly manner towards all those non-Muslims who are neither at war with Muslims nor are they assailants intending to invade or occupy their territories'<sup>36</sup>.

These Quranic references had a profound impact on Muslim audiences. People felt compelled to join in non-co-operation under the sway of religious arguments which effectively silenced opposition to *hijrat*. In his diary of 24 October 1920, Dr. Mohammad Shafi, a prominent Muslim politician from Lahore, noted a telling description of a meeting of local Muslim leaders which was convened at the Islamia College to pass a resolution of non-co-operation, to stop government grants to the local college and demand its disaffiliation from the government-founded university. The Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Gandhi had arrived to press for the meeting. Muhammad Ali made a speech and Azad delivered a sermon quoting references from the Quran, apparently similar to the ones mentioned above. He asserted that 'in the face of that (Quranic) text, no Mohammadan could co-operate with British Government.'

The meeting finally adopted the required non-co-operation resolution. Shafi quoted participants saying that 'in the presence of the *fatwa* based on text of *Quran* nothing could be said by any one'. To make sure that matters went right, student supporters of Muhammad Ali had arrived in great strength, acting as strong-voiced pressure group.<sup>37</sup>

### *Gandhi joins hands*

All four, the Ali brothers, Bari, and Azad, closely cooperated in the Khilafat movement with Gandhi, though their motives differed sharply.

After his experience with the method of non-co-operation in South Africa, the Khilafat/non-co-operation movement was the first large mass campaign led by Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) against British rule in India. He found the issue ideal for forging a unity of action among Hindus and Muslims where the latter constituted about 20 per cent of the population. His idea was not to confront the British militarily but to challenge them on a civic ground.<sup>38</sup> The Indian people were to make an example of the doubtful advantages of India's association with Britain. The British had so far argued that all they were doing was to the best of their Indian fellow-subjects of the Crown, slowly but steadily 'civilising' their country. A gradual association with government was the laurel held out for subservient behaviour.<sup>39</sup> Gandhi's movement envisaged the isolation of the British, to show them how fragile and precarious their position in India was. The keyword was boycott. It had earlier been successfully tried in the campaign to undo the partition of the province of Bengal 1905-1911 when Indians refused to buy English wares and preferred Indian-made, *swadeshi* goods. This time, a four-fold boycott was envisaged, social, educational, legal and economic, aimed at law courts, government-owned or -affiliated schools and colleges, the new legislative assemblies at the centre and in the provinces, which had been established according to the constitutional reform of the Government of India Act 1919, at honours, titles and official functions, and at British goods.

Though basically conceived to be achieved through persuasion it was clear that this movement heavily relied on mass pressure. Prominent amongst them was the *hartal*, a kind of strike when shops refused to open and tools were put down. Traders who were more interested in money than in the distant and intangible benefit of self-government often had to be convinced by strong-arm tactics to close their shops. For this and similar jobs, volunteer corps were essential which were trained in civil disobedience tactics, i.e. self-defence without fire arms, confronting the military and the police voluntarily, called 'courting arrest'. They were highly motivated ideologically by patriotic education which was broadly nationalist but differentiated into Hindu-nationalist and Muslim-nationalist and some ethnic variations, according to the cultural back-

ground. The *satyagraha*, as the peaceful demonstration of boycott was called, had first been tried on a massive scale a year earlier in connection with the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill. It led to violent scenes and the massacre in Amritsar's *Jallianwali Bag*. Since Amritsar was in the province of Punjab, these incidents and the much-criticised Hunter Commission Report of 1920 which was supposed to have inquired into the conduct of the civil and military authorities during these disturbances, were sometimes also called the 'Punjab wrongs'. Together with the Khilafat question, these were the 'three wrongs' which caught the imagination of the masses.

At first, Gandhi had been reluctant to engage himself again in direct action against the colonial power since he doubted that it would be possible to control the masses but was afraid to miss the momentum of Hindu-Muslim co-operation. The Muslim activists demanded strong measures and pushed Gandhi into action. Direct action in the name of the *khilafat* started much earlier than the official begin of non-co-operation on 1 August 1920. The Khilafat days on 17 October 1919 and on 19 March 1920, when *hartals* enforced a close-down of public life in most places, were a huge success.

The Muslim leadership was thus tightly bound into civil mass action against the British. But the support of Muslim leaders remained conditional. If the non-co-operation program was not approved by Congress and put into action, they threatened to proceed on their own. They also retained their own line of argument, as far as the link between the Khilafat movement and non-co-operation was concerned. Gandhi repeatedly faced the dilemma to defend his position simultaneously against the Muslim leaders and Hindu activists in his Congress Party. While Muslim leaders favoured much more speedy and radical action, Hindu politicians from the Congress Party like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya preferred a more gradual approach. They had not forgotten that the last mass campaign against the partition of Bengal, though finally successful, did not succeed in bringing the business of government to a standstill. Other Congress politicians found the focus on the Khilafat and the 'Punjab wrongs' diversionary. In his concluding speech on 9 September 1920, Lala Lajpat Rai, the President of the special Calcutta session of Congress reminded his audience that 'whatever might happen to the Khilafat question, whatever might happen to the Punjab wrongs, what they wanted was complete responsible government'. He demanded that 'in everything they did [they should] give the first place for Swaraj or complete self-government'<sup>40</sup>.

Yet Gandhi knew that *swarajya*, his cherished dream of Indian independence, would not be possible without Muslim association. Gandhi believed he needed to support the Muslim desire to present the whole issue as a religious affair. He insisted that it was only possible to keep the Muslims in the mainstream of the movement through major concession to them. However, the nationalist and the Muslim lines of argument repeatedly clashed. Gandhi, for instance, knew too well that in demanding national freedom for India he could

ill-oppose Arab and Armenian demands for independence from the Turkish Sultan. He therefore suggested:

'Let there be all the necessary guarantees taken from Turkey about the internal independence of the Arabs. But to remove that suzerainty, to deprive the *Khalif* of the wardenship of the Holy Places, is to render *Khilafat* a mockery which no Mohammedan can possibly look upon with equanimity.'<sup>41</sup>

The *Khilafatists* themselves were hard-put to explain why they, who had joined the nationalist movement, resisted sovereignty for the Arabs. Muhammad Ali, in an interview with the Prime Minister Lloyd George in England on 17 March 1920, naively hoped they could 'reconcile' the Arabs with the *Khalifa*.<sup>42</sup> He believed that Emir Feisal, 'when he looks upon the matter from the point of view of a Muslim, as he is bound to do, will realise that his own personal ambitions, and even the ambitions of the Arabs, can be entirely satisfied within the scheme of Turkish sovereignty'<sup>43</sup>. The *Khilafatists* faced similar difficulty in explaining away the massacre of the Armenians perpetrated by the Turks during and after the War.

In a way, it was a case of political autism where the Indian Muslim leaders would not want to hear or listen to any argument other than their religious commandments - as they understood them. The temporal powers of the *Khalifa* which were taken away by the peace settlement seemed to them so essential since it was the only extra-regional source of political power to which Indian Muslims believed they had access, or at least a claim.

Gandhi particularly pressed the issue of the breach of faith, of broken promises by British politicians. In his article 'Pledges Broken,' which appeared in *Young India* on 19 May 1920, he was echoing sentiments of prominent Muslim leaders like Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928), a former High Court Judge.<sup>44</sup> The British Prime Minister Lloyd George had pledged on 5 January 1918 that Britain was not fighting 'to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race'<sup>45</sup>. This was a carefully worded statement. What Lloyd George meant was that he did not mind to deprive Turkey of the non-Turkish districts of Asia Minor and Thrace. When the Turkish peace terms became known in India through a communique of the Indian Government on 15 May 1920 after they had been communicated to Turkey on 11 May, the *Khilafatists* lamented they were a rude shock to the public. Although according to the peace terms, not much of Asia Minor and Thrace was left with Turkey, Britain apparently took refuge in the fact that the ethnic Turkish heartland still belonged to Turkey. On 26 February 1920, Lloyd George defended the pledge in the House of Commons, conceding that it had been formulated deliberately vague to reap maximum political benefit from it in India:

'The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting went up appreciably from that very moment. They were not all Mohammedans but there were many Mohammedans among them... They are disturbed by the prospect of our not abiding by it.'<sup>46</sup>

Lloyd George's sudden readiness to abide by the pledge was now aimed at the status of Constantinople. Gandhi must have known that the pledge of January 1918 was never intended to secure anything for Turkey beyond ethnic Turkish areas. This in itself was a correction of earlier British policy. When the War was at its height, Britain had joined the allies in demanding Turkey's expulsion from Europe which would have meant to deprive it of Constantinople.<sup>47</sup>

A similar confusion surrounded an earlier British pledge of 2 November, 1914. The Viceroy was then authorised to guarantee in public that in the coming war between Britain and Turkey the Holy Places of Arabia, including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia, and the port of Jeddah 'will be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces'<sup>48</sup>. While Britain later maintained this only applied to Mecca and Medina which were never occupied in the formal sense, the Indian Khilafatists held that through its operations in Mesopotamia the British temporarily occupied Muslim shrines there. Also, the port of Jeddah was apparently bombarded by British warships.<sup>49</sup> The double meaning of this pledge was fully utilized by the organisers of the coming *hijrat* campaign. While maintaining that Britain had occupied the Holy Places of Islam they knew full well that most of the *muhajirin* believed that it was Mecca and Medina which had been occupied, though they were not.

### *The Khilafatists stick to their argument*

But Indian Muslims did not go into the niceties of diplomatic squabbles. They were more likely to side with Gandhi's argument. After the peace terms were published, they, as Afzal Iqbal put it, 'felt so thoroughly ashamed of themselves'<sup>50</sup>. They had fought shoulder to shoulder in the British Indian army with British and Australian soldiers against their Turkish co-religionists in the Dardanelles campaign, in the battlefields of Syria and Mesopotamia. They had joined the Christian powers to fight against Muslims and had not received any reward for that, neither any degree of self-government for India nor any particular advancement in the status of the Muslim community.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the Khilafatists tried to maintain their independent line of reasoning. This was clearly shown in the coverage of the Muslim press. The above-mentioned *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* took special care to collect the news-bits from the Muslim press that supported the Khilafatist view. One concern was how England could be forced to accept the demands of the Khilafatists and how could the evasive arguments of British politicians be countered. England, for instance, excused itself that it could not influence the

decisions of the allied powers on its own since it was only one of many negotiating sides. At the Bombay Khilafat meeting on 15-17 February 1920, Ghulam Mohammad, the President of the gathering argued 'that England alone fought in [Arab Iraq]. If she restores the territory to the Turks other kingdoms will also give up their claims'<sup>51</sup>.

Realising the fears which the Bolsheviks instilled in British hearts, the Khilafatists loved to point to the political vacuum which would allegedly be created by the implosion of the Ottoman Empire:

'The Bolsheviks will derive advantage from the perplexity of the Muhammadans. The only remedy to evade the Bolshevik danger is to make peace with Turkey in accordance with our desires, otherwise all the Muhammadans will join with the Bolshevik.'<sup>52</sup>

Another favourite anti-British argument was the assumed Christian bias in England against Islam, the *khilafat* and the *Khalifa*. In support of this thesis, moves were quoted to expel the Sultan from Constantinople, to restore the Christian character of Constantinople, and to reconvert the Hagia Sophia into a Church. Inconsistencies in the English argumentation were pointed out. On the one hand, the British Premier Lloyd George had told the Khilafat delegation in London that Islamic Turkey was not treated any differently from the Christian Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, Indian Muslims noted with marked disquiet the tribute paid to General Allenby, the British Commander of the operation that brought final defeat to Turkey. He was praised for concluding a centuries-old battle and for the fact that it was a Britisher who had put the final seal on the history of Ottoman-Muslim power.<sup>53</sup> They feared that the Sultan was to be reduced to the position of the Pope in Rome to make it easier to control him or to prevent the Turkish government from inflicting harm on Christians as in the Armenian massacres.<sup>54</sup>

Matters came to a head at the Allahabad Khilafat Conference on 1-2 June 1920. Heated exchanges were taking place between advocates and opponents of non-co-operation on the issue of the Khilafat. Controversial arguments were exchanged in the Hindu-Muslim meeting during the Conference. Finally, non-co-operation was adopted as the method of political struggle. Muslim politics, supported by Gandhi, had gone ahead of Congress which had not yet taken a binding decision.

Gandhi forwarded the decision of the Allahabad meeting to the British Viceroy with the demand to resign in protest against the Turkish peace terms failing which non-co-operation would be initiated on 1 August 1920.<sup>55</sup> Thus the Turkish peace terms had become the immediate pretext for the non-co-operation campaign. Muslim and nationalist politics had converged, but they were far from identical.

## Afghan ambitions

One more incident marred the Allahabad Conference. In the heat of the debate, when radical Muslim politicians grew impatient with those who were hesitant to support the movement, one Hasrat Mohani, a Khilafat conference delegate, sparked a huge controversy when he vowed to join any Afghan army that might invade India to drive out the British.<sup>56</sup> This was indicative of the contradictory attitude which marked the perception of the Afghan factor in Indian political life.

### *Would the Afghans invade India?*

The Afghan factor had become intrinsically interwoven with the Khilafat movement and was about to play a key role in the *hijrat* affair. Modern political life in India had not removed the almost primordial fear of the Hindu population from the plains of the Afghan hordes charging down the Khaiber and robbing them of all their belongings. The ambiguous attitude of the Afghan Amir had contributed to this fear. Rumours were current that Indian Muslims wanted to make common cause with the Afghans. In its manifesto, the Central Khilafat Committee found it necessary to formally dissociate itself from these rumours:

In serving their religion they wish to keep the *khilafat* intact... But they do not desire to oust England and introduce a Muhammadan or any other power to rule over India ... the Mussalmans of India will fight to the last man in resisting any Mussalman power that may have designs on India.<sup>57</sup>

But the 'Afghan threat' had become a useful political ploy which no one was averse to exploiting for his own ends. When Gandhi reported on the Allahabad Conference in his journal *Young India* he referred tongue-in-cheek to the Afghan issue,

'The Mohammedan speakers gave the fullest and frankest assurances that they would fight to a man any invader who wanted to conquer India but they were equally frank in asserting that any invasion from without undertaken with a view to uphold the prestige of Islam and to indicate justice would have their full sympathy if not their actual support.'<sup>58</sup>

The issue continued to haunt the Indian national movement. One of the most radical statements on this issue was made as late as 1925 by the Muslim politician Dr. Kitchlew. When a quarrel with Hindu Congress leaders over the Islamic revivalist movement Tanzim arose he threatened,

'If you put obstacles in the path of our Tanzim movement, and do not give us our rights, we shall make common cause with Afghanistan or some other Mussalman power and establish our rule in the country.'<sup>59</sup>

*Amanullah: establishing authority*

References to the threat of an Afghan invasion alluded to the grumblings of the young King of Afghanistan, Amir Amanullah Khan (1890-1939).<sup>60</sup> He had been engaged in a drawn-out tug-of-war with the British ever since he came to power in February 1919. In the night of 19-20 February, his father, Habibullah Khan (1869-1919) had been assassinated. After removing Nasrullah Khan, another pretender to the throne, he established his authority as heir to the crown. His ambitions were far-reaching. Not only did he want to reform and modernise Afghan society and administration, he also sought a new place for his country in the rapidly changing international environment and towards the new power equation in the region that had emerged after the ascendance of the Bolsheviks as an important regional player. Until then Afghanistan had been under the suzerainty of Britain and not free in its conduct of foreign relations over which the Government of British India exercised control.

Proceeding in the established Afghan tradition of bargaining with contending bidders, Amanullah tried to set one against the other. In order to force the British to accept Afghan independence he simultaneously played the Russian, the Central Asian, the Indian Muslim and the Pakhtun tribal card. Finally he succeeded in getting new treaties from both Russia and Britain in 1921, laying the foundation for a new, national and independent Afghanistan. However, when he started his forays into the British political domain it was difficult to see him succeed. He had no plan of action nor a realistic assessment of the situation both in the region and in Afghanistan. He only had his strong determination to change the course of his country.<sup>61</sup>

Most observers agree that it was his volatile position inside Afghanistan which tempted him to venture into another war with Britain in May-June 1919. The report of the Afghan post-master in Peshawar, the major city in the Pakhtun area of British India, about an imminent revolt and widespread local support for an Afghan incursion led him to believe that military action could be more successful this time. The British also chose to describe the third Afghan War as diversionary from Amanullah's internal difficulties.<sup>62</sup> This was much to be preferred by the British as an official explanation, although they knew full well that the root cause of the conflict was deeper. All the new Amir desired was a revision of the treaty relations which Britain was reluctant to grant him. Already on his accession to the throne Amanullah announced at the inaugural court reception, or Durbar,

... I have declared myself and my country entirely free, autonomous and independent both internally and externally. My country will hereafter be as independent a state as the other states and powers of the world are. No foreign power will be allowed to have a hairs-breadth of right to interfere internally and externally with the affairs of Afghanistan, and if any ever does I am ready to cut its throat with this sword.<sup>63</sup>

Conditions which the British home government and the British Indian government wanted to impose on the new Amir after his defeat in 1919 were harsh. Using his influence in the tribal areas on the Indian side, Amanullah succeeded in avoiding a final settlement unfavourable to him. A peace treaty was signed on 8 August 1919 which was to be followed by a six-months period in which the Amir should prove himself worthy of a new friendship treaty that would also resume the subsidy which was traditionally paid to the Afghan Amirs but was suspended after the third war. Formal peace negotiations should follow after this period.<sup>64</sup>

The Amir refused to budge under British pressure and started actively courting the Bolsheviks for a treaty that could offset British intransigence. Professing friendship with the Bolsheviks did not prevent him from simultaneously probing the ground in Central Asia. Defiantly he insisted on his right to deal with the Pakhtun tribes of the independent territories directly and not through the British.

These moves were supplemented by intensified anti-British propaganda, guided by the *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* and the *Amman-i-Afghan*. The Bolshevik factor played the dominant role in this game. The king rightly assumed that this was one of the few extra-regional issues which could induce the British to make concessions to Afghanistan.<sup>65</sup>

Also the German factor was kept in reserve. A decidedly pro-German attitude could be discerned from the uncritical, almost eulogizing coverage of World War I by the two Afghan propaganda papers - well noticed by British intelligence.<sup>66</sup>

News on the Irish situation were given a disproportionately large share of coverage in these Afghan papers picking up arguments of Indian nationalists who had often before pointed out the similarities in the courses of the Irish nationalists and the Indians.

High on the agenda was the British attitude towards Turkey. But reports on the Turkish situation reflected the common confusion about the *khilafat* and the nature of Turkish politics. Leaders of the Young Turks like Mustapha Kemal and Enver Pasha were repeatedly feted as new Islamic heroes without realising that it was not so much Islam which they had at heart than a nationalist and secularist Turkey. To the great dismay of Indian Muslims and the Afghans, Mustapha Kemal himself abolished the *khilafat* in Turkey on 5 March 1924.<sup>67</sup>

When he saw unrest growing in India by the end of 1919, Amanullah must have decided to become more daring. In the beginning of 1920 the Afghans made several parallel moves that were designed to gain a lever on the situation in the Frontier Province of British India. For this purpose, two causes suggested themselves, common ethnic bonds with the Pakhtun tribes on the Indian side and religious connections with Indian Muslims in the spirit of pan-Islamism.

### *Pan-Pakhtun unity and self-determination*

The new Afghanistan had little choice but to build its nation around the core Pakhtun identity. Yet, this institutionalised a permanent claim on Pakhtun areas beyond Afghan borders. More than half of the Pakhtun tribes lived on the Indian side, separated by the *Durand* line, the border on which Afghanistan and Britain agreed in 1893. Afghanistan had not forgotten that over the last decades Britain had nibbled away at Afghanistan's Pakhtun territories. And Afghan rulers had long set an eye on the coveted Pakhtun city of Peshawar. Furthermore, Amanullah was inspired by the principles of self-determination enunciated by Wilson.

For the British, self-determination had become nightmare. It was a high moral ground on which the Amir was much closer to Russia and the US than to Britain. In fact, Britain must have perceived the Wilson doctrine as a challenge to its Empire. The official report *India in 1920* argued, 'The increased interest in political agitation caused in recent years by the Home Rule movement had received a great impetus from the new doctrine of self-determination'<sup>68</sup>. On 23 June 1920, at the Mussoorie conference<sup>69</sup> with Afghanistan, Dobbis, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, openly acknowledged that if Britain admitted self-determination it would mean the end of the Empire. To deflect from Afghanistan's demands for control over the independent tribes and for an independent, equal international status, he remarked that, although more Pakhtuns lived under British control than in Afghanistan, the (British) Government of India was making no demands on Afghanistan.<sup>70</sup> Realistic British representatives like Denys Bray, the previous Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, sensed in early 1919, before Amanullah came to power, that it would be difficult to keep Afghanistan in the traditional dependent relationship after the end of the war. It would be more beneficial for Britain if Afghanistan turned to it in friendship rather than having to force it into subservience.<sup>71</sup> However, on the intervention of Lond, his views were not accepted at the time.

To lend substance to the Afghan claim on Indian Pakhtuns, Amanullah first had to unify the disparate tribes on the Afghan side, restore civil order and cohesion of Afghan society shattered after the last war with Britain.

At the same time, the Amir was keeping the independent Pakhtun tribes on the Indian side agitated and in a state of combat preparedness. For this, he used the traditional system of subsidies which the independent tribes were drawing from Afghanistan and, incidentally, often from British India, too.

The Afghan War Minister, General Nadir Khan, was very active in those days. On the Indian side, the tribes were encouraged not to return weapons which deserters from the tribal police forces had taken with them.<sup>72</sup> The British made it a point to recover every single rifle in order to teach the tribes a lesson and to check raiding which had become difficult to deal with. Pakhtun tribes from independent territories made it a habit to raid the plains of the Peshawar valley, occasionally abducting Hindu merchants, or their relatives, often their children to take them hostage for ransom money. They took advantage of the ambiguous legal status of the tribal belt where they took refuge and where enforcement of law was difficult or impossible. For guns not recovered the British would hand down heavy summary penalties on the defaulting tribes.

By holding out to the tribes the perspective that Afghanistan might resume control over the independent territories, Nadir Khan was trying to shore up allegiances among them. The reasoning was that the transborder tribes could ill-afford to alienate the Amir if in due course he was becoming their permanent master. Apparently, the Afghan side went so far as to canvass signatures from tribal representatives on a petition asking to come under the Amir's rule.<sup>73</sup> The six-month ceasefire to them was presented as a temporary arrangement while the tribes should keep their powder dry.

On 31 January 1920, Nadir Khan paraded the military muscle of the tribes at a ceremony at Hadda in Afghanistan which was remarkable in more than one way. The meeting was extensively reported in the Afghan propaganda press.<sup>74</sup> Nadir had called representatives of the Afridis, the Mohmands, the Shinwaris and other tribes from Ningrahar to whom black standards were distributed embroidered with a white mosque and an Arabic inscription in white letters. 'Nadir Khan made a speech to the effect that the standards had been blessed at the shrine of Sakhi Sahib at Mazar-i-Sharif... The white mosque was an emblem of unity and all were ordered to lay aside their differences and present a united front.' He told them about the coming peace conference. 'If the British Government accedes to the Amir's demands there will be peace to all Islam but if these demands are refused there will be war, and the assembly must be prepared to take part. In the event of war the tribesmen were to attack and regular troops would reinforce them at suitable points.' To substantiate the threat the tribesmen were informed that the Amir had just received four aeroplanes, and 300,000 soldiers were crossing the Oxus and coming to his assistance. Every soldier was exhorted to contribute one month's pay to the cost of the aeroplanes. The recipients of the flags were instructed to 'keep them carefully and not to unfurl them unless there was war'<sup>75</sup>.

A major aspect of the Hadda meeting was the drive for pan-Pakhtun unity across the Afghan-Indian border. The meeting was ostentatiously held on the eve of the expected resumption of peace negotiations since the six-months period would have expired on 8 February 1920.<sup>76</sup> The meeting was held at the shrine of Hada Sharif giving it a distinctly Islamic colour, emphasising the Islamic and, therefore, 'holy' nature of the state of Afghanistan and the reign of Amir Amanullah. The meeting was called 'The Union gathering of Tribes', spelling out the policy objective of uniting all Pakhtun tribes. The British Intelligence Diary anxiously noted that the title of the meeting laid claim to representation of the tribes under control of the Government of India as well.<sup>77</sup> Its policy objective was described in Afghan publications as forging unity among the Afghan [!] tribes. From the reports in the *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* the Intelligence Diary summarized the pan-ethnic connotation of the meeting:

'The Frontier tribes are one with the Afghans in race, religion and customs and there is no reason why they should remain under the control of strangers.'<sup>78</sup>

When negotiations finally started at Mussoorie, it was on their status that Afghan attention focused. Petitions from transborder tribal representatives to the Amir were elicited and circulated, stressing they were 'naturally a part of Afghanistan', particularly after the War when the question of nationality had assumed such great importance. The *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* gave well-meaning editorial advice to the British to pay due heed to such petitions,

'We expect that our just-minded neighbours will dress up the wounds of our care-worn frontier brothers. If the British Government gave proofs of its friendship with Afghanistan it would know how carefully Afghanistan guards her interests and how readily (it) offers any kind of necessary help.'<sup>79</sup>

The implied threat was that Afghanistan might after all be ready to come to the aid of any unrest in British India if it dealt with tribal Pakhtun or Muslim interests which was so close to Afghanistan's heart. An important element of pan-ethnic unity was harmony. Special efforts were undertaken to settle differences among warring factions of the Frontier tribes. Obviously, the Afghan leadership understood, that if at all it were to mount a serious challenge to the British hold over the tribal territory, the appearance of tribal unity was essential. The newspaper *Aman* of 4 February 1920 described such a conflict between the Shinwari tribe on the Afghan side and the Afridi tribe under British Indian control. The Afridis were going home after plundering Jalalabad, the Shinwaris waylaid them, killed a few of their men and snatched away 52 of their rifles. Thus an old enmity was rekindled. It was only at a joint *jirga*, a meeting of tribal elders of both the tribes, which took place under the pressure of the Amir's representatives, that they were reconciled.<sup>80</sup>

Local luminaries were commissioned by the Afghans to sort out differences on the spot. The Haji of Turangzai (1885-1938?) whom the British regarded as a notorious 'trouble maker' was charged with acting as an intermediary for Kabul with the Mohmands.<sup>81</sup>

'On the 2nd of March 1920, Haji Sahib Turangzai gathered the tribes of the Mohmands at Naqi in Gundab and Mullah Sahib Babra held a meeting of the tribes of Bajaur at Charmang and explained to them the miserable plight of the *khilafat*. It was also decided that a *jirga* of the Mohmands including the son of Haji Sahib should go to the Afridis so that the latter may unite with the Mohmands.'<sup>82</sup>

The *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* No. 5 of 13th March 1920 gave a more detailed account of the Mohmand meeting:

'The meeting held at Charmang consisted of the Maliks of Salarzai, Mahmud Khurd, Mahmud Kalan and Utmanzais. Mullah Sahib Babra exhorted the people to be ready to serve their religion. The audience pledged that they would desist from personal and mutual quarrels and will hold themselves in readiness to serve their religion.

The meeting and Jirga held at Naqi was very grand and successful. The representatives of the tribes of Safi, Gurbaz, Turkzai, Halimzai and Khwaezai, etc. were present.

Haji Sahib Turangzai, bare-footed and bare-headed, with the Holy Quran on his head, came into the meeting and delivered an exceedingly touching speech delineating the sad plight of Islam and the *khilafat*. His words were so impressive that tears welled out from the eyes of the audience and he concluded by saying "Oh, you, the sons of brave and dauntless Afghans, the Holy Places and the *khilafat islamia* (are) in danger, the whole Muslim world is in a state of confusion. Even the Hindus are restless about it. For God's sake shave off this negligence and lethargy, the time is up. If you will not wake up now the name of Islam will vanish from the world (God forbid). Learn lessons from your Indian brethren who are ready to lay down their lives in the cause of religion, notwithstanding their helplessness. It is shameful for you, who are renowned all the world over for your bravery and possess arms, to sit idle."

The audiences took oaths and pledged themselves to leave nothing undone in the service of their religion. The Mohmands sent a deputation to the Afridis and Orakzais to ask them to be ready for the service of their religion and co-operate with them at the moment of need.<sup>83</sup>

### *Keeping the powder dry*

Order, military discipline and defence preparedness were further essentials of Pakhtun unity if the Afghans were to make an impression on the British. The *Aman-i-Afghan* lauded Nadir Khan for restoring order and tranquillity in

eastern Afghanistan. When he came to Jalalabad which was destroyed and where the Amir's palace was plundered he reorganised the army and saw to the suppression of local banditry. He went after the main scoundrel, one Saifullah Khan, who was captured and 'blown from the gun' with many others to follow.<sup>84</sup>

The *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* No. 6 of 15 March 1920 reported that now the eastern tribes fully contributed to the military built-up,

'The Mohmands of Afghanistan and its frontiers, with other tribesmen, have been holding the trenches of Gardi, Hazar Nao and Basul for six long months against the British. They served Islam very diligently under the burning sun at Jalalabad. Some of them died by sun stroke, but this fact did not discourage the rest. They fought with their own weapons and ammunition, and lived upon their own private rations. Bread, with all other necessary eatables, even onions, were carried to the *Mujahidin* from Kama, Behsud, Kunar and Lamqan by means of rafts. The Malikis and the Mullahs did their (? utmost) in raising troops and affecting them with fanatic ardour... Underground trenches for guns and ammunitions and roofed trenches which can accommodate above 20,000 men have also been prepared near Dakka in four line of defence.'

Other tribesmen rendered auxiliary services for the military like transporting fuel, corn which, it was stressed, they did 'voluntarily' or 'without accepting even a single pie in return'<sup>85</sup>.

Talk of imminent war persisted at various places. General Wakil Khan held a Durbar at Birkot on the 31st March, at which all local troops and the elders and Malikis of the neighbourhood were present. He announced that the *Amir* would contemplate  *Jihad*  which was expected to begin about the end of April or early May, and 'exhorted all to be faithful unto death'<sup>86</sup>. However, the fervent preparations for war and the frequent announcements of imminent fighting do not seem to reflect so much the desire for action as fear and insecurity on the part of the Afghans. They found the bogey of religious war convenient to threaten the British with against whose superior forces they had little else to deploy. They also needed to control the tribes in the independent territory whose allegiance was shaky and temporary at best. They were thus treading a thin line between peace and war which at times almost became almost indistinct. One Afghan official was unwittingly candid when he sent a message to the small tribe of the Kharotis encamped in the Derajat, 'reassuring them that the Amir had no intention at present of going to war with the British, and that the excitement among the border tribes was started intentionally with the object of insuring the support of the tribes in the event of hostilities and to guard against the possibility of the tribes joining the British in an attack on Afghanistan'<sup>87</sup>.

### *Taking up the Muslim cause*

Besides Pakhtun unity, pan-Islamic ambitions were the other major plank of the Afghan campaign to enhance its status *vis-a-vis* Britain. The facets of the Amir's pan-Islamism were numerous. Three major directions could be discerned: they were (1) aimed at Indian Muslims, (2) at Afghanistan's position in the Muslim world, the *ummah*, and (3) at Central Asia. It is not difficult to see that crude *realpolitik* was behind these considerations. Afghanistan, like other regional contenders, dreamed of filling the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Regarding the Frontier Province, Afghanistan had always been a convenient *hinterland* for Indian nationalists and Muslim activists. They found ready shelter in Afghanistan whenever they met with trouble in British India. People whom the British called out-laws, among them quite a few radical Mullahs, acted as go-between for Afghanistan and the tribes on independent territory. The more famous among them were the Haji of Turangzai, the Sandaki Baba and Haji Abdul Razaq from Waziristan. They mainly acted as individuals but sometimes also in concert with local movements like the 'Hindustani fanatics', also called the *mujahidin*, who sustained a sporadic but steady local insurgency. The latter continued the tradition of the nineteenth-century *Wahhabites* who were fighting under Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of Rai Bareilly (1786-1831), first against the Sikhs and then against the British. They had set up a colony of up to 800 members in the Frontier Province near Smasta in the Buner area in which they sought to practice their ideal of a perfect religious and social community. A second, smaller colony was organised at Chamarkand, in Bajaur near the Indo-Afghan border (see the maps on pages 6 and 7). The colony was the base for training their cadres who were involved in attacks against the British at various times. Their Amir or chief Nimatullah (-1921) entered into a secret deal with the British in 1917 in exchange for a piece of land and a small pension. Despite the settlement they were still a headache for the British during the period under review as the Amir could not openly follow his pro-British course in the wake of unrest in India.<sup>88</sup>

On 18 December 1915 Indian revolutionaries established a 'Provisional Government' in Kabul which was meant to rule over a socialist 'Republic of India'. They had appointed Mahendra Pratap (b. 1886) as 'President', Maulvi Barkatullah (1870-1928) as 'Prime Minister', and Obeidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) as 'Administrative and Foreign Minister' of the 'Provisional Government'. They mainly acted from Afghanistan. The 'Provisional Government' supplied Indian militants with propaganda material, bombs and arms.<sup>89</sup> In India its influence was largely limited to the Frontier Province. During 1920 it succeeded to establish control over the local administration in some places of the Mansehra Sub-division until its leaders were arrested.<sup>90</sup> Though this group was primarily inspired by nationalist, anti-British motives, pan-Islamic overtones of Socialist

orientation could also be heard. Barkatullah (1870-1928) had written a pamphlet on 'Bolshevism and Islam', explaining Marxist Socialism as a return to the concept of the *bait al-mal*, the common treasury for the community.<sup>91</sup> Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) simultaneously was involved in local Islamic resistance, but also in reformist and educational activities.

Of much more value to the Afghans than these pin-pricks of localised opposition was the broadly-based religious and political movement in defence of the *khilafat*. This issue seemed useful to strengthen the Afghan position both in the Muslim world and *vis-à-vis* India. Right from the beginning of his reign Amanullah took the posture of a true Islamic ruler, both grieved about British policies against Turkey and the plight of Muslims in India. Pan-Islamic ideals were revived which tallied well with Amanullah's intentions to play a key role in the restructuring of a region in which Islamic states predominated. Afghanistan arrogated to itself a kind of wardenship for all Muslims in India. One could even read into the Amir's statements dormant intentions of taking on the mantle of *khilafat* which Turkey no longer could carry. The symbols used at the above-mentioned Hadda ceremony of handing out banners to the tribes was very telling in this respect. Using the white mosque as a symbol of unity and charging them with the task of upholding peace to 'all Islam,' they were depicted as Islamic warriors waging *jihād* not for a limited purpose but for the well-being of all Islam. In January 1920, British intelligence reports noted with anxiety that a *khutba*, or prayer, preaching the cause of pan-Islamism, had by the orders of the Amir been read in Persian in the name of other Muhammadan rulers as well as in the name of the Amir.<sup>92</sup> The implication of this subtle demonstration was that he was ready to act as a kind of spokesman for other Muslim rulers, a prelude to the position of *Khalifa*.<sup>93</sup>

Earlier, on 20 December 1919, by his presence at a prayer at the *Juma Masjid* in Kabul, the Amir had lent his support to the calls of the Mullah of Kabul city to the Muhammadans to defend their faith in the wake of the occupation of the Holy Places of Islam in the course of the War against the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.<sup>94</sup>

Other pointed gestures in support of the Khilafat movement were to follow. The Hadda meeting of the tribes, mentioned above, equally focused on the Khilafat issue. The Khilafat aspect of the meeting and the Afghan position were neatly summarised by the British Intelligence Diary: 'If the heart of the *khilafat* or any of its limbs sustain injury we will not withhold ourselves from taking the steps incumbent upon us.'<sup>95</sup> It seemed that the Afghan leaders at least considered to play a much more central role in the whole Khilafat agitation. On the Khilafat Day of 19 March organised by the Indian campaign, the Amir ordered all Afghan Muslims to assemble at the central mosque, the *Juma Masjid* to pray for Turkey.<sup>96</sup>

When on the occasion of the anniversary of his father's death the Amir suggested to receive Indian Muslims who in despair over British treatment of their

religion went on *hijrat*, he must have believed that he was making an innocent gesture of mostly propagandistic value.<sup>97</sup> Had he known for what he had bargained he might have been more careful in his generosity.

It is difficult to believe that the Amir seriously considered becoming the next *Khalifa*. But the issue did implicate him in regional geo-politics as an international party, a status, he had long been reaching for. In a practical vein, it might help him to raise the stake for a new treaty with Britain and maximise financial and technical assistance he expected from the British.

A more practical dimension of the Afghan pan-Islamism were the designs on Central Asia. Unmoved by parallel talks with the Bolsheviks, they aimed at control over the Khanates, or even at annexing parts of their territories for which at one time practical moves were made.<sup>98</sup> He wanted to either forge a Central Asian confederation under Afghan leadership or establish Afghan suzerainty over parts of Central Asia in the course of the turmoil prompted by the Bolshevik quest for control over Turkestan.<sup>99</sup> These intentions met with both suspicions by Britain and Russia. Bolshevik advances quickly rendered them obsolete.

The vacillations of the Afghans made it difficult to locate their position reliably. Their concerns were manifold, their ambitions varied and often worked at cross-purposes.

## Conceiving Hijrat

### *Why Indian Muslims needed the khilafat?*

Also on the Indian side, *hijrat* at first was no more than an idea floated in the course of a political and religious debate. Few could think of it as a reality.

Why Indian Muslim leaders had come to think of *hijrat* as a means of dealing with an intolerable situation, had more to do with the situation of Indian Islam than with that of Islam in general.

After many centuries where Islam had ruled over India unchallenged it was removed from its preeminent political and cultural position by the ascendance of British Christian rule - or so felt the Indian Muslim elite. It could never reconcile itself to the subordinate position it now occupied towards both the British and towards the Hindu majority. To ameliorate their situation as a political and cultural minority Indian Muslims now sought to reaffirm their Islamic identity. They believed that this gave them their special *locus standi* in Indian politics. This also was the *raison d'être* for the Muslim political elite.<sup>100</sup> Differing from countries where Islam was the religion of the majority like in Arabia, any scheme of political mobilisation of Indian Muslims centred on the minority status of their religion. Political goals like the independence of India or nation-building, social or educational reforms were considered good when

they enhanced the status of the Indian Muslim elite. But not only Muslim leaders who wanted to preserve Islam as it was, or restore its glory, sheltered in doctrinal references. Also the reformist camp which wanted to adapt Indian Islam to the new times and prepare it to the challenge of a commercial society could argue their cases of political and social change only with reference to Islamic doctrine if they were to win over Muslim public opinion. For this reason, Islamic doctrine was sometimes pragmatically searched for references which would fit the demand of the Indian political scene. British power and influence were considered alien and corrupting. The only remedy to this was the return to the true, the pure Islam which made no compromises either with the British or the majority Hindus. The most radical anti-British Mullahs were the most orthodox in terms of religious doctrine. The Deoband seminary, a close ally of the Congress Party in the national movement, was unbendingly strict in its approach to the observance of Islamic injunctions and completely rejected *ijtihad* which would allow independent reasoning on Islamic sources in the light of new developments. The reason for the deplorable state of both India and Indian Muslims, to them, was little influenced by worldly considerations. Mainly the lack of religiosity, of devotion to Islam was held responsible.

The debate whether British rule limited religious freedom of Muslims had continued ever since Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824), a follower of Shah Walliullah alleged that Britain had turned India into *dar-ul-harb*. His reason for doing so was connected with British interference in administration and law-making challenging the theoretical supremacy of the *sharia*, the Islamic law.<sup>101</sup>

With their firm belief in the supremacy of Islam and their unrelenting opposition to British rule over India, Muhammad and Shaukat Ali continued this line of tradition. They believed that since British rule was oppressive and harmful for the Indians it was so for Indian Islam.

When they made one of the first references to the political option of *hijrat* it was in this spirit that the Ali brothers argued with the Viceroy in their memorial in April 1919 from their internment,

'When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, *Jihad* or *Hijrat*. That is to say, he must either make use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to it when it is once more safe for islam... In view of our weak condition, migration is the only alternative for us.'<sup>102</sup>

#### *Abu Kalam Azad: theological arguments*

This was the same tenor which pervaded the thinking of Maulana Kalam Azad. As far as is known Azad mentioned the option of *hijrat* for the first time at the

Calcutta Khilafat Conference in February 1920 when he expounded his systematic religious argument on the *khilafat*. Azad's address to the conference was the theological ground on which he several weeks later pronounced a *fatwa* in favour of emigration or *hijrat*. Absorbed as Azad usually was in his theological arguments he did not think of practical consequences. Yet his mentioning of the option of *hijrat* was quickly picked up by other *ulama* and by the public at large.

*Fatwas* played an important part in the mobilisation of the Muslim masses for both the Khilafat movement and non-co-operation. They represented religious rulings about the conformity of deeds and actions with traditional Islam. These rulings were usually given by religious scholars, learned men of Islamic tradition, the *alim* or *ulama*. The *ulamas*, religious scholars, were instrumental in raising support. Gail Minault considered them one of the three main avenues of mass contact for the Khilafatists, the others being the volunteer corps and student non-co-operation.<sup>103</sup> In a way, the *fatwa* was an endorsement of a particular activity, if sometimes only qualified.

Azad wrote a so-called *hijrat ka fatwa*, inviting those who were prepared to migrate to communicate with him or certain others whose names were listed, and giving notice that a pamphlet, giving further details, would be issued later. The fatwa was published in the Urdu daily *Ahl-e-Hadith* of Amritsar on 30 July 1920.<sup>104</sup> The pamphlet he was referring to was never published. There was some dispute as to what degree Azad's *fatwa* was binding and unequivocal, a calamity which extended to the positions of most of the divine men since they made many and often contradictory statements on these issues. Gail Minault thought Azad understood *hijrat* as an alternative, not a replacement for non-co-operation.<sup>105</sup> Lal Baha contended that Azad's and Bari's *fatwa* 'made *hijrat* a sacred duty incumbent on the Indian Muslims to perform'<sup>106</sup>. Qureshi held the view that Azad was more stringent in his view.<sup>107</sup>

Under the heading 'Religious injunctions regarding migration (*hijrat*)!' the Muslim paper *Hamdam* of 3 August reprinted Azad's *fatwa* together with the *fatwa* by Abdul Bari. Comparing the two, Azad is definitely more explicit in his demand for *hijrat*, but also accepts some practical qualifications. The main thrust of his argument stems from his theological position on the *khilafat*. Defending the *khilafat* was of central importance to Azad for being a true Muslim, any threat to the *khilafat* was a threat to Islam. 'The belligerent British armies are in occupation of the Holy Places' where according to the Turkish peace terms they should not be. He was enraged that the *Dar-ul Khilafat*, the land of the *khilafat*, was 'in British possession' and the defending Muslim forces were opposed by the British.<sup>108</sup> True to classical Islam knowing no distinction between the spiritual and the worldly aspect of religion, Azad here extended the spiritual importance of the *khilafat* to the worldly fate of the Ottoman Empire and to Turkey. Any British action against the Ottoman power and the Turkish state was therefore a threat to Islam. He concluded that 'under these

circumstances, the term of "the enemies of Islam" is fully applicable to British Government<sup>109</sup>.

From there it was only a small step to make the *hijrat* obligatory. 'There is no other course open to Indian Muslims but to migrate, and those who are unable to migrate should devote themselves to the services of the *muhajirs*.' Those who remained in India were 'not allowed to have any co-operation or connection with the body known as "the enemy of Islam", and one who fails to do this will, in accordance with the holy *Quran* also be counted as "the enemy of Islam"'. Though this injunction was obviously referring to the non-co-operation movement he maintained that his opinion was not at all based on political grounds. His object was not (the temporal aim of) saving Constantinople but saving the Muslim faith.<sup>110</sup>

His only reservation about the *hijrat* was regarding its conduct. It 'should be made in an organised form and not in an haphazard manner'. This referred to the ever swelling numbers of emigrants and the increasing chaos resulting from it in the border districts of the Frontier Province and Afghanistan. His other qualification was that he considered it 'essential to take an oath of migration before one actually migrates'<sup>111</sup>. By this he might have thought to stop dishonest emigrants to join the campaign who went out of adventurism, were easily disheartened by the difficulties on the way, or were just after promises of a better life.<sup>112</sup>

It is important to note here the time gap between his mentioning *hijrat* and the respective *fatwa* which was not made public before the end of July when the *hijrat* campaign reached its peak. To him the *hijrat* was a logical conclusion from his theological argument but he did not care to give a verdict of practical meaning such as a *fatwa* until he felt pressured by the public. Even then, late in the campaign, when he could see its limitations and dangers, he remained stubborn and true to his principles, making only minor qualifications on practical grounds.

#### *Abdul Bari: trying to manoeuvre*

Abdul Bari was the other prominent advocate of the Khilafat movement, though less of the *hijrat*. While the first he canvassed actively and openly, attempting to associate with a joint *fatwa* as many prominent *ulama* as possible, the second he undertook reluctantly and as a reflection of the strong public interest taken in the issue. His efforts to obtain a united *fatwa* of all *ulama* from all Indian schools of thought on the Khilafat issue were in fact a prelude to the *ulama* meeting of November 1919 at which the *ulama* party *JUH* was founded. But there were notable gaps among the signers. As Minault noted, the *fatwa* received 'a numerous but hardly all-inclusive endorsement, reflecting the network of Abdul Bari's and Firangi Mahal family disciples among Sufis and

*ulama* in Lucknow, Ajmer, Bihar, and Sindh. The *ulama* of Deoband, Punjab, and Bengal were conspicuous by their absence<sup>113</sup>. This background partly explains why Bari turned out to be more amenable to compromise and more restrained in matters of Islamic doctrine. By May 1920, when the Turkish peace terms had been announced, Bari must have become the major religious authority on the *khilafat* in public eyes. His statements of around 20 May denounced all those Muslim or non-Muslim consenting to the peace terms.<sup>114</sup> His special wrath was reserved for the Arab rulers who had opted for independence from Turkey and who 'should be regarded as among the Christians'. Yet his calls for concrete actions were qualified. The masses should 'wait for the final orders of responsible leaders'<sup>115</sup>.

On the option of *hijrat*, Bari was even more cautious. Qureshi maintained Bari agreed on the general theological terms of reference but differed on the contention that India was *dar al-harb*. Bari allegedly came under enormous pressure to make his position more explicit but remained firm.<sup>116</sup>

Quotations from the local press allow to lend more substance to this assessment. The Afghan paper *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* gives details of Bari's *fatwa* in its issue No. 22 of 12 May 1920. It is kept in a guarded tone and does not impose any obligation on anyone to leave for *hijrat*:

'All those who find that while living in India they cannot freely perform their religious duties, can emigrate to such places where they think that they will not find any hindrances.'

The Afghan paper explains that the Maulana advises that 'only those men should emigrate who may, by going out of India, perform such deeds as cannot be done in India, and that those men who cannot be of more use outside should not leave their homes and undergo the troubles of emigration'<sup>117</sup>.

Also, in a letter to the *Safina* from Lucknow in May 1920, Bari gives details of the various forms of *hijrat* sanctioned by Muhammadan law and says that if intellectual and diligent Musalmans from India migrate to Afghanistan, they will be rendering valuable service to their country and religion.<sup>118</sup> This clearly represented a rather cautious and selective approach.

This position made *hijrat* an elite exercise, a token political demonstration by a few hundred activists. Such an approach would have been quite acceptable to the Afghans. Editorial comment on Bari's *hijrat fatwa* in the *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* explained who was meant to come to Afghanistan. Men like Maulana Muhammad Ali, who at the time were fighting for the *khilafat* in England as members of the deputation, where they performed 'many precious duties for religion and country' should emigrate. The editor appreciated that Indian papers like the *Hamdam* recommended that preferably doctors, engineers, artisans and 'editors of newspapers who are well up in Science and Arabic, Persian and English literature' should emigrate. This religiously motivated 'brain-drain' was justified with reference to the ability of those men to earn

their living without being a burden on the Afghan treasury. The editor assumed that this was a good way for both India and Afghanistan to reap the advantage of the emigration.<sup>119</sup>

However, interpreting the *hijrat* as an elite activity raised questions among his adherents about his personal attitude. Some wanted to know why he himself did not perform *hijrat*. Others, on the contrary, complained that he intended to go and leave common people behind facing the daily sufferings. Some asked him to stay in India, others not to delay *hijrat* any further.<sup>120</sup> At the time of the Allahabad Khilafat Conference on 1-2 June 1920, in which he took active part, Bari felt compelled to clarify his position on the issue:

'Whatever I did or said was in accordance with the command of God. I stick to this position and so shall I ever do. In reality I regard India as a *dar-ul-Islam*, although I do not consider it a place where Islamic laws are enforced and which apparently makes it a *dar-ul-harb*. As I declared at [the] Calcutta [Khilafat conference], in case of extreme necessity, I have firmly decided to leave India. In my opinion migration is neither obligatory nor is it meant for one's own advantage or good. It is only to attain the object of protecting Islam and hence no one has a right to stop those who want to migrate and in the same way no one has a right to compel those who do not want to go.

I simply gave expression to my views, but owing to the advice of my friends gave up my intention of *hijrat*... I regard as futile bloodshed, specially in the shape of an invasion, and barring this I consider all other means of protection and safeguarding to be advantageous.

For God's sake do not distrust me. My determination is firm and my views are unchanged. As a matter of fact I am bound by the commands of God and cannot deviate from them. Until the proposed [Allahabad Khilafat] Conference is over I cannot make any clear statement regarding these matters. I have discharged my personal duty of propagation. As regards the duties incumbent upon us now, it is necessary to develop resources and to take concerted action. It is also necessary that publicists and politicians should indicate the line to be adopted. Now I am bound by their advice and the same is God's command for me.'

This was still a compromise statement since it tried to mediate between various factions, between those who considered India still *dar-ul-Islam* and others who held it was already *dar-ul-harb*. Bari still maintained that he intended to go on *hijrat* though he avoided to state when he would actually leave. Contrary to people like Azad for whom *hijrat* was an objective religious duty, for Bari it remained a personal affair which was another way of saying that he would rather not advise to do it but could not say so openly without undermining his religious authority. His allusion to 'bloodshed' and 'invasion' was meant to clearly dissociate himself from the rumour that Indian Muslims wanted to invite an Afghan invasion to reach their aims.

After the Allahabad Conference, which adopted the non-co-operation program as the course of action for the Khilafat movement, Bari must have felt that his camp succeeded in separating the *hijrat* issue from the Khilafat movement. His clearest pronouncement yet on the Khilafat campaign and on *hijrat* he made towards the end of June 1920.

'Certain wicked enemies of Islam have conspired to publish certain manifestos purporting to be signed by me and certain other servants of Islam. Though this conspiracy has been traced, still it is apprehended that some manifestos might have been published and might mislead the public. It therefore appears desirable that I should make a formal announcement of the final decision which was arrived at Allahabad in consultation with respected *alims* and which I have adopted as my line of action:

- (1) It is necessary to support the *swadeshi* movement on religious grounds as it would cause economic loss to the enemies of Islam.
- (2) The non-co-operation movement should be supported in accordance with the instructions of the Khilafat committees.
- (3) Though *hijrat* is not an obligatory duty, it should be adopted when there is no other course left.

I and the *ulama* have, at least for the present, decided to do nothing besides these.<sup>121</sup>

In his recommendations published in the *Hamdam* of 3 August he re-emphasised this position and added that no one should be forced to migrate nor should anyone willing to migrate be kept back. And he made known his reservation about the massive scale of the *hijrat* which he compared to the 'attack of an army'. He announced another delay in his departure for *hijrat* - 'in obedience to the advice of his friends' though he still maintained that he preferred migration especially to Arabia to his stay in India.<sup>122</sup> In another letter to the paper *Zulqarnain* of 28 July he made the careful distinction that he favoured the migration of all Muslims 'except those who by their stay in India can serve their religion better and have sufficient power to resist every compulsion contrary to their religion.'<sup>123</sup> Apparently Bari counted himself among the latter.

#### *Gandhi: how to keep hijrat away*

The option of *hijrat* was apparently disturbing also for Gandhi. It would upset his plans to keep the non-co-operation movement non-violent, a task, difficult enough. Gandhi believed that violence was primarily a problem with Muslims, less with Hindus. The more support on religious issues he gave to the Muslims, the more he could demand their subservience under his leadership and directions for a non-violent campaign. Gandhi instinctively felt that *hijrat* as a movement had a strong mass appeal. It would not easily lend itself to directions

and limitations and was fraught with the danger of violence. Most telling in this regard was his letter of 22 June 1920 to the Viceroy in which he again pleaded with him to see reason in non-co-operation:

'Three courses were open to the Mussulmans in order to make their emphatic disapproval of the utter injustice to which His Majesty's Ministers have become party, if they have not actually been the prime perpetrators of it. They are:

1. To resort to violence.
2. To advise emigration on a wholesale scale.
3. Not to be party to the injustice by ceasing to co-operate with the Government.

Your Excellency must be aware that there was a time when the boldest though also the most thoughtless among the Mussulmans favoured violence and the *hijrat* (emigration) has not yet ceased to be the battle-cry. I venture to claim that I have succeeded by patient reasoning in weaning the party of violence from its ways. I confess that I did not - I did not attempt to - succeed in weaning them from violence on moral grounds, but purely on utilitarian grounds. The result for the time being at any rate has however been to stop violence. The school of *hijrat* has received a check if it has not stopped its activity entirely. I hold that no repression could have prevented a violent eruption, if the people had not had presented to them a form of direct action involving considerable sacrifice and ensuring success, if such a direct action was largely taken up by the public. Non-co-operation was the only dignified and constitutional form of such direct action, for it is the right recognized from times immemorial of the subject to refuse to assist a ruler who misrules.<sup>124</sup>

But in public, Gandhi could not deprecate the *hijrat*. When addressing Muslim audiences, he told them that the country was not prepared, not yet ready for *hijrat*, depicting it as the ultimate step of an advanced stage of non-co-operation after everything else failed. He tried to dissuade people from going on *hijrat* by arguing that instant emigration would belittle the high religious ideal of the *hijrat* when more earthly methods of protest like non-co-operation had not been tested.<sup>125</sup>

Hard-put to explain the rationality of the *hijrat* in the light of his demand for a civilised political movement, Gandhi stated under the caption '*Hijrat and Its Meaning*' in *Young India* on 21 July 1920,

'India is a continent. Its articulate thousands know what inarticulate millions are doing or thinking. The Government and the educated Indians may think that the Khilafat movement is merely a passing phase. The millions of Mussulmans think otherwise. The flight of the Mussulmans is growing apace. The newspapers contain paragraphs in out-of-the-way corners informing the readers that a special train containing a barrister with sixty women, forty children including twenty sucklings, all told 765, have left for Afghanistan. They are cheered *en route*. They were presented with cash, edibles and other things, and were joined by more *muhajirin* on

the way. No fanatical preaching by a Shaukat Ali can make people break up and leave their homes for an unknown land. There must be an abiding faith in them. That it is better for them to leave a State which has no regard for their religious sentiment and face a beggars's life than to remain in it even though it may be in a princely manner. Nothing but pride of power can blind the Government of India to the scene that is being enacted before it.<sup>126</sup>

His pronouncements on the *hijrat* exemplarily demonstrated Gandhi's political tactics. Despite his distinct uneasiness about the *hijrat*, he took great care in wording his statements in a way that he could still make use of the pressure potential of the *hijrat* campaign and threaten the British with its consequences, as the above mentioned letter to the Viceroy shows.

### *The masses: following a vision*

Why was the common Muslim public so charmed by the idea of *Hijrat*? Bari and Gandhi knew that people expected something more from the *hijrat* than removing themselves from British rule. They expected it would bring them extra-ordinary religious happiness and fulfilment like the duty of *hajj* (pilgrimage) to be performed at least once in a lifetime. The *hijrat* had the additional advantage that becoming its witness or participant was much more rare and exceptional than the *hajj* and promised a much higher degree of religious deliverance. This led the common man to place on the *hijrat* hopes for the long-awaited deliverance from earthly sufferings. Many believed that life in Afghanistan could only be better than it was in India.

On enquiring as to what the attractions were in Afghanistan, government officers were told 'that for the first three months the *muhajirin* would be quartered in *Jabal Serai* [*Jabal us-Siraj*] where they would do no work at all. At the end of this time, those who wished to enlist might do so, tradesmen would follow their trades, while farmers would be given free land and all would live in peace and harmony. For the first three years the Afghan Government would assist them financially'<sup>127</sup>.

In this attitude, the *hijrat* reflected a strong millenarian aspect. It is difficult to prove whether this perception was shared by some fanatic leaders only or these expectations were a wide-spread social phenomenon among the local Muslim population. An editorial highly critical of these hopes for deliverance appeared in the Punjab paper *The Sikh* of 16 May 1920. Though rabidly anti-Muslim, the paper's reaction showed that these illusions were indeed fairly common among local Muslims in the Frontier and in Punjab if they incited such a strong response in the rival political camp. Asking the Muslims whether they expected the Hindus to follow them on the road to Afghanistan *The Sikh* alleged that the Indians

'can expect little hospitality and little comfort from a ruler, whose ancestors always plundered and killed them, and a territory whose inhabitants are so many fierce beasts and cannibals... They are sure that the swaraj or self-government or Home Rule or whatever else they want to have, would be far better under the British Crown than anything of the sort under the ferocious Afghan, the arrogant Turk or the revolutionary Bolshevik ... Admitted that the Afghans with Amanullah as their ruler are their co-religionists; but history has not so far been able to record even one episode in proof of their sympathy with the Indian Muhammadans, and fierce and comparatively very uncivilised as they are, those habituated to live under British civilisation should not expect a better treatment in that savage country.'

In an almost clairvoyant premonition with racist undertones, the paper remarked,

'They know that these Turks, Arabs, and Bedouins, who do not let their own co-religionists go scot-free, would not leave a piece of cloth on their bodies if they ever came across them.'<sup>128</sup>

For the same reasons, the loyalist paper *The Leader* from Allahabad, United Provinces, of 7 May 1920, alleged: 'Indians are not prepared to exchange British rule, with all its shortcomings, for Afghan domination, at the bidding of a few thoughtless people.'<sup>129</sup> Had this 'bidding' been confined to the mentioned few it would not have merited any response.

### *The Afghans: toying with a proposition*

Either unwittingly or in naive speculation on propagandistic benefits, the Afghan side contributed to these expectations. The Amir of Afghanistan entered the *hijrat* discourse at about the same time when the Calcutta Khilafat Conference took place. In his speech on the occasion of the anniversary of his father's assassination, which he delivered on 9 February but which was made public somewhat later, he undertook to welcome intending migrants. He declared that he was prepared to die for the protection of the integrity of the *khilafat* and would gladly receive any Indian Musalman who under religious obligations may be obliged to leave India for good in connection with the *khilafat*.<sup>130</sup> After some delay, his speech was widely circulated in India coinciding with the beginning of the Mussoorie peace talks. There must have been some organisational effort behind the circulation of the speech which was printed in most Indian newspapers around the 20 April 1920 and also communicated during prayers in various mosques.<sup>131</sup>

From various issues of the Afghan paper *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* which usually summarised the Indian Muslim press it is evident that at first other possible destinations of the *hijrat* like Anatolia and the Central Asian *khanates* were

also considered. And some of the *muhajirin*, indeed, made their way on to Turkestan in Central Asia or to Turkey.<sup>132</sup> After the Afghans almost invited the emigration and pledged to support it materially to a certain extent it was not surprising that the focus of the *hijrat* campaign primarily centred on Afghanistan. Today it is known that the Afghan leaders were not very sincere in their support. On certain occasions, their representatives made in clear to the British side that they were ready to sacrifice the 'seditionists,' as the Indian opposition was disparagingly called, for a settlement with Britain that would grant them independence, financial and technical support and would include some concession on the issue of control over the tribal belt.<sup>133</sup>

The Amir's pronouncement was topped and reinforced by Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan Foreign Minister who on 16 April addressed a Friday prayer congregation at the *Landour Mosque* near the hill station of Mussoorie where he had arrived for talks with the Government of India on a friendship treaty. There he contended that the principal object of his delegation was to secure a just and favourable peace for Turkey.<sup>134</sup>

#### *The activists: going for the real*

That the circulation of the Amir's speech and Mohammad Tarzi's address at the *Landour Mosque* may have been connected also transpires from an account of a meeting in Delhi called 'The meeting of servants and devotees of *khilafat*' at which the speech was debated and a vote of thanks to Foreign Minister Tarzi for his address at the mosque was adopted at the follow-up meeting of *muhajirin*, or intending migrants. The meeting took presumably place around 20 April.<sup>135</sup> This meeting of *muhajirin* proved crucial in setting up a formal organisation that would take charge of the *hijrat*. As apparent from the account, a committee of *muhajirin* was constituted of which Ghulam Mohammad Aziz was appointed secretary. The meeting proceeded to send telegrams to the British Indian Viceroy,

'As our religion does not permit us to live in this country therefore we wish to leave the country peacefully. Can you kindly acquaint us whether there will be any hinderance in our way or not? (Care of Hurryat [- 'Democracy,' an Indian paper. - D.R.].)'

Another message was addressed to the Afghan Foreign Secretary Tarzi:

'Thanks to His Majesty the King Ghazi. His Majesty has graciously invited the Indian Mussalmans desirous of leaving their country. We after offering thanks deem the invitation an act of great honour. Kindly convey this humble message of gratefulness to His Majesty the King - Letter follows.'<sup>136</sup>

Though the movement had only started some participants of the *muhajirin* meeting were ready to proceed to Afghanistan at once:

'The following resolutions were passed: "Today we meet to bring into effect the resolution that was passed by the Khilafat Conference at Calcutta. As the Afghan Government and the great King of Islam has offered an abode for the muhajirin refugees from India, it is incumbent on us that those who cannot do jehad in India must forthwith effect their escape to Afghanistan." Moulana Fazla-ul-Hasan Hasrat was in the chair. Some of the audience had their Kofans (winding sheets) with them with the idea of not returning home alive. Some had obtained forgiveness from their mothers for her milk and from their wives for their dowey, and some had left their written wills behind at their homes. The President, however, told them to remain quiet for some time till Mohamed Chotani, the President of all-India Khilafat Meeting notifies his order."<sup>137</sup>

It is difficult to believe that this meeting was a coincidence or a spontaneous event. The formation of a *hijrat* committee for the Sindh area was reported in a similar fashion with an almost identical message, announcing that 25,000 *muhajirs* were ready to proceed to Kabul.<sup>138</sup> More meetings of the same kind must have followed in other cities. From this stage onwards a formal network was apparently established centering on the north-west of India but stretching to other parts of the subcontinent. It is not clear who was the prime mover behind the *hijrat* network, was it a certain wing of the Khilafat Committee, was it the doing of the Afghans, or were the local activists in the Frontier Province responsible. Presumably, all three factors combined in building the *hijrat* network. It relied on people who became convinced that *hijrat* could be an effective means of non-co-operation. To them, it must have been part of or a prelude to a militant campaign of radical change in British India. Apparently, they took guidance from more radical interpretations of the meaning of *hijrat*. In these, one of the central objectives of *hijrat* was to migrate to other countries in order to gain strength, collect forces and come back to turn the un-Islamic into an Islamic land, the *dar ul-harb* into *dar ul-Islam*.<sup>139</sup> If followed to its logical conclusion it would have meant to think of an Islamic invasion into India restoring the political power of Islam which had been reigning over India for centuries during the Moghul era. While wild dreams like these had little to do with reality, they reflected certain real aspects of Indian life like the threat of a new war with Afghanistan.

Despite all assertions to the contrary,<sup>140</sup> the Khilāfat committee seems to have been the main organisational base of the *hijrat* campaign. Many of its ordinary workers, if not of its political members, must have championed the cause of *hijrat* enthusiastically, for elaborate preparations were undertaken which tapped the resources and the network established by the Khilafat Committee. A Central *Hijrat* Office with branches all over India was opened, a broad-based propaganda campaign was launched with leaflets distributed and

special preachers appointed.<sup>141</sup> For Peshawar, Lal Baha noted that 'the formation of the *Hijrat* Committee synchronized with the establishment of a Khilafat Committee'<sup>142</sup>. Apparently, the *hijrat* committee was organised by Ghulam Muhammad Aziz on 14 May after the Friday prayer. He was described by Baha as some nationalist who specifically came up to Peshawar for this purpose from Amritsar.<sup>143</sup> His main objective was to arrange for board and lodging of the *muhajirin* coming up from down-country. A small volunteer corps was to meet them and see them off.<sup>144</sup> Local *hijrat* committees sprang up all over India, and in the Frontier Province in particular. The Peshawar Committee proved to be the most energetic one which also bore the brunt of the preparations for the *hijrat*. It was known by the name of *Anjuman-i Muhajirin-i Islam Subah Sarhadi* (Organisation of Islamic Emigrants of the Frontier Province). Most prominent was its secretary Jan Muhammad who also headed the Khilafat Committee. Baha also listed the members of the Peshawar *hijrat* committee: Āgā Sayyid Maqbūl Shāh, Mawlānā 'Abd al Karīm, Mawlāwī 'Abd al-Ghafūr, Mīrzā Muhammad Salīm Khān, Munshī 'Abd al-Karīm, Yūsuf 'Alī Khān, Ḥakīm Quṭb Shāh, 'Alī Gul Khān and Āgā Lāl Bādshāh.<sup>145</sup>

Ghulam Muhammad Aziz was apparently a much more central character of the *hijrat* campaign than Baha's findings suggest. He not only founded the Central Hijrat Committee in Delhi and its branch in Peshawar. The Afghan paper *Ittehad-i Mashraqi* quotes his name with the title of *khadīm-e-muhajirin* and as a source of directions to the *muhajirin* published in the Islamic-oriented Indian paper *Hamdam*.<sup>146</sup> This suggests that he, at least temporarily, played the role of a central organiser of the whole campaign. The way the Afghan paper quotes him would also hint at a deeper connection between the Afghans and Aziz where he might have acted on their instructions or at least in constant contact with them.<sup>147</sup>

Qureshi and Baha provided the details of the nexus and co-operation between the *hijrat* and the Khilafat networks. At the same time, they declined to comment or elaborate on the contention that both the *JUH* and the Central Khilafat Committee were reluctant to patronize the *hijrat*. This suggests an inclination towards the Muslim nationalist position. Apparently they find it embarrassing to accept that the Islamic religious campaign of *hijrat* was perhaps the deed of some overzealous nationalist Khilafat activists, who went somewhat astray in their activism, rather than the outcome of Islamic revivalism among the masses.

Now, everything was in place. The *hijrat* campaign had an ideology, had organisers, internal and external support. The movement was ready to start.

### Getting into gear: the movement spreads its tentacles

For the commencement of the campaign, a symbolic gesture was intended. The Urdu-paper *Zamindar* which played an important role in the Khilafat campaign announced on 7 May 1920 that 1338 persons, corresponding to the year of the Muslim *Hijra* era, were ready to proceed to Afghanistan.<sup>148</sup> The original *hijrat* of the prophet Mohammad and his companions had been taken as the beginning of the era of Islam, starting a new Islamic calendar.

#### *Catching up after a slow start*

Yet in the beginning the attraction of the *hijrat* apparently did not catch on with the masses. When the first batch of intending migrants arrived at the Frontier the provincial diary counted no more than 53 persons who had crossed the famous Khaiber pass during the week ending the 15 May 1920.<sup>149</sup> The following weeks witnessed the passage of 34 *muhajirin*, 'chiefly from Punjab,' during the week ending the 22 May,<sup>150</sup> and 24 by 5 June.<sup>151</sup> The campaign gained speed when the numbers of migrants picked up in mid-June. 81 followed during the fortnight ending the 19 June.<sup>152</sup>

Matters started improving for the *hijrat* campaign after that. The same diary noted with concern that large numbers were said to be collecting in Peshawar. A new stage was reached when by 26 June 104 *muhajirin* moved up the Khaiber by means of the weekly caravan into which traders and travellers crossing over into Afghanistan were usually grouped.<sup>153</sup> A week later, the figure jumped to 283 *muhajirin* departing on the holy mission accompanied by a local tribal chief, Arbab Raza Khan of Tahkal, who was received and entertained at the Afghan border town of Dakka by Akbar Khan of Lalpura, a local Afghan luminary.<sup>154</sup> Owing to anxiety among intending migrants over a violent incident in a train in India *en route* to the frontier in which a *muhajir* was shot dead by British soldiers on 8 July 1920, the migration figure temporarily slumped to 81 per week by 10 July 1920,<sup>155</sup> only to exceed all expectations when by 17 July a caravan of 846 *muhajirin* passed into Afghanistan.<sup>156</sup>

#### *A special train from Sindh*

This was the famous Sindh train which was named after the Sindh area forming part of the Bombay Presidency and later turned into a separate province. A wealthy barrister-at-law, Jan Muhammad Junejo, chief of Larkana, had footed the entire bill for hiring a special train at the cost of 14,500 Rupees.<sup>157</sup> He brought with him four lakhs of rupees [= Rs 400,000] in cash. This event set the bells ringing in the corridors of bureaucratic power. The whole campaign

turned into a political calamity. The train had passed through Sindh, Punjab and the Frontier Province on its way to the Khaiber and had created a lot of excitement. The intelligence diary which reported their arrival lamented that 'the largely advertised circumstances attending their *hijrat* have produced an unsettling effect on the Afridis in the Khaiber Pass, who turned out in large numbers and provided iced sherbat on the road'<sup>158</sup>.

Almost more than the political fall-out of this episode it was technical problems occurring in the wake of the massive influx of migrants in to Peshawar and the border area which alarmed the government. This presumably was no coincidence since British colonial authority was largely bureaucratic in structure.

The immediate concern was the congestion of the roads to the frontier and in Peshawar itself which was bound to have implications undermining the much-cherished public order. Accommodation became a scarce commodity.

A large *jirga* of Malik Din and Qamber Khel, a delegation of these tribes which had arrived in Peshawar for talks with the authorities, felt disturbed by the preparations made in honour of the emigrants, and suffered from the consequent lack of accommodation in the Serais, the travellers' inns for the caravans.<sup>159</sup>

One senior British official who was fully aware of the potential repercussions of the *hijrat* at an early stage was Sir Hamilton Grant serving as Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province in which capacity he held charge of the provincial administration. Grant sounded severely alarmed at the prospect of a considerable *hijrat*, 'possibly numbering thousands from Peshawar district'<sup>160</sup>. He equally foresaw the inadequacy of arrangements for these people on the Afghan side and demanded that the Afghan Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi or the Afghan Government be urgently warned of this possible contingency.<sup>161</sup>

And, special trains were the last thing the Frontier administration would want to allow for the transport of emigrants, since they would provide an additional outlet for the holy pursuits of the intending emigrants otherwise limited by the exigencies of regular rail transportation. Grant, therefore, urged the central railway authorities on 17 July to 'refuse on technical grounds to provide any more special trains for emigrants as a serious situation is likely to result if any more special trains arrive in Peshawar'<sup>162</sup>.

But Grant had wanted to go a step further. It would have been ideal to keep the *muhajirin* traffic altogether clear of Peshawar where there were 'so many elements of disorder' as the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India so aptly put it. The latter was trying to shove the 'hot potato' to the Chief Commissioner of British Baluchistan proposing that *muhajirin* traffic pass on the alternate route *via* Quetta and Chaman to Afghanistan. But the Baluchistan agent was less than enamoured of the idea of intense *muhajirin* traffic bringing trouble to his otherwise - as he thought - peaceful province which had so far in

the course of the latest campaign evinced little political or religious fervour. 'It would give hostile agitators the opportunity they have long been working for of starting political excitement in this province with which they have already a close connection as they have not with the Punjab or the North-West Frontier Province.'<sup>163</sup> He quoted further difficulties with police and army in Balochistan which were inadequately staffed, paid and trained.

### *British anxiety*

This tussle between different sections of the administration alarmed the higher echelons of government. Knowing full well the potential implications of the movement, Grant had wanted to avoid unnecessary attention or interference from Delhi or London which he probably thought would only complicate the handling of the situation. He must have been convinced from the very outset that the movement could best be deflated by leaving it to its own. But the almighty Secretary of State for India in London was far from satisfied with the performance of his otherwise brilliant officer. The administrative approach would not suffice to put things in perspective for the interest of the British Empire. Given the marked attitude of decided courtesy which was usually expressed in communications between the Secretary, the Viceroy and the Governors, it amounted to a reprimand when he had to ask for political evaluation of the *hijrat* movement. His terse telegraphic request to the Viceroy of the 27 July ran:

'Muhajarin movement. How are emigrants received in Afghanistan and from what classes of population do they come? Do you attach any importance to the movement? I should be glad of a brief telegraphic appreciation of the movement.'<sup>164</sup>

It was forwarded from Delhi to Peshawar with an additional inquiry as to the accuracy of the allegation that *muhajirin* who wished to return were prevented from doing so by British authorities.<sup>165</sup> Since this was another potential censure of the conduct of the Frontier authorities it was clear that everyone concerned was distinctly unhappy with this phenomenon which despite all the other worries of the non-co-operation movement was so difficult to understand and to deal with.

### *First assessment reports*

Grant could feel the uneasiness of his superiors and the opening formula of his reply ('As the Government of India are aware, ...') was leaving no doubts that he was indignant. In his first consolidated assessment he described the extent of the excitement and the classes and areas affected by it. His general evalu-

ation was fairly precise: 'Non-co-operation and *hijrat* movements are closely connected and the combined effect of these two movements working on economic discontent is beginning to affect the police and other services.'<sup>166</sup> Though he gave due credit to 'malicious agitators' and 'wicked rumour' he laid less stress on the instigation of the movement than on the grievances they were holding. He tried to convey to the higher-ups that people were thinking they had a genuine case to argue with the Khilafat issue. Grant had dispatched his Deputy Commissioner for the Peshawar District to the tracts which were most affected by the movement 'with the object of heartening and reassuring the people'.

Grant, and also to some extent Keen, treated the local population with understanding and respect, of course, within the limits of an imperial and condescending paternal attitude. They seemed to regard their excitement as confusion resembling almost a natural state of mental disorder against which little can be done and where one has the responsibility of a warden who should prevent the inmates from inflicting upon themselves unnecessary harm which would be equally burdensome and could reflect adversely on the keeper. Grant and Keen went so far as to partially identify themselves with the people's demands. Keen accepted their petition to review the peace terms with Turkey and Grant requested to forward it 'to the personal notice of the Viceroy'<sup>167</sup>. Grant thought something had to be done about the Khilafat issue. Taking the position of an officer who had gone 'native' on his duty, he felt that people were at least genuine in their concern without understanding 'much about the niceties of the theological points at issue':

'The feeling now aroused has come to stay: and though the *hijrat* movement and the non-co-operation movement may die a natural death, these movements will be replaced by others of perhaps a more dangerous kind; and we shall not again secure the whole-hearted loyalty of the Muslim community until we have done something to redress what, rightly or wrongly, they consider a breach of faith, a bitter wrong, and a deep injury to their religion.'<sup>168</sup>

### *Local inquiries*

On his deputation to the villages, Keen had undertaken to play the local patron: 'I am glad I went, for I think the people appreciated it.'<sup>169</sup> His report of the 24 July elaborately described how he proceeded. At each place where he went he was met by a large crowd 'which showed their interest and the importance they attached to the matter. I began by making a short speech saying that I knew that they were perturbed in their minds over the religious question'<sup>170</sup>. He then tried to dispel the rumours which had been spread to make them keener to emigrate. The major issues were the fate of their womenfolk and of

the Holy Places which were supposed to be in danger of desecration at the hands of the British. Leaving the details of rumour-mongering to another chapter, one has to mention here that he was particularly anxious lest their religious zeal not be constituted as a menace to the political interests and the security of the British Crown:

'At each place expression was given to practically the same sentiments, which were that they and their fathers before them had been loyal to the British Government and they had fought for us in the Mutiny, in many frontier wars, in Egypt and elsewhere and last, but by no means least, in the Great War, and they had no wish whatever, to be severed from Government, but wish for nothing better and to go and fight again for it, but their religion forbade them, for we had a hand in taking away the Holy Places from the Sultan of Turkey upon whom they looked as *Khalifa*. They begged that I would tell you that they wish to remain loyal if only Government remove this grievance.'<sup>171</sup>

Instantly grasping the chance of the rapport which he seemed able to establish with them, he tried to convince people to lay off their plans for *hijrat* and on the Khilafat issue - and to be patient and wait. This was a World Question, he attempted to persuade them, which was not to be settled by the British alone, and that they could not expect to get their answer by return post, a more practical metaphor which would hopefully make them see the wisdom of his argument. They should expect no answer within less than a year.<sup>172</sup>

### *Why go on hijrat?*

The motives with which British officials were confronted when making their inquiries were extremely varied. These accounts seem particularly valuable for a differentiated assessment since they bear testimony to the people's original intentions, or to the way in which the local Muslim elites, in particular the Maulvis, or preachers, manipulated the tribal and peasant population.

On 25 July, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and the Assistant Commissioner visited Sawabi where they attended a *jirga* to which all the leading men of the Tehsil Sawabi were summoned. When the DC asked them to state their case,

'the most influential Maulvi, a man from the village of Maneri, stated from his pulpit in front of the assembly that the Musalmans of India rendered the Government great service during the European War, they were loyal, but now the Government had destroyed Mecca and Constantinople and in consequence of this, no true Musalman was able to say his prayers as he had nowhere to turn, nor could he remain in India any longer. They must go and serve under a Muhammedan ruler.'<sup>173</sup>

The DC asked the Mullahs whether or not the plea for *hijrat* was merely a bargaining ploy for the reduction of revenue or other costs, but the Maulvis

stated that this was not what they wanted. All they wished was that the Holy Places of Islam should be returned to Turkey, and that when this was done they would only be too willing to remain in India. The DC asked them for a petition to this effect which would then through the Chief Commissioner and the Government of India, be forwarded to His Majesty The King-Emperor.<sup>174</sup>

The local people could not comprehend the abstract danger to Islam which was purported to arise from the demise of the *khilafat*. It was left to rumours - about the destruction of Mecca and Constantinople - to make people effectively believe that Islam was in real, physical danger, that a central object of their devotion, and, therefore, a key focus of their Muslim identity like the Holy Places of Islam was in the danger of annihilation.

Another plank of the local support for the *hijrat* were the millenarian hopes mentioned above.<sup>175</sup> They arose out of a profound religiosity and a thorough despair at their actual plight. They were based on the strength of religious imagination and fiction. Though the local people should have known better since most of them had personal contacts or family relations in Afghanistan and had access to information about life and living standards there, they imagined Afghanistan as sort of a promised land. The idea as it emerged from the first communications of the Afghans and the *hijrat* committees was to form colonies of emigrants in Afghanistan. They would be sort of self-governing settler communities, supporting themselves economically and participating in the defence of their community and first of all of Afghanistan. Before they could become self-sufficient, however, they would have to be supported by the Afghans. *Jabal us-Siraj* was fixed as a reception centre and the location for the first colony. With information reaching local peasants being hazy and sketchy, and muted by the local Mullahs and Hijrat officials or volunteers who partly twisted it for their own purposes, soon the word got round of the ideal conditions waiting for them in the colonies.

The third plank was economic deprivation. Presumably the Deputy Commissioner was not far off the mark when he suspected that the rent situation also played a part in people's willingness to participate in the campaign. It was notable that of those who went on *hijrat*, many were from among the poorer sections of society, more than Afghanistan wished. Eleven *muhajirin* from the first batch of fifty-three 'seemed miserably poor'<sup>176</sup>. In the beginning of June, the Frontier provincial administration noticed that the *muhajirin* 'are in almost all cases impecunious people of the lower orders and influenced more by the promises of material prosperity and betterment held out to them in Afghanistan than by any scruples of religion'<sup>177</sup>.

Of the Sindhi emigrants, 95 per cent were estimated to be 'labourers, loafers and broken men. With one exception, prominent men went only as far as Peshawar and then returned.' The Punjab *muhajirin* at this stage were considered to come mainly 'from the cities, owning no land and having nothing to

loose by the venture. Few agriculturists have gone from villages; up to the present no men of importance have emigrated<sup>178</sup>.

Furthermore, many emigrants did not seem to have the means to support themselves once they crossed over into Afghanistan. This greatly disturbed the Afghan side. It felt compelled to introduce regulations which stipulated that every *muhajir* must possess at least Rs 50 in cash when entering Afghanistan.<sup>179</sup> For those who were not in position to provide this security deposit, more wealthy village neighbours paid up the charge.

### *Who was leaving, and from where?*

The impact on certain areas and districts was considerable. Most affected were the Peshawar and the Nowshera districts, Kohat, Bannu and Hazara. In the rural areas of the Peshawar district, particularly in the Doaba and Hashtanagar tracts, participation was widespread.<sup>180</sup> Also the Swabi Tehsil of the Yusufzai Sub-Division, now in the Mardan district, was a major source of emigrants.<sup>181</sup> This shows that the influence of the movement was regional, concentrating as a whole on the Peshawar valley and bordering areas. At its height the campaign was limited to the North-West Frontier Province from where approx. 85 per cent of the emigrants hailed, while around 10 per cent came from Punjab and another 5 per cent from Sindh.<sup>182</sup>

It is not easy to make sense of the 'numbers game'. The highest estimate is contained in an intelligence diary assessing the number of *muhajirin* who had arrived in Afghanistan 'at over 50,000'<sup>183</sup>. The lowest figure is quoted in the official annual report for 1920 which gives the figure of 18,000.<sup>184</sup> This figure is obviously based on the telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State of 13 August.<sup>185</sup> That telegram, however, quotes this figure only for the frontier province, with 1,000 *muhajirs* from Sindh and 2,000 from Punjab. An official press communique of 10 August originally contained the figure of 20,000 but had apparently been revised so as to omit any figures.<sup>186</sup> British authorities obviously feared that too high a number of emigrants might be regarded as a potential threat or sign of weakness and betray inability on the part of the British to control the situation. Cumulative figures given for various stages quoted 750 *muhajirin* as per 12 July<sup>187</sup>, a huge leap to 13,000 by 3 August<sup>188</sup> and a climax of approx. 30,000 for 21 August<sup>189</sup>. This tallies with the count kept by the Frontier administration in its provincial diary as evident from the table attached to this manuscript. Officially, however, it was never admitted that the emigration reached that level. Actual numbers may still have been somewhat higher since the provincial diary could not give very reliable accounts of the numbers crossing sections of the Afghan border other than the Khaiber Pass. Also, *muhajirin* who crossed Baloch territory were apparently not accounted for, though their number must have been fairly low.

When religious excitement started growing daily in the larger area of Sindh, Punjab and the Frontier Province, the movement reached disquieting proportions. By the middle of August when 30,000 had already left, information gained credibility that another 40,000 intending emigration from Punjab and Sindh which had hitherto been spared of the pitch of the campaign were waiting to perform *hijrat*.<sup>190</sup> While in the beginning the poorer sections predominated the composition of the *muhajirin*, from mid-July the movement spread to important Pakhtun agricultural classes including persons of good family who are leaving their lands uncultivated and emigrating in large numbers<sup>191</sup>. During the last week of July most of the emigrants belonged to the 'Zamindar class from Hashtnagar, Yusufzai and Hazara'<sup>192</sup>. They were self-contained peasants who could certainly not hope for an improvement of their economic situation.

Although the British never admitted to their deep-felt concern in public, the confidential communication reveals that two aspects were particularly worrisome.

One aspect concerned the atmosphere of general compulsion which was created by the progressing movement. In areas where support was widespread few villagers could desist from joining the movement. As whole villages were vacated few could stay behind. This in turn heightened speculation over land and property which the intending emigrants were forced to sell. Prices tumbled and speculators had a field day. A typical report of 1 August 1920 describes the following situation:

'A number of these intending Muhajirin are unable to realise this sum [security demanded by the Afghans - D.R.] as they are unable to dispose of their land and crops. They are making the most liberal reductions in the price of the land, crops and cattle but still have no sale. Land valued at Rs. 10,000 cannot realise Rs. 100. Cow buffaloes worth Rs. 200 are offered at Rs. 40. The same applies to crops. No one wants to hold land or houses in a deserted village. The more wealthy *Muhajirin* finance their poorer comrades, and those villagers who have not yet left are only awaiting their turn to be helped into Afghanistan. Coloured flags, the Banners of the *Muhajirin* are paraded, *jirgas* are being held daily the greatest unrest prevails and 'Allah o' Akbar' is the daily greeting. The loyal few who do not intend to emigrate are being hit very hard over this exodus as they too must leave their villages when the others depart.'<sup>193</sup>

The disruption of agricultural relations was of particular concern to Grant. In order to check the exploitation of the *muhajirin* and to allow them or their relatives to redeem their lands without delay and hindrance according to tribal usage in case of returning back from Afghanistan, the Chief Commissioner had ordered that disputes over property and land were regulated under the Civil Section of the Frontier Crimes Regulations.<sup>194</sup> This was a body of special legislation enacted on the basis of tribal law. They conferred extraordinary

powers on British officials, the local agent, and *jirgas*, councils of elders, for handling local disputes. At the same time, they effectively limited access to ordinary civil law. Opinion on them was divided. Some regarded the Regulations as an attempt of the British to deny to the frontier population constitutional reform enjoyed by other provinces of India. Others saw it as an effective recourse to legal settlements and justice under the conditions of tribal societies.

The second factor causing consternation among British officials if not outright alarm was the growing impact of the *hijrat* on police officers and the army. Resignations started to spread to local police officers.<sup>195</sup> This had a devastating effect on the reputation of local authority.

Still more difficult was the situation for the army. Grant had foreseen early on that the Indian armed forces may be adversely affected by the *hijrat* movement. The British held a peculiar conception about the suitability of Indians for armed service where some ethnic or religious communities were considered unfit for military duties and others included in the 'martial races'. Muslims, and Pakhtuns all the more, were counted among the latter. Besides Punjab, the Frontier Province was the recruiting ground for a substantial number of Indian soldiers who were stationed all over India and in other British colonies as well. They left behind their property, in particular their land. Their families were exposed to the increasing pressure in the villages to join the *hijrat* movement. After 1 August the Sepoys started receiving disquieting letters from home. Whole families, including their own wives were reported to be on the point of leaving for *hijrat*. British military officers saw no other option but to allow them short leave in order to put their home affairs in order. Some military officers correctly sensed that it would be difficult for some of them to extricate themselves from the effects of the movement. The Commanding Officer of the Wazirforce wrote to the Chief of the General Staff that he was 'fully aware that some of them may be overborne by the arguments of Mullahs and of their own friends even to the point of consequent desertion; but if I were to refuse leave it would provoke discontent without stopping desertion; and in my opinion it is better to run the risk which the giving of leave entails'<sup>196</sup>.

Some of the military officers thought that the civil authorities were far too lenient in dealing with the movement, favouring much quicker action. They were particularly irked over the argument of non-interference in religious matters. This view was advocated by Grant and more forcefully by Keen who believed it was difficult to proceed against the *hijrat* activists at a time when the central government of India chose to go slow on the prominent agitators like Gandhi and the Ali brothers.<sup>197</sup>

To smoothen ruffled feathers and take care of justified concerns, Grant initiated special measures to protect the interests of absent soldiers, their families and their property, particularly their land.<sup>198</sup>

Civil servants had even less inhibitions to join the campaign: 'Religious excitement caused by the stream of emigrants has begun to affect Government

servants.<sup>199</sup> In some localities of the Frontier Province government officers started resigning in large numbers. One report spoke of two-thirds of the *Patwaris*, village headmen, who had resigned and joined the *hijrat*.<sup>200</sup> The resignation of government servants enhanced the similarities between the *hijrat* and the non-co-operation movement, only that in the case of the *hijrat* the officers resigned in order to leave India while non-co-operation assumed they would stay in India and continue to fight for self-government if not independence.

### *Rumours: an effective weapon*

No matter how hard officials tried to keep the movement in check they could never really compete with the speed by which one particular kind of communication operated - the rumour. It travelled within days to far-flung army units well outside India.

It is difficult to assert what or who was responsible for the multitude of rumours that were roving the countryside during the Khilafat and the *hijrat* campaigns. Some may have resulted from the ignorance of local political activists or Mullahs. But it was often assumed that many of them were spread deliberately to mobilise the illiterate common man who was not accessible through print media or public meetings. The *hijrat* campaign to a large extent would presumably not have been possible without the widespread circulation of rumours decrying the anti-Islamic policies of the British in the most harrowing details.

In one case, the events prompting the rumour can be traced through the file papers in the annex. The Deputy Commissioner at the above-mentioned *jirga* meeting in Sawabi on 25 July apparently failed to explicitly refute the allegation that the Holy Places were destroyed. Immediately, such omission was taken as admission of guilt. It was later cited in proof of the contention that real damage was done to the Holy Places. Obviously *hijrat* volunteers used this argument to great effect with Government servants. The General Officer Commanding of the Northern Command reported on 8 August that some soldiers enquired why steps were not taken to deny the rumours and punish the people responsible for spreading them, if all the stories regarding the Holy Places etc. were untrue.<sup>201</sup>

The hearsay was telegraphed back to the Government from army units on 14 August where it was current and believed that Keen is supposed to have admitted Mecca to have been destroyed, and that Government is supposed to send men with the *Muhajirin* to fire on Tommies in Khaiber, as an excuse to kill *Muhajirin*. Tommies are supposed to have abducted a woman in a lorry. Finlay thinks that unless checked within ten days movement may easily get absolutely out of control<sup>202</sup>.

The suspicion that the British were preventing the *muhajirin* from returning to India<sup>203</sup> did not hold long.

The more 'enduring' rumours mainly fell into three categories: one, that the British were alleged to have occupied or destroyed the Holy Places in the Arabian peninsula<sup>204</sup>, two, that they interfered with practising Islam in India, like prohibiting the study of the Quran or fixing Sunday instead of Friday for Muslim prayer<sup>205</sup>, and three, that the villages would be maltreated by the British, by quartering a large army of soldiers and Gurkhas in the district and compelling people to provide women for the army<sup>206</sup>.

*British handling: between deference and contempt*

The rumour-mongering made it clear to the British that they were facing an extra-ordinary challenge, one which drew its strength not so much from classical political support as from a variety of bewildering circumstances which were rooted in the local culture and religion. These were much more difficult to control and to predict. This was precisely the kind of advantages which the organisers may have seen in the campaign.

Predictably, such an affair was bound to create differences among British officials as to how to react to this campaign. As on many other occasions, the Chief Commissioner Grant and the Deputy Commissioner of the Peshawar district counselled in favour of moderation, hoping it 'will earn them the gratitude of the people'<sup>207</sup>. Reviewing the more turbulent episodes of the campaign, the Chief Commissioner believed that strict non-interference resulted in the absence of any 'lawlessness or disorder whatever, in spite of such exiting incidents as the Kacha Garhi affair though there have been endless meetings and processions'. (At the railway station of Kacha Garhi a *muhajir* was shot by British soldiers in a fracas.) Grant noted with satisfaction and some surprise that the *hijrat* generated a rather unusual side-effect, a marked falling off in ordinary crime.<sup>208</sup>

When Deputy Commissioner Keen had attentively listened to the grievances on the Khilafat issue expressed by the local people and dutifully forwarded them to the government the response was terse. Delhi had decided to put a close to the debate over the Treaty of Sèvres. Foreign Secretary Cater thought it necessary to display a much firmer attitude. Not much was to be gained 'by holding out vain hopes of modification, and in fact the holding out of such hopes might be prejudicial to good order by encouraging Moslems to believe that agitation may still secure modification'<sup>209</sup>. Likewise, he could see no justification for being soft on the trouble-makers. 'Every consideration seems, therefore, to point to the wisdom of prompt proceedings under the law against the most violent agitators.' It was obvious that his *raison d'être* was pacification of the frontier and not its mollification. The government of India equally feared

that treating the *hijrat* activists leniently would cost Britain the support of all those 'who are at heart loyally disposed'<sup>210</sup>. If anti-British activism was allowed to go unpunished what attraction was there to stand by the side of British rule?

This difference in attitude showed at every stage. The formal telegraphic request for information of 27 July to which Grant replied on 3 August was already marked by the different approaches.<sup>211</sup> But the London-based India Office and the Government of India seated in Delhi continued to give recommendations for a more active approach that was designed to tackle the threat in its formative phase rather than having to deal with its consequences. Growing impatient with seeming local inaction, a suggestion was telegraphed to Peshawar on 6 August contemplating a representative deputation from the frontier districts to be sent immediately to Mecca at the expense of Government to see for itself that there was no occupation or desecration of Holy Places, proposing further to curb the passage of the *muhajirin* across the Khaiber pass into Afghanistan by administrative means. The daily numbers of *muhajirin* going up the Khaiber should be restricted on sanitary grounds and the surplus detained to give time for the excitement to abate and to convince them of the folly of their actions. To take control of the campaign network communication it was suggested that postal censorship be introduced between Punjab and the Frontier Province.<sup>212</sup>

But Grant was not easily distracted from his path. In a more sanguine mood than central government, he replied that he did not think the proposed deputation to Mecca 'will have much effect as some months must necessarily elapse before deputation would return to India'. When it was proposed that some of the *muhajirin* be detained near Peshawar 'to give time for excitement to abate and to permit of propoganda among them', he didn't think that this would help. Holding up intending emigrants in Peshawar 'more than is absolutely necessary as it can only result in trouble'. Similarly, he was doubtful about the effects of postal censorship compared with the exertion it involved,<sup>213</sup> since it was no easy task to control postal traffic across these extended territories without a major administrative effort.

A more serious difference of opinion could have emerged over the impact of the movement on the army as indicated above.<sup>214</sup> Since the frontier province played a key role in British security arrangements for India and the British Empire, any matter affecting the army, and, therefore, the defence capability of the north-west frontier area of British India was extremely sensitive in official eyes. Underestimating these repercussions could have had serious consequences for Grant personally and for Keen also. Grant, therefore, right from the beginning paid special attention to the concerns of local soldiers and the army, in general. The response given by the General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, to anti-British rumours betrayed complete disapproval of the approach of the local administration: 'Unless immediate action is taken by Civil

[authorities] to contradict these lies, not only will Muhammadans in Army be very seriously affected, but situation in Peshawar may get beyond control.<sup>1215</sup>

The reasoning of the civil administration in India in dealing with the *hijrat* movement was neatly summed up in a telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State of 13 August:

'So far we have not interfered with the movement, because we believe that as in most religious revivals enthusiasm would only be stimulated by repression and if left alone will exhaust itself.'<sup>1216</sup>

At the same time, local government left no doubt that the security aspect remained foremost on its mind:

'Collection of these large numbers of emigrants in the North-West Frontier Province and religious excitement engendered thereby are cause of serious unrest and may give rise to disorder which might spread to Northern India. Besides, we cannot ignore the danger arising out of the close historical connection between the *hijrat* and Jihad.'<sup>1217</sup>

Yet, strangely enough, hope for an early end to this affair came to rest primarily in the Afghans. It was based on indications that

'the Afghan authorities started showing alarm at (the) invasion and for economic reasons must put a stop to it before long... Emigrants will find life intolerable in Afghanistan and numbers will return disheartened and discourage others from going. We have had unverified report that this has already happened in case of some Punjab emigrants. Further, Afghanistan cannot afford to support and feed emigrants on this scale. They have so far been well received, but they are a burden on villages on the Kabul road, and it is reported that their entertainment is very poor at Jabal us-Siraj, where they are concentrated.'<sup>1218</sup>

#### *Afghan response: expectations and confusion*

When the pressure on Afghan resources became unbearable, the Amir felt compelled to issue regulations for curtailing the movement. In fact, it was suspended until further notice. They also spelled out the conditions under which further emigration might take place. This was done in the Firman (order) by the Amir dated 9 August 1920.<sup>1219</sup> Whether this date is reliable is not clear, especially, since the Firman became known only after the events of 14 August (see further on). The Firman may have been backdated to avoid the impression that Afghanistan might have acted under the pressure of circumstances.

It is difficult to confirm whether the Afghans were completely clear about what visitations they had invited upon themselves. There is, however, some evidence that certain practical calculations must have been done as to what to do with the arriving emigrants. One object may have been to employ them as

some kind of religiously motivated development aid as mentioned above.<sup>220</sup> Another one may have been to colonise sofar barren land by agricultural settlers, as the idea of setting up self-supporting colonies of agriculturists suggests.<sup>221</sup> A third one apparently was a potential military use of the emigrants, and against British India at that.

No wonder that the latter aspect particularly intrigued the Government of India. Its Foreign Secretary inquired from Grant on 10 August if the newspaper report was true that the Afghan authorities in Jalalabad were trying to form regiments of those arriving there. And, he asked for bi-weekly estimates of the numbers leaving for Afghanistan.<sup>222</sup>

Other information suggested that the Amir's requirements might be more specific:

'The Amir wants 900,000 men from India; none are required from Independent Territory as those tribes are to consider that they are already the servants of the Amir and are serving him better by remaining at their homes.'<sup>223</sup>

The Firman of 9 August made provisions for military duty of the *muhajirin*. Three of their regiments were to be enlisted in the Afghan army. The young emigrating Khanzadas were to be allowed to enter the Military College and after the completion of their training would be appointed in the *Muhajirin* army according to requirements.<sup>224</sup>

Mentioning the idea of a *muhajirin* army immediately conjured up images of a religious war, of *jihād*. Was this done to inspire the *muhajirin*, or the Afghan army, or to threaten the British? If the Amir had succeeded in forming a *muhajir* army of 900,000 against British India this would have constituted a formidable threat. But did the Amir really harbour this intention, did he follow up on these plans? If he was ever serious about it he would not have allowed the whole movement to collapse when it reached enormous proportions with 30,000 people having arrived in Afghanistan.

The new rules were deliberately strict not to encourage emigration any further. The *muhajirin* were supposed to become Afghan citizen and not allowed to proceed to other countries without Afghan consent. Since all the land available around *Jabal us-Siraj*, which had been fixed as the reception centre by the previous proclamation, was already used up completely for distribution among the *muhajirin*, future arrivals would be redirected to Katghan in Afghan Turkestan where a second *muhajirin* colony was to be founded. The chain of command was clarified. All *muhajirin* petitions to the Amir were to be directed through two Committees, one in Kabul and the other in the colony the office-holders of which were appointed by the same Firman. No direct access to Anatolia for lending support to the cause of the Turkish *Khalifa* was allowed. Instead, the formation of an enquiry party from the

*muhajirin* was proposed which may first go and enquire about the route and the place of their service before permission would be granted to them.<sup>225</sup>

These new rules did not look as if they were designed to entice many more Indian Muslims to come. Considering all the contradictions in the Afghan position, the British assessment was presumably correct. Afghanistan started eating its words, which foreshadowed the end of the campaign before it had yet reached its climax.

## High tide and ebbing out

### *The daily business of hijrat*

Before coming to the events of the 14 August when the *hijrat* reached its peak, it may be useful to shed some more light on the routine and the exigencies of the *hijrat*.

Though the *hijrat* was growing half-spontaneously it required elaborate administrative arrangements and involved a growing number of full-time workers or volunteers. Intending *muhajirin* would come to Peshawar City and register their names with the *hijrat* committee who would send their names to the Afghan Agent and apply for a pass.<sup>226</sup> The *muhajirin* were required to pay a deposit of Rs. 50 which was collected by the Afghan representative in Peshawar. Those who could not afford to pay were often helped by the more wealthy *muhajirin*.<sup>227</sup> Meanwhile the *hijrat* and Khilafat committees would supply the *muhajirin* with board and lodging. Two hundred volunteers assisted in arrangements and keeping order. The Chief Commissioner remarked that it was a 'remarkable achievement that in spite of intense excitement and wildest rumours there has been no disorder or untoward incident in city'<sup>228</sup>. According to Grant's description of the weekly ritual the *muhajirin* were then proceeding on foot or by bullock cart to Jamrud where they stayed on Thursday nights before they would continue their journey on Fridays. The weekly passage across the Khaiber which by the end of July had already become a clearly established routine was fixed for Fridays, the weekly Islamic holiday. It was a festival what the *hijrat* in Islamic mythology, and increasingly in the reality of this movement, was meant to be. Coloured flags, the banners of the *muhajirin* were paraded, and chanting could be heard everywhere.

The centre of activity in Peshawar was the Salt Market, a big business centre, where many *serais* provided spacious accommodation for the intending emigrants. Lal Baha describes the scene there,

'A large number of active Hijrat and Khilafat volunteers which included young and grey-haired zealots, wearing green cloth belts on their shoulders, were ever ready to perform their allotted duty with almost religious fervour. Hajji Jan Muhammad, the President of Hijrat and Khilafat

Committee, opened his office in one of the shops of Salt Market and employed more than a dozen office assistants whose duty included the management of the hijrat fund, registering the names of the intending emigrants, sending the lists and applying to the Afghan Agent for passports.<sup>229</sup>

### *Building up tension*

When Chief Commissioner Grant rejoiced over the absence of violence and disorder in his telegrams to the Viceroy and the India Office he painted a slightly rosy picture in full knowledge that things were not quite so after all. And completely so they could not be, given the situation where a religious movement threatened to engulf a whole province of British India.

Though there were isolated incidents they were still significant. One was the shoot-out at the train station of Kacha Garhi on 8 July, a small railway station between Peshawar and Jamrud. It was the crowded special train from Larkana in Sindh. Two British soldiers, Private Chilcott and Lieutenant Hewett, had entered the train at the Islamia College Station while the train headed for its last stop before the Afghan border at Jamrud. When they checked the train their intervention resulted in a deadly fracas with serious political implications. In the emotionally charged atmosphere, the event became a catalyst in the expansion of the *hijrat*.

Official communiques and the reports of the Hijrat Committee greatly differed on what had happened. Referring to the papers of the martial court proceedings against Private Chilcott which are still preserved in the India Office,<sup>230</sup> the most likely one appears to be the following: The two soldiers, apparently filled with emotions of anxiety and anger over the *hijrat* exodus, were travelling on the train to reach their destination of service. While inspecting the train they also entered the women's compartment, the *zenana*, which was kept apart and closed according to conservative Islamic tradition. From there they were evicted by a *muhajir*, one Habib Allah from the village of Tangik in the Tehsil of Charsadda. He insisted that they should not trouble the women since the tickets were with the men. He also considered this intrusion provocative and felt compelled to uphold the Islamic spirit of the mission of *hijrat* he was on. In the ensuing scuffle which ended on the rear platform of the train the *muhajir* was riddled with bullets by soldiers from the station coming to the aid of Chilcott while Habib Allah died in the arms of his small daughter. Chilcott later tried to contend that he had been checking train tickets and found Habib Allah resisting his inspection and not possessing a ticket. The Martial Court session revealed that he had no business to do so, and his testimony on the events was contradictory and apparently false. Nevertheless, he was acquitted of the charge of attempted murder.<sup>231</sup> Though the British

took the unusual step of holding a Court-Martial, the acquittal amounted to condoning the soldiers' actions.

The incident prompted a public outcry all over India. The anti-British section of the public saw this as an exemplary instant of the arrogant, racist and wilful way the British ruled over the country. The 'Times' correspondent tried to make light of the conduct of the British soldier calling it 'the irresponsible officiousness of the soldier' who acted 'out of sheer light-headedness'<sup>232</sup>. In an unprecedented public funeral, in which 90,000 people were reported to have participated, the *muhajir* was laid to rest in the family grave-yard of Hajji Jan Muhammad, the president of the *Hijrat* Committee of Peshawar.<sup>233</sup> Where personal passion and emotions mingled with religion and politics it became an explosive mixture. The British were trying to placate public anger and yet not to yield on any principle. On 6 August, the Home Department of the Government of India advised a two-pronged response,

'The Kacha Garhi incident greatly inflamed feeling. We have decided, in consultation with the military authorities and the Chief Commissioner, that Private Chilcott should be tried by Court Martial for attempt to murder a Pathan Mahajir, and a communique is being published to this effect. Lieutenant Hewett is not held to be blame-worthy for the death, but the Chief Commissioner presses for departmental action by the military authorities with whom decision must rest. On the other hand, Hewett had been grossly libelled in a report published by the Peshawar Khilafat Committee and he has been advised to take legal proceedings which he approves.'<sup>234</sup>

Another conflict revolved around the person of Pir Mahboob Shah who was one of the influential Pirs in Sindh. A Pir was the hereditary spiritual leader of a local community in Sufi Islam. He was revered like a saint and usually living at a shrine which he maintained and where he used to receive donations which often reached quite substantial sums. This made him one of the most influential personalities in local politics. Pir Mahboob was arrested on 1 August for a speech which he delivered on 19 June. In that speech he was reported to have urged his fellow-Muslims to make war on the British Government and sacrifice their lives - which probably was the bureaucratic way of describing his call for *jihad*. The Delhi Home Department telegraphed an abridged version of his speech:

'It was bounden duty of Islam to fight at once with enemies who fired guns at Ka'ba. Zamindars should not pay assessment, government servants should leave service, license holders surrender licenses, life and property should be sacrificed in war of Islam. Mussulmans should leave the country and go to war, they should send their children to fight, they should destroy railway lines so that coming and going of troops may be stopped, they should not go to government courts, but decide disputes according to Shariat.'<sup>235</sup>

Turning the *hijrat* into *jihad* - in the context of both the *hijrat* and the Khilafat movement, this was the most dangerous nexus the British could think of. They therefore decided to deal with his case harshly. Yet again, religion intervened in politics. His particular local status made him a special case. Not only did his arrest provoke local disturbances, but it was of a peculiar nature:

'The crowd assembled at the jail and half the warders and half the prisoners struck work. Forty British soldiers were despatched and the crowd dispersed. The troops withdrew and there were no further disturbances, though the crowd was in a sensitive mood till late in the evening of the 2nd, when the town began to take on normal aspect.'<sup>236</sup>

He made things even more difficult for the authorities when he went on hunger strike. When on 12 August the Secretary of State replied to various proposals on how to deal with the hunger strike he was sufficiently sensitised to the religious aspect of the recent political trouble:

'It occurs to me that a man of this description might be more persistent in starving himself to death than the political détenus and that the consequence of his doing so in the present inflamed state of opinion might be more serious. Your advice to keep him alive by forcible feeding is in accordance with the opinion followed by Home Office which is that it is the duty of the medical officer to resort to it when necessary until the point is reached when it becomes more dangerous than starvation. I recognise that you have carefully weighed the alternatives in a very difficult case, presumably that of bail with the condition of silence during proceedings has been deliberately rejected, and I do not propose to interfere with your discretion in dealing with the case. Should you however find yourselves in the difficulty that the man likely to die before the proceedings are completed would you consider the possibility of interrupting them and meanwhile externing him from any area in which he is likely to be dangerous.'<sup>237</sup>

After threatening him with a sentence of two years of rigorous imprisonment he was finally released on signing a declaration of admitting his guilt,

'In view of the fact that prisoner had broken his hunger strike and had given signed admission which will be most valuable to Government, and that power of Government to obtain a conviction had been fully demonstrated, it was considered unnecessary to enforce the penalty, especially as man practically worshipped by thousands. Religious excitement caused by detention in jail would nullify good effect already produced by the course of case. Orders have been issued therefore under Section 401 Code of Criminal Procedure, remitting sentence.'<sup>238</sup>

A third instance of tension produced as a side-effect of the *hijrat* was documented in the annexed file. It related to the attempts of a local journalist, editor of the widely circulated newspaper 'Zamindar,' and Muslim politician,

Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956), to add to his popularity by meddling in the *hijrat*. On 5 August, he telegraphed to the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier Province and declared tongue in cheek that he was proceeding to Peshawar to 'tackle (the) *hijrat* problem and obtain authentic data regarding (the) Kacha Garhi incident.<sup>239</sup> When Grant refused him permission to go he protested the decision before the Viceroy<sup>240</sup> who, however, saw 'no reason to interfere with the Chief Commissioner's discretion in this matter'<sup>241</sup>. The prohibition order was then an excellent cause for mobilisation. A stream of 'emphatic' protest resolutions against the order started coming in 'praying' for its cancellation.<sup>242</sup>

The prohibition order did not prevent Zafar Ali Khan from joining in the religious rhetoric in full force. The Intelligence Bureau through one of its agents reported his speech of 14 August when the movement reached its climax:

It was time for the advent of the *Mahdi* ... He referred to the dropping of bombs in Mecca and the outraging of virgin Turkish girls; the Turkish treaty was a scrap of paper; they should now perform *hijrat* ... if they failed in non-co-operation they were all *kafirs* themselves. He said further the face of an Indian soldier killed at Baghdad had been turned into that of a pig, and they should never join the army.<sup>243</sup>

These incidents of tension made it difficult for the local administration to defend its position of non-interference. It goes without saying that it was non-interference only to a limited extent avoiding any major crackdown on the movement but still applying all the emergency measures which were so typical of political life in the Frontier Province. Yet, the British were increasingly pushed into making a choice on *hijrat*, either to give leeway to religious leaders and movements, which in their conservatism were more often than not potential allies of British rule, or to put a decisive halt to the further unfolding of political unrest in a religious garb.

### *Turning point*

Events reached a turning point when the numbers of intending emigrants swelled to the extent that they threatened to clog up the whole Peshawar district with unforeseeable consequences for public order and stability which were particularly cherished by the British Indian government. After more than thirty thousand *muhajirin* had gone to Afghanistan, and another forty thousand emigrants were standing in readiness, the migration had indeed turned into a natural phenomenon with little means to influence or direct the incessant stream of emigrants.

Whether the British intended to force the hands of the Afghan side or simply wanted to ease up *muhajirin* traffic is not clear. But on 10 August, the Political Agent of the Khaiber border district, who was the responsible British

official, approached his counterpart on the Afghan side, the Sarhaddar of Dacca suggesting to ease the previous restrictions on the *muhajirin* traffic across the *Khaiber*. He was proposing that caravans of limited number of *muhajirin* should pass through (the) *Khaiber* into Afghanistan every day of (the) week instead on only one day.<sup>244</sup> The Political Agent referred to the lack of accommodation in the Serais and shortage of water on the Indian side. He wanted to limit the number of travellers each day to one thousand.<sup>245</sup> This would have greatly reduced the stress on the border crossing point but it would also have exposed the Afghan side to ever greater waves of emigrants. So far the Afghans had benefited from the bottleneck situation on the border since it limited the number of emigrants to a single day's load, and once a week. This prospect must have sent shock waves down the necks of Afghan officials who were already considerably rattled by the demands made by the continuous arrival of thousands of emigrants on the meagre resources of the border region. The Afghan official, therefore, after consultation with his superiors, including the Amir himself, replied that there was already great congestion on the road and arrangements for accommodation of the *muhajirin* were incomplete. He enclosed a copy of a new Firman, a royal order by the Amir, and new rules for intending emigrants.<sup>246</sup> He asked as a favour that further immigration through the *Khaiber* may be stopped for the present.<sup>247</sup>

The letter by the Sarhaddar reflected the predicament in which the Afghan side had landed itself: It had to decide how to pull out from a situation it first created or, at least, it had helped to build up. It quickly shifted responsibility to the emigration committee, the *Anjuman-i-Muhajirin*, which, reminiscent of the Soviet style, was a committee of 'people's representatives' consisting of Indian politicians, local leaders and persons of influence from the region where the *muhajirin* hailed from. In the form of a petition to the Amir the committee laid down the new rules to be enacted for any future emigration to Afghanistan. Its main line of arguments was that preparations for the *muhajirin* who had arrived earlier were insufficient and arrangements for the coming winter were particularly urgent. It decided that new *muhajirin* could only come after they were cleared by the Afghan authorities and after arrangements for the earlier arrivals had been completed pretending that emigration could then be resumed. At the same time, it left no doubt that the halt to the emigration was absolute and total for the time being.<sup>248</sup>

The Chief Commissioner had then warned the Khilafat Committee about the new rules which the Afghans had issued. He asked them if possible to stop the large caravan proceeding to the *Khaiber* on 12 August.<sup>249</sup>

But it was too late for that. The huge party of over 7,000 *muhajirin*, which was by far the largest in the whole course of the movement, left Peshawar for Jamrud on 12 August before the letter of the Sarhaddar of Dacca arrived. After the receipt of the fateful message volunteers were despatched by the Khilafat Committee to Jamrud to inform them of the changes and make them

return. The *muhajirin*, however, were not to be shaken in their resolve. They 'refused to accept orders and showed great truculence towards (the) emissaries saying that (the) Khilafat Committee had obviously been bribed'<sup>250</sup>. Interestingly, the *muhajirin* did not take it out on the British officials who were on the spot. The *muhajirin's* attitude towards them was 'perfectly orderly and correct as usual'. When the Afghan Agent himself went to dissuade them from proceeding he was pelted with stones and had to return. There was no choice but to let them continue their journey to their next stop at Landi Kotal. In the meanwhile, Hajji Jan Muhammad, Secretary of the Khilafat Committee, went to the border and discussed matters with the Afghan official how best to prevent them from passing the border. But to no avail. Further discussion at Landi Kotal threatened to turn violent. The emissaries were called *kafirs*, infidels. When in the morning of the following day, the 14 August, at 7 o'clock, the vanguard of the party reached the border it faced 50 barrels pointed at them by border guards and the Sarhaddar. The masses were on the verge of breaking the barrier when the Afghans after consultation with General Nadir Khan, the head of the Afghan army, consented to let them pass through provided they were able to pay their own expenses.<sup>251</sup>

Though deeply anxious about the dire effects of the developments, Grant felt vindicated in his assessment and could not hide his glee over the defeat of the purposes of the organisers of the movement. 'Khilafat Committee realise that they have aroused forces they cannot control and are paralysed with fear of public who are bitterly resentful at having thus been duped. I am, however, putting strong pressure on them to face their responsibilities and themselves close down a movement which they have raised to its present dimensions.'<sup>252</sup>

Still it took some time until the effect of the unexpected turn of events could be felt. The message about the new proclamation met with disbelief. The original documents had to be produced to the Khilafat Committee and it took some convincing before they gave due credit to the bad news and agreed to circulate the proclamation widely. The Afghans themselves had sent copies to the Afghan Agent in Peshawar who was ordered to send them on to Muslim leaders in India and a few prominent *muhajirin* from Peshawar.<sup>253</sup>

For the British authorities, the divide in the movement had appeared not a moment too soon. Messages between 12 and 16 August<sup>254</sup> showed mounting concerns particularly among British military officers over adverse effects on the loyalty of Indian soldiers. They could not fully appreciate the niceties of political and cultural considerations by the civil administration which as the military would tend to believe had only aggravated the situation by its reluctance to apply sterner measures at once.<sup>255</sup> It therefore came as a profound relief not only to Chief Commissioner Grant that the tide seemed to reverse.

On 19 August Grant reported that the next party of 4,000 intending emigrants who had assembled for the weekly passage on Friday could almost quietly be dispersed and sent back to their homes, but for 50 emigrants from

Sindh who alleged that they were fleeing from oppression in Sindh where, they said, they were debarred from public prayers and suffered through stoppage of canal water.<sup>256</sup> Grant suggested that the Local Government of Bombay contradict these allegations officially since this may be helpful to dispel the doubts in the minds of the unbending Sindhis who had remained at Peshawar.<sup>257</sup> To break the *hijrat* myth in Sindh seemed particularly important since it was from there that religious fervour had started, there that the superstitious Pirs still had a strong hold over a largely ignorant disciple populace.

Another two thousand late-comers were halted at Bannu where they pressed for a passage *via* Tochi. Their designs were successfully frustrated, 'though (a) small deputation from Bannu may proceed to Khost to enquire whether *muhajirin* may emigrate that way'<sup>258</sup>.

With the time gap in communication, tension had not yet fully abated so that on 21 August the General Staff made another inquiry requesting Grant to reassure their Commanders, particularly overseas, where Pakhtuns were stationed.<sup>259</sup> But now Grant was in a position to assuage their fears completely and informed them that the movement had collapsed, that no more emigrants were leaving and that they started returning daily by the hundreds.<sup>260</sup> He again promised to send special officers to the affected villages, particularly to the Yusufzai to watch the interests of absent soldiers.<sup>261</sup>

## Aftermath - disarray and frustration

### *Tales of hardship*

The message of 19 August for the first time contained information about the impending return of thousands of emigrants.<sup>262</sup> On the 19 August the first party of 500 returning emigrants crossed the border<sup>263</sup>, with another one of the same size following on the 20<sup>264</sup>. The tide had now turned the other way.<sup>265</sup>

According to the information contained in the British telegrams and reports, the *muhajirin* were quickly disillusioned once they arrived in the 'promised land'. Though in the beginning they were entertained in their travel by some of the tribes through whose territories they passed, the Afghans had to put pressure on others to stop raiding the travellers which occurred early on.<sup>266</sup> Owing to the raids, in July 300 infantry soldiers were reportedly moved from Kahi to Dakka to escort the *muhajirin* convoys.<sup>267</sup> The Afghan Amir repeatedly called on the Afridi and the tribes from Ningrahar to accord all necessary assistance to the *muhajirin*, which meant that they were somehow lacking the eagerness to receive these travellers. Some *muhajirin* must have taken great liberties with the hospitality of the tribes.<sup>268</sup> Afghan state money was insufficient to provide for the expenses incurred by the Afghan authorities. Repeatedly subscriptions

were raised for the *muhajirin* which in turn caused increasing resentment.<sup>269</sup> The Amir had to contribute from his own purse to supplement the means of support. He allocated additional amounts of money<sup>270</sup> and land for distribution<sup>271</sup> which apparently was still insufficient.

There were other adversities in store. *Muhajirin* who arrived without families in May were detained at Jalalabad pending inquiries into their business and status.<sup>272</sup> Presumably, the Afghans were afraid that under the cloak of the *muhajirin* campaign, the British might send spies into Afghanistan. When six of the early *muhajirin* returned to Peshawar in the beginning of July, they complained they were arrested on the suspicion of being spies, and ill-treated.<sup>273</sup> In Afghanistan the *muhajirin* mail was being subjected to close censorship.<sup>274</sup> Also, the Afghans did not want them to come and go as they pleased. Once the *muhajirin* had arrived in one of the Afghan reception centres they could only return after they were cleared by the Afghan authorities. Those returning on their own were detained. This was later explained with reference to the implications of issuing passes to the *muhajirin* for their travel to Afghanistan. Those passes were in the form of the identity sheet which every Afghan must possess. On accepting these passes the *muhajirin* effectively became Afghan citizens relinquishing their British Indian nationality, meaning citizenship. Hence no *muhajirin* were allowed to leave Afghanistan without a valid passport.<sup>275</sup>

Many emigrants found the Afghan climate and general conditions much less agreeable than they had expected.<sup>276</sup> The emigrating Mahsuds complained of the heat in the Khost area.<sup>277</sup> Dissatisfied with conditions there, they soon looked for ways how to return.<sup>278</sup> Many of the Waziri and Mahsud immigrants in Khost had been 'reduced to selling their cattle to buy food'<sup>279</sup>.

Through the *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* the Afghans asked the Indian press to warn intending emigrants of the scorching heat, the danger of sun-stroke and the necessity of wheeled transport.<sup>280</sup> Ghulam Aziz, the secretary of the Central Hijrat Committee, was even more explicit after his return from Kabul. He urged his countrymen to undertake *hijrat* only when they were capable of defraying the expenses of the way, providing themselves with transport, and able to make their own living in a foreign land.<sup>281</sup> With time passing these notices of warning became more urgent and desperate. The *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* No. 38 urged upon all Khilafat committees that it was their duty to prevent 'further arrivals of those who are either useless to the State or who repent of *hijrat* before they have well crossed the Frontier', failing which 'there will be a grave danger of a rupture of friendly relations now existing between Afghans and Indians'<sup>282</sup>.

As long as the emigration served the intentions of the Afghans, the Afghan authorities tried to keep a check on the incidents of raiding and harassing the emigrants. But as soon as the Afghan side lost all interest in them and was looking how to get rid of them, the check disappeared and many emigrants fell victim to harsh tribal treatment. It is difficult to independently verify the

reports about their misery and sufferings. However, even when discounting a certain element of bias the picture emerging from the British records appears rather grim.

Graphic tales of hardship endured by the *muhajirin* started dominating the reports. They stated that everywhere they were oppressed by the Amir's officials, who kicked and beat them, and demanded a tax of five rupees per head, which they took from them by force. They also commandeered their carts. The *muhajirin* were reported to be so bitter against those who induced them to emigrate that they were swearing to shoot the Mullahs when they reached their homes.<sup>283</sup> A large number of returning *muhajirin* perished through exhaustion or disease. The road from the Frontier to Kabul was dotted with *muhajirin* graves. According to eye-witnesses, the Khaiber Pass was littered with corpses.<sup>284</sup>

Two quotations may suffice reflecting the general trend of the information about the travail of the *muhajirin* in Afghanistan. The Frontier Provincial Diary for the week ending 21 August reported,

'(4) The *hijrat* movement has undergone a remarkable change during the week. The gay processions through the Khaiber have ceased, and in their place a stream of footsore, crestfallen and disillusioned peasants is trickling through to Landikotal every day from Afghanistan. The *muhajirin*, especially those who went as far as Kabul, have terrible stories to tell of their privations on the journey, and the harsh and in many cases brutal, treatment which they received from the people of their adopted country. Clothes and other possessions which escaped the notice of robbers were sold at ridiculously low prices to buy food and water. Their women were insulted, and many succumbed to exhaustion. About 3,000 have returned *via* the Khaiber, and hundreds, alarmed by false stories of British vengeance, are making their way back through Mohmand country. The news that sympathetic treatment awaits them in Peshawar was received with surprise and gratitude, and reassuring messages have been sent to their comrades in Jalalabad. All are anxious to return to their homes and repair their shattered fortunes as best they may, and many talk of revenging themselves on the *mullas* and others who drove them to undertake this disastrous pilgrimage.'<sup>285</sup>

The Diary for the following week added,

'Nearly 3,000 more *muhajirin* have returned from Afghanistan *via* the Khaiber during the week. They confirm the stories of terrible hardships endured on the journey, and estimate that at least 150 emigrants have perished on the road. Absurd rumours about British vengeance are still current in Jalalabad, and many hesitate to face the Khaiber route on this account. Those who elected to return through Mohmand country have suffered heavily from the depredations of the Halimzai, and 3 emigrants are reported killed and several wounded. A *muhajir* was also robbed and murdered at Dakka, and his corpse thrown into the Kabul river. It is said

that Jan Muhammad of Larkana and Arbab Raza Khan of Tahkal are seeking for an excuse to escape from Kabul at the earliest opportunity. The latter has lost two sons in Afghanistan, and both have ruined themselves on what they now realise was a mad undertaking.<sup>286</sup>

### *Repatriation and relief work*

The large-scale return of the *muhajirin* was preceded by a trickle of returning individuals and small groups some of which had been mentioned above. Before the bulk of the Indians started returning, a group of Afghans attempted to flee the ever-increasing stream of *muhajirin* and wanted to come over to the Indian side. Though their number was not significant, they received certain attention because of the curious circumstances involved. For them the situation was the reverse since Afghanistan became for them unbearable with the influx of the *muhajirin*, and British India promised at least a better life. They intended to come to India in a sort of a 'counter *hijrat*'.

The request for migration to India was made by the inhabitants of the Khost area in Afghanistan. They were called Khostwals and their main reason to migrate to India was that they had been dispossessed of their land in favour of the arriving *muhajirin*, mostly Mahsud emigrants. The Khostwals alleged that they were facing hunger.<sup>287</sup> The Frontier Intelligence Diary had earlier reported about the trouble brewing in the Khost area where both the arriving emigrants and the local population were deeply discontented with the situation.<sup>288</sup> Grant, who on 10 August communicated their intention to the Government of India, however, proposed not to permit their migration and asked them to 'settle matters with their own officials.' In a propagandistic countermove, he suggested to give wide publicity to this 'quaint' development as he called it.<sup>289</sup> The incident was immediately exploited in an official communique prepared for the press in order to discourage other intending emigrants and to discredit the movement. There, the incident was mentioned, but the intended refusal of the Khostwal migration quietly omitted.<sup>290</sup>

The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department replied to Grant on 15 August that the Government was reluctant to abandon the principle of granting free entry and the right to asylum to foreign subjects except in cases of 'obviously mischievous character'. Instead, Delhi preferred that he merely reply to the Khostwals that no arrangements could be made for their reception or maintenance. They were therefore strongly advised not to come. 'If after such warning they persist in coming they should not be prevented.'<sup>291</sup> After that as far as is known most of the Khostwals abandoned their plan.

The repatriation of the 'real' *muhajirin* was more demanding. The British could not absolve themselves of their responsibility, though technically the emigrants had become Afghan citizen and could be dealt with like the Khostwals.

However, a denial of return, according to the appended file, was never considered as a viable proposition by the British. On the contrary. Right from the beginning, the British tried to dispel rumours and doubts about the British attitude towards the returners. In the beginning, the British wanted the *muhajirin* to return in order to discourage new intending emigrants. The first *muhajirin* who wanted to return were told by the Mullahs who had accompanied them that their ears would be cut off and their women dishonoured on their return to British territory. Delighted as the *muhajirin* were at their easy reception they promised every encouragement to intending returners.<sup>292</sup> Later on, the British favoured their return since they could see that they only benefited from regaining loyal subjects who had seldom been so submissive.

Was the whole affair to be carried to a successful conclusion it was now necessary to make arrangements for the alleviation of the sufferings of the returning desperate. For, desperate they were profoundly, and often destitute and in financial difficulties. But the financial means usually at the disposal of the Provincial administration were far from sufficient to cope with this unforeseen burden. Keeping in mind that some of his superiors in Delhi and London had enough of this whole business, Grant was careful not to provoke them. 'I do not propose that Government should do more than facilitate resettlement of these people on their lands on the lines already indicated by me.'<sup>293</sup> Thus ran his introduction to the proposal of setting up a relief fund from private sources which could assist returning *muhajirin* in their resettlement and rehabilitation. Grant assumed that 'this would not only hasten a return to normal conditions but would also be regarded as a generous and sympathetic measure towards misguided peasants who have been misled on religious grounds into a disastrous undertaking'<sup>294</sup>. His proposal was cleared by Delhi, with the important qualification that the fund should be managed in a way that the money would not fall into the hands of the *hijrat* committees or the Mullahs 'and other agitators' who had 'fanned' the movement.<sup>295</sup> Since everything was to be judged under the angel of loyalty and political support, Delhi assumed 'that care will be taken to discriminate between deserving persons who have honestly been deluded and ne'erdo wells and loose characters who joined (the) movement merely in hope of free food and comfortable life'<sup>296</sup>.

Other relief efforts were directed at the speedy settlement of claims to land and other property. Baha quotes the number of 2,407 applications and petitions only in Peshawar district.<sup>297</sup> This was still much less than the number of households or people affected. These measures could therefore do little to help the returning poor. All in all, the relief effort by the Frontier administration appears to have been more of a political gesture rather than an effective social measure - though still important measured against the conservative ethos of a colonial administration. The communication between London and Delhi published in the annex makes abundantly clear that the British wanted the

returners to take a lesson from their adventure on which according to the British they went on their own folly.

The Frontier Provincial Diary of 11 December reported that the return of *muhajirin* had practically ceased. The remainder were either too poor or destitute to find resources for their return, very few had by then proceeded to Turkestan and single individuals only to Anatolia.<sup>298</sup>

### *Easing relations with Afghanistan*

Though Afghanistan obviously masterminded the campaign to a large extent Britain now found it more convenient to emphasise the change of heart in the Afghan attitude. The respective Firman of the Amir had been the decisive factor to stop the campaign. None of the militant projects floated earlier like a *muhajirin* army could be realised. Eventually only a few *muhajirin* stayed on in Afghanistan, or kept serving in the Afghan army. Neither had the Bolsheviks been capable to exploit the situation, nor had the Amir allowed them to do so. Obviously, the Bolsheviks could recruit only a few *muhajirin* who must have been of limited value to them at a time when they themselves were at loggerheads with the Islamic opposition in Turkestan and the Khanates. An interesting episode is recounted by M. N. Roy (1887-1954), the founding father of Indian communism who was a long-time secretary of the eastern section of the Communist International. He describes in his autobiography how he saved 70 odd *muhajirin*, who had escaped from Afghan camps to Bokhara, from captivity of Turkoman rebel forces. When Roy had set up shop in Tashkent after the revolution in Turkestan he was also charged with looking after them. Going by his own account, he kept them busy by - founding the Indian Communist Party and an Indian Military School at Tashkent. Finally he could convert only a very few to communism with the rest creating endless problems for him. Under British pressure and as a concession for the intended Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, the school was closed down soon.<sup>299</sup>

Irrespective of the adverse circumstances Britain had reason to be grateful to Afghanistan. Considering the protracted negotiations with Afghanistan on a new and lasting treaty relationship, Britain gained Afghanistan's co-operation on a controversial matter like the *hijrat* while, on most issues, the two sides still held opposite views. The failure of the *hijrat* therefore contributed to an easing of the mutual relations, at least temporarily.

In this connection the advice by the India Office to Delhi is worth mentioning that nothing in the call for relief to the returning *muhajirin* was to be construed as criticism of Afghanistan or the Amir's conduct.<sup>300</sup> In his communication to the Secretary of State, the Viceroy sighed, 'the orders from Afghanistan came at a time when feeling was beginning to run dangerously high and to affect Government servants, including police'<sup>301</sup>. The Afghans

were said to have erected a strong barrier across the Khaiber Pass to prevent further unauthorised entry into Afghanistan.<sup>302</sup> In order to diffuse the tense situation, a delegation of the Peshawar Khilafat Committee was allowed to go to Jalalabad to confer with General Nadir Khan about the repatriation of the *muhajirin*.

Seeming unlikely at first, the Afghans also gained from the affair. As later events showed, the Amir finally succeeded in negotiating with the British a new relationship based on independence and sovereignty where Britain lost control over Afghan affairs. The events of the *hijrat* demonstrated to the British how vulnerable the frontier province was and how easy it was for the Afghans to mobilise parts of the frontier population for an emotional cause. Regretfully, the official government report for 'India in 1920' noted: 'Rarely of recent years has it been so borne upon the student of politics that India is an integral portion of Asia, as in the course of period under review.'<sup>303</sup> British India could not manage its security on the north-western frontier easily against a hostile Afghanistan - and an ambitious Bolshevik power. Friendship and co-operation with the first seemed to be essential for India, also for its internal situation.

The Amir's pan-Islamic ambitions were frustrated as much by the failure of the *hijrat* as by the Bolshevik advances in Central Asia in the course of the year 1920 when Khiva, Ferghana, Turkestan and Bokhara became dependent upon Moscow.<sup>304</sup> Though the Amir refused to get involved in the Khilafat issue and plans for tribal risings after the *hijrat* failed, he continued to tolerate efforts by his associates to probe public opinion on the issue of taking on the position of *Khalifa*.<sup>305</sup> Whether or not his position was practical or feasible, it may still have helped him to raise his international stature and force the British to consider the potential implications of the Amir forging an alliance with other Muslim powers.

### *Legacy for India*

Now that the tide had turned, the British appeared on the winning side since all who had been engaged in the mobilization of the exodus stood discredited. People returned 'disgusted at the treatment they received in Afghanistan and talked bitterly of the deception practised by their Mullahs'<sup>306</sup>. The Khilafatists continued their efforts to send another party to Afghanistan in September and actively canvassed for their plan in Delhi.<sup>307</sup>

But not to much avail. The tribes on the Indian side were by then well aware of the real situation in Afghanistan. When tribal representatives from the British side of the tribal belt came to Jalalabad for a meeting, a *jirga*, they were impressed by the large number of emigrants. The general mood was described as 'most gloomy and repentant'. Peace was said to be certain now.<sup>308</sup>

Repentance was what the British most gladly accepted. It suited them well that the turn of events had enabled them to teach the rural frontier population a lesson at the hands of the Afghans. The effect of the movement which originally was designed to challenge British authority and control over India, or at least in the Frontier Province and its vicinity, served to consolidate it, to dishearten the opponents to British rule and to confuse the common man about his allegiances towards the British or to the Mullah. Other sources of authority like the tribal chiefs or local feudal lords stood on the sidelines during the campaign with little means at their disposal to influence the situation. The Mullahs were able to blackmail a large part of the hesitating people through arguments pressing the religious duty of doing *hijrat*. The Khilafatists were able to benefit from this for the purpose of strengthening their own campaign and establishing their network of political activism.

The reference to peace was also most crucial in this connection. The failure of the campaign made it less likely that Afghanistan could risk jumping into another military adventure against British India in the spirit of the 1919 campaign when distraction from internal disorder had appeared to be the major objective. The two major motivations of the emigration, Afghan bullying tactics and Islamic-cum-civil discontent, stood defeated. The British position both in the region and among the Muslims in India looked stronger than before.

The nationalist movement, or, more precisely, the leadership of the Indian National Congress, was most unhappy with the whole episode, despite the collaboration of a part of the Khilafat organisation. If Congress found it hard to persuade its Hindu leaders, who were important to maintain close contact with the majority Hindu population in India, to support the cause of the *khilafat*, it was almost impossible to make them see the wisdom of the *hijrat*. A commentary from the newspaper *Leader* from Allahabad of 7 May clearly shows the reasoning of more conservative public opinion.<sup>309</sup> Only Gandhi, who felt that the *hijrat* threatened his tenuous alliance with Muslim leaders, made desperate efforts to argue a certain rationality of the *hijrat*. The end of the *hijrat* came as a relief to Congress. The Allahabad Congress session in December 1920 clearly reflected these mixed feelings. The abstention of a large number of delegates while voting on the civil disobedience resolution made it clear that many Congress delegates had become doubtful about the close alliance with Muslim leaders and the Islamic clergy.<sup>310</sup>

Yet also in India there was a cumulative, long-term effect which benefited the nationalist movement, less on the all-India level, more on the regional level of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab provinces and the Sindh area which was elevated to the status of a separate province in 1935. Local politicians tried their political skills, learned their trade of coordination and logistics which was put to use in later campaigns. The most prominent reference in this context is the example of Abdul Ghaffar Khan who himself participated in the *hijrat*. He later emerged as the political leader of the Indian Pakhtuns in the course of

the Red Shirt movement which he started 1929/1930. He made repeatedly clear that his movement relied on a number of people who had been active in the *hijrat* and the Khilafat campaigns in the frontier region as well as on the political experience gained during the campaign.<sup>311</sup> Apparently, local politicians made a name for themselves by leading a *qafila* or caravan of *muhajirin*. Ghaffar Khan led one of the caravans of the *muhajirin*, the seventeenth which included 500 people and passed through the tribal agency controlled by his mentor, the Haji of Turangzai.<sup>312</sup> The two had earlier conducted a movement to establish free schools independent from government and geared to Islamic education, the so-called *Azad* Schools. During this time, both were in contact with Obeidullah Sindhi. Ghaffar Khan was received by the Amir for an interview in which he was said to have agreed with Amanullah 'that it was futile to run away and take shelter in Afghanistan or any other country.' After his return from Afghanistan, he founded the *Anjuman-i-Islah-e-Afaghina* to tackle 'the various defects in the social life of our people.'<sup>313</sup>

The technique of the political campaign in the Frontier Province among the tribal population was later perfected by Ghaffar Khan and imaginatively applied by his *khuda-e-khidmatgaran*, or Servants of God. Images and imaginations of harsh and anti-Islamic British rule were painted to mobilise the common man. Rumours and social pressure were used to ostracise people who hesitated to participate in the campaign.<sup>314</sup> What they did was neither original nor unusual for a political movement. But they relied on a certain tradition where the elite and the masses in the frontier regions had trained political responses during the *hijrat* campaign.

Official policies for the Frontier Province were equally influenced by the widespread unrest and insecurity in the province in 1919/20. Besides the *hijrat* campaign there was local unrest which led to the establishment of local pockets of influence of the 'Provisional Government of India', apparently under Afghan influence.<sup>315</sup> The movement collapsed with the arrest of its leaders 'but the neighbouring Black Mountain tribes, having been persuaded that they were invulnerable to rifle fire,' burnt and sacked some British posts until they were harshly convinced of their mortality through severe gun fire followed by aerial bombings.<sup>316</sup> There were repeated raids from the trans-border tribes, as those living in the independent territories were called, on British Indian territory. The official report counted 41 raids. The British availed of this opportunity to extend their sovereignty to the tribal area of the Mahsuds, permanently annexing part of their territory under the pretext of punishing them for frequent raids. The intense unrest in 1919/20, combined with what the British saw as the new and far-reaching Bolshevik challenge, made the defence of the north-west frontier extremely precarious. 'The structure of peace and order which had been built up so carefully in forty years collapsed rapidly.'<sup>317</sup> When in 1922 a commission led by the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, Bray, inquired into the proposition to re-amalgamate the Frontier province with

the Punjab he rejected this proposal firmly. On the contrary, he suggested to extend the constitutional reforms enjoyed by the rest of British India since 1919 to the Frontier: 'If the Pathan nationality is allowed self-determination and given scope for that self-development within the Indian Empire under the Reforms Scheme after which it is now striving, we are assured that with a contented frontier population India can face with calm resolution the future that the frontier has in store for her.' He refused to contemplate the prospects on the frontier if an attempt were made to crush the Pathan's will for self-determination.<sup>318</sup> An influential section of the British establishment maintained that the widespread unrest was facilitated by the lack of political options to articulate dissent. The reasoning was that self-rule by the local elite was as essential to preventing archaic opposition like the *hijrat* movement or the *mujahidin* risings as was the buttressing of the military fortifications of the frontier.

### Evaluation attempt

The *hijrat* proved to be a many-sided event. In line with the assumption which was laid out by, amongst others, Paul Brass that group identities in South Asia are characterised by competing loyalties,<sup>319</sup> one cannot fail to note that the *hijrat* was indeed tied into both parallel and competing networks of loyalties.

### *A religious affair?*

Previous assessments of the *hijrat* have fallen considerably short of explaining the complexity of the phenomenon. The main emphasis of the conventional evaluation has been on the religious aspect.

Beginning with the British commentators, the religious aspect was found most intriguing. The official annual report *India in 1920* stated that 'the *Hijrat*, or migration from one country to another for religious reasons has played a considerable part in Muslim history; but its revival in the present year of grace presented to the student of politics a phenomenon at once remarkable and tragic'<sup>320</sup>.

Gail Minault picked up on the religious aspect and contributed to the myth that the Khilafat Committee had little influence or control over the *hijrat* when she stated, that 'the most eloquent example of the influence of religious figures over the Muslim populace, however, was the *Hijrat* movement in the summer of 1920. As a method of protest against British policy toward the *khilafat*, *hijrat*, in this case, migration to Afghanistan, had been discussed at various Khilafat meetings, but was generally disapproved on the grounds that such action could only weaken the Muslim cause in India'<sup>321</sup>.

Though Qureshi attempted to give a balanced assessment, he also tilted towards the 'pious ... intentions' of the organizers, thus emphasising the primary religious motive. While he gave due credit to the 'machinations of Afghan diplomacy' and the political 'leaders who encouraged' the movement, the *ulama* stand out in his account as the main driving force behind the campaign.<sup>322</sup> Baha stressed that 'the Muslim religio-political leadership, being unaware of the practical realities, exploited the religious feelings of the Muslims to such an extent that they awakened forces which they could not control; a sad commentary on their leadership'<sup>323</sup>.

Mushirul Hasan, a distinguished writer on the history of Indian Islam, called the *hijrat* 'a spontaneous outburst of religious fervour'<sup>324</sup>.

The authors also tended to see the campaign as an isolated incident and focused on its failure without sufficiently addressing the consequences for local and regional politics.<sup>325</sup>

Though not explicitly stated, these arguments have led readers to interpret the *hijrat* as a precursor of Muslim nationalism, a line of thinking which in retrospect interprets Indian Muslim history as a succession of events inevitably leading up to the creation of the state of Pakistan. Keeping in view the close co-operation between the Khilafat and civil disobedience campaign on one hand and the *hijrat on the other, as demonstrated here*, such an approach might be difficult to sustain. There is no doubt that the religious factor was important, but it was not the only element in the campaign. And, given the way a movement is built up one may doubt whether there is a significant difference between a secular political and a religious movement. In both cases a cause is conceived by certain political activists. Then it depends on their capability and resources whether and to what extent they can spread the cause among a sufficient number of people. Whether the idea catches on is determined by the responsiveness of the people. But unless it is tied to their problems of daily survival, an abstract cause is seldom convincing enough to create a spontaneous following. Now a certain amount of organisation is required. Local elites have to be convinced of the righteousness of the cause and in turn they have to do some arm-twisting to convince or coerce local people by all kinds of blackmail, often moral, threatening them with the most dire consequences in case they do not join the campaign.

How does a religious campaign differ from that? It differs on the nature of the issue at stake and the level of its emotiveness. In a religious society social pressure is strong to perform the rituals or at least not to be seen as openly disobeying the commandments of the religion. In the case of the *hijrat* most of the spade work was no doubt done by the Mullahs, the village preachers. But there is not much evidence that evoking the religious cause of *hijrat* was sufficient to send people running to Afghanistan. There were other, more emotive elements, or incidents which translated to the masses that the threat to Islam and to their way of life was real. Apparently rumours played the most crucial

role here. When the villagers were threatened with letting British or fierce soldiers loose on them and being forced to provide women for them, the threat became real. For the more thinking, the alleged bombing of the Holy Places and their occupation became the turning point. Threats by the Mullahs that their families would meet with great misfortunes<sup>326</sup> also were 'helpful' to get people out. The shooting incident at Kacha Garhi in which two *muhajirin* died was a similar catalyst. Once the movement had gained momentum it became easier to raise a following. It had gained wide recognition and legitimacy among the locals and it became a matter of pride and reputation to jump on the bandwagon.

This mechanism little if at all hinged on religiosity. The fear for their lives, both material and spiritual, proved to be decisive instead.

### *Lack of leadership*

Some analysts betray their illusions about the *hijrat* when they argue that one of the major causes of its failure was the lack and inadequacy of the Muslim leadership.<sup>327</sup> This presumes that the *hijrat* could have been successful but for the right kind of leadership. It makes the *hijrat* look as if it was a noble and commendable effort frustrated by self-seeking or incompetent leaders. What could a better-led and organised *hijrat* have achieved in terms of political gains? Had it been confined to a tempered elite exercise it would not have stirred much of the political establishment in British India or elsewhere. The idea of an elite movement also failed for economic reasons. The urban elite apparently detested the poor living conditions in Afghanistan and the landed elite had no intention to alienate its landed property permanently.<sup>328</sup>

Without the mobilization of the masses, the *hijrat* would not have left a significant mark on the political landscape. Yet, the masses would not have been roused so easily had it not been for the highly emotive issues of their religion being allegedly in danger. Zafar Ali Khan's reference to the non-co-operation movement<sup>329</sup> suggests that Khilafatists like him may have hoped to use the movement to provide steam to non-co-operation among the Muslim masses, to put maximum pressure on the British. He did not see - or did not want to - that recourse to religious mobilisation placed many inherent limitations on the movement. Where as the British feared it would be difficult to control the situation, the leaders of the movement themselves were sidelined by the events and spontaneous mass reactions.

### *Local political culture*

Most analysts and historians suggest that the Muslim leaders and nationalist politicians largely resisted a radical and final endorsement of *hijrat*.<sup>330</sup> How then should it be explained that the movement on the ground was stirred up, led and firmly controlled by local activists both Mullahs and Khilafatists. Did they disobey the orders of their national leaders? Here, one has to turn the lights on the local political culture and the tradition of resistance to British rule.

The question which should be asked here is, who was instrumental in organising the movement on the ground and how was it done. The Frontier area of British India had long developed a unique culture of resistance. Here one has to mention the crucial role of the Mullah. There was also a local tradition of techniques of resistance, some of them peculiar to the Frontier and some shared in other parts of India and Asia. Besides methods such as the *hartal*, the *satyagraha*, the role of rumours, often deliberate, of travelling lay theatre groups, of martial music and satirical couplets has to be considered here.

Unlike other parts of India, or, for that matter, the Islamic world, the local Mullah or preacher in the Frontier Province was often inclined to radical politics. He used to serve as a go-between with the Afghan authorities for which he received regular allowances. Some Mullahs got involved in reforming or educational efforts like the Haji of Turangzai. Yet again, he also was a local organiser of unrest. Presumably this had to do with their central social and cultural position in the area. His weekly speech to the village people at the prayer congregation on Fridays was a powerful instrument, an advantage not shared by many competitors for political weight. Given the widespread lack of information and knowledge beyond tribal affairs, the Mullah was one of the few village people who kept in regular contact with other Islamic institutions and therefore with the outside world, though often his ignorance was by no means less than that of the local population.

For long, the local Mullah had been an important agent in local politics who often took upon himself to articulate tribal demands or who called the tribesmen into action against what was perceived as the un-Islamic rule of the *firangi*, the fair-headed Englishman. The process of the formation of local political authority was spontaneous and fluid. The only clear sign posts were enmity towards British rule and the desire on the part of the Mullah to maximise local political control, to reign unchallenged over his tribal disciples in matters of spiritual and, if possible, worldly authority. Other references were far more ambiguous. There was apprehension towards the Hindus and their political organisations. And there was competition for influence with tribal leaders. In the process of establishing control the Mullahs were not choosy about which references to use to mobilise local support. Racial stereotypes about the fair-

headed Englishman were as welcome as orthodox Islamic injunctions or superstitious traditions revering local Saints, tombs or other religious objects.

A second group consisted of local political activists who wanted to make a name for themselves. They clearly understood the role of the Mullah and of Islamic references. But their primary concern was political, not religious power. They knew that they had to fall in line with the Islamic or political leadership somewhere higher up, but only to a certain extent. Guidelines on national issues like the Khilafat movement were translated by them into the local political idiom. It is therefore no surprise that the Central Khilafat Committee tried to keep aloof from *hijrat* while local functionaries of the Khilafat movement evinced revolutionary zeal in converting peasants to go on *hijrat*.

Some analysts did not take full notice of these local networks. Due to its peculiar methods the local effort backing up the *hijrat* campaign was apparently underestimated. So it happened that the *hijrat* was not noticed as an important stage for local political mobilisation. Strangely enough, and at the same time quite understandable, the failure of the movement did not influence the activists' standing negatively. They could successfully shelter behind the banning order of the Amir and religious arguments. What survived was their network.

The *hijrat* shared this local tradition of resistance with other local movements like the tribal risings, the skirmishes of the *mujahidin* and the episode of the 'Provisional Government'. For the British, this local culture of resistance was primarily confusing and irritating. A government report of 1937 described the climate in which the *mujahidin* resistance existed. It reflected the British uneasiness about the ambivalence of its religious connotation:

'As a fighting force the *Mujahidin* do not constitute a danger. As an enemy in the field they may safely be ignored. They remain however a source of constant annoyance as the colonies are hot-beds of intrigue, safe asylum for murderers, *ghadarites* and disaffected Indians, and centres from which emissaries are sent to incite the tribes whenever occasion offers.'<sup>331</sup>

The *hijrat* episode was also highly educative about the stereotypes which ruled British responses to political and social conflict in India. Most stunning was the way in which the whole affair was treated as a natural calamity more than a political disaster. This flowed from the racist concepts of British policy believing in the natural, biological superiority of the English over the native races. Local populations, particularly tribes and the like, were seen as species, interesting, but wild, and in need to domesticate yet as every species of wild life, precious and to be preserved. So if you treat them well and with understanding you will be rewarded by their unflinching loyalty. To British officers on the ground religious fervour remained immensely irritating by its irrationality since it does not lend itself easily to calculation along the lines known to the British administrative mind. He obviously believed that religious fanaticism cannot be controlled and any action resulting from it will know no bounds and limits. A

conflagration of unrest and resistance to British rule in India and elsewhere, in fact, to the rule of the Christian West over the East, was feared. This spoke of the most unstable nature of the reigning order and admitted to the fallacy of its logic and justification. At the same time there was also present an element of envy and admiration that the people of the East are still capable of deeply felt religiosity which was hard to come by in the West by then.

This time the British succeeded to avert a negative repercussions beyond the local crisis. However, on second thought, the local political scene was not so much isolated as the British could have wished.

One thing that strikes the eye here was the much stronger than expected challenge to the loyalty of the Indian soldiers and police. Had the movement been sustained just a little longer or had the Afghan side ventured into this episode not so light-heartedly but with some more preparation, one is tempted to believe that it would have had much graver consequences. The loyalty of Muslim peasantry in the north-west and probably beyond could have been tested beyond restraint. Widespread disruption of public life in northern India could have ensued resulting in a violent conflagration of discontent. It would then have been difficult to restore Muslim trust in the British order with profound effects for the constitutional process. The fatal Hindu-Muslim schism of the following years might have been avoided. Grant's tact and understanding, therefore, served the interests of the British empire much better than the bullying tactics of the military or the Central Government in Delhi.

### *Millenarian hopes*

But the emigrants did not only move to Afghanistan under the cloud of a threat real or imagined. The mobilisation also drew much strength from a promise of a better life which is called here the millenarian aspect of the movement.<sup>332</sup> These were the hopes of the village poor who wanted to escape the miseries of their daily plight and move to the 'promised land' with all its attractions indescribable though they were. The appeal of a harmonious community of settlers was an old Islamic ideal from the days of Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam.

These hopes were not so much spread deliberately as they crept into the perceptions of the people intuitively. Even keeping in view the modest promises which the Afghans made to the emigrants for their support in Afghanistan in the beginning, these hopes were by and large founded on imagination, for they far exceeded the commitment made by the Afghans.

These hopes resulted from the element of social protest in the movement. Not directed against any particular wrong it was a desire to lighten the burden of their daily lives. In this aspect, the *hijrat* partly falls into the category of archaic social and political protest first systematically treated in 1959 by E. J. Hobsbawm in his 'Primitive Rebels'<sup>333</sup>.

Also, the framework published in 1976 by J. C. Scott in his 'Moral Economy of the Peasant' would partly be applicable here. It made the element of subsistence level survival a crucial factor in determining rural unrest motives and conduct.<sup>334</sup> At the same time, the *hijrat* does not totally fit in these frameworks. It differs from the archaic protest analyzed by Hobsbawm inasmuch as it was not directed against any particular act of rural or agrarian policy which could not be tolerated. Even if rural discontent underlay the *hijrat* as well, as analyzed by the provincial administration of the Frontier,<sup>335</sup> this aspect remained vague and unmeasurable. The social aspect of the *hijrat* might even have been thought up in the British reports since it seemed to the administration the most plausible. No particular social cause of dissatisfaction was mentioned in any of the documents or reports. There is some vague evidence that social aspects played a role in the expectations of the emigrants for a better life in Afghanistan. The issues of land allotment and cultivation regularly recurred in the reporting and documents on the settlement of the Indian emigrants in Afghanistan. For a certain section of the emigrants the hope for agricultural land seems to have been a major driving force. The failure of the Afghan authorities to solve this issue anywhere satisfactorily was a major contributing cause to the speedy disillusionment of the emigrants with their host country.

However, the more the *hijrat* progressed and reached massive proportions, the more members from 'important Pakhtun agricultural classes including persons of good family who are leaving their lands uncultivated'<sup>336</sup> joined the movement. The element of social protest was becoming increasingly camouflaged. It could no longer be tied down to any specific social strata or issue. Taking up Scott's model of explanation one would have to expand on the moral component. Scott argues that the moral performance of the elites was judged by the peasants against the extent to which they invaded the peasant's reserves of subsistence and provided for his maintenance in times of dearth.<sup>337</sup> For the conditions under which peasants from the Frontier participated in the *hijrat* this statement has to be rephrased. If according to Scott the peasant prefers the security of ensured subsistence to the prospect of profit or loss, the emigrants preferred a *dignified* subsistence where beyond their material subsistence their moral subsistence and integrity was ensured and inviolate. The indignity of the participation of Indian Muslim soldiers in the war against the Muslim Ottoman power and the subsequent British denial of what they considered just and moral treatment to both Turkey and the Indian Muslims, with the rumoured perspective of further anti-Islamic violations of their cultural and personal sphere as mentioned above, was considered an *invasion of their moral reserves*. It was therefore not so much their social deprivation in absolute terms as their perceived moral deprivation which led them into action.

### *Exodus and avoidance protest*

The technique of exodus was by no means unique. Other cases were mentioned by Qureshi. He noted that voluntary exodus was not peculiar to Islam quoting more ancient cases like the Plebeians to secure rights from the Patricians of Ancient Rome, the planned flight of the Israelites, the withdrawal of the Puritan Fathers from England and the emigration of Doukhobors from Russia.<sup>338</sup>

Ever since Hobsbawm and Scott analyzed fringe forms of social rural protest interest in the form of avoidance protest remained alive. The *Journal of Peasant Studies* published in 1986 a number of articles devoted to this subject that emanated from a workshop on the topic.<sup>339</sup> Besides the mainly theoretical contribution by J. C. Scott it is the article by Michael Adas 'From Footdragging to Flight: The Evasive History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and South-east Asia' which covers phenomena comparable to the *hijrat* movement - though the *hijrat* itself is not mentioned. In this article, and in a precursor published in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* in 1981,<sup>340</sup> he noted three forms of avoidance protest which belong to the archaic stage of rural resistance: (1) Resistance from within, when the peasant denies the use of his labour or produce to the employer or those who are viewed as his exploiter. These include theft or intentional pilferage, working slow or less than required etc. (2) Denial through exit when the peasants leave the land of their employer or exploiter. (3) Protest through retribution, e.g. forms of social banditry like arson, vandalism, crop destruction and raids.

In the case of the *hijrat* it is the second category of denial through exit which would apply. As it was the most disruptive form of protest it was bound to attract the attention of the colonial administration and is therefore the best documented. Here Adas distinguished four forms of exit protest, (1) the transfer of allegiance from one landlord/ruler or employer to another, including to religious institutions, (2) the flight *en masse* to occupied areas beyond the state's control like forests, (3) the abandonment of routine agrarian tasks in favour of joining a sectarian community, and (4) the rejection of the peasant status altogether in order to join a bandit gang or theatre troupe.<sup>341</sup>

This categorisation makes clear that exit protest is a very amorphous group activity where various shades and combinations exist. The *hijrat* for instance would apparently not fit into any of these entities completely. His analysis of sectarian exit protest comes closest to what the *hijrat* represented. He notes that the imposition of 'infidel' rule and social and economic dislocation resulted in a marked increase in sectarian movements. Their adherents intended to register their dissent through passive withdrawal.<sup>342</sup> Yet this categorisation is not entirely satisfactory. The analogy between the *hijrat* and the sectarian forms of protest is based on the same 'flaw' that social and rural protest is least pronounced, conscious and recognizable in them. With the sectarian move-

ments - as with the emigrants - it is not clear whether their protest was *intentional* or whether vague promises of a better life merely *conditioned* them to agree to the mobilisation efforts of their leaders.<sup>343</sup>

The latter interpretation would rather suggest that at the stage of archaic group formation phenomena like the *hijrat* were *social* movements only to a limited extent. The issue of *political* formation seems much more relevant. As Hobsbawm, Scott and others have repeatedly emphasised, archaic protest has much to do with the need to deal with a new situation marked by the intrusion of a new order, the capitalist society into their daily lives. Where political participation is absent or unknown, as was the case with the Frontier Province in 1920, group avoidance protest is one of the few available political means to register their protest against the existing order. Thus the *mujahidin* movement mentioned above represented some kind of a sectarian community, a certain type of kinship politics into which they withdrew in response to their inability to participate in the public life of the province through other means. Participation in the *hijrat* also bore some traces of pre-modern kinship politics. Emigrants joined in the *hijrat* often on the advice from their tribal elders or Mullahs which represented a common variation of kinship politics in the Frontier. Where you cannot cast your vote you cast your lot with those leaving. The emigrants did not so much deny labour or produce to a landlord as they denied the British in their quality of being subject citizens by which they criticized the mode of authoritarian colonial rule.

### *Where does the hijrat belong?*

To sum up and correlate the various aspects of assessment it seems useful to suggest a more general framework of coordinates for the *hijrat*. The movement stands in the line of three traditions, or larger strands of mass mobilisation efforts which had in common the desire to wrench control of public life in India from the British. The three traditions could be distinguished by the extent and thrust of the control at which they aimed.

(1) The *hijrat* continued the line of religious movements whether Islamic or of other denominations. They became prominent in the nineteenth century and symbolised the desire to regain *cultural control*, which apparently included such diverse objects as symbols, language, identity and religion, in the face of the ascendance of British Christian rule over India. Other Islamic movements of this kind were the so-called Wahhabites, the *mujahidin* who followed Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly.<sup>344</sup> They shared elements of revivalism, reasserting identity against what was perceived as threats from alien and dominating influences like Christianity, or, for that matter, for some of them, the increasing political profile of Hinduism.

(2) At the same time, the *hijrat* clearly belonged to the Khilafat and civil disobedience movement of 1920-1923. Those reached primarily for *national political control*, not necessarily cultural or ritual control. But it was significant that both components, the Khilafat and the civil disobedience forces, aimed at a different kind of political control. The Khilafat program sought political control for the Indian Muslim elite and the Islamic clergy in particular, while the champions of civil disobedience were after political control over the whole of India for cross-cultural elites, basically through a secular ideology with important infusions of religious Hindu nationalism.

(3) Finally, the *hijrat*, by way of its limited north-western regional base, was a component of the formation of local politics and of regional political mobilisation, with strong ethnic elements emphasising either a common north-west Indian Muslim identity or the preponderance of Pakhtun influence in the affair. In this capacity it reached for *regional control* over the north-west, or, more limited, over the Pakhtun areas of British India and the Independent Territories.

The *hijrat* episode suggests that rationality in culturally circumscribed politics is highly dependent on the frame of reference. For the *hijrat* movement, there were three levels of reference: (1) the international or regional level, concerning relations between British India and Afghanistan, on which also fears of Russia counted, (2) the national level of politics in both India and Afghanistan, and (3) the local region of the frontier and some areas of Punjab and Sindh from where the emigrants mainly hailed. The movement seemed irrational on the first and second levels where it was considered an option in passing only. But it seemed fairly rational in the local context in which it was pursued. On the social side, it was agrarian discontent that prepared the ground. There was a clearly marked and highly localised idiom of political discourse which mainly fed on Islamic symbolism and Pakhtun pride. And there was, at one time or the other, a wide range of attitudes of national political and Islamic leaders going from helplessness, to tolerance to cautious approval leaving a wide margin of interpretation to local activists who used it according to their understanding of the situation and to their local objectives of control and resistance.

Thus the *hijrat* appears in various perspectives sometimes small and insignificant, even futile and foolish, and sometimes grand though desperate and daunting. But it no doubt enables the analyst to study the combination of various aspects of political mobilisation in a unique context and on the basis of a rich supply of sources. The latter aspect can make it a model case for analysing culturally circumscribed local movements and discontent, an issue which has not lost its vibrancy today.

## Notes

- 1 F. S. Briggs, *The Indian Hijrat of 1920*. In: *Moslem World*, Princeton, Vol. 20 (1930), p. 166.
- 2 For details, see page 65 onwards.
- 3 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*. Delhi: Usha 1985 (1946), pp. 242-243. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (Studies in Oriental Culture, 16). New York: Columbia University Press 1982, pp. 103-107. K. K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement, 1915-1933. A documentary record*. Karachi: Pak Publishers Ltd. 1972, p. 119.
- 4 Shan Muhammad, *The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record 1900-1947*. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, n.d., esp. Vols 6, 7: Khilafat Movement.
- 5 Ghulam Rasul Mihr, *Sarguzasht-e Mujāhidīn*. Lahore: Kitab Manzil 1965; Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, *Karwāni Āzādī, Manzil awwal, Safarnāma-e-Rūsi-Turkistān 1920-21*. Charsadda 1972.
- 6 Lal Baha, *The Hijrat Movement and the North-West Frontier Province*. In: *Islamic Studies*, Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, Vol. 18 (1979), pp. 231-242.
- 7 M. Naeem Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India and the Hijrat of 1920*. In: *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 13 (1979), No 1, pp. 41-59.
- 8 Lal Baha, *The Activities of the Mujahideen 1900-1936*. In: *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 18 (1979), pp. 97-168. The Indian *Wahhabites* were called by this appellation with reference to their spiritual mentor Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) whose theological concept was influenced by the Arabian *Wahhabites*. Beyond that there were not many links between the Indian and the Arabian variants. Cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*. Delhi: Usha 1985 (Repr. 1947), pp. 2-3, 191ff. See also p. 10, 31 of this manuscript; Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, *op. cit.*
- 9 M. Naeem Qureshi, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924*, unpublished London University Ph. D. thesis, 1973.
- 10 Briggs, *The Indian Hijrat of 1920*, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-168.
- 11 In his *The 'Ulamā' of British India ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 51, footnote (hereafter fn) 48, Qureshi made an indirect reference to the P&J File No. 5703/20 when he referred to rumours about alleged anti-Islamic British or Allied atrocities.
- 12 Cf. Martin Moir, *A general guide to the India Office Records*. London: The British Library 1988, pp. 191-196.
- 13 Cf. Baha, *The Muhajirin movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-42, fn 3, 23, 24; Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42, fn 4; Afzal Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali: An analysis of the hopes, fears and aspirations of Muslim India from 1778 to 1931*. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture 1974, pp. 246, 248, fn 29, 30; Ghulam Muhammad Jaffar, *Agreement between the British Government of India and the Amir of Mujahidin, Mawlawi Ni'mat Allah*. In: *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Islamabad: Pakistan Historical Society/Bail al-Hikmat, Vol. 41 (1993), p. 60, fn 6.
- 14 See p. 48.
- 15 Tribal areas which formally were left outside the jurisdiction of British India and which were ruled through British Political Agents acting as some kind of ambassador-cum-adviser to the tribal chiefs.
- 16 For the crucial years of 1919 and 1920, see *North-West Frontier Provincial and Intelligence Diaries 1919-20. Political and Secret Department*. Shelf Mark BL L/P&S/10/813.

- 17 For a more complete collection, see for instance *Fortnightly Reports for [the first/second half of each month of] 1920 [etc.]*, in the Government of India Home Department (Political) Proceedings series 1911-25, National Archives of India, Delhi.
- 18 *Selections from newspapers published in the United Provinces in 1919-20*. Shelf-mark BL IOR L/R/5/95, Microfilm IOR Neg 8136. [Hereafter *Selections UP (year)*] *Punjab Press Abstract 1920-21*. Shelf-mark BL IOR L/R/5/202, Microfilm IOR Neg 8198 26m. [Hereafter *Punjab Press (year)*]. They are part of the India Office series *Indian Newspaper Reports 1869-1939*, shelf-mark BL IOR L/R/5/1-208, which has some gaps on the Frontier province for the period under review.
- 19 For India's role in World War I, cf. Rajendra Singh, *History of the Indian Army*, Delhi 1963.
- 20 See his Fourteen Points from his message to Congress of 18 January 1918, in James Brown Scott (ed), *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 To November 1918*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1921, pp. 234-239.
- 21 For a thorough discussion of the Khilafat movement, see Minault, *Khilafat Movement in India...*, *op. cit.*; also Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, chapter 8, Khilafat Agitation in India, pp. 224-250.
- 22 For more details on the non-co-operation movement, see Judith M. Brown, *Gandhi's rise to power: Indian Politics 1915-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972; B.M. Taunk, *Non-Co-operation Movement in Indian Politics 1919-1924: A Historical Study*, Delhi 1978.
- 23 Cf. Shan Muhammad, *Freedom Movement in India - The Role of the Ali Brothers*. Delhi: Associated Publishing House 1979.
- 24 *The Comrade*, 19 August 1911. In: *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 25 Muhammad, *Freedom Movement...*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- 26 See for instance Government of India. *Who's who in the Peshawar District*. Corrected up to 1 January 1931. Peshawar: H. M. S. O. 1931. Confidential. Shelf Mark BL IOR L/P&S/20B.296/10.
- 27 J. M. S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi, 1703-1762*. Leiden: Brill 1986, pp. 186-186.
- 28 Cf. Ahmad Aziz, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*. London: Oxford University Press 1964, p. 206.
- 29 For details, see Minault, *The Khilafat Movement...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-84.
- 30 Ian Henderson Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*, edited by Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll. Delhi: Oxford University Press 1988, pp. 170ff.
- 31 Maulana Abu Kalam Azad, *Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jazirat al-Arab, passim*. English translation, Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, *Khilafat and Jazirat al-Arab* (Bombay: Central Khilafat Committee 1920).
- 32 Cf. Minault, *The Khilafat Movement...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-96.
- 33 *The Muslim Outlook*, 12 August 1920, p. 6.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 *Ibid.* [Muhammad Ali's translation of the Quran].
- 36 Quoted after Mushirul Hasan, Introduction - The Khilafat Movement: A Reappraisal. In: M. Hasan (ed), *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*. Delhi: Manohar 1985, p. 6.
- 37 Sir Shafi's diary, dated 24 October 1920, quoted in: Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240.

- 38 See various statements by Gandhi in the course of 1920, in: *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (hereafter: *CW*, Volume No.), Vols. XVII, XVIII. Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1968, 1965.
- 39 See the statement by Secretary of State for India, Montague, in the House of Commons on 20 August 1917, in which he announced a policy 'of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development to self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of Responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'. Quoted in: Shan Mohammad, *The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record 1900-1947* (hereafter: *IMDR*, volume number), Vol 5. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan 1982, p. 101.
- 40 H. N. Mitra (ed), *Indian Annual Register* (hereafter: *IAR*) 1921, Vol. II. Delhi: Gian, 1988 [Repr.], Part III, p. 112(n).
- 41 *CW*, Vol. XVII (Feb-Jun 1920), Doc. No. 182, p. 457.
- 42 *IMDR*, Vol 6, 1983, p. 187.
- 43 *IMDR*, 6, p. 187.
- 44 *CW*, Vol. XVII, pp. 434-436. See also his cable of 7 July 1920 to Muhammad Ali in London in which he emphasised 'Muslim religious sentiments' and the 'fulfilment of Ministerial pledges' as the major political points of the Khilafat movement. *CW*, Vol. XVIII: 1968, Doc. No. 7.
- 45 *CW*, Vol. XVII, p. 456.
- 46 *CW*, Vol. XVII, p. 459.
- 47 'We may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or of any of the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied note.' See British supplement to Entente Reply to President Wilson of 13 January 1917. In: James Brown Scott (ed), *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 To November 1918*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
- 48 Quoted after *Muslim Outlook*, 26 August 1920, p. 1.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- 51 *Itihad-i-Mashraqi* No. 3, 5th March 1920, enclosure to *Diary No. 14 of the North-West Frontier Intelligence Bureau for the week ending the 1st April 1920* [hereafter: *FID + No. of issue + date on which week ended*]. BL IOR L/PS/10/813, *op. cit.*
- 52 *Itihad-i-Mashraqi* No. 3, 5 March 1920. In: *FID* 14, 1 April 1920, enclosure, p. 1.
- 53 The statement which enraged the Indians was made in August 1919 by Lloyd George. It ran: 'The name of General Allenby will be ever remembered as that of the most brilliant commander who fought and won the last of the most triumphant crusades. It was his good fortune by his skill to bring to a glorious end an enterprise which absorbed the chivalry of Europe for centuries. We forget now that the military strength of Europe was concentrated for generations upon this purpose in vain and a British army under General Allenby achieved it, and achieved it finally.' Here quoted after Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 110. This passage was repeatedly quoted at that time, cf. the newspaper *Mussalman*, Calcutta, 5 March 1920. In: *Report on Indian Newspapers and Periodicals in Bengal*, Calcutta 1920, National Archive of India; by Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1927) in his presidential address to the Amritsar session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1919. In: *IMDR*, 6, p. 104, and by Muhammad Ali in a meeting addressed by the Khilafat delegation at Essex Hall on 20 March 1920, *ibid.*, p. 213.

- 54 These arguments were given wide currency in the *Ittehad-e-Mashraqi*, No. 5, 13th March 1920. In: *FID* 16, 15 April 1920, enclosure 1, p. 3; No. 11, 2 April 1920. In: *FID* 17, 22 April 1920, enclosure 2, p. 2. In the latter, Dr. Ansari, a prominent Muslim politician, was quoted as having addressed a public meeting on the Khilafat Day of 19 March: 'It should also be conveyed to the King that the movement started in England to convert the Mosque Al Sophia into a Church is fraught with great danger for the peace of the world and the Empire, and that if at any time the Muslims have to choose between their obedience to the Commandments of their religion, and their loyalty to Government they will be compelled to follow the dictates of the former.'
- 55 *CW*, Vol. XVII, Doc. No 225, pp. 502-504.
- 56 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.
- 57 Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
- 58 *CW*, Vol. XVII, Doc. No. 211, pp. 484-485.
- 59 *Times of India*, 14 March 1825, quoted in: B. R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan*, Bombay 1946, p. 264.
- 60 For a detailed account of this period of Afghan history, see Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1967, especially chapters 6 'Amanullah', and 7 'The Settlement', pp. 108-166.
- 61 On Amanullah's concept of and approach to reform, see also Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1973.
- 62 L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *India in 1919: A Report prepared for presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 26th Section of the Government of India Act (5 & 6 Geo. V., Chap. 61)*. Delhi: Anmol Publications 1985 (Reprint) (hereafter: *India in 19..*), p. 9.
- 63 NAI, Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Secret, Frontier B, Nos. 18-191, Sept. 1919, No. 147, Report of British Agent, 15 April 1919, quoted in: Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
- 64 The official wording ran 'that if the Afghans showed that they were sincerely desirous of regaining our friendship, we should be prepared, after six months, to receive a mission for the discussion and settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments, as well as for the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis'. *India in 1920*, pp. 4-5.
- 65 For instance, the Afghan propaganda paper *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi* rather bluntly reminded the British that the spending of £ 1,15 million sterling on the Mensheviks did not help them to advance their aims. *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 17, 25 April 1920. In: *FID* 19, 6 May 1920, enclosure 2.
- 66 *FID* 14, 1 April 1920, para 350.
- 67 For instance, the Afghan propaganda paper *Aman-i-Afghan* in its issue No 1 of 30 March 1920 called Mustafa Kamal Pasha and his associates 'lovers of Islam'. In: *FID* 18, 29 April 1920, enclosure 2.
- 68 *India in 1920*, p. 45.
- 69 Anglo-Afghan peace talks at Mussoorie, a mountain resort near Rawalpindi, from 17 April to 18 July 1920. Followed by further talks in Kabul, before the new Anglo-Afghan treaty was signed on 22 November 1921.
- 70 Quoted in: Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.
- 71 *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.
- 72 *FID* 4, 22 January 1920, para 80.
- 73 *FID* 5, 29 January 1920, para 104.
- 74 *Aman-i-Afghan* of 4th February 1920. In: *FID* 9, 26 February 1920, enclosure.

- 75 FID 6, 5 February 1920, para 120.
- 76 Due to the evasive tactics of the British sides, the talks did not resume before 17 April in Mussoorie near Rawalpindi.
- 77 FID 9, 26 February 1920, para 192.
- 78 FID 12, 18 March 1920, para 289.
- 79 *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 23, 15 May 1920, enclosure to FID 22, 27 May 1920.
- 80 FID 9, 26 February 1920, enclosure.
- 81 For a contemporary biographical sketch by British intelligence, see *Who's who in the Peshawar District*, *op. cit.*, p. 12. His civil name was Fazl-i Wahid. He presumably died in or before 1938. (Naresh Kumar Jain, *Muslims in India - A Biographical Dictionary*, Vol. II. Delhi: Manohar 1983, p. 194.) For his activities in 1920, see FID 12, 18 March 1920, para 297; FID 13, 25 March 1920, para 325/2. [Due to misnumbering, the paras 324 and 325 appear twice on the page, here: the second one.]
- 82 *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 4, 9 March 1920. In: FID 15, 8 April 1920, enclosure, p. 5.
- 83 *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 5, 13 March 1920. In: FID 16, 15 April 1920, enclosure 1.
- 84 *Aman-i-Afghan*, No. 14, 4 February 1920. In: FID 9, 26 February 1920, enclosure, p. 4.
- 85 FID 14, 1 April 1920, enclosure, p. 7.
- 86 FID 15, 8 April 1920, para 388.
- 87 FID 15, 8 April 1920, para 396.
- 88 For details, see Baha, *The Activities of the Mujahidin...*, *op. cit.*; Jaffar, *Agreement between the British Government...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-62.
- 89 Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, *op. cit.*, pp. 144ff.
- 90 *India in 1920*, pp. 12-13.
- 91 Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
- 92 FID 8, 19 February 1920, para 165.
- 93 In May, Muhammad Faiz, interpreter to the Afghan delegation at Mussoorie, sent a letter to Abdul Bari and Mushir Husain Kidwai formally contradicting the rumour that the Amir desired to become the Muslim *Khalifa*. (*Hamdam*, 20 May 1920, *Selections UP 1920*, p. 113.) In his speech on the occasion of the *Id* festival the Amir denied that he had any ambitions to seize the *khalifat* and described himself as purely the sincere servant of Islam. These denials were worded more to revive the rumours than to disprove them though the Amir probably was never serious about the position of *Khalifa*. (FID 29, 15 July 1920, para 847.) Other reports on his *Id* speech ascribe to him the expression of sympathies with intentions to aid Turkey, Persia and Bokhara in their present trouble. (FID 30, 22 July 1920, para 884) In July, the Amir floated the idea of a representative Conference of Mohammadan notables of the world discussing the conditions of Muslims, particularly in Turkey and Arabia, and to devise measures 'to protect Islam'. (FIDs 29, 15 July 1920, para 850; 31, 29 July 1920, para 914).
- 94 FID 2, 8 January 1920, para 31.
- 95 FID 12, 18 March 1920, para 289.
- 96 FID 12, 18 March 1920, para 290.
- 97 For more details, see from p. 42 onwards.
- 98 Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923*, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-146.
- 99 Official British opinion had no doubt 'that for some time the Afghans have cherished the idea of a great Islamic federation of the states of Central Asia, Khiva, Bokhara, Ferghana and Turkestan, under their own aegis'. This scheme naturally did not suit the Bolsheviks who disliked the very idea of a strong Islamic *Staatenbund* but not as the British presumed for the obstacles it created in their advances towards India which was low in priority on the Bolshevik agenda but because of its threat to internal

- political control by the secular Bolsheviks over the Islamic lands of Russia and the Khanates. (*India in 1920*, p. 5).
- 100 The meandering ways of Muslim political mobilization have been ably described, among others, by Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972; Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The politics of United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975; Farzana Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim representation in colonial India, 1860-1947*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989.
- 101 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.
- 102 Memorial dated 24 April 1919, BL IOR, J&P files 3915/19 and 1451/19, quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- 103 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement...*, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
- 104 Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad*, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Qureshi dates the origin of the *fatwa* to April or early May 1920. For the text of the *fatwa*, see Ghulām Rasūl Mihr (ed), *Tabarrakāt-i Azād*, Lahore 1959, pp. 203-206, quoted in: Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, p. 50, fn 46. An English version of Azad's *fatwa* was published in: Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*. Washington: Public Affairs Press 1963.
- 105 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
- 106 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 231. If this summary assumption is somewhat permissible for Azad's position, it is doubtful if not wrong in relation to Bari. See pp. 36, 37ff.
- 107 See note 104.
- 108 *Hamdam*, 3 August 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 246.
- 109 *Ibid.*
- 110 *Ibid.*
- 111 *Ibid.*
- 112 In the interpretation of Qureshi, Azad's *fatwa* looks more restrained. On the basis of the text from the *Hamdam* it is difficult to support this. See note 104.
- 113 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
- 114 See Bari's *fatwa* in *Al-Bureed*, 20 May, and *Medina*, 21 May 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, pp. 123-124, and his letter to the *Hamdam*, 27 May 1920. In: *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- 115 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- 116 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, pp. 47-50.
- 117 *Ittehad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 22, 12 May 1920. In: *FID* 22, 27 May 1920, enclosure 2.
- 118 *Safina*, Lucknow, 4 May 1920. In: *Selection UP 1919-20*, p. 101.
- 119 See note 114.
- 120 For these opinions and the following argument, see Bari's extensive letter to *Al Bureed*, Cawnpore, published 4 June 1920, quoted in: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 144.
- 121 *Hamdam*, Lucknow, 22 June 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 168.
- 122 *Hamdam*, 3 August 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 246.
- 123 *Zulqarnain*, 28 July 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 245.
- 124 *CW*, Vol. XVII, pp. 503-504.
- 125 See, for instance, Gandhi's speeches in Amritsar on 16 July 1920 and in Lahore on 17 July 1920. In: *CW*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 50-55.
- 126 *CW*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. No. 49, p. 76.
- 127 *Document* No 21, p. 13 of the political committee file from P&J file No 5703/20 published in the annex (hereafter: *Doc* + No of the document, page No of the committee file).
- 128 *The Sikh*, 16 May 1920. In: *Punjab Press 1920*, p. 210.

- 129 *The Leader*, Allahabad, 7 May 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920, op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 130 *Democrat*, Allahabad, 25 April 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 98.
- 131 *Ibid.*; *Aman-i-Afghan*, No. 1, 30 March 1920. In: *FID* 18, 29 April 1920, enclosure 2; *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 19, 2 May 1920. In: *FID* 21, 20 May 1920, enclosure 3.
- 132 Some reports referred to attempts by the Bolsheviks to contact the *muhajirin* in Afghanistan and use them for their own political purposes. Allegedly Suritz, head of the Bolshevik mission in Afghanistan, was reported to have tried to persuade some emigrants to go to Tashkent where they then could be supposedly trained by the Bolsheviks. Some families were reported to have fled the Afghan reception centre towards Central Asia in the earlier phase of the emigration. (*FID* 32, 5 August 1920, paras 964, 985.) About 1,800 *muhajirin* in all were reported to have made on to Turkestan of which the majority soon returned. (See for instance, *FID* 34, 19 August 1920, para 1059).
- 133 Ghulam Mohammad, member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie peace talks to Sir Abdul Qayyum, member of the British Indian delegation. In: Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923, op. cit.*, p. 152.
- 134 *Democrat*, Allahabad, 25 April 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 98.
- 135 A meeting of self-sacrificing Khilafat workers was announced at Delhi for 18 April by the Muslim paper *Hamdam* which later was the major tribune for the *hijrat* announcements. (*Hamdam*, 18 April 1920. In: *Selections UP 1920*, p. 92.) Note also that the meeting followed closely after the 16 April speech by Tarzi at Mussoorie. One source dated a telegram sent to the Viceroy 26 April (see next note).
- 136 *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 19, 2 May 1920. Another version of the telegram addressed to the Viceroy, sent by the *Khadim al-Muhajirin*, apparently referring to Ghulam Aziz, and dated 26 April 1920, was published in K. K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat movement, op. cit.*, p. 119.
- 137 *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 19, 2 May 1920.
- 138 *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* No. 28, 2 June 1920. In: *FID* 25, 17 June 1920.
- 139 Cf. Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Jaffar, *Agreement between the British Government of India...*, *op. cit.* p. 53.
- 140 Gail Minault basing herself on a note on the All-India congress Committee and Khilafat meetings in Benares and Allahabad, CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI, contended that *hijrat* had been discussed at various Khilafat meetings, but was generally disapproved on the grounds that such action could only weaken the Muslim cause in India. Minault; *The Khilafat Movement, op. cit.*, p. 162.
- 141 For the organisational network of *hijrat* and its nexus with the Khilafat Committee, see Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
- 142 Similarly, the Punjab Khilafat Committee was in charge of the administration of *hijrat* for its province. See the references to its statements on the *hijrat* in: Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57, fn 86.
- 143 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement, op. cit.*, p. 232.
- 144 Qureshi quotes the 12 July for the formal establishment of the Peshawar Hijrat Committee. It is not clear whether he refers to the separation of the *hijrat* from the Khilafat committees since the Peshawar Hijrat Committee no doubt existed since the middle of May. (Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, p. 51, fn. 47.)
- 145 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement, op. cit.*, p. 232. For the middle of July, Qureshi quotes the office bearers of the Peshawar Committee. Concurring only on Ali Gul Khan, these also include Abd al-Samad, Agha Qasim, Hakim Abd al-Jalil and Abd al-Rab. (Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, p. 51, fn 47.)
- 146 *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 28, 2 June 1920. In: *FID* 25, 17 June 1920.

- 147 On 19 June he reportedly went on *hijrat* himself and left Landi Kotal for Afghanistan. (FID 26, 24 June 1920, para 744.) He went to see for himself the conditions under which the *muhajirin* emigrated. (FID 29, 15 July 1920, para 847.) His signature also appears on the letter by the *hijrat* committee of 9 August urging the Amir to stop the emigration before conditions are regulated for those who arrived earlier. (Doc 48-2, p. 27; see also p. 65).
- 148 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India ..., *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 149 North-West Frontier Provincial Diary No. 20 for the week ending the 15 May 1920 [hereafter: FPD + No. of issue + date on which week ended], p. 1; BL IOR L/PS/10/813, *op. cit.*
- 150 FPD 21, 22 May 1920, p. 1.
- 151 FPD 23, 5 June 1920, p. 1.
- 152 FPD 25, 19 June 1920, p. 1.
- 153 FPD 26, 26 May 1920, p. 1.
- 154 FPD 27, 3 July 1920, p. 1.
- 155 FPD 28, 10 July 1920, p. 1.
- 156 FPD 29, 17 July 1920, p. 2.
- 157 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, pp. 55, fn 71.
- 158 FPD 29, 17 July, p. 2.
- 159 FPD 29, 17 July 1920, p. 2.
- 160 Doc 2, p. 1.
- 161 *Ibid.*
- 162 Doc 4, p. 1.
- 163 Doc 6, p. 2.
- 164 Doc 13, p. 4.
- 165 Doc 14, p. 4.
- 166 Doc 17, p. 7.
- 167 Doc 15, p. 5.
- 168 Doc 15, p. 5.
- 169 Doc 15, p. 6.
- 170 Doc 15, p. 6.
- 171 Doc 15, p. 6.
- 172 Doc 15, p. 6.
- 173 Doc 21, p. 13.
- 174 Doc 21, p. 13.
- 175 See page 41.
- 176 FPD 20, 15 May 1920, p. 1.
- 177 Secret Fortnightly Report for NWFP for the First Half of June 1920, Political and Secret Subject Files, Vol. 55. In: Baha, The Hijrat movement, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
- 178 Doc 37a, p. 20.
- 179 Doc 21, p. 12.
- 180 Docs 15, 17, 21, 30, 33, 50, 53, 63.
- 181 Baha, The Hijrat Movement, *op. cit.*, p. 234.
- 182 Based on the figures quoted in: Doc 37a, p. 20, for the composition of the emigrants with 18,000 from the Frontier, 2,000 from Punjab and 1,000 from Sindh. If the total was higher there is no evidence that the composition significantly varied from these figures.
- 183 FID 34, 19 August 1920, para 1043. Indian sources quoted much higher estimates. The Punjab Khilafat Committee counted 125,000, its secretary, Malik Lal Khan (1892-1976) even quoted the figure of 235,000. (Quoted after: Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, p. 57, fn. 86). It is hard to believe their accuracy given the fairly

regular non-public counting of the Frontier intelligence service and administration. Qureshi himself regards the figure of 60,000 more plausible though it still looks exaggerated.

- 184 *India in 1920*, p. 52.
- 185 *Doc 37a*, p. 20.
- 186 *Docs 31*, p. 16; 32, p. 17.
- 187 *Doc 1*.
- 188 *Docs 17; 26*, p. 15.
- 189 *Doc 63*, p. 32.
- 190 *Muslim Outlook*, 12 August 1920, p. 3.
- 191 *Doc 17*, p. 7.
- 192 *FPD 31*, 31 July 1920, p. 1.
- 193 *Doc 21*, pp. 12-13.
- 194 *Doc 37*, p. 19.
- 195 *Docs 21*, p. 12; 37a, pp. 19-20.
- 196 *Doc 43*, p. 23.
- 197 *Doc 44*, p. 23.
- 198 *Doc 58*, p. 31.
- 199 *Doc 37a*, pp. 19-20.
- 200 *Doc 17*, p. 7.
- 201 *Doc 33*, p. 17.
- 202 *Doc 44*, p. 24.
- 203 *Doc 17*, p. 7.
- 204 *Doc 21*, p. 12.
- 205 *Doc 15*, p. 6; 37a, p. 20.
- 206 *Doc 21*, p. 11.
- 207 *Doc 17*, p. 7.
- 208 *Doc 17*, p. 7.
- 209 *Doc 16*, p. 6.
- 210 *Doc 16*, p. 7.
- 211 *Docs 13*, p. 4; 17, p. 7.
- 212 *Doc 19*, p. 8.
- 213 *Doc 29*, pp. 15-16.
- 214 See page 54.
- 215 *Doc 44*, p. 24.
- 216 *Doc 37a*, p. 20.
- 217 *Doc 37a*, p. 20.
- 218 *Doc 37a*, p. 20.
- 219 *Doc 48-2*, pp. 26-27.
- 220 See page 37.
- 221 See page 51.
- 222 *Doc 28*, p. 15.
- 223 *Doc 21*, p. 13.
- 224 *Doc 48-2*, p. 27.
- 225 *Doc 48-22*, pp. 6-7.
- 226 *Doc 37*, p. 19.
- 227 *Doc 21*, p. 13.
- 228 *Doc 37*, p. 19.
- 229 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
- 230 P&J file 5411/20 *Kacha Garhi incident*.

- 231 *IAR* 1921, Vol. I, pp. 52-53.
- 232 *Muslim Outlook*, 12 August 1920, p. 2.
- 233 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
- 234 *Doc* 20, p. 8-9.
- 235 Telegram from Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State, 13 August 1920, in P&J file 5259/20, Shelf Mark BL IOR L/P&J/6/1696.
- 236 *Doc* 20, p. 9.
- 237 Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Home Department, 12 August 1920. In: P&J file 5259/20, *op. cit.*
- 238 Telegram Viceroy Home to SoS, 17.8. In: P&J file 5259/20.
- 239 *Doc* 22, pp. 13-14.
- 240 *Doc* 23, p. 14.
- 241 *Doc* 24, p. 14.
- 242 *Docs* 27, p. 15; 36, p. 18.
- 243 *Punjab History of Non-co-operation*, quoted in: D.I.B., p. 161. In: Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, p. 249, fn 331.
- 244 *Doc* 34, p. 18.
- 245 *Doc* 48, encl. 1, p. 25.
- 246 See also p. 59.
- 247 *Doc* 34, p. 18.
- 248 Text of letters by Political Agent and Sarhaddar, and of Amir's *farman* in: *Doc* 48, pp. 25-26.
- 249 *Doc* 34, p. 18.
- 250 *Doc* 40, p. 21. For an eye-witness account, see Briggs, *The Indian Hijrat of 1920*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
- 251 *Doc* 40, p. 21.
- 252 *Doc* 40, p. 21.
- 253 *Doc* 41, p. 22.
- 254 *Docs* 43-46, pp. 23-24; 50-52, pp. 28-29.
- 255 *Doc* 44, p. 23. See also p. 54.
- 256 *Doc* 53, p. 29.
- 257 See also *doc* 61, p. 32.
- 258 *Doc* 53, p. 29.
- 259 *Doc* 56, pp. 30-31.
- 260 *Doc* 58, p. 31.
- 261 *Doc* 58, p. 31.
- 262 *Doc* 53, p. 30.
- 263 *Doc* 55, p. 30.
- 264 *Doc* 60, p. 31.
- 265 On the end of the movement see also Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-240.
- 266 In the first days of July, a section of the Shinwari tribe was reproached by the Afghans for raiding *muhajirin* on the road. (*FID* 28, 8 July 1920, para 818.) Another incident where eight *muhajirin* were looted was reported for 9 July in: *FID* 29, 15 July 1920, para 873.
- 267 *FID* 32, 5 August 1920, para 991.
- 268 *FID* 29, 15 July 1920, paras 872, 874. See also *FID* 25, 17 June 1920, para 707, for a call on the *muhajirin* not to depend on the liberality of the Ningraharis to provide them with resources.
- 269 For the subscriptions see *FID* 31, 29 July 1920, para 914.

- 270 The Amir gave Rs. 30,000 from his private expenses in addition to the sum that has been allotted from the State Treasury for the Muhajirs. (*Ittihad-i-Mashraqi*, No. 31, 12 June 1920. In: *FID* 26, 24 June 1920, enclosure 2).
- 271 Fifteen thousand jaribs of crown land worth Rs. 7,500,000 in the south of Kabul. (*FID* 33, 12 August 1920, para 995.)
- 272 *FID* 23, 3 June 1920, para 653.
- 273 *FID* 28, 8 July, 1920, para 828.
- 274 *FID* 29, 15 July 1920, para 875.
- 275 *FID* 33, 12 August 1920, para 1002.
- 276 Repeatedly heat-strokes were reported. The Frontier Diary of 29 July mentioned that two Indian migrants died of heat. (*FID* 31, 29 July 1920, para 937.) Of the 14th caravan of *muhajirin* which passed through the Khaiber around 27 July ten died of heat-stroke. (*FID* 34, 19 August 1920, para 1029.)
- 277 *FID* 29, 15 July 1920, para 863.
- 278 *Ibid.*, para 866.
- 279 *FID* 30, 22 July 1920, para 897.
- 280 *FID* 28, 8 July 1920, para 828.
- 281 *FID* 29, 15 July 1920, para 847.
- 282 *FID* 30, 22 July 1920, para 884.
- 283 *The Daily Telegraph*, 26.8.1920.
- 284 Quoted after Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, p. 58.
- 285 *FPD* 34, 21 August 1920, p. 1.
- 286 *FPD* 35, 28 August 1920, p. 1. Jan Muhammad was the leader of the Sind train (see page 46) and Arbab Raza Khan of Tahkal a local notable who had earlier in the campaign received by the Amir being one of the very few local feudal chief who had gone on *hijrat* himself.
- 287 *Doc* 30, p. 16.
- 288 See for instance *FID* 30, 22 July 1920, para 897.
- 289 *Doc* 30, p. 16.
- 290 *Doc* 31, p. 16.
- 291 *Doc* 39, p. 21.
- 292 *Doc* 60, p. 32.
- 293 *Doc* 53, p. 30.
- 294 *Doc* 53, p. 30.
- 295 *Doc* 62, p. 32.
- 296 *Doc* 62, p. 32.
- 297 Baha, The Hijrat Movement, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
- 298 *FPD*, 11 December 1920, p. 2.
- 299 M. N. Roy, *M. N. Roy's Memoirs*. Delhi: Allen & Unwin 1964, see chapters 57-65, in particular pp. 436ff, 455ff.
- 300 *Doc* 62, p. 32.
- 301 *Doc* 63, p. 32.
- 302 *Doc* 63, p. 33.
- 303 *India in 1920*, p. 1.
- 304 Cf. *India in 1920*, p. 5.
- 305 *FID* 49, 9 December 1920, para 1460; 50, 16 December 1920, paras 1512-14, 1516.
- 306 *Doc* 60, p. 31.
- 307 *Doc* 63, p. 33.
- 308 *FPD* 35, 28 August 1920, pp. 1-2.

- 309 'Indians are not prepared to exchange British rule with all its shortcomings, for Afghan domination, at the bidding of a few thoughtless people. If the *khilafat* is endangered, it is so not by the British but by the Arabs, and even the Young Turks are attaching more importance to their national independence than to the commands of the Sultan. If the dark counsels of reaction prevail, Afghanistan must thank itself if disappointment meets it at every turn.' *Selections UP 1920*, p. 102. See also the *Leader* of 12 May. In: *ibid.*, p. 108.
- 310 The practices of the non-co-operation movement which to most politicians of the time seemed to be a radical or fatal breach with political tradition continued to be hotly disputed. The *Nagpur session* of Congress in December 1920 reaffirmed the resolution of non-co-operation and adopted *Swaraj* only due to the abstention of 3188 delegates whereas 1826 voted in favour and 800 against the resolution, argued that the concept of non-co-operation was almost forced on the mainly loyalist leadership by Gandhi and Shaikat Ali. Special *Khilafat* trains brought faithful adherent of Shaikat Ali and Marwaris, personal adherents of Gandhi, to the Nagpur session. The Ali brothers and Gandhi practically blackmailed the loyalist leaders by using religious references as a weapon to stir up public concern and pressurise the dithering leaders to move. Cf. Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-250; Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain, A political biography*. Bombay: Longman, Green, & Co. 1946, p. 124.
- 311 On Ghaffar Khan's use of symbols and slogans to strengthen Pathan identity in his *Red Shirts* campaign, see the comparative study by Dietrich Reetz, *Community Concepts and Community-Building: Exploring Ethnic Political Identity in Colonial India*. In: Joachim Heidrich (ed), *Changing Identities: The transformation of Asian and African societies under colonialism* (Studien FSP Moderner Orient, No. 1). Berlin: Das Arabische Buch 1994, pp. 123-148.
- 312 *FID* 34, 19 August 1920, para 1030.
- 313 Yunus 1942: pp. 141-142.
- 314 Cf. P. S. Ramu (ed), *Momentous Speeches of Badshah Khan: Khudai Khidatdar and National Movement*. Delhi: S. S. Publishers 1992.
- 315 For more details, see p. 31.
- 316 *India in 1920*, p. 13.
- 317 *India in 1920*, p. 13.
- 318 *Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee and Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T. Rangachariar and Mr. N. M. Samarth*. Delhi: Central Government Press 1924 [Frontier (Bray) Enquiry Committee 1922], p. 30; see also *Transfer of administration of the Frontier Province to the Punjab: North-West Frontier Inquiry Committee, 21 Sep 1921-21 Apr 1925*, File No. P 4749/21, Shelf-Mark BL IOR L/P&S/11/202.
- 319 Cf. Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*. London-New York: Cambridge University Press 1974; Paul R. Brass, *Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia*. In: David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds), *Political Identity in South Asia*. London: Curzon Press 1979.
- 320 *India in 1920*, p. 51.
- 321 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
- 322 Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
- 323 Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
- 324 Hasan, Introduction - *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 618.
- 325 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107; Qureshi, *The 'Ulamā' of British India...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58. Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
- 326 See Telegram from Brigadier-General Frioth, 1 August 1920, *doc* 21-22.

- 327 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, p. 57; Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, *op. cit.*, p. 249; Baha, *The Hijrat Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
- 328 For the latter aspect, see *FPD* 30, 24 July 1920, p. 6.
- 329 See p. 64.
- 330 Ian Henderson Douglas shares Ghulam Rasul Mihr's argument that Abu Kalam Azad's hijrat fatwa had soon become a dead letter since 'the Khilafat Committee, the Jamiat ul-Ulama, and the Congress were all in the process of approving the non-co-operation programme, and thus work within India began on a vast scale, and there was no longer any need to go abroad'. (Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.) Douglas further maintained that Azad 'never committed himself to the extent of issuing final or detailed instructions' though he concedes it 'had been a mistake to allow the text of that preliminary *fatwa* to leave his hands'. See also his extensive referencies for this assumption.
- 331 Baha, *The activities of the muhajidin 1900-1936*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- 332 For details, see p. 41.
- 333 E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1959. See also his revised edition of 1971.
- 334 J. C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1976.
- 335 'Non-co-operation and hijrat movements are closely connected and the combined effect of these two movements working on economic discontent is beginning to affect the police and other services.' Telegram from CC NWFP, Grant, 3 August 1920, *doc* 17.
- 336 Telegram from CC NWFP, Grant, 3 August 1920, *doc* 17.
- 337 Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
- 338 Qureshi, The 'Ulamā' of British India..., *op. cit.*, p. 41, fn 2.
- 339 J. C. Scott, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. In: *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, January 1986, pp. 5-35; Andrew Turton, Patrolling the Middle-Ground: Methodological Perspectives on 'Everyday Peasant Resistance'. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 36-48; Michael Adas, From Footdragging to Flight: The Evasive History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and South-east Asia. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 64-86.
- 340 Michael Adas, From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Precolonial and Colonial Southeast Asia. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1981, pp. 217-247.
- 341 Adas, From Footdragging to Flight, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- 342 *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
- 343 It should be mentioned here that exodus as a form of clearly intended social protest against an intolerable state of affairs was also well-known in South Asia, and around the time of the *hijrat*, at that. Suffice it to point to the famous no-rent campaign organised by Congress in the Bardoli district in 1928 in which peasants left their land, or the tea coolies who repeatedly in protest against low wages and poor treatment left the tea plantations in the Indian Assam in 1920-21. Also, on the Afghan side of the Pathan area, peasant temporarily left their homes and villages in protest against attempts to collect arrears of land revenue in 1920.
- 344 See p. 10, 31 and note 8.

## Glossary

<i>Āfrīdī</i>	: Pakhtun tribe (see map):	آفریدی
<i>Alīgār̄h</i>	: In United Provinces, seat of Muslim Anglo-Oriental College, est. 1875:	علی گڑھ
<i>‘ālim</i>	: One possessing <i>ilm</i> , knowledge of Muslim theology, or jurisprudence, pl. <i>ulamā</i> :	عالم
<i>Aman-i-Afghān</i>	: 'The Afghan People', newspaper:	امن افغان
<i>Amīr</i>	: Leader, chieftain, commander:	امیر
<i>anjuman:</i>	: Association, usually of Muslims, e.g. <i>Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka‘ba</i> :	انجمن
Bareilly School	: Islamic seminary at Bareilly, United Provinces	
<i>bāy‘a</i>	: Clasp of hands in recognition of authority, formal act of recognizing a Caliph:	بایع
<i>bait al-māl</i>	: Public treasury:	بیت المال
Chief-Commissioner	: Head of provincial administration	
<i>crore</i>	: Ten million (10,000,000):	کرور
<i>dār al-ḥarb</i>	: Land (House) of War:	دار الحرب
<i>dār al-Islām</i>	: Land (House) of Peace, of Islam:	دار الاسلام
Deoband school	: Islamic seminary at Deoband, United Provinces	
Durbar	: <i>darbār</i> - Court reception:	دربار
<i>fatwā:</i>	: Generally a written opinion on a point of Islamic law given by <i>ulamā</i> standing:	فتوی
Firangi Mahal	: Islamic seminary at Lucknow, United Provinces:	فرنگی محل
Firman	: <i>farmān</i> - Order by the Amir of Afghanistan:	فرمان
Governor	: Head of provincial administration (with more independence from the central government than Chief Commissioner)	
<i>ḥadīth</i>	: Body of traditions emanating from the words of the Prophet Muḥammad:	حدیث
<i>ḥajj</i>	: Annual pilgrimage to Mecca:	حج
Hajji	: <i>ḥājī</i> - Pilgrim, one who has performed <i>hajj</i> :	حاجی
<i>hartāl</i>	: Strike:	ہڑتال
<i>hijrat</i>	: Act of migration from persecution to safety, especially of the Prophet Muḥammad from Mecca to Medina in A.D. 622, the starting point of the Islamic era:	ہجرت
<i>‘Id al-ḥiṭr</i>	: Festival at the close of a month's fast in <i>Ramazan</i> :	عید الفطر
<i>ijteḥād</i>	: 'Exerting oneself' - Applying verses of the <i>Quran</i> and the <i>hadīth</i> to new situations:	اجتہاد
<i>imām</i>	: Religious leader, also one who leads prayer in the mosque:	امام
<i>Itteḥād-i-Mashraqī</i>	: 'The Eastern Unity', Afghan newspaper:	اتحاد مشرقی

<i>Jabal Serai</i>	: See <i>Jabal us-Sirāj</i>	
Jabal us-Sirāj	: Locality in Afghanistan earmarked as a site for the muhajirin colony	
<i>jazīrat al-‘Arab</i>	: 'The island of Arabia', the Arabian peninsula:	جزیره العرب
<i>jihād</i>	: Determined effort or struggle in defence of the religion, also holy war:	جهاد
<i>jirgā</i>	: Council or meeting of tribal elders in the Pakhtun society:	جرگه
<i>Juma Masjid</i>	: The grand mosque	
<i>ka‘ba</i>	: Shrine of the sacred black stone in Mecca:	کعبه
<i>Khādīm-i-Muhājirīn</i>	: 'Servant of the <i>muhājirīn</i> ' - appellation of the secretary of the <i>hijrat</i> organisation:	خادم مهاجرین
<i>Khalīfa</i>	: Caliph, successor to the Prophet Muhammad as head of the Muslim community:	خليفة
<i>khilāf</i>	: Against, opposed to:	خلاف
<i>Khilāfat</i>	: Caliphate - the line of succession to the Prophet Muhammad:	خلافت
<i>Khilāfatist</i>	: Activist of the Khilafat movement	
<i>khutba</i>	: Prayer:	خطبه
<i>lākh</i>	: One hundred thousand (100,000):	لاکھ
Mahdi	: <i>mahdī</i> - Leader, guide; Prophet or Saviour:	مهدی
<i>maulānā</i>	: Title used by an ‘ <i>ālim</i> ’:	مولانا
Maulvi	: <i>mawlawī</i> , from <i>maula</i> , a lord of master - used for learned Muslims, a Muslim doctor of law:	مولوی
<i>muhājir</i>	: A migrants, emigrant, one performing <i>hijrat</i> , pl. <i>muhājirīn</i> :	مهاجر
<i>mujāhid</i>	: One who wages holy war, pl. <i>mujāhidīn</i> :	مجاهد
Mullah	: <i>mullā</i> - Muslim preacher, usually attached to a mosque:	ملا
<i>murīd</i>	: Disciple, follower of a Sufi <i>pir</i> :	مرید
Ningrahari	: Afghans who live in Ningrahar	
Orakzai	: Pakhtun tribe (see map)	
<i>Paṭwārī</i>	: Village headman:	پٹواری
<i>Pīr</i>	: Spiritual guide, religious preceptor, a Sufi or the descendant of a Sufi saint. In Sindh, powerful landowning religious figure, associated with Sufi shrines:	پیر
Punjab	: <i>Panjāb</i> - Province of British India:	پنجاب
<i>qāfila</i>	: Caravan:	قافله
<i>Qur‘ān</i>	: Koran, holy book of Islam:	قرآن
<i>satyāgraha</i>	: 'Possessed by the truth', used to denote the technique of non-violent resistance and the movement led by Gandhi:	ستیه گره
Sepoy	: <i>sipāhī</i> - British Indian soldier, (police) constable:	سپاہی
Serai	: <i>sarā‘e</i> - inn, caravanserai:	سرائی

<i>sharīʿa</i>	: <i>sharīʿat</i> - Islamic law, including both the teachings of the Quran and the tradition of the <i>hadith</i> :	شريعة
<u>Shinwārī</u>	: Pakhtun tribe (see map)	
Sind	: <i>Sindh</i> - area on the lower Indus around Karachi belonging to the Bombay presidency in 1920:	سندھ
Sufi	: <i>sūfī</i> - Islamic mystic:	صوفي
<i>swadeshī</i>	: National:	سودیشی
<i>swārājya</i>	: Also <i>swārāj</i> - dominion of heaven; independence, self-government:	سواراجیہ
Tanzim	: <i>tanzīm</i> - Organization:	تنظیم
Tehsil	: <i>tahsīl</i> - District:	تحصیل
<i>ʿulamā</i>	: see <i>ʿālim</i>	
<i>ummah</i>	: <i>ummat</i> - nation, people, sect; the community of Islamic believers:	امت
Viceroy	: Representative of the British Crown in India and head of the colonial administration, also called Governor-General	
<i>wahhābī</i>	: Member of Islamic school of thought:	وہابی
<i>zanānā</i>	: Separated women quarters in Muslim household, here: women compartment in train:	زنانه
<i>zamīndār</i>	: Landlord:	زمیندار

## Chronology

- 19 January Khilafat deputation waited upon the Viceroy.
- 31 January Hadda meeting of Unity. The Afghan War Minister Sardar Muhammad Nadir Khan distributed military banners to Pakhtun tribes.
- 9 February Speech of the Amir of Afghanistan on the first anniversary of the murder of his father, Amir Habibullah Khan where he first pledged to welcome intending Indian *muhajirin*.
- 15 February (Third) All-India Khilafat Conference in Bombay produced a Khilafat manifesto and the constitution of the All-India Khilafat Committee.
- 22 February Khilafat delegation under Muhammad Ali arrives in Europe.
- 28 February Calcutta Khilafat conference, speeches by Maulanas Abu Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari.
- 14 March British Prime Minister Lloyd George received the Indian Khilafat delegation under Muhammad Ali.
- 19 March Khilafat Day.
- 17 April Peace talks between British India and Afghanistan after the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 begin at Mussoorie near Rawalpindi. Mahmud Tarzi, Afghan Foreign Minister and head of the Afghan delegation, propagated the *hijrat* and the Khilafat issue at the Landour Mosque near Mussoorie on the eve of the talks.
- 20 April 'The meeting of servants and devotees of Khilafat' where a committee of *muhajirin* was constituted of which Ghulam Mohammad Aziz was appointed secretary.
- 26 April Durbar speech by the Amir calling for *jihad*.
- May Maulana Abdul Bari writes his first *fatwa* on the *hijrat* in the beginning of the month, published around mid-May.
- 11 May Peace terms communicated by Allies to Turkey.
- 14 May Ghulam Aziz organised Hijrat and Khilafat Committee in Peshawar.
- 1-2 June All-India Khilafat Conference in Allahabad. Four-stage program for non-co-operation to start on August 1 finalised. Khilafat Volunteers Corps instituted with branches all over India for raising funds and preparing people for non-co-operation.
- 08 July Kacha Garhi incident.
- 12 July Special train bringing about 750 *Muhajirin* from Sindh arrived in Peshawar.
- 27 July Inquiry from SoS to Viceroy in to *Muhajirin* movement; how received in Afghanistan, from what classes of population, importance.
- 30 July *Fatwa* by Maulana Kalam Azad on *hijrat*.
- 1 August Start of non-co-operation movement.
- 9 August Firman by the Afghan Amir, regulating the *hijrat* and suspending it.
- 10 August Treaty of Sèvres signed between Allies and Turkey.
- 14 August Afghans closed the border for *muhajirin*.
- 25 Sept. Two British Privates who were involved in the Kacha Garhi incident were acquitted by the general Court-Martial.
- 04 October Khilafat delegation returns from Europe, arriving in Bombay.
- December Last batches of *muhajirin* returning.

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**Tab: Provincial Diary of the North-West Frontier Province on the number of muhajirin in 1920**

Number of <i>muhajirin</i> emigrating to Afghanistan via the Khaiber Pass for the week ending the		Number of <i>muhajirin</i> returning from Afghanistan via the Khaiber Pass for the week ending the	
15 May		31 July	40
22 May	34	21 August	about 4,000 (About 3,000 plus several hundreds via the Mohmand Country)
29 May	-	28 August	about 5,000 (Few hundred through the Bazar and Bara Valleys, several hundred via Kunar and Bajaur, Malakand)
5 June	24	4 September	about 1,600
12 June	-	11 September	about 3,400 (About 1,900 via Khaiber and 1,500 via Mohmand Country)
19 June	81	18 September	about 1,100
26 June	104	25 September	810
3 July	283	9 October	444
10 July	83	16 October	131
17 July	846	23 October	104
24 July	1,226	6 November	about 255 (55 via Khaiber, about 200 via Keitu)
31 July	about 3,000	13 November	54
7 August	about 12,000 (Between 6 and 8 thousand plus an estimated 5,000 via Mohmand Country)	20 November	98
14 August	about 12,000 (7,000 plus between 500 and 1,000 daily via Mohmand Country)	11 December	60 (Return practically ceased.)
<b>Total</b>	<b>29,734</b>		<b>17,036</b>

*Transf. to JRP*  
*Sec*  
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1

Telegram, No. 144-P. N., dated (and received) the 13th July 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla. (repeated to Home Department).

Special train bringing about 750 Muhajarin from Sind arrived Peshawar City station 12th July. Large crowds met them and procession controlled by Khilafat volunteers proceeded through city to Peshawar prepared for Muhajarin. Though there was considerable excitement no untoward incident occurred and there is no cause to apprehend disorder.

2

Telegram No. 1949-R., dated the 14th (received 15th) July 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla (repeated Chief British Representative, Indo-Afghan Conference, Mussoorie, and Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar).

Excitement consequent on arrival of Sind Muhajarin is likely to cause considerable *Hijrat*, possibly numbering thousands from Peshawar district. In order that adequate arrangements may be made for supplies for these people in Afghanistan, I suggest that Sardar Mahmud Tarzi or Afghan Government be urgently warned of this possible contingency.

3

No. 436-F., dated Simla, the 16th July 1920.

Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned paper is forwarded to the Home Department, for information.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 1969-R., dated the 14th July 1920. (Serial No. 2.)

4

Telegram P., No. 171-N., dated (and received) the 17th July 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla (repeated to Home Department)

Clear the line. My demi-official letter of 26th ultimo, No. 1780-R., Hijrat, and my telegram\* No. 1009-R. of the 14th instant. I strongly urge that Railway

authorities should refuse on technical grounds to provide any more special trains for emigrants as a serious situation is likely to result if any more special trains arrive at Peshawar.

5

Telegram R., No. 880-S., dated the 17th July 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,  
To—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General, and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan, Quetta.

Priority. A special train recently took 750 Muhajarin from Sind to Peshawar, and it is anticipated that more will follow. The Punjab Government strongly object to such trains passing through the Punjab owing to the political effect and increase of fanaticism caused among the Muhammadans

RECEIVED IN THE FOREIGN

DEPARTMENT NO 70M

171 26th AUG.

population thereby. It is also desirable to keep Muhajarin traffic, as far as possible, clear of Peshawar where there are so many elements of disorder. It is, therefore, proposed in future to send Sind Muhajarin *via* Quetta and Chaman, which is shorter and more convenient railway route. Do you see any objection, and what notice would you require to arrange for accommodation and onward despatch of Muhajarin from Chaman? Please telegraph your reply urgently.

## 6

Telegram R., No. 391-S., dated (and received) the 16th July 1920,  
 From—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan, Ziarat,  
 To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Privacy.* Your telegram of the 17th July, No. 880-S.\* No objection to dealing with Muhajarin in small parties of less than a dozen at a time. But

\* Serial No. 5.

with regard to large train loads the objections of the Punjab Government apply with much greater force to Baluchistan which has a purely Muhamadan population, and which being very inflammable is difficult to hold once excited. Although Quetta-Chaman route is of course (? shorter) its adoption for conveyance of large numbers of Muhajarin would involve a danger, which I consider Government should seriously consider, of upsetting Baluchistan, a province which up to now has been kept singularly free of all political and religious excitement and in which so far not one single meeting in favour of Khilafat or *Hijrat* propaganda has been held. It would give hostile agitators the opportunity they have long been working for of starting political excitement in this province with which they have already a close connection as they have not with the Punjab or the North-West Frontier Province.

To come to details. I estimate that it would take at least three weeks to a month to make necessary arrangements with Afghan authorities for onward despatch of Muhajarin from Chaman. But I have not sufficient police or Civil Indian Officers to cope with the large number of these which are anticipated. My ill-paid police force is already discontented and at a dangerously low strength and I am with greatest difficulty holding up large number of resignations. The force at present consists almost entirely of very young recruits. It would, therefore, be necessary for me to ask for assistance from military not only to look after adjacent district of Chaman but to guard the railway stations at which special trains would stop, as existing railway police altogether inadequate for such a purpose and I could not possibly employ tribesmen for this duty.

The above are my provisional views. I am going to Quetta Tuesday and have called in for purpose of consultation some of leading Sardars and non-officials without whose opinion I could not give definite answer and without whose co-operation it would be impossible to carry out scheme successfully. But however successfully and quietly it were carried out, it could not in my opinion fail to have seriously disturbing effect in a province where troubles once started would spread rapidly and owing to lack of communication be extremely difficult to repress.

Presume Amir is prepared to receive and make arrangements for such large numbers of Muhajarin in Kandahar province.

## 7

Telegram P., No. 894-S., dated the 19th July 1920.  
 From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,  
 To—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan, Ziarat (repeated to Baluchistan, Quetta).

*Clear the line.* It has been decided to abandon idea of diverting Muhajarin traffic *via* Quetta-Chaman route.

† Serial No. 6.

Above refers to your telegram No. 391-S.† of the 18th instant.

## 8

No. 450-F., dated Simla, the 21st July 1920.  
Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the Home and Army Departments, for information (in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign and Political Department, No. 430-F.,\* dated the 16th July 1920) :—

( ) To Home Department only.

\* Serial No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 144-P. N., dated the 13th July 1920.

[Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 1869-R., dated the 14th July 1920.]  
[ ] To Army Department only.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 171-N., dated the 17th July 1920.

Telegram to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 880-S., dated the 17th July 1920.

Telegram from the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 301-S., dated the 18th July 1920.

Telegram to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 894-S., dated the 19th July 1920.

## 9

## MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified below were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 60-M., dated the 22nd July 1920;—

*Hijrat movement.*

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 144-P. N., dated the 13th July 1920.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 1869-R., dated the 14th July 1920.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 171-N., dated the 17th July 1920.

Telegram to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 880-S., dated the 17th July 1920.

Telegram from the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 301-S., dated the 18th July 1920.

Telegram to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, No. 894-S., dated the 19th July 1920.

## 10

Telegram P., No. 203-N., dated (and received) the 21st July 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(Addressed to Home Department.)

Clear the line. With reference to your telegram No. 2883-L. of the 17th instant, I am grateful for proposed arrangements but at the same time

† Home Department.

I must again lay stress on the fact that a very serious situation may arise if any more special trains of emigrants arrive here. There is a good deal of excitement in Peshawar City and district and the wildest rumours are credited while the last train load of emigrants from Sind made a great impression on Afridis who previously were quite indifferent. At Quetta local populations are small and easily controlled and I urge that special trains should be sent there instead. Situation is hardly likely to be improved if, as is possible, Shaukat Ali and Ghandi pay a visit to Peshawar in near future.

11

No. 472-F., dated Simla, the 29th July 1920.  
Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned paper is forwarded to the Army Department, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign and Political Department, No. 450-F.,  
Serial No. 8.  
dated the 21st July 1920:—

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 203-N., dated the 21st July 1920.

12.

## MEMORANDUM.

The paper specified below was transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 62-M., dated the 29th July 1920:—

*Hijrat movement.*

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 203-N., dated the 21st July 1920.

13

Telegram P., No. P-5443, dated the 27th (received 29th) July 1920.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

Muhajarin movement. How are emigrants received in Afghanistan and from what classes of population do they come? Do you attach any importance to the movement? I should be glad of a brief telegraphic appreciation of the movement.

14

Telegram P., No. 954-S., dated the 30th July 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali.

Priority A. Secretary of State telegraphs 27th instant as follows:—

Serial No. 13.

“Muhajarin . . . movement.”

Is there any truth in the rumour that Muhajarin who wish to return are being prevented from crossing the frontier by British authorities?

Please telegraph suggestions for reply to Secretary of State's telegram as regards Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

15

Office Memo., No. 2090-R., dated Nathiagali, the 27th July 1920 (Confidential).

From—The Hon'ble Sir HAMILTON GRANT, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—A. N. L. CATER, Esq., Officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

As the Government of India are aware, there is intense excitement in the Peshawar City and district at the present moment. This is due, in part, to the fact that Peshawar, as the place of departure for Afghanistan, receives the concentrated essence of the *Hijrat* movement; in part, to the arrival by special train of a large number of Muhajarin from Sind; in part, to the unfortunate Kaoba Garhi incident; and in part, to wicked rumours regarding the intentions of Government spread by malicious agitators. The *Hijrat* movement is now very seriously affecting the rural areas in the Peshawar

district: hundreds of peasants are flocking daily into Peshawar to join the emigration, and there is a general unrest affecting all classes. One of the worst signs is that the country people are taking no interest in agriculture; the tenants say there is no use in cultivating if they are going off to Afghanistan.

2. Apart from the Peshawar City, the area most affected is the Charsadda Sub-Division, particularly the Doaba and Hashtanagar tracts; two-thirds of the Patwaris in that area have resigned their appointments as already reported, and even the wealthy Khans are depressed and distracted. Consequently the Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Keen, has lately been on a tour through this area with the object of heartening and reassuring the people. I enclose a copy of his report which speaks for itself.

3. From this report it will be seen that Colonel Keen promised the people that I would represent to His Excellency the Viceroy the difficulties of their position, and move His Excellency to do what he could to alleviate it. I understand from Colonel Keen that the two main religious points on which they are exercised are (i) the maintenance of the Khilafat and (ii) the maintenance of the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places. I trust you will bring to the personal notice of the Viceroy the representations of these people, and that he will authorise me to tell them that I have done so.

4. Whether any further representations to His Majesty's Government on the subject of the Turkish peace terms are now possible or not I do not know: but it is my firm conviction that there will be no real peace or contentment among the Muslims of Northern India unless and until some further modification is made in the Turkish peace terms. The bulk of the people, it is true, do not understand much about the niceties of the theological points at issue: but unless and until the spiritual suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine is nominally admitted, there can be no real contentment. The feeling now aroused has come to stay: and though the *Hijrat* movement and the non-co-operation movement may die a natural death, these movements will be replaced by others of perhaps a more dangerous kind; and we shall not again secure the whole-hearted loyalty of the Muslim community until we have done something to redress what, rightly or wrongly, they consider a breach of faith, a bitter wrong, and a deep injury to their religion.

5. Finally I desire to record that throughout this time of great anxiety in the Peshawar district the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Keen, has handled the situation with an admirable combination of firmness and tactful sympathy: he has long been associated with the district, and is trusted and liked by all classes—this has been a valuable asset.

6. I am sending a copy of this Memorandum to the Home Department also.

D.-O., No. 814, dated the 24th July 1920.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. J. KEEN, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar,  
To—THE HON'BLE SIR HAMILTON GRANT, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner in  
the North-West Frontier Province.

I got back from my small campaign in the district yesterday evening. I am glad I went, for I think the people appreciated it. I saw crowds in all the villages of Hashtanagar on Thursday, and yesterday went through all the principal villages of Doaba tract ending up at Shabkadr talking to the people in each. On the way back in the evening I saw the people of the Daudzai tract at Nahakki. I will now tell you how I proceeded and what my impressions are. I was met at each place by a large crowd which showed their interest and the importance they attached to the matter. I began by making a short speech saying that I knew that they were perturbed in their minds over the religious question, and I said that I also knew that, in order to make them keener to emigrate, certain lying rumours were being spread in the district. With regard to these rumours I went through them one by one and gave specific assurances that no *zulam* of any kind would be done, and I think they really were relieved. There was rather a difference of opinion in different places as to the effect of these rumours, some saying that they were not really

believed and that they were of no importance, while others admitted that a large percentage of men who have left for Afghanistan went because they were afraid of what might be done. The principal rumour which affected most was, that British soldiers were to be let loose in their villages and into their houses to outrage their women. There are many others also, but this was the worst. I think I did something towards allaying their fears on this head.

2. Having discussed the rumours, we then passed to the religious question on which it was, of course, they who did most of the talking. I contented myself with saying that I could not give an expression of opinion on the subject as I was not a Muhammadan, and I assured them of the sympathy of Government with all who were moved by purely religious motives. At each place expression was given to practically the same sentiments, which were that they and their fathers before them had been loyal to the British Government and they had fought for us in the Mutiny, in many frontier wars, in Egypt, and elsewhere and last, but by no means least, in the Great War, and they had no wish whatever, to be severed from Government, but wish for nothing better and to go and fight again for it, but their religion forbade them, for we had a hand in taking away the Holy Places from the Sultan of Turkey upon whom they looked as Khalifa. They begged that I would tell you that they wish to remain loyal if only Government remove this grievance. I replied that I would certainly write and tell you and would ask you to inform the Viceroy. I urged, however, that this question was a very difficult one and that it was a World Question not to be settled by us alone, and that they could not expect to get their answer by return of post. I said that in matters of this kind it would be useless to expect any answer under about a year, and I asked them to be patient and not to do anything in a hurry. I endeavoured to point out to them that their two principal Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, were not, as they had been told, in British hands nor ever had been. This seemed to relieve them a little and they promised that they would do nothing in a hurry and would wait with, what patience they could, till they could get an answer. They were all very earnest and undoubtedly they are deeply moved, but I was very much struck with the absence of anything approaching what I might call Ghazalism, by which I mean anti-Government or anti-British spirit. I was never more respectfully received and treated and it seemed to me that in nothing were they more earnest than in their desire to be allowed to remain as faithful subjects of Government. I sincerely hope that some good may come of my going, and in any case I don't think there can be any harm.

## 16

No. 488-F., dated Simla, the 3rd August 1920 (Confidential).

From—A. N. L. CATER, Esq., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

To—The HON'BLE SIR HAMILTON GRANT, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential office memorandum No. 2090-R.,\* dated the 27th July 1920, reporting the present excitement in the Peshawar City and district. The report has, as you requested, been brought to the personal notice of His Excellency the Viceroy.

\* Serial No. 15.

2. The Government of India feel that, so far as the Turkish peace terms are concerned, the last word has been spoken. Both the Viceroy personally and the Government of India have, as is well known, repeatedly and fully represented to His Majesty's Government the feelings and attitude of Indian Moslems on the subject. The decisions of the Allied Governments were made after careful consideration of these feelings and were to some extent influenced by them, and it is now for all British subjects to accept loyally these decisions. There is, the Government of India think, little to be gained by holding out vain hopes of modification, and in fact the holding out of such hopes might be prejudicial to good order by encouraging Moslems to believe that agitation may still secure modification.

3. With regard to the malicious agitators of whom you write the Government of India desires you to consider whether the time has not now come for stronger action. It seems from your reports that the agitation, if unchecked, is almost bound to increase the present dangerous excitement and to lead before long to civil disturbance, which may break out at an unexpected time or place. Its continuance will tend also to alienate or terrorise those who are at heart loyally disposed. On the other hand, if some of the most violent agitators are successfully dealt with, the impression of the weakness of Government may be dissipated and this may alone prevent disturbance. If it does not, the authorities will at all events be prepared for an outbreak and be in a position to suppress it, instead of being taken by surprise, as might otherwise be the case. Every consideration seems, therefore, to point to the wisdom of prompt proceedings under the law against the most violent agitators.

## 17

Telegram P., No. 285-N., dated the 3rd (received 4th) August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Hijrat* movement. Please refer to your telegram No. 954-S.\* of the 30th ultimo. Peshawar being the neck of the bottle has received concentrated stream of this movement and in consequence has been seriously affected. Number of pilgrims that have left the province for Afghanistan up to date is about 13,000. At the outset, emigrants came from poorer classes, but movement has of late spread to important Pathan agricultural classes including persons of good family who are leaving their lands uncultivated and emigrating in large numbers. Hazara and Kohat have also been affected. Non-co-operation and *Hijrat* movements are closely connected and the combined effect of these two movements working on economic discontent is beginning to affect the police and other services. Kacha Garhi incident, synchronising as it did with the arrival of large special train of Sind emigrants, undoubtedly gave a stimulus to the movement.

2. So far emigrants have been well received in Afghanistan but they are a burden on villages on Kabul road and it is reported that their entertainment at Jabal-us-Siraj, where they are concentrated, is on a very poor scale. It would be well to allow cold douche to come from Afghan authorities who are already showing alarm at this incursion and must, for economic reasons, put a stop to it before long.

3. Rumour that return of emigrants to India is being prevented by British officers is entirely without foundation. Strict non-interference is our policy with the result that there has been no lawlessness or disorder whatever, in spite of such exciting incidents as the Kacha Garhi affair though there have been endless meetings and processions; indeed there has been a marked falling off in ordinary crime. Our moderation will earn the gratitude of the people if and when, as seems likely, the movement dies a natural death.

## 18

Telegram R., No. 973-S., dated the 5th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali.

Your telegram, dated the 3rd August, No. 285-N.† 13,000 pilgrims are stated to have left province for Afghanistan. Is this number correct? Please confirm.

\* Serial No. 14.

† Serial No. 17.

Telegram P., No. 977-S., dated the 6th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali.

*Priority.* Government of India would be glad of views by telegraph on the following suggestions which have been made in connection with the Muhajarin movement :—

(1) that in order that they may satisfy themselves that there is no occupation or desecration of Holy Places you should offer to send representative deputation from frontier districts to Mecca immediately at the expense of Government;

(2) that daily numbers of Muhajarin going up the Khyber should be restricted on plea of sanitary measures and the surplus detained so as to give time for excitement to abate and to permit of propoganda among them;

(3) that a postal censorship between the North-West Fronteir Province and the Punjab should be established.

Telegram P., No. 635, dated the 6th August 1920.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Home Department), Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

*Clear the line.* The weekly telegram is as follows :—

United Provinces report that racial bitterness caused by the Dyer controversy shows no sign of abatement. On the contrary, Bombay report that extreme circles are making most of the debate in Lords, but the feeling that the matter should be allowed to drop is growing. Recent articles in the "Leader" and "Bengalee" take rather the same view. Pickford's appeal, which was reported last week, has, on the whole, been well received.

2. Moreover, in most parts of India political situation shows some tendency to improve, but in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind the Muhajarin excitement is still very great. The Chief Commissioner is particularly anxious about the situation in Peshawar. The *Hijrat* movement in the Punjab also has given rise to considerable unrest resulting in resuscitation of the Khilafat ngitation in violent form, large demonstrations are being held and seditious speeches delivered. The tour of Shaukat Ali and Gandhi giving instructions for *Hartal* to be observed on the 1st August has roused excitement. However, people in the Punjab generally are, by no means, convinced of the advisability of adopting policy of non-co-operation.

*Bombay.* Moderate leaders issued manifesto condemning and emphasizing the danger which may result from the non-co-operation movement. The Deccan Liberal Party similarly passed resolutions disapproving non-co-operation. The anticipated special Congress to be held early in September in Calcutta may discover means of covering refusal to adopt non-co-operation by supporting the demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops engaged for employment against Muslims in the Middle East. Recently the Council of the Indian Muslim League passed a resolution to this effect which the "Bombay Chronicle" has taken up, and sustained press campaign is expected. This would be a serious development.

*Bengal.* Non-co-operation is being urged by the extremist press but there is apparently no enthusiasm among the people. Local Government have forfeited the security of newspaper "Nabajug" which published a harmful leaflet enjoining people not to enlist as soldiers or proceed to Mesopotamia as soldiers or sailors. Proceedings under section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code are also contemplated. Other Local Governments have been warned of the leaflet and action has been taken.

**North-West Frontier Province.** No improvement in the internal situation. Mahajarin are passing through in large numbers and many departing from the Peshawar district. The Kacha Garhi incident greatly inflamed feeling. We have decided, in consultation with the military authorities and the Chief Commissioner, that Private Chilcott should be tried by Court Martial for attempt to murder a Pathan Mahajir, and a communiqué is being published to this effect. Lieutenant Hewett is not held to be blame-worthy for the death, but the Chief Commissioner presses for departmental action by the military authorities with whom decision must rest. On the other hand, Hewett has been grossly libelled in a report published by the Peshawar Khilafat Committee and he has been advised to take legal proceedings which he approves.

**United Provinces.** General disinclination amongst Musalmans to take an active part in the non-co-operation movement, but loyal Musalmans are uncertain of the results of appeals made after August 1st. Lawyers made it clear to the Khilafat Committee that they expect others to make the sacrifices, not themselves.

**Delhi.** Extension of the application of the Seditious Meetings Act has led to less criticism than was expected. The local press are comparatively restrained. Gandhi forbade any defiance of orders. Heavy securities are being demanded from the Indian press for printing *Hartal* posters advising masters and students to quit schools.

**Burma.** The Khilafat Committee decided that active participation in the non-co-operation movement was uncalled for in Burma where action should be confined to sympathy.

3. Gandhi has returned his Kaiser-i-Hind Medal, and issued a grossly improper letter to the Viceroy and manifesto attacking His Majesty's Government's policy regarding Turkey as being immoral and unscrupulous; expressing dissatisfaction at the Government's conduct over the Punjab disturbances, and inviting that he be prosecuted for causing disaffection towards the Government, though he urges the people to take his prosecution quietly. We have no intention at present of making a martyr of him and thus strengthening the movement which, we hope, is likely to fail. His knowledge of this fact seems to have prompted the manifesto. Reports summarised before of the *Hartal* on August 1st justify the belief that it was far from generally successful and does not, in any case, indicate that non-co-operation will be supported.

**Bombay.** At Karachi a disturbance occurred where boys tried to force two cinemas to close down. Some destruction done to property. *Hartal* in Bombay little different from the last, but Tilak's death gave considerable impetus. There was a meeting of 4,000 persons, and resolutions were passed supporting the non-co-operation movement. Speeches were moderate. Little sympathy shown for the movement in the Central and Southern Division except Sholapur where there was a partial *Hartal* probably in mourning for Tilak. There were practically complete *Hartals* in districts of Kaira and Ahmedabad as well as in Larkhana and Karachi, partial in Hyderabad; main centre of the movement in Sind. At Karachi Pir Mahbub Shah was arrested under Section 124(a) of the Indian Penal Code. The crowd assembled at the jail and half the warders and half the prisoners struck work. Forty British soldiers were despatched and the crowd dispersed. The troops withdrew and there were no further disturbances, though the crowd was in a sensitive mood till late in the evening of the 2nd, when the town began to take on normal aspect. The threatened further *Hartal* as protest against the arrest of Pir Mahbub Shah failed to materialise. The District Magistrate issued an order to be in force for two months forbidding interference with gariwallas and shop-keepers either by coercion, persuasion or intimidation. No manifestation of non-co-operation anywhere in the Presidency save some resignations by a few subordinates and three menials in the Larkhana District. Devji Ganji resigned membership of Council before the *Hartal* and not on account of the non-co-operation movement. Bombay report failure on the whole.

*Bengal.*—*Hartal* practically a failure. In Calcutta there was no general observance, only a few shops closed. A meeting was held at the Town Hall, six thousand were present. No general observance elsewhere, fasting or prayer. Shops partially closed in some big towns. Hindus were little effected, Muhammadians only very partially, no enthusiasm. The only instance of non-co-operation were the return of one recruitment certificate, the refusal of one invitation to Durbar and one invitation to the Governor's Garden Party.

*Madras.* Almost all shops were shut in the city, but, being Sunday, it is difficult to say whether this was due to *Hartal*. A meeting of 10,000, half of whom were Hindus, was spoilt by the rain. Nothing objectionable beyond the hoisting of the Turkish flag and a resolution approving the non-co-operation movement. Half-hearted *Hartal* in the mufsaal, a few meetings, but no disturbances reported, no manifestation of non-co-operation notices.

*Delhi.* In the main bazars the *Hartal* was practically complete, very slight in smaller bazars, totally ignored in lanes. The ordinary manual labour and traffic were not affected. To avoid application of the Seditious Meetings Act meetings were held in small village outside Delhi, and resolutions were passed adopting non-co-operation and calling for withdrawal of Indian troops from overseas. One barrister of notorious seditious reputation with small practice announced his withdrawal from practice, one head constable of indifferent morals resigned.

*United Provinces.* *Hartal* observed in most of the headquarter towns and in few others, but partial and half-hearted. Worst supported *Hartal* so far held. No *Hartal* observed in the districts. No indication of any excitement or enthusiasm. One resignation of the title of Khan Bahadur.

*Punjab.* Complete *Hartals* were held in Ludhiana, Amritsar, Lahore, Hoshiarpur, Simla, Sargodha, Multan and Patankot. Partial *Hartal*, Hindu shop-keepers not participating generally, in Karnal, Rohtak, Hissar, Jhang, Gujranwala, Montgomery, Gujrat and Jullundur. No *Hartals* observed in Amballa, Sialkot, Mianwali, Attock, Lyallpur and Muzaffargarh. Few meetings were held, resolutions passed and prayers on behalf of Turkey were offered. No manifestation of non-co-operation, no disturbances anywhere.

*Bihar and Orissa.* A fairly successful *Hartal* was held in Patna, but only a few shops closed on the main roads and others partially closed, but transacting business. Observed partially in Chapra, Gaya, Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Ranchi. Not observed elsewhere. In many cases participation due to desire to avoid worry. Meetings were held in a few places. No disturbances, lack of enthusiasm everywhere. There were three resignations, one of a title, one of an honorary magistracy, one of membership of the Legislative Council.

*North-West Frontier Province.* Complete *Hartals* were observed in Peshawar, Nowshera and Kohat where Hindus unwillingly participated. Partial *Hartals* in Hoti, Mardan, Haripur, Mansehra, Abbottabad, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. General unwillingness of Hindus to join. No *Hartal* in other towns or villages, but inhabitants of rural areas visited Peshawar in large numbers. There was no disorder. Non-co-operation movement was generally advocated, but no sign yet of the movement increasing. Teachers of District Board School in Peshawar have resigned. Twelve constables in Kohat, and other resignations elsewhere partly due to dissatisfaction with pay. A large meeting was held in Idgarh, Peshawar City, where Khilafat leaders appeared to have discouraged non-co-operation. Several meetings pressed for *Hijrat* and revision of the Turkish peace terms.

*Burma.* *Hartal* observed partially in Rangoon only by Muhammadans. There were no public meetings, no enthusiasm. It passed off almost unnoticed and the doctrine of non-co-operation was not preached.

*Central Provinces.* Stoppage of business in the Mahratra districts was caused by the news of Tilak's death, but the *Hartal* itself proved a failure except in Jabulpore and Nimar where it was partially successful. No disorder and no manifestation of non-co-operation.

*Assam.* *Hartal* only observed in Dibrugarh where a mass meeting was held, and at Dhubri where certain shops closed. Everything was quiet. No interest or enthusiasm and no manifestation of non-co-operation.

4. There are strikes of some importance at Government presses, Delhi and Calcutta. About 100 men out of 560 at Delhi still at work and 600 men out of 3,000 at Calcutta. Terms of employment, recently revised, include generous concessions in matter of wages and pension, and the establishment of Works Committee has been agreed to, but the agitation centres round demand for the abolition of piece rates. Extreme party in Calcutta supported by B. C. Pal, Nawab Ali and other agitators. Asaf Ali, barrister referred to above, is moving spirit in Delhi. In Calcutta a considerable section is believed to favour a return to work, and Delhi strikers are weakening, as the offers of assistance from politicians proved worthless. Simla is uneasy, but presses are working. Most of men in Madras Government Press and Bengal Government Press are also on strike.

5. There have been serious floods at Cuttack, Bihar and Orissa. Impossible at present to estimate, generally, the damage and loss of life. Rivers falling, but still high. Much depends on the speed with which flood subsides. Generally hoped that loss of life is not considerable.

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21

Endorsement from Army Department.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded for information :—

*Regarding the Internal Situation.*

From the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, Landi Kotal, No. 912—37-G. S., dated the 28th July 1920.

From the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, Landi Kotal, No. 912—38-G. S., dated the 1st August 1920.

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*Enclosure No. 1 to Serial No. 21.*

No. 912—37-G, S., dated Landi Kotal, the 28th July 1920 (Secret).

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. FRICHT, General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Simla.

With reference to your No. 1349—1 (M. O. 3), dated 18th January 1920, I have the honour to submit the following from the Officer Commanding, 40th Pathans :—

One Indian officer and one Sepoy heard last week that their relations were going as "Muhajarins" to Kabul. I allowed them to go home on leave and they returned this morning.

Jemadar Abbas Khan, I.O.M., a Khattak of village Nandrak, Than Akora, said his brother is a Zamindar with land and cattle. The Jemadar found excitement and preparations for departure among many people of his village, including his brother. The reasons for their wishing to go are :—

- (1) Khilafat question.
- (2) A widely spread story, in which the people believe to the effect that a large army of British soldiers and Gurkhas is to be quartered in the district and that they will be compelled to provide women for the army.

The Lumbardar of the village believes in and assists in spreading this story. Jemadar Abbas Khan says he argued with the villagers and has succeeded in convincing them that the story is untrue and is persuading his brother and the other villagers not to go.

Sepoy Bashir, a Khattak of Nowshera City, is a bandsman with 6 years service. He has got exaggerated reports that half is leaving, the reasons being the same as mentioned by Jemadar Abbas Khan together with a story to the effect that the Koran is to be prohibited in mosques. He says his people are going and he wants to go himself. I have told him that the stories are untrue and that he will only find himself badly let down. He apparently wishes to go on religious grounds so I am allowing him to take his discharge.

An officer of this unit (Lieutenant Putnam), who was motoring with some other officers yesterday, states that they met a party of about 60 men with a green flag on the Grand Trunk Road near Akora. The party of men lined the road and waved sticks and shouted with evident intention of stopping the car but the driver put on speed and ran through them.

I do not see at present any signs of excitement or even particular interest on the part of the men of this unit. The trouble in the Akora district seems at present to be confined to that district. It seems to be of a mischievous nature and if it spreads to the Yusufzai districts will affect recruiting.

The views of the Senior Muhammadan Indian Officer in the 40th Pathans on the Khilafat question are as follows :—

He does not consider the necessity for the Khilafat to remain with the Sultan of Turkey to be a very important question for all Muhammadans, but he says "we fully realise that when two men fight, one of them will probably be knocked down (referring to Turkey)". I think this is the opinion of the Muhammadans of the Regiment as a whole.

*Enclosure No. 2 to Serial No. 21.*

No. 912—38-G. S., dated Landi Kotal, the 1st August 1920 (Secret).  
 From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. PRIOR, General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division,  
 To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Simla.

In continuation of my No. 912—37-G. S., dated 28th July 1920, I have the honour to submit the following from the Officer Commanding, 2/33rd Punjabis :—

No. 683 Havildar Abdulla Khan, English School Master of this Unit received a letter from his brother-in-law on the 23rd instant, stating that the affairs in his village were in a very bad state, and on the strength of this he was granted seven days' leave to visit his home.

He returned to-day and the main points in his statement are as follows :—

Right throughout the Tehsil of Sawabi, Peshawar district, the Lumbadars, Maulvis and all the leading men are calling on the villagers to leave Hindustan and go to Kabul for "*Hijrat*"; that the Government have taken and destroyed Mecca and Constantinople, that as Mecca has been destroyed they are unable to say their prayers as they should, and that this being so, they cannot remain in India under such a Government. Great preparations are being made in every village to leave and emigrate to Afghanistan, and such men as do not intend to leave are being persecuted. This is being done with open approval and greatest encouragement of such Government servants as the Lumbadars. Throughout the country the greatest excitement and disloyalty prevails. The Maulvis preach that no true Musalman can serve a Government that so desecrates Holy Places of Islam, and that any man serving after the 1st of next month will be denounced as unfaithful and will be the cause of the greatest misfortune befalling his family. They call upon all who have relatives in Government employ to see that they obtain their discharge immediately. In consequence of this a party of ten men, four of whom came from the Havildar's village approached the Police authorities at Peshawar yesterday and have arranged for the immediate discharge of twenty police, who are their relatives. The Havildar states that he fears, since so much faith is placed in the teachings of these Maulvis, that desertions may be frequent in the next month or so.

As stated above, practically all are preparing to leave and the reason why they have not already done so is that it is stated that each emigrant must possess Rs. 50 in cash on entering Afghanistan. A number of these intending Muhajarin are unable to realise this sum as they are unable to dispose of their land and crops. They are making the most liberal reductions in the price of the land, crops and cattle but still have no sale. Land valued at Rs. 10,000 cannot realise Rs. 100. Cow buffaloes worth Rs. 200 are offered at Rs. 40. The same applies to crops. No one wants to hold land or houses in

a deserted village. The more wealthy Mubharajin finance their poorer comrades, and those villagers who have not yet left are only awaiting their turn to be helped into Afghanistan. Coloured flags, the Banners of the Mubharajin are paraded, *jirgas* are being held daily the greatest unrest prevails, and "Allah o' Akbar" is the daily greeting. The loyal few who do not intend to emigrate are being hit very hard over this exodus as they too must leave their villages when the others depart.

In pursuing his investigations further, the Havildar called to-day on an Afghan in Peshawar who is arranging for the passage of the Mubharajin Kafilas and collecting the deposits of Rs. 50. On enquiring as to what the attractions were in Afghanistan, he was informed that for the first three months the Mubharajin would be quartered in Jabal Serai where they would do no work at all. At the end of this time, those who wished to enlist might do so, tradesmen would follow their trades, while farmers would be given free land and all would live in peace and harmony. For the first three years the Afghan Government would assist them financially. The Amir wants 900,000 men from India; none are required from Independent Territory as those tribes are to consider that they are already the servants of the Amir and are serving him better by remaining at their homes. Should any of the emigrants later wish to emigrate to Persia or Turkey, arrangements would be made in Kabul for them to do so. This is also the statement that is being made known in all the villages.

On the 25th instant, the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner visited Sawabi where a *jirga* to which all the leading men of the Tehsil Sawabi had been summoned, was held. The Havildar's brother-in-law attended this *jirga* and gave the following information to the Havildar. The Deputy Commissioner asked them to state their case, and the most influential Maulvi, a man from the village of Maneri, stated from his pulpit in front of the assembly that the Musalmans of India rendered the Government great service during the European War, they were loyal, but now the Government had destroyed Mecca and Constantinople and in consequence of this, no true Musalman was able to say his prayers as he had nowhere to turn, nor could he remain in India any longer. They must go and serve under a Mubammadan ruler.

The Havildar's brother-in-law further states that the Deputy Commissioner did not contradict the statement that Mecca had been destroyed, but held out promises or reduction of revenue and in the cost of all articles sold in the district, food-stuffs, clothing, &c. The Maulvis stated that this was not what they wanted. All they wished was that the Holy Places of Islam should be returned to Turkey, and that when this was done they would only be too willing to remain in India. The Deputy Commissioner asked for a petition from them to this effect and also for copies of the tracts they were circulating. These were handed in and the Deputy Commissioner promised that the matter would be put up through the Chief Commissioner and the Government of India to His Majesty The King-Emperor, but he explained to them that the British were not the only nation responsible for framing the Turkish Peace Terms and that the other nations who had been our Allies in the Great War also had a voice in the matter. About 500 attended, including all the leading Maulvis.

Such is the Havildar's statement.

The rumour that Mecca has been destroyed has also reached this Unit.

## 22

Telegram, No. 295-P. N., dated the 6th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla (repeated Home, Punjab and Deputy Commissioner, Lahore).

Clear the line. Zafar Ali Khan, Editor, "Zamindar", telegraphed 5th August:—Begins. Proceeding Peshawar to tackle *Hijrat* problem, and obtain

authentic data regarding Kacha Garhi incident. Please ask District Magistrate to provide all facilities. I reach Peshawar 7th August. *Ends.* I have replied clear the line to-day:—*Begins.* Your telegram of 5th August. Chief Commissioner considers your visit to Peshawar undesirable. He accordingly orders that you shall not enter or remain in North-West Frontier Province at present. *Ends.* I am arranging for police to stop Zafar Ali at Attock if he comes and to present him with formal order under Rule 3, Defence of India Rules, and turn him back.

## 23

Office Memo., No. 3411, dated Simla, the 7th August 1920.

Transferred to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

No reply has been sent to the enclosed.

*Enclosure to Serial No. 23,*

Telegram, dated the 6th August 1920.

From—ZAFAR ALI KHAN, Editor, "Zamindar," Lahore,  
To—The Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Simla.

Yesterday I telegraphed to Sir Hamilton Grant my intention to proceed to Peshawar. My purpose was to tackle *Hijrat* problem by studying it on the spot and to prevent if necessary unchecked flow of emigrants to Afghanistan. I had also in view the pacification of Muslim opinion which is abnormally exacerbated by present psychological condition engendered by anti-Turkish policy of our Foreign Office. I also intended to obtain authentic data regarding Kacha Garhi incident before carrying on a constitutional agitation in respect of this tragic affair. Sir Hamilton Grant in reply to my modest request has arbitrarily forbidden my ingress into his territory. He was at perfect liberty to deal with me according to law if I had broken it; as it is he has acted in a most highbanded manner and complicated matters instead of helping to smooth. I appeal to Your Excellency as head of a constitutional Government against the repressive restrictions imposed upon me and I trust the Chief Commissioner's orders will be rescinded.

## 24

No. 501-F., dated Simla, the 8th August 1920.

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department,

To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I am directed to enclose a copy of a telegram from the Editor of the "Zamindar" newspaper to the address of the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy protesting against his exclusion from the North-West Frontier Province by order of the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and to request that the petitioner may be informed, with the permission of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that the Government of India see no reason to interfere with the Chief Commissioner's discretion in this matter.

## 25

Telegram H., No. 988-S., dated the 9th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathingali.

\* Serial No. 18.

*Priority.* My telegram, dated the 5th August, No. 973-S.\* Muhajarin. Please expedite reply.

26

Telegram P., No. 314-N., dated (and received) the 9th August 1920.  
 From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
 To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

**Priority.** Muhajarin. With reference to your telegram No. 973-S.\* of the 5th instant, when my telegram No. 2t5-N.† of the 3rd idem was despatched 13,000 was approximately correct number of pilgrims who had left for Afghanistan *via* the North-West Frontier Province. Of this number 1,000 were from Sind, 2,600 from the Punjab and northern India and about 10,000 from this province. The total now, however, exceeds 20,000 as since the 3rd August about 8,000 more pilgrims have left nearly all from this province.

27

Office Memo., No. 3449, dated Simla, the 9th August 1920.

Transferred to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

No reply has been sent to the enclosed.

*Enclosure to Serial No. 27.*

Telegram, dated the 7th August 1920.

From—The Khilafat Secretary, Bannu,  
 To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Bannu Muslims emphatically protest against order Chief Commissioner forbidding Zafar Ali Khan entrance Frontier Province. Pray cancellation.

28

Telegram R., No. 996-S., dated the 10th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,  
 To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar.

"Englishman" newspaper reports ten thousand Muhajarin concentrated at Jamrud, and that Jalalabad authorities are trying to form regiments of those arriving there. Is there large concentration camp at Jamrud? Also are they travelling up Khyber daily or only on regular caravan days? It would be useful if you could send fairly full account of arrangements and methods of migration and any extra organisation undertaken by British authorities to deal with it. Please also telegraph bi-weekly estimates of numbers leaving.

29

Telegram P., No. 327-N., dated (and received) the 10th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
 To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Muhajarin. With reference to your telegram No. 977-S.‡ of the 6th instant, I shall report result after sounding Moslem leaders on my arrival at Peshawar, but I do not think it will have much effect as some months must necessarily elapse before deputation would return to India. Some effect may be produced by message which I have already had widely circulated in which I have emphatically and personally denounced the false reports about the Holy Places.

I am opposed to any action to bottle up intending Muhajarin in Peshawar more than is absolutely necessary as it can only result in trouble.

I doubt whether postal censorship is worth trouble it involves but I shall submit further report after discussing the matter with Adam and Deputy Commissioner in Peshawar.

## 30

Telegram, No. 326-P. N., dated (and received) the 10th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla (repeated Resident, Waziristan).

*Priority.* Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, telegraphs 9th August:—*Begins.* The Afghan residents of Khost who have been deprived of their lands in favour of Muhajarin are furious and have sent to me asking if they may migrate to India. What answer should be given. *Ends.* This alludes presumably to lands given to Mahaud emigrants. We certainly do not want counter *Hijrat* of hungry Khostwals though this might sober *Hijrat* movement in Bannu which is gaining force. I propose to tell Deputy Commissioner to reply that migration of Khostwals to India cannot be permitted and that they must settle matters with their own officials. I propose also to give wide publicity to this quaint development in *Hijrat* movement.

## 31

Telegram, No. 2230-B., dated the 10th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali,  
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Priority.* In view of sensational article in "Englishman", the "Civil and Military Gazette" ask for official communiqué regarding *Hijrat*. I propose to issue following:—*Begins.* The *Hijrat* movement has assumed considerable proportions in the North-West Frontier Province. Over 20,000 persons have migrated into Afghanistan, of whom about 1,000 were from Sind, 2,000 from the Punjab and adjoining provinces and the remainder from the North-West Frontier Province, chiefly the Peshawar district. As the place of departure for Afghanistan, Peshawar receives the concentrated essence of this movement and has been consequently more affected than other areas. Impetus has also been given to the movement by the spreading of wild and wicked falsehoods regarding the occupation and defilement of the Holy Places by British troops and other malicious lies of this kind. The rural areas have been most affected and in many places people are selling their lands and crops at absurdly low prices in order to go on *Hijrat*. The situation is further being exploited by unscrupulous persons anxious to buy up land and crops at fictitiously cheap rates. The Chief Commissioner is taking steps to check this exploitation and special officers are being deputed to safeguard the property and interests of sepoys and others in Government service. There has however been no interference with this movement which has been characterised throughout by an extraordinary absence of any lawlessness. Except for the unfortunate Kaaba Garhi incident, there has been no disorder of any kind. A curious side-light is thrown on the situation by a petition lately received from the Afghan residents of Khost who have been deprived of their lands in favour of immigrants asking that they may be allowed to migrate and settle in India. Many of the leading Khans on the frontier are doing their best to dissuade the people from embarking on these ruinous adventures. *Ends.* Please telegraph approval.

32

Telegram, No. 511-F., dated the 11th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, camp (repeated Nathiagali).

*Priority.* Your telegram 2230-B.,\* August 10th. Communiqué as drafted is being issued here with following sentence in substitution for second

\* Serial No. 21.

sentence, *Begins* :—and a very large number of persons have migrated into Afghanistan, of whom some are from Sind and some from the Punjab and adjoining provinces but the majority are from the North-West Frontier Province and chiefly from the Peshawar district. *Ends.*

33

Telegram P., No. G. S.-25, dated the 8th (received 9th) August 1920.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province (repeated Chief of the General Staff).

The 2nd Division send the following :—

Many families of tenant farmers coming from the Usufzai and other parts from which recruits are drawn for many units were amongst the pilgrims proceeding to Afghanistan yesterday. The following were included :—Six soldiers and one Havildar belonging to the 59th Rifles. These had been allowed to cut their names.

These numbers have already been magnified into one complete company with its Indian officers.

Yesterday's caravan has somewhat disturbed the Punjabi Battalions serving in the Khyber. Unless measures can be put in hand to prevent migration in large numbers of this particular class the effect may become worse.

Soldiers enquire why steps are not taken to deny the rumours and punish the people responsible for spreading them, if all the stories regarding the Holy Places, &c., are untrue.

I forward the above for your information and instructions are being issued to all Commanding Officers to deny the rumours. They are to give assurance to Muhammadan troops that no British or Indian Regiments are in Mecca or Medina, nor have they ever been there. They will explain that the rumours are put about only for political purposes and that they have no foundation.

34

Telegram, No. 444-E, dated the 12th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Clear the line.* Political, Khyber, wrote a few days ago under my instructions to Sarhaddar, Dakka, proposing that caravans of limited number of *Muhajarin* should pass through Khyber into Afghanistan every day of week instead of only one day. Sarhaddar has to-day replied that there is already great congestion on road and arrangements for accommodation of *Muhajarin* are incomplete. He enclosed copy of *farman* and new rules issued by Amir on subject of *Muhajarin* and asks us favour that further immigration through the Khyber may be stopped for the present. I am awaiting original papers being sent by motor car. Meanwhile I have warned Khilafat *Hijrat* Committee and asked them if possible to stop large caravan proceeding to-day. I shall telegraph again full purport of papers and further action I am taking.

35

No. 525-F, dated Simla, the 13th August 1920.

Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, for information:—

\* Serial No. 24.

† Serial No. 23.

Letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, No. 501-F,\* dated the 8th August 1920, and enclosure.†

36

Office Memo., No. 3503, dated Simla, the 13th August 1920.

Transferred to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

No reply has been sent to the enclosed.

*Enclosure No. 1.*

Telegram, dated the 10th August 1920.

From—The Secretary, Khilafat Committee, Rawalpindi,

To—The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Following resolution was moved by Lala Lalchand supported by Bakhsh Abnassiram and carried unanimously. This mass meeting of the citizens of Rawalpindi protests most strongly against the arbitrary manner in which Zafar Ali Khan, Editor of "Zamindar", was prohibited by Sir Hamilton Grant from proceeding to Peshawar and prays His Excellency the Viceroy to intervene and cancel the lawless order.

*Enclosure No. 2.*

Telegram, dated the 10th August 1920.

From—The Secretary, Khilafat Committee, Nowshera City.

To—The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

The following resolutions were unanimously passed at mass meeting of citizens of Nowshera City. This mass meeting of the citizens of Nowshera views with grave concern the action of Sir Hamilton Grant in prohibiting Mnuvi Zafar Ali Khan from entering Frontier Province; regards it an infringement of personal rights and religious liberty. Urgently implore cancellation of order. The mass meeting also views with grave concern the treatment exercised over religious leaders in Sind for participating in Khilafat movements and strongly protests against this policy.

Telegram, No. 846-P, dated (and received) the 12th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

Your telegram \* 096-S., August 10th. *Muhajarin*. There is no concentration camp at Jamrud. *Muhajarin* proceeding on foot or by bullock cart

\* Serial No. 22.

stay there on Thursday nights preparatory to proceeding up Khyber on Fridays. Emigrants have gone weekly only on caravan days, *vide* my clear the line telegram† of to-day. Intending *Muhajarin* come to Peshawar City and

† Serial No. 24.

register their names with *Hijrat* Committee who send list and apply to Afghan Agent for pass. Meanwhile *Hijrat* and Khilafat Committees supply *Muhajarin* with board and lodging. Two hundred volunteers assist in arrangements and keep order. It is remarkable achievement that in spite of intense excitement and wildest rumours there has been no disorder or untoward incident in city. Police deserve great credit for tact and forbearance often in most trying circumstances. Except for unremitting vigilance and constant close communication between local officers and leaders of movement I have ordered no special arrangements in city. In district I have deputed one Extra Assistant Commissioner and two Tahsildars to watch interests of sepoy and other Government servants and have invited Wazirforce to send Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, all petitions from sepoy anxious about their property or families which will be at once dealt with by special officers. I suggest military authorities make similar communication other Commands having sepoy belonging to frontier districts. I have also arranged that disputes regarding land and property of *Muhajarin* shall be dealt with under Civil Section of Frontier Crimes Regulations and not ordinary law. This should check exploitation by speculators and give chance to *Muhajarin* or their relatives of redeeming their lands in accordance with tribal usage. Ugly story was spread by city few days ago that British soldiers had abducted Indian women in motor lorry on grand trunk road. Disappearance of a woman from city gave colour to this monotonous story, luckily woman was promptly discovered and story discredited. Very dangerous excitement was, however, caused. I am therefore having originator criminally prosecuted. There was slight collision also at Risalpur between patrol and party of *Muhajarin* moving at eight in which one *Muhajarin* was accidentally wounded with buckshot on leg. Full report is awaited. But as yet this has not caused serious excitement. Attempts are still being made to work up excitement over decision regarding Kaucha Garhi case.

Telegram P., No. 911, dated the 13th August 1920.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Home Department), Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

*Muhajarin* movement. Please refer to your telegram, ‡ No. P.5443 of the 27th July and continuation paragraph 3 of Home Department telegram of 9th August. At outset emigrants came from poorer classes with sprinkling of intelligentsia chiefly from towns, but movement has spread to other classes, since then. In North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar has been seriously affected, as it has received concentrated stream of *Muhajarin* owing to its geographical position. It is reported that about 18,000 emigrants have up to date left the province chiefly from the Peshawar district. Important Pathan agricultural classes, including, it is said, some persons of good family, are leaving lands uncultivated and emigrating. Kobat and Hazara are also affected. Religious excitement caused by stream of emigrants has begun to affect Government servants. One batch of emigrants included one Havildar and six sepoy, who were allowed to put their names, and there have been some

‡ Serial No. 13.

resignations from the police and other services. The Kaaba Garhi incident synchronising with the arrival of large number of *Muhajarin* from Sind in special train gave stimulus to the movement in the Frontier Province, where it is encouraged by wildest rumours alleging occupation by British troops of Mecca and Medina, desecration of Kaaba, intended billeting of British troops on villages with threatened outrage of women. The movement has also been encouraged by speculators who are exploiting rural land-owning classes, buying up land and crops at fictitiously low prices. A statement drawing attention to the absurdity of the rumours and folly of emigration has been issued by the Chief Commissioner and vigorous efforts are being made to bring all this home to the people.

2. It is estimated that 1,000 have emigrated from Sind, 95 per cent. of the main party are labourers, loafers and broken men. With one exception prominent men went only as far as Peshawar and then returned. It is said that *Muhajarin* are affected by rumours current:—

- (a) their religion was being interfered with;
  - (b) Government had prohibited the study of the Koran;
  - (c) Sunday instead of Friday to be fixed as prayer day for Muhammadans.
- Religious enthusiasm observed, but little sign of bitterness. No importance attached to movement at present which is regarded as window dressing, but rumours above being widely contradicted, and the Commissioner is endeavouring to get the leading *Pirs* to deprecate emigration.

The effect remains to be seen of (a) the prohibition of special trains for *Muhajarin*, (b) the prosecution of Pir Mahbub Shah, (c) the reported ill-treatment of certain *Muhajarin* in Afghanistan, but Gandhi's speech in Hyderabad is reported to have given some fillip to movement and much depends on success attending non-co-operation movement generally.

3. It is reported from the Punjab that some 500 emigrants have proceeded from that province, but others have gone quietly and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, estimates actual number of *Muhajarin* from Punjab at 2,000. The Punjab *Muhajarin* come chiefly from the cities, owning no land and having nothing to lose by the venture. Few agriculturists have gone from villages; up to the present no men of importance have emigrated. The movement at present is of little importance, and is likely to subside unless wave of enthusiasm in Peshawar extends to Punjab and Sind *Muhajarin* pass through Punjab in large numbers. As special trains have been prohibited, the latter contingency is unlikely.

4. At one time the *Hijrat* movement connected as it is with the Khilafat agitation seemed likely to assume serious proportions. There are, however, indications of a check. Moreover, the Afghan authorities themselves are showing alarm at invasion and for economic reasons must put a stop to it before long. It is said that they are already placing restrictions in the way of intending *Muhajarin*. So far we have not interfered with the movement, because we believe that as in most religious revivals enthusiasm would only be stimulated by repression and if left alone will exhaust itself. Emigrants will find life intolerable in Afghanistan and numbers will return disheartened and discourage others from going. We have had unverified report that this has already happened in case of some Punjab emigrants. Further, Afghanistan cannot afford to support and feed emigrants on this scale. They have so far been well received, but they are a burden on villages on the Kabul road, and it is reported that their entertainment is very poor at Jabal-us-Siraj, where they are concentrated. At the same time collection of these large numbers of emigrants in the North-West Frontier Province and religious excitement engendered thereby are cause of serious unrest and may give rise to disorder which might spread to Northern India. Besides, we cannot ignore the danger arising out of the close historical connection between the *Hijrat* and *Jihad*.

## 38

Telegram, No. 537-F., dated the 14th August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Chief Commissioner's Camp.

Priority A. Your telegram\* 444-P., August 12th, and communiqué of August 13th, from Peshawar. We have

\* Serial No. 34.

not yet received full purport of Amir's farman promised by you. Does it definitely order postponement of emigration?

## 39

Telegram, No. 540-F., dated the 15th August 1920.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Chief Commissioner's Camp.

Your telegram,† 326-P. N., August 10th. Desire of Khost residents to emigrate. Government of India are reluctant to abandon principle of granting

free entry and right of asylum to foreign subjects except in cases of obviously mischievous character. They would therefore prefer that you should merely reply to Khostwals that no arrangements can be made for their reception or maintenance in British territory and they are therefore strongly advised not to come. If after such warning they persist in coming they should not be prevented.

## 40

Telegram, No. 853-P., dated (and received) the 14th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Clear the line.* Party of over seven thousand *Muhajarin* had left Peshawar for Jamrud on 12th August before receipt of Sarhaddar, Dakka's letter saying Amir desired complete postponement of *Hijrat*. Accordingly Khilafat Committee at once despatched emissaries and volunteers to Jamrud to inform *Muhajarin* and bring them back. *Muhajarin*, however, refused to accept orders and showed great truculence towards emissaries saying that Khilafat Committee had obviously been bribed. Attitude of *Muhajarin* towards British authorities was perfectly orderly and correct as usual. Afghan Agent from Peshawar himself then went out to try and dissuade them from proceeding but was stoned and had to return. They were allowed therefore to proceed to Landi Kotal yesterday. Haji Jan Muhammad, Secretary of Khilafat Committee, and others proceeded yesterday to boundary and discussed matters with Afghan officials and returned to Landi Kotal and did their best to dissuade *Muhajarin*, who again showed great truculence calling emissaries *kafirs*. Vanguard of *Muhajarin* reached boundary at 7 this morning and were met by Sarhaddar, Dakka, and Afghan Commandant with guard of 50 men who told them they could not come on. Parleying continued for about an hour and-a-half by which time main body of *Muhajarin* had arrived and were threatening to break down barrier. Thereupon Sarhaddar, Dakka, who had communicated with General Nadir Khan by telephone said he would admit *Muhajarin* if they could pay their own expenses. They were accordingly allowed to pass through. Khilafat Committee realise that they have aroused forces they cannot control and are paralysed with fear of public who are bitterly resentful at having thus been duped. I am, however, putting strong pressure on them to face their responsibilities and themselves close down a movement which they have raised to its present dimensions. Meanwhile the general atmosphere in both city and district is

hourly improving and there is hope that this development from the Afghan side will speedily cool the whole position. There are, however, still elements of grave anxiety. If possible the Central Khilafat Committee should be moved to give wide publicity to the Amir's orders to his officials to refuse admittance to further emigrants in order to save poor Moslems elsewhere from embarking on this ruinous adventure.

## 41

Telegram, No. 860-P., dated (and received) the 14th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Clear the line.* Your telegram,\* 537-F., dated August 14th. Sarhaddar, Dakka's letter after mentioning congestion of road, &c., said:—*Begins.* Having

these difficulties in view emigration committee have launched petition to Amir asking him to order postponement of emigration movement until further orders so that in coming winter arrangements for their accommodation, &c., may be made. Amir accepted their request and has ordered absolute postponement of emigration until further orders through proclamation enclosed. I, therefore, hope you my friends will oblige by stopping caravan of *Muhajarin* until further permission. *Ends.* Enclosed proclamation orders definite postponement of emigration in Amir's name. Copies of this proclamation were sent to Afghan Agent, Peshawar, by Afghan authorities, for transmission to Moslem leaders in India and have been sent on. Copies were also given by Governor of Jalalabad to well known Peshawar *Muhajir* to take back and distribute in Peshawar. There can be no doubt of Amir's orders or meaning in view of fact that preparations were made by Afghans at frontier to stop *Muhajarin* to-day by force if necessary and it was only overwhelming numbers and threatening attitude of *Muhajarin* that gained them admittance of which Political Agent, Khyber, was eye witness. Translation of Sarhaddar's letter was forwarded to-day and proclamation will be forwarded to-morrow.

I regret delay which is due to my having had to send all papers to Khilafat Committee in original to satisfy them of authenticity. Khilafat Committee are now taking definite steps to promulgate proclamation and inform all other local Committees that *Hijrat* is closed.

## 41a

Telegram, No. 4006, dated the 15th August 1920.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Home Department), Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Following communiqué regarding *Hijrat* movement was issued by Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on 18th instant:—*Begins.* A

few days ago \* \* \* \* \* intending emigrants. *Ends.*

Following telegram received from Chief Commissioner on 14th instant has been published for general information:—*Begins.* "Party of over \* \*

\* \* \* this ruinous adventure. *Ends.*

42

No. 546-F., dated Simla, the 16th August 1920.  
Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the <sup>Chief Secretary to the</sup> ~~Hon'ble the Chief~~  
Government of the Punjab <sup>Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province</sup> for information, in continuation of the  
Serial No. 24. <sup>letter</sup> from the Foreign and Political  
<sup>enclosure</sup> Department, <sup>No. 201-F., dated the 24th</sup> August  
Serial No. 25. <sup>No. 522-F., dated the 12th</sup> August  
1920 :—

Telegram from the Secretary, Khilafat Committee, Rawalpindi, to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy; dated the 10th August 1920. (Enclosure No. 1 of Serial No. 36.)

Telegram from the Secretary, Khilafat Committee, Nowshera City, to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, dated the 10th August 1920. (Enclosure No. 2 of Serial No. 36.)

43

Telegram P., No. 2254-G. L.—9, dated (and received) the 12th August 1920.  
From—Wazirforce, Dera Ismail Khan,  
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla.

Yusufzai soldiers are getting letters from their homes to the effect that all their relations including even their own wives are on the point of departure on *Hijrat*; and this is occasioning most appreciable dismay in connection with the question of *Muhajarin*.

I am accordingly allowing men so affected to proceed on short leave, so that they can make arrangements for the safety of their own wives and can put their home affairs in order. I am fully aware that some of them may be overborne by the arguments of Mullahs and of their own friends even to the point of consequent desertion; but if I were to refuse leave it would provoke discontent without stopping desertion; and in my opinion it is better to run the risk which the giving of leave entails.

There are Yusufzais in the following units :—

- 2/19th Punjabis,
- 2/21st Punjabis,
- 2/25th Punjabis,
- 58th Rifles, F. F.,
- 3rd Bn. Guides, F. F.,

but the last-named unit is the one most affected. It has about 90 Yusufzais in it.

I have also heard rumours that both Khattaks and Attock Punjabi Musalmans are now being contaminated by the flow of *Muhajarin* enthusiasm. If this is true, the effect will reach greater numbers of sepoy and further units.

The above refers to your 1435—2 M. O. 3 of August 8th.

44

Telegram P., No. 018448—3-G. S., dated (and received) the 14th August 1920.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, Murree,  
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla (copy sent to Colonel Muspratt).

*Clear line.* Paraphrased extracts from Finlay's demi-official, dated 12th, are as follows. Keen is very agitated over situation. He appears to take the line that it is against British policy to interfere in religious matters and that local agitators should not be arrested, whilst no action is being taken at present against Gbandi and Shaukat.

Pensioned I O's who have been called *kafrs* for wearing medals, were told by Keen that they could bring action for slander. Finlay understands that it is proposed to start active propoganda, but Chief Commissioner had not been seen by him up to then. He understands that on 12th instant 8,000 went Khalifa (? joined Khilafat party). Resignations have been received from the police which include one complete post.

Movement is bound to spread if unchecked and to affect Army, as sepoy's whole families have gone. Rumours are current and believed that Keen is supposed to have admitted Mecca to have been destroyed, and that Government is supposed to send men with the *Muhajarin* to fire on Tommies in Khyber, as an excuse to kill *Muhajarin*. Tommies are supposed to have abducted a woman in a lorry. Finlay thinks that unless checked within ten days movement may easily get absolutely out of control. My Aide-de-Camp Khwaja Muhammad, who was seen by Finlay, considers that propoganda by I O's is now useless, but Finlay is seeing what can be done. He reports that Chief Commissioner was to hold a meeting of Civil officers to discuss furture policy. I agree with Finlay that, unless immediate action is taken by Civil to contradict these lies, not only will Muhammadans in Army be very seriously affected, but situation in Peshawar may get beyond control.

## 45

Telegram P., No. 018448—5-G. S., dated the 14th (received 15th) August 1920.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, Morree,

To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla (repeated Wazirforce).

Information received from the Commissioner, Rawalpindi, is that there is much excitement amongst Chhach Patbans. The movement of non-co-operation is not, however, agreed to by any of the people. The Mullahs are against *Hijrat*.

Above refers to your 1435—4 (M. O. 3) of 13th instant.

## 46

Telegram, No. 862-P., dated the 16th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

All canal Patwaris on Upper and Lower Swat river canals have resigned partly for economic reasons and partly owing to *Hijrat* movement. Not impossible, however, that a number will repent and return when they find *Hijrat* is collapsing.

(Addressed Revenue and Agriculture; repeated Foreign.)

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Telegram, No. 868-P., dated Peshawar, the 17th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

There has been steady improvement in general situation. Under great pressure *Hijrat* Committee have given wide publication to Amir's Proclamation and it is now generally credited. They have also persuaded majority of newly-arrived *Muhajarin* to return to their homes. I have interviewed about one hundred Khans and leading men and visited many surrounding villages and met with greatest cordiality and evident signs of intense relief everywhere. At the same time many Mullahs and seditious factions in Peshawar City are very bitter at turn of events and efforts will certainly be made to excite trouble in one form or another. Situation, however, is well in hand and if necessary severest punishment will be meted out to anyone attempting to upset improving conditions. Arrangements for safeguarding property of *Muhajarin* and settling their land disputes under Frontier Crimes Regulation have evoked general approval and gratitude.

- 48

Memo., No. 7330-P., dated Peshawar, the 14th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble SIR HAMILTON GRANT, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

(1) Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Sarbaddar of Dakka, dated 10th August 1920.

(2) Letter from the Sarbaddar of Dakka to the Political Agent, Khyber, dated the 21st Asad (12th August 1920).

Translations of the marginally-noted letters from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Sarbaddar of Dakka and his reply thereto, are enclosed for the information of the Government of India.

Enclosure No. 1 to Serial No. 48.

Translation of a letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Sarbaddar of Dakka, dated the 10th August 1920.

Petitions have been sent to me that owing to lack of accommodation in the *serais* and shortage of water, people who desire to do *hijrat* may be allowed to travel through the Khyber on every day of the week. I have granted this request to open the Khyber every day for the present and to limit the number of travellers each day to one thousand in order that the arrangements may work smoothly. I trust that you, my friend, will make the necessary arrangements in this connection.

Merchants and others than *Muhajarin* have been told that arrangements for them will only be made on Fridays.

Enclosure No. 2 to Serial No. 48.

Translation of a letter from the Sarbaddar of Dakka to the Political Agent, Khyber, dated the 21st Asad, corresponding to the 12th August 1920.

Your letter about the arrival of *Muhajarin* reached on the 10th Asad (10th August 1920) in which you note that according to the request of the *Muhajarin* their caravan would be allowed to pass through the Khyber to the limit of one thousand people daily and that you hoped that I should make necessary arrangements for their reception. I have thoroughly understood your letter and in reply thereto I write to inform you that the previous caravans of the *Muhajarin* are still on their way to Kabul and the road is congested owing to their transport animals and carts and it is, therefore, impossible that other caravans should daily pass on by this road. Having

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these difficulties in view the Emigration Committee have launched a petition to the Amir asking him to order the postponement of the emigration movement until further orders so that in the coming winter arrangements for their accommodation, &c., may be made. The Amir accepted their request and has ordered the absolute postponement of emigration through leadlets (copy of which is given below) until further orders. I, therefore, hope that you, my friend, will oblige me by stopping the caravans of *Muhajarin* until further permission.

(“ Notice necessary to be obeyed.”)

(True copy of the petition of Emigration Committee and orders of the Amir.)

As our brethren the Indian emigrants are coming to Afghanistan in great numbers through different routes without informing us of their number and without paying any attention to the notices given and as it is necessary to arrange for their accommodation and comforts before the setting in of the winter for about 40,000 men, it is, therefore, notified that hereafter until the completion of the arrangements for the emigrants who have already arrived in Afghanistan, other *Muhajarin* should be stopped from entering Afghan territory and till further orders about the emigration are issued.

Because it is necessary to make proper arrangements for those who have already come in, and when arrangements have been completed for those who have already reached, information will be given that so many *Muhajarin* should come. Nobody will be allowed admittance into Afghanistan if he comes against provisions of these rules.

The following few paragraphs have been added to the former rules :—

(1) *Muhajarin* should receive passports from Faqir Muhammad Khan, the Afghan employé at Peshawar.

(2) The *Muhajarin* Committee at Peshawar should inform the Head Office at Jalalabad through Faqir Muhammad Khan about the number of men desiring to proceed to Afghanistan. The Head Officer at Jalalabad after making proper arrangements for them will then inform that so many *Muhajarin* should be sent by such and such route and so many by caravan.

(3) In the first proclamation it was given out that Jabul-us-Siraj was fixed as a centre of the *Muhajarin* who come to Afghanistan and that they would be granted land and accommodation in the vicinity of Jabul-us-Siraj. But as the land surrounding Jabul-us-Siraj is now full of *Muhajarin* there is no room for others, and those who will come hereafter will be given accommodation according to regulations towards Afghan Turkistan.

(4) Those who prefer to serve in the army of their own accord will be sent to any place the Afghan Government like. They will be subjected to the same rules and regulations as are observed by the Afghan people.

(5) The Indian *Muhajarin* on their entering Afghanistan become Afghan subjects and if they have any idea of going out of Afghanistan they are not allowed to do so without a passport or the permission of the Afghan Government and therefore will not be able to go.

The above five paragraphs were submitted by the *Muhajarin* Committee to the Amir, signed by the members of the Indian Emigration Committee.

Dr. Abdul Ghani; Hakim Muhammad Aslam, *Muhajir*, Hindi; Muhammad Akbar, *Muhajir*, Yusufzai; Dr. Nur Muhammad, M.B., B.S., Sindi; Muhammad Raza Arbab, Peshawari; Ghulam Muhammad Aziz, Khudim-ul-Muhajarin; Preyawarda, M.A., Ph. D., late Editor, “Baharat”, Shula Safar, Benares, Professor of America; Muhammad Iqbal Shedai, B.A.; Mr. Jan Muhammad Junejo, Barrister-at-Law, Sind; Abdul Karim; Muhammad Zakriya, *Muhajir*; Abdul Ghafar, Utmanzai; Sher Muhammad Khan Ghauri; Sheikh Abdur Rahim of Quasoor; Sheikh Abdul Haq of Multan; Rahmat Ali Zakriya of Lahore; Muhammad Salah Abbas of Sind;

Pir Usman Shah of Kohat; Muhammad Afzal, Senior Cambridge student, B.A., son of Abdur Rahim of Qussoor; Mir Rahmat Ullah of Lahore; Maulvi Obedullah, late Editor, "Nazarat-ul-Mu'arif", Delhi; Abdur Rahim Bashir, Wakil, *Mujahiddin*; Maulvi Shamsul Qamar; Haji Maulvi Ahmad Ali, President of Khilafat Committee, Lahore; Muhammad Khan and Syed Qamash. The orders of the Amir are:—

The representation and the notes submitted by the *Muhajarin* Committee which are divided into five paragraphs were laid before me and perused. These are correct. In accordance with the above notes orders may be issued.

Dated 18th Asad 1299.

Signature of the Amir.

The rules proposed by the *Muhajarin* after the approval of the Amir are as follows:—

(1) At Kabul three regiments of the *Muhajarin* will be enlisted in the Regular army according to their option and will be paid according to the scale of the Afghan army.

(2) The young emigrant Khanzadas will be allowed to enter the Military College and after the completion of their training there they will be appointed in the *Muhajarin* army according to requirements. Of these there will be no distinction and the *Muhajarin* from India both Hindus and Muslims will have equal rights with the Afghans according to their service.

(3) Teachers, doctors and skilled labourers will be appointed in their respective departments according to their want and requirements in the various departments. Their pay will be equal to that of the Afghans.

(4) For proceeding to Anatolia for the purpose of Islam and in the interests of India an enquiry party from the *Muhajarin* may be appointed which may first go and enquire about the route and the place of their service after which permission could be granted to *Muhajarin* to go there for service.

(5) The *Muhajarin* Committee will make arrangements for the journey of the emigrants up to Katghan and will limit their number. The Committee will also recommend for assistance to poor and indigent and those pedestrians who cannot afford to travel on reasonable grounds. The Afghan Government sanctions expenses up to Rs. 30,000, Kabuli, for all *Muhajarin* of this class.

(6) For the new colony of *Muhajarin* the Afghan Government provide wood, iron and clothing and for the supply of these things orders are being issued to the Chief Hakim of that place.

(7) As to grain for *Muhajarin* it will be given to them according to the regulations until the harvest of the *Muhajarin* is ready, but the grain will be issued after the date of the arrival of the *Muhajarin* to their colony.

(8) Under the arrangements and the supervision of the Afghan Hakims the Indian *Muhajarin* will be allowed to carry on through the *Muhajarin* Committee their internal business like trade, industry and education.

(9) The military training to *Muhajarin* will be given in their respective colonies through Afghan officers and instructors. But the *Muhajarin* who undergo this military training will not get any pay and will be considered as volunteers.

(10) In Eastern and Southern Afghanistan there is no good Government land and therefore Katghan, which has good land and healthy climate, will be given for the colony of the *Muhajarin*.

(11) Two Committees are allowed to be formed of the *Muhajarin* one to be at Kabul and the other in the colony—and the petitions of the *Muhajarin* will be forwarded to the Amir through these Committees.

(12) The President of the Committee in Kabul will be late Ishak Aqasi-i-Kharjia with Ghulam Siddiq Khan, late Assistant to the Afghan Envoy, as Vice-President and Abdul Jabbar Khan as Secretary of *Muhajarin* and Amin Ullah Khan, Supervisor of the *Muhajarin*.

Signature of the Amir. Ends.

Memo., No. 7341-P., dated Peshawar, the 15th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble Sir HAMILTON GRANT, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Provin. x,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

A translation of Extraordinary Issue No. 47 of the "Itihad-i-Mashraqi", Jalalabad, dated the 23rd Ziq'ad 1338 Hijra, corresponding to 20th Asad 1299 (11th August 1920), which contains the Proclamation referred to in my telegram No. 860-P., dated 14th August 1920, is enclosed for the information of the Government of India.

Serial No. 41.

*Enclosure to Serial No. 49.*

Extraordinary Issue No. 47 of the "Itihad-i-Mashraqi", Jalalabad, dated Wednesday, the 23rd Ziqad 1338 Hijra, corresponding to 20th Asad 1299 (11th August 1920).

*Proclamation necessary to be obeyed.*

This is the order that has been passed on the representations and the submission of the notes of the Committee of *Muhajarin* (that has been specially formed for the management of the Indian *Muhajarin*) and are received in this office for publication.

Therefore we give below a true copy of the representation and the notes and the orders of the King Ghazi together with special regulations that have been passed by the Amir according to the proposals submitted by the *Muhajarin* Committee. I hope that all contemporary papers will publish translation of this publication for the information and guidance of the *Muhajarin* of India.

The intending *Muhajarin* are requested that they should comply with the meaning of this proclamation.

The duty of a messenger is to deliver the message only.

*True copy of representation submitted by the Anjuman-i-Muhajarin and orders of the Amir thereto.*

(This is identical with the proclamation given in Enclosure 2 of Serial No. 48.)

No. 564-P., dated Simla, the 20th August 1920.

Endorsed by Foreign and Political Department.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded to the Home and Army Departments, for information:—

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 868-P., dated the 17th August 1920. (Serial No. 47.)

Memorandum from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 7338-P., dated the 14th August 1920, with enclosures. (Serial No. 48.)

Memorandum from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, No. 7341-P., dated the 15th August 1920, with enclosure. (Serial No. 49.)

No. 1436—G.M. O. 3, dated Simla, the 18th August 1920.

From—The Chief of the General Staff\* and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India,

To—

- (1) General, Baghdad.\*
- (2) Egyptforce, Cairo.†
- (3) Britforce, Constantinople.†
- (4) General, Aden.\*
- (5) General, Singapore.\*
- (6) General Officer Commanding Troops, Hongkong.\*

*Priority.* Nearly twenty thousand *Muhajarin* passed through the Khyber and Mohmand country since 1st August. Most of them are from

the Peshawar and Nowshera districts, where there has been great excitement over the *Ajrat* movement but no disorder. Mullahs have been preaching the religious obligation to emigrate giving out false statements regarding occupation and desecration of Holy Places by British troops as reason and have also been spreading rumours that British troops will be let loose on Pathan villages and other lies of similar nature. Amir finding such large numbers serious embarrassment has announced that Afghanistan can receive no more emigrants until further orders. No appreciable effect yet produced by this *farman*, but it should check movement and steady the people when generally known. Trans-border situation quiet and unchanged.

Addressed Baghdad; repeated Cairo, Constantinople, Aden, Singapore and Hongkong.

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 51

Telegram P., No. 1435—7-M. O. 3, dated the 18th August 1920.

From—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Baghdad (repeated Cairo, Constantinople, Aden, Singapore and Hongkong).

Reference my telegram "in clear" of date, No. 1435—6-M. O. 3. Alarmist letters may probably be received by Indian troops from their homes, particularly "Khattaks", "Yusefzais" and "Peshawaris". Please inform them, if they require any assurance, that special officers have been deputed and the Civil authorities are taking steps to safeguard serving soldiers' interests.

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 52

Telegram, No. 873-P., dated (and received) the 19th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Police. One hundred and twenty-eight constables and five head constables lines and city police, Bannu, have resigned as protest against inadequate increase in pay. Other upper and lower subordinates showing sympathy. Demands are preposterous and possibly other elements are at work. Inspector-General is proceeding at once to Bannu to enquire.

(Addressed Home; repeated Foreign.)

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 53

Telegram, No. 875-P., dated (and received) the 19th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Priority. Muhajarin.* Since last caravan day some four thousand *Muhajarin* from Peshawar district, Hazara, Sind and elsewhere had collected in Peshawar city. I have, however, managed to get nearly all these persons quietly sent back to their homes with exception of some fifty emigrants from Sind who allege that they are fleeing from oppression in Sind, where they say they were debarred from public prayers and suffering through stoppage of canal water. I hope to get them returned shortly but suggest that steps be taken by Sind authorities to contradict these allegations. Two thousand *Muhajarin* who had collected at Bannu and were pressing to be allowed to go *oid* Tochi have been persuaded to disperse to their homes though small deputation from Bannu may proceed to Khost to enquire whether *Muhajarin* may emigrate that way. There is distinct improvement in general situation here and authenticity of Amir's order is now generally accepted.

2. It is reported that several thousand *Muhajarin* will shortly be returning from Afghanistan. Many of these will doubtless be destitute and all in financial difficulties. I do not propose that Government should do more than facilitate resettlement of these people on their lands on the lines already indicated by me, but I think that it would be a gracious act if with a Committee of Hindu and Muhammadan gentlemen I were to start a relief fund for assistance of returning *Muhajarin* as an unofficial undertaking. This would not only hasten a return to normal conditions but would also be regarded as a generous and sympathetic measure towards misguided peasants who have been misled on religious grounds into a disastrous undertaking. Please telegraph if Government approve and I shall issue appeal at once. Apart from its humanity I think this measure would go far to convince Muslim community of the sincerity of our good-will and prevent all chance of recrudescence of this deplorable movement. I have not yet fully sounded leading men but I believe they would willingly support proposed fund. To secure adequate funds we should have to appeal to persons outside province also though proceeds would be applied entirely to cases of distress in North-West Frontier. If my scheme is approved possibly a similar scheme might be found desirable in Sind.

## 54

Telegram P., No. 88—1-I. A., dated the 19th August 1920.

From—GENERAL WOODYATT, Ferozepore,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, Murree (repeated Adjutant-General in India, Simla, Chief of the General Staff, Simla, General Division, Dalhousie).

*Clear the line.* At Multan a situation of a somewhat serious nature has suddenly arisen in the 127th Baluchis, which I personally investigated yesterday evening. It was caused chiefly by the reports of men who had just returned from leave in Shaksadda (? Charsadda) district. I strongly recommend that this unit be not sent near the frontier at present, but that it be left in India for six months, and that leave be given to as many as possible in order to straighten things out, as it is entirely Muhammadan with a large number of Pathans and Cis-Mohmands, who are seriously affected by *Hijrat* and are genuinely alarmed about their land and relations. Thus necessitating the mobilisation of 5/124th not at Multan but elsewhere. I have to-day posted details in full.

## 55

Telegram, No. 877-P., dated (and received) the 20th August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Political, Khyber, wires from Landi Kotal, 19th instant:—*Begins.* About five hundred *Muhajarin* have returned from Afghanistan to-day. They consist chiefly of residents of Charsadda, Swabi, Sind, Amritsar, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Lahore. They emigrated on various dates including 13th August and some have returned from Kabul and others from Jalalabad. They state that Amir sent them a message that *Muhajarin* were at liberty to proceed onward or return to India as they please. This implied that no hospitality or special consideration would be shown them and the great majority of *Muhajarin* are much incensed at their cold reception and intend to return to India at an early date. *Ends.*

## 56

Telegram R., No. 1031-S., dated the 21st August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar.

General Staff are somewhat anxious as to the effect which letters from home giving news of departure on hijrat of their friends and relations may

have on soldiers from the North-West Frontier now serving overseas. To discount this they wish to send reassuring messages to Commanders overseas, coming with *imprimatur* of your authority. Can you kindly supply some material?

## 57

Telegram P., No. 894-P., dated (and received) the 22nd August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

*Hijrat* movement. With reference to your telegram,\* No. 1031-S. of the 21st instant, I would suggest that my *en clair* telegram† to the Chief of the General Staff, which follows, should be sent to Commanders, overseas, for communication to soldiers from North-West Frontier Province.

\* Serial 56.

† Serial 58.

## 58

Clear telegram, No. 895-P., dated (and received) the 22nd August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Message to Chief General Staff:—*Begins*. News of *hijrat* movement will have reached soldiers belonging to North-West Frontier Province serving overseas and they will doubtless be anxious regarding their families and property. It will relieve them to learn that Amir has refused admittance to further emigrants and that *hijrat* movement is consequently collapsing. No more emigrants are going and hundreds are returning daily from Afghanistan and probably nearly all will shortly come back. Meanwhile special arrangements have been made to help and resettle returning *Muhajarin* in their villages and special officers have been appointed in areas most affected particularly Yusufzai to watch interests of absent soldiers. I am giving personal attention to this matter and shall gladly receive and deal with any specific petitions any absent soldiers may wish to send regarding their families or property. Hamilton Grant, Chief Commissioner. *Ends*.

## 59

Telegram P., No. 1959-M. O. 1, dated the 20th August 1920.

From—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, Murrec.

*Priority*. If not already done, General Woodyatt's attention should be drawn to the Foreign Department communiqué, which appeared on the first page of "The Pioneer" of 13th August, which clearly shows the steps being taken by the Government of India to safeguard the interests of Indian soldiers.

Above is with reference to General Woodyatt's telegram No. 88—1-A., of August 19th.

Serial No. 54.

## 60

Telegram, No. 882-P., dated (and received) the 21st August 1920.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

Political Agent, Khyber, Landi Kotal, wires, dated 20th instant:—*Begins*. 2548—49. Five hundred more *Muhajarin* arrived Landi Kotal to-day from Dakka. They are disgusted at the treatment they received in Afghanistan and talk bitterly of the deception practised by their Mullahs. They were told

in Dakka that their ears would be cut off and their women dishonoured on their return to British territory. They were delighted at their sympathetic reception and the news that every encouragement would be given them to settle again on their lands. They are sending messages to Dakka to reassure *Muhajarin* left behind and contradict false rumours. I am opening pass every day of the week to returning emigrants. *Ends.*

## 61

Telegram R., No. 1034-S., dated the 23rd August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, Bombay.

Following from North-West Frontier, repeated for information of Bombay Government :—*Begins. Muhajarin.*

Serial No. 53. Since last caravan day some four thousand *Muhajarin* from Peshawar district, Hazara, Sind and elsewhere had collected in Peshawar city. I have, however, managed to get nearly all these persons quietly sent back to their homes with exception of some fifty emigrants from Sind, who allege that they are fleeing from oppression in Sind, where they say they were debarred from public prayers and suffering through stoppage of canal water. I hope to get them returned shortly but suggest that steps be taken by Sind authorities to contradict these allegations. *Ends.* Government of India approve suggestion.

## 62

Telegram R., No. 1036-S., dated the 23rd August 1920.

From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar.

Priority. Your telegram, 875-P., August 19th. *Muhajarin.* Government of India approve your suggestion that

Serial No. 53. you should issue unofficial appeal for relief fund for assistance of returning *Muhajarin*, but hope that you may be able to manage so that organization of relief shall not fall into hands of *Hijrat* Committee or of Mullabs and other agitators who have fanned the movement but into hands of moderate and loyal persons. They assume that care will be taken to discriminate between deserving persons who have honestly been deluded and ne'er-do-wells and loose characters who joined movement merely in hope of free food and comfortable life. You will of course be careful that nothing in wording of your appeal shall give suspicion of propaganda against Afghanistan or criticism of Amir's conduct.

## 63

(Extract)

Telegram P., No. 698, dated the 21st August 1920.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Home Department), Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Priority A.

3. Approximately 30,000 *Muhajarin* migrated to Afghanistan mainly from rural tracts of Peshawar district, but excitement spread to Kohat, Bannu and other districts. The orders from Afghanistan came at a time when feeling was beginning to run dangerously high and to affect Government servants, including police. General tension appears to be slackening, and the position is distinctly better. Sind leader advises no further migration for next two months owing to difficulties of journey and excessive heat. Zafar Ali, Editor of the "Zamindar" paper, Lahore, was refused permission to enter the

North-West Frontier Province. Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, *inter alia* resolved in spite of some opposition that *hijrat* movement be controlled and supervised by Central Khilafat Committee for purpose of which *hijrat* Sub-Committee should be formed. Small numbers of *Muhajarin* are beginning to return from Afghanistan with graphic tales of hardships endured after passing Landi Kotal. It is stated by them that strong barrier has been erected across Khyber Pass to prevent further unauthorised entry into Afghanistan. Delegation of Peshawar Khilafat Committee, however, has been allowed to start for Jalalabad to confer with General Nadir Khan. In the matter of orderly conduct of *Muhajarin* the general situation in Peshawar remains unchanged, but religious excitement continues. The situation is otherwise quiet, though one of vernacular press continues unchanged. Non-co-operation movement and *hijrat* movement gain little support in Bengal, the Punjab, the United Provinces and Delhi, though *hijrat* movement is being energetically canvassed in Delhi and efforts have been made to despatch a large party in September. For time being, however, the *hijrat* movement is broken by the action of Afghanistan.

## 64

Telegram, No. 4069, dated the 25th August 1920.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Home Department), Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Continuation our telegram, dated 15th instant. *Muhajarin* movement.

Serial No. 41a.

Following telegrams received from Political Agent, Khyber, through Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province on 20th and 21st August:—

Serial No. 55.

First telegram:—*Begins*. About five hundred \* \* \* at an early date. *Ends*.

Serial No. 60.

Second telegram:—*Begins*. Five hundred more \* \* \* returning emigrants. *Ends*.

## 65

Telegram P., No. 887, dated the 24th (received 25th) August 1920.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Simla.

*Hijrat* movement. Please refer to your Home Department telegram, No. 4006 of the 15th instant. It has been suggested that for the Afghans to send

Serial No. 41a.

back a few of the leading *Muhajarin* from Jal us Sinaj (? Jabul-us-Siraj) to explain the position to intending immigrants might be the most effective way of securing acceptance of the Amir's orders. If you have not already taken such action perhaps you will consider the advisability of making this suggestion to the Afghans.

## 66

## MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified below were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 70-M., dated the 28th August 1920:—

*Hijrat* movement.

Serial Nos. 1-46.

'Times', Aug. 16.

## 20,000 MOSLEM EMIGRANTS.

### AFGHAN VETO ON THE MOVEMENT.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

SIMLA, AUG. 13.

The total number of *Muhajireen* (Moslems emigrating to a country under Islamic rule) who have so far emigrated to Afghanistan is 20,000. Of these 12,000 have gone from the Frontier Province, and the remainder mainly from the Punjab and Sind.

A large proportion are women and children, and a serious situation is likely to arise owing to the difficulty of providing for such a large influx of strangers in a country like Afghanistan. Mullahs are preaching that Moslems who remain in India will become infidels, which is having a great effect on ignorant people. Migration from the Frontier Province is largely confined to two or three areas in the Peshawar district.

AUGUST 14.—After repeated warnings sent to the Caliphate Committees of India from Jellalabad an order given by the Ameer that no more *Muhajireen* are to be admitted into Afghanistan for the present causes no surprise. The problem of relieving the thousands of unfortunates who have been misled by the lying statements of agitators will now probably have to be faced by the British authorities in the Frontier Province.

AUGUST 15.—Extraordinary scenes were witnessed on the Afghan boundary on Saturday morning, when 7,000 *Muhajireen* arrived who had started from Peshawur before the Ameer's order for the postponement of the *Hijrat* [the movement to aid Moslems to emigrate] was received.

The vanguard was confronted by the Afghan commandant with a guard of 50 men, who told them they could not come on. After a long parley the *Muhajireen* threatened to break down the barrier, and were ultimately allowed to pass on condition that they could pay expenses.

At Jamrud the *Muhajireen* had stoned the Afghan agent from Peshawur, who tried to induce them to return, and violently abused the emissaries of the Caliphate Committee, who also urged them to go back. They declared that the Committee had been bribed and that the emissaries were infidels. The Committee is paralysed by fear of public resentment at the situation it has created.

## FORSCHUNGSSCHWERPUNKT MODERNER ORIENT

### ARBEITSHEFTE

- Nr. 1 ANNEMARIE HAFNER/  
JOACHIM HEIDRICH/  
PETRA HEIDRICH: Indien: Identität, Konflikt und soziale Bewegung
- Nr. 2 HEIKE LIEBAU: Die Quellen der Dänisch-Halleschen Mission in Tranquebar in deutschen Archiven. Ihre Bedeutung für die Indienforschung
- Nr. 3 JÜRGEN HERZOG: Kolonialismus und Ökologie im Kontext der Geschichte Tansanias - Plädoyer für eine historische Umweltforschung (herausgegeben von Achim von Oppen)
- Nr. 4 GERHARD HÖPP: Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg, 1915 - 1945. Geschichtlicher Abriss und Bibliographie
- Nr. 5 DIETRICH REETZ: Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful. A British file on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North India to Afghanistan in 1920
- Nr. 6 HENNER FÜRTIG: Demokratie in Saudi-Arabien? Die Āl Sa'ūd und die Folgen des zweiten Golfkrieges
- Nr. 7 THOMAS SCHEFFLER: Die SPD und der Algerienkrieg (1954-1962)

### STUDIEN

- Bd. 1 JOACHIM HEIDRICH (Hg.): Changing Identities. The Transformation of Asian and African Societies under Colonialism
- Bd. 2. ACHIM VON OPPEN/  
RICHARD ROTTENBURG (Hg.): Organisationswandel in Afrika: Kollektive Praxis und kulturelle Aneignung