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Religion, Staat und Politik
im Vorderen Orient

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On the Threshold to a Civil State?
Elite Change Scenarios in Egypt

The issue of succession and regime change in the Middle East has, for several reasons, recently attracted the attention of scholars. The new research interest is based on the unknown “effects of multiple, parallel successions in the region” (Perthes forthcoming), the possible danger to regional stability (Faith / Koszinowski / Mattes 2000; Sobelman 2001), the fact that Arab gerontocracies will soon end naturally and the hope that a younger generation will both liberalize and modernize Arab societies more rapidly than their predecessors. The prevailing idea is that the expected transition will either create internal upheaval or trigger off a process of democratization. Hopes for democratization very often include the expectation that rejuvenation of Arab leadership will bring a more pragmatic generation of leaders to office, who will pursue a different political agenda that is oriented more towards domestic politics, i.e., economic and political liberalization and participation in the manifold processes of globalization. Pragmatism also implicitly means "more open" or "less ideological" towards the state of Israel. Young leaders now govern Qatar (1995), Bahrain (1999), Jordan (1999), Morocco (1999) and Syria (2000) but have not prompted the set of reforms hoped for by citizens and external observers alike. Although these examples demonstrate a smooth transition of power to young men in their thirties, a number of social scientists still work from the hypothesis that succession scenarios in the region are accompanied by major difficulties and in some cases even violence. The authors of this article refute the underlying assumption that state institutions are weak and relatively new, so that the expected transfer of power cannot take place peacefully. The mild transitions that have occurred so far support this assumption. The growing research interest rather reflects the lack of information about possible successors, which can indeed lead to considerable speculation; Muhammad VI of Morocco and ‘Abdallah II of Jordan were comparatively unknown to the local and international public until they came to office. The same could have been said of Jamal Mubarak until very recently.

The smoothness of transition is even more surprising since the question of who would succeed remained to a certain degree in all cases unanswered. King Husain shocked Jordanian society by announcing a week before his death that his brother Hasan was no longer Crown Prince but his son ‘Abdallah. In Morocco, a debate took place on whether the nephew of King Hassan II, Hisham bin ‘Abdallah ‘Alawi, was more equipped to lead Morocco into the 21st century
Egypt under Mubarak

The political system in Egypt is a centralized multi-party system with most of its power vested in the hands of the president. However, this does not mean that he takes most political decisions unilaterally. Middle Eastern states are regularly portrayed as being ‘highly personalized’, where the leader (be it king or president) is able to do just that, despite the fact that there is no convincing empirical evidence for this assumption.

Egypt’s constitution is based on conflicting socialist, democratic and Islamic principles (Büttner/Büttnner 1983 and Büttnner/Klostermeyer 1991). Three presidents have marked the country in very different ways: Jamal ‘Abd an-Nasir introduced what was called “Arab socialism”, Anwar as-Sadat opened up the economy and initiated the peace process with Israel, and Husni Mubarak, who was at first considered an uncharismatic bore, managed to save part of the legitimacy of both presidents and is today widely regarded as a wise statesman by his countrymen. Remaining a close ally of the United States, he can still voice strategic interests that differ from US concerns in the region, i.e., Egypt’s policies towards Libya, Iraq and Iran. Under Mubarak’s rule, the legitimacy of the core elite stemmed from three issues: 1) A rapprochement with Arab and Muslim states after the shock of the bilateral peace treaty with Israel, which resulted in the return of the Arab League headquarters to Cairo in 1990. 2) The return of Egyptian national territory. This process ended in 1989 with the return of Taba as the final fulfillment of the Camp David Accords. 3) A “geo-political rent” that originated from Egypt’s participation in the US-led anti-Iraq alliance during the second Gulf War. This prevented the collapse of the economy and allowed for investment in infrastructure and basic facilities. Husni Mubarak’s rule has been marked by (cold) peace, relative stability and economic relief, making it at least thinkable that Egypt’s next president might have a civilian background. But since the 11th of September 2001 and with the preparations for war on Iraq under way at the time of writing, this stable and peaceful picture might yet have to be revised.

It might even be too early to predict future scenarios for succession in Egypt. The 74-year old Husni Mubarak is energetic and even more important at the peak of his legitimacy. The last referendum for the presidential term 1999–2005 was carried out under the slogan “Loyalty for all his life” (al-ba’a madd al-hayat). The Egyptian case contains a further remarkable element, as Ranjit Singh rightly pointed out, namely the degree of unity among the ruling elite.

“For example, even the death of Nasir did not push the personal rivalries of elite actors beyond the elite circle; Sadat’s succession struggle remained a largely intra-elite affair because popular bases of support were unavailable to his regime opponents.”
and "[n]either regime repression nor Sadat's assassination provoked significant elite fissures." (2002: 17f.) Singh concludes that Egypt has never experienced the kind of public elite fissures that kick off transition politics as has happened in other countries.

What makes the scenarios for Egypt more precarious are the unknown internal and external factors at stake, especially repercussions from the escalation between the Palestinian Authority and the religious-military government under Ariel Sharon in the shadow of the Bush administration's "War on Terrorism". The unpredictable results of the US-American elections in 2004, i.e., one year before the end of Mubarak's present term, add to the uncertainty since the US-administration will also have a say in who succeeds Husni Mubarak. Despite the prevailing foggy situation, the authors propose to draw four scenarios for presidential succession and thereby elite change in Egypt as mentioned above.

In order to clarify who "the elites" are in Egypt, we propose to have a look at several notions to denote 'elite' in Arabic, since there is no exact translation. Some Arab scholars tend to simply use the French word 'elite'. Others use the word nukhba, which refers to those who are elected from below. As the Egyptian historian Amira el-Azhary Sonbol (2000: xxviii) pointed out, safiwa is the direct translation for the term 'elite' in a narrower sense. It reveres to the ceronic notion of Mohammed chosen by God, and therefore refers to the very few who are chosen or selected from above. The root of safiwa makes up words such as the best, the cream, the filter, the bosom friend, choice or the epithet for Muhammad, al-Mustafa. In addition, political discourse and public debates in Egypt use the designation ayyada for their leadership, which comes closer to the Western concept of political elites.

"The term khassa denotes people who consider themselves the final arbiters of power and who are perceived by society as playing this specific role." (ibid.: xxvii)

Historically, khassa was also a concept of proximity to the sultan. Sonbol further hints at the term dhawar, which was used before the 1952 revolution to "describe certain members of the khassa who could be considered elites" (ibid.). Under Nasir, people used the terms ahl ar-thing (people of confidence) and ahl al-khibra (people of experience) to talk of the close circle around the Free Officers.

The designations for the president himself have also changed over the years. While Nasir was called the 'everlasting leader' (az-zaf'm al-khalid) or ar-rayyes (colloqual for "the Captain"), Sadat was the pater familias (rab al-'ula) and Mubarak was simply called "the President". By Egyptian standards, this indicates a process of de-psimaternalization.

Several terms denote the power circle closest to the president: The term for his advisors and counselors (mustashar) refers back to the Islamic notion of consultation or shura. This small group within the presidential institution is known as the president's elite (khassat ar-ra'is), which holds the traditional autocratic meaning, or simply the 'gang' (shitter), which has a friendly and loyal connotation.

**Legitimate Successions**

After the Arab military defeat against Israel in 1948, the ruling troika in Egypt, composed of King Faruq (the last monarch of the dynasty founded by Mohammed 'Ali), the political parties (essentially the Wafd party) and the English forces in the Suez Canal, was unable to reach agreement on complete independence of the country. The legitimacy of the local elite (king and pashas) crumbled after allegations of corruption appeared and the press claimed that the state had bought old weapons, which in the event made the military look innocent of defeat. Several articles reported on the lavish life of King Faruq. What gave this system the death blow was the distribution of property in society.

Egypt has not encountered such a veil of mystery around the question of succession as today since its transformation from a kingdom to a republic. For historical reasons, the issue is closely connected to the vice-presidency, as a deputy has automatically become president twice since 1952 (Sadat succeeded Nasir in 1970 and Mubarak likewise Sadat in 1981). This secured first of all a smooth transfer of power but more importantly, it transferred part of the established legitimacy to the respective new president. However, Husni Mubarak has never nominated a vice-president since coming to power, although theoretically he could have replaced him several times, as both Nasir and Sadat had done. It is all the more surprising that Mubarak has not done so in the course of his 20-year reign, considering Egypt's internal instability as a result of an upsurge of violent Islamist groups and major regional conflicts during this period. Moreover, several assassination attempts were made on Mubarak and some of his ministers in the 1990s. Two assassination attempts on Mubarak have been confirmed, one by an Islamist officer from the Egyptian Air Forces in 1993 at the airport in Sidi Barrani and a second in Addis Abeba in 1995. In the latter attack Mubarak was on his way to Ethiopia to attend a summit conference of the Organization of African Unity. On his way from the airport, Mubarak's car was ambushed by an armed group. His security forces shot back at them and returned to the airport where Mubarak was immediately flown back to Cairo, awaited by a stunned Egyptian public. Any other accounts of assassination attempts are rumors and have always been attributed to mentally disturbed individuals, as in the case of the Central Security Forces (CSF) riots in 1986 or in Port Said in 1999. This last attempt was apparently carried out four weeks before the fourth presidential
referendum. Several attempts are said to have been made close to Mubarak’s home.

The fact that no deputy was nominated even after these unsuccessful assassination attempts and open threats to Mubarak’s life have added to the mystery of why he has not appointed a potential successor. Mubarak has left the Egyptian people – deliberately it seems – in a vacuum. Based on common sense, however, we can safely assume that an emergency plan for succession exists within the realms of the core elite.

Mubarak’s answer to the question of his successor has always been that he did not want to impose anyone and that the constitution and state institutions would guarantee a smooth and legal transfer of power if need be. The constitution stipulates that first of all the speaker of parliament and secondly the president of the High Court are to replace the president should the occasion arise, provided they themselves do not want to stand for presidency. One of the two will rule technically until the parliament approves a successor. Mubarak’s legalistic answer touched the deputy issue but clearly avoided the question of succession. What has been seen by numerous external observers as a failure, as cowardice or as an attempt to install one of his sons, could well be interpreted as a deliberate strategy: It gives Mubarak the leeway to keep the door open for a civilian successor for the first time since the declaration of the republic. This process of de-militarization is still the underlying matrix for politics today. Sameer Shehata pointed out that father-to-son successions are not characteristic for Arab political culture:

"With the succession of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and speculation that similar father-to-son transitions will take place in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Egypt, some journalists have already implied that dynastic succession is a product of Arab political culture. The claim might soon be made explicit in academic guise and could easily be deployed as another variant of the 'Middle East exceptionalism thesis.' [...] The relationship between father-to-son succession and 'Arab political culture,' however, is spurious for a number of reasons. First, it is simply empirically false. Father-to-son successions have more often occurred in non-Arab contexts: in North Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nicaragua and Haiti. Rather than being the product of an essential 'Arab political culture,' the phenomenon is more likely specific to a particular type of authoritarianism – centralisation of power in the person of the leader, a small ruling elite, the lack of institutionalised power centres outside the leader, a cult-of-personality, and long serving rulers who have been able to eliminate potential rivals." (2002: 112)

In the following, we will take a brief look at the transfer of power that has so far occurred in Egypt in order to make assumptions about a future handing over. A definition of the prevailing pillars of legitimacy is crucial here, since only the ideological current with the highest backing from the political elites and the masses can take over.²

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All-in-one: Nasir³

The legitimacy of Nasir’s political project was the result of two elements: implementation of complete independence by 1956 and the social-revolutionary project adhered to by the Free Officers. Although the Free Officers altered the political system from a constitutional monarchy to a pan-arabist republic, they neither installed a multi-party system nor introduced a new constitution. After the failure of the United Arab Republic with Syria in 1961 and the deployment of Egyptian troops to Yemen in 1962, a process whereby the civilian lobby was strengthened and military power counterbalanced began to take place in the single political party, Arab Socialist Union (ar-tanzim at-tal‘i). Nasir re-integrated the communist movement, part of which he had been imprisoned, and banned activities of the Muslim Brotherhood completely.³ The malfunction of the Nasirist state became apparent in the defeat against Israel in 1967. The Egyptian population took to the streets and demanded the withdrawal of the military from politics, a harsh punishment for the military leadership, and democratic reforms. Marshall 'Amir, who was vice-president at the time, committed suicide two months later. A public consensus emerged that the army should distance itself increasingly from politics since it had failed utterly. A military court sentenced most of the first rank of the military to 15 years imprisonment. In 1968, people even demonstrated against what was perceived as “soft” sentences. The army was subsequently submitted to major restructuring, especially the Air Force, whose planes had almost completely been destroyed on the ground at the outset of the 1967 war.

The ideological differences within the core elite over how to overcome the crisis resulted in an open split between two main camps. One group, headed by Zakaria Muhiy ad-Din, was hoping to introduce democratic participation and a US-friendly orientation. The opposite wing, led by 'Ali Sabri, favored safeguarding the status quo and intended to keep Egypt a close ally of the USSR. Four days after the war, Nasir suggested leaving office and handing over power to Muhiy ad-Din, thus confirming Nasir’s pro-US stance. While this was violently rejected by the populace, Nasir later on chose to balance the two wings by appointing representatives of both as vice-presidents. But demands for thorough reforms were emanating from all societal groups, in particular from the student movement, the journalist union and the bar association. Nasir countered their demands in 1968 with the 'Declaration of March 30th', announcing reform intentions to strengthen the rule of law, which later led to the promulgation of a constitution under Sadat. It is important to note here that this societal pressure allowed the political officials from the second rank, who sympathized with the state of law, to emerge and later take over key positions under Sadat. Today, several people from this generation, such as Kamal ash-Shazli (Number 3 in the
Political Bureau of the NDP) and Husain Kamil Baha' ad-Din (Minister of Education) still occupy important government posts, and the leaders of the social movements in the sixties are now veterans of civil society, such as the sociologist and former student movement leader Ahmed 'Abdallah.

In June 1969, Nasir appointed Anwar as-Sadat as vice-president for several reasons: he was the weakest candidate, he was unable to escape the shadow of his charismatic president and he did not represent either of the two factions. He was also the crossing-point between the ASU and the parliament and, as head of the Islamic Conference Organization, a middle man between the conservative states of the Arab Peninsula and the progressive nationalist Arab republics. Although he was vice-president at the time and should have supported Nasir, Sadat refused to endorse the initiative of American Foreign Minister William Rogers in 1970 to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Egypt, still in the throes of a low-intensity war, in order to confirm that he was neither a US nor a USSR man. The authors will come back later on to this strategy of keeping away from controversial issues in order to retain 'clean hands'. The image of the untainted politician or the 'Middle Man' is a recurrent theme for the second strong man in the state during the Sadat era and thereafter during Mubarak's reign as well (Walker 1991).

Don Quijote: Sadat

When Nasir died unexpectedly at the age of 52 in 1970, Sadat succeeded him. On the day of the funeral, five million people took to the streets and mourned the loss of a 'father'. The conflict between the two political factions within the ASU over the future orientation of Egypt escalated further. In what was called the 'correction revolution' after Nasir's death, Sadat imprisoned 91 members of the ruling core elite under the slogan 'destroying the secret service state' (Ismail 2000). To secure his rule, Sadat relied mainly on such prominent figures as Hasanain Haikal, who was nominated Minister of Information. No one symbolized the Nasirist state more than Haikal. Although he had been the ideologist of the Nasirist state, he wrote an article in the daily al-Ahram entitled 'Nasir is not a myth' that was published during the 40 days of mourning for Nasir. Haikal understood that in order to build political credentials for the coming president, it was necessary to restrain Nasir's charisma. Sadat then began to build his reign on the second rank of the military, on people like Husni Mubarak and on state officials such as the police officer Mamduh Salim, who rose to the position of Prime Minister in 1979.

Sadat built his legitimacy on replacing the defeated military and political elite, freeing the Islamist opposition and introducing a constitution in 1971. His first projects were the installation of a multi-party system and the opening of the economy. In order to balance Leftist groups, Sadat began to rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood, released many of them from prison and allowed more space for their activities. In the seventies, the Egyptian political elite was completely split on the main political issues, e.g., the inshiha policy, the peace process with Israel and the social norms governing society. Sadat's 'shock policies' increased this breach and led to a radicalization of political activists on all sides. The leaders of the workers' uprising in the industrial centres of Egypt in 1972, 1975 and 1976 today occupy important posts in the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) such as its president, Sayyid Rashid. The emerging political elite demanded more individual liberties and confrontation with Israel for the return of Sinai. Besides the fact that Sadat had been chosen as vice-president by Nasir, his legitimacy was made complete by the 'victorious' 1973 war. What weakened his legitimacy in the short run and made him look like Don Quijote were the economic open-door policies and his visit to Jerusalem in 1977, a step opposed by almost everyone in Egypt. Much later, these two decisions were to become the cornerstone of his reputation. Although information on opposition within the army is scant and difficult to verify, the death in 1981 of 13 generals close to Sadat as a result of a helicopter accident and the assassination of Sadat himself by a young Islamist officer in the following year, indicate that there was major opposition to Sadat's policies within the army. However, two important factors assured Sadat of the loyalty of the majority in the army: new military aid from the US amounting to 1,3 billion US$ p.a. and the setting up of a local weapons industry.

In 1980, Sadat amended the constitution and gave the state a new identity, thereby reflecting the enormous social pressures of his time:
1. The constitution was now based wholly on Islamic law (sharia),
2. the Egyptian system was entitled socialist-democratic,
3. the multi-party system was laid down in the constitution,
4. the press was established as the fourth power, and
5. the restriction on the presidential terms was lifted.

On September 5th, 1981, Sadat imprisoned 1536 intellectuals (among them Hasanain Haikal; Fu'ad Siraj ad-Din, President of the Wafd Party; 'Umar Tilimsani; Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood; the feminist writer Nawwal al-Saa'dawi; several Ministers, party, trade union and student movement leaders as well as eminent religious scholars) when he saw that the amendment of the constitution could not silence the opposition. At no other time did an elite conflict erupt with such vehemence as during this period. One month later Sadat was assassinated by an army officer during the annual military parade commemorating the October War. His funeral was solely attended by Egyptian officials, three former US-presidents and Menasche Begin.
Machiaevelli: Mubarak

Mubarak was educated at a Military Academy in the Soviet Union until 1964 and nominated Air Force Chief of Staff after the defeat in 1969. In 1972, he became Deputy Minister of War and Commander of the Air Force. Husni Mubarak became part of the new military generation that planned and carried out the 1973 war under Anwar as-Sadat. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General after the October War and nominated vice-president a year later at the age of 47. In 1975, Sadat appointed Mubarak vice-president because he brought along the legitimacy of the emerging military elite from the October War. The generation that had acquired key political positions with Mubarak was called ‘fil octobir’, the October generation. With the subsequent unfolding of negotiations with Israel, this generation experienced another major split. General Sa’d ad-Din ash-Shazli and the civilian Hasanain Hakal were opposed to the idea of Egypt going ahead with negotiations with the state of Israel alone. Sadat had therefore gradually installed an elite that would support him in the peace process. It has remained in power until this day: Husni Mubarak, Yusuf Walli, Safwat Sharif et al.

In 1981, Husni Mubarak came into office as unexpectedly as Sadat had done. Mubarak’s legitimacy was initially built on three aspects: the anti-corruption purge that put people like Anwar as-Sadat’s brother, ‘Isnat, and Rashad ‘Uthman, who came from an influential business family, in court; the dialogue between different segments of society including moderate Islamists; and the peace dividend of Camp David. The last time that Mubarak was seen wearing his military uniform in public was the day of Sadat’s assassination. Immediately afterwards, Mubarak exonerated all 1536 intellectuals imprisoned by Sadat. This was one of the pivotal symbolic gestures right at the beginning of Mubarak’s term, adding considerably to his legitimacy, which increased as a result of progress with the rule of law and the peace dividend from which he profited long after Sadat’s death. Tabia, the last occupied city of Sinai, was returned to Egypt in 1989. Mubarak implemented the Camp David Accords but reintegrated Egypt on the other side into the Arab League; the headquarters of the Arab League returned to Cairo in 1990. Mubarak achieved the continuation of the peace process with three components: a) the gradual return of Sinai, b) the economic effects of US aid and c) a dialogue with civil society and a limited inclusion of its representatives in the political decision-making process. A change in the election law from individual candidates to lists of candidates allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to be represented in the parliament in 1984 and 1987. An indication that Mubarak’s balancing act had been successful was the decision by the parliamentary members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 to vote in favour of nominating Mubarak for a second presidential term.

In short, Mubarak managed to achieve a compromise between the political elite who supported normalization with Israel and the segments that opposed it. It should be remembered that Mubarak was walking on very thin ice during this period, since Israel had invaded Southern Lebanon in 1982 and tension was high in the region. What helped Mubarak in achieving a balance was the fact that he had not visited Israel. Again, he was kept or kept himself outside and managed not to be identified with Sadat’s contested politics, although he was his vice-president at the time. His image remained "untainted" similar to that of Sadat before him and ‘Amr Musa later on. Mubarak only visited Israel in 1995 to attend the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin. In line with Sadat’s pragmatic land-for-peace approach, Mubarak installed a lasting cold peace. Until today, most segments of Egyptian society are against normalization with Israel. Mubarak’s US-friendly foreign policy added further to widening his internal maneuvering space. In the aftermath of the participation by Egyptian soldiers in the liberation of Kuwait, Egypt’s foreign debt was reduced by half. During his first visit to the US under the administration of George W. Bush, Mubarak announced that he was currently studying several dossiers and would nominate a vice-president by the end of 2001. However, no personality has since been officially announced. Once again, the mystery was perfect.

To summarize, there are three common elements in the transfers of 1952, 1970 and 1981: 1) they all happened at a time of severe external and internal crisis, but 2) no major bloodshed occurred and 3) contrary to some expectations, the upshot was always a period of stability and longevity.

Who comes after Mubarak? Four Scenarios

The Military

Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazzala belongs to the same generation as Mubarak (born in 1930) and graduated in 1949 from the same military college. In the 1973 war, he led the Cannon Division, which was said to be the second most important factor after the Air Force in deciding the war in favor of the Egyptian side. Therefore, he also belongs to the ‘October generation’. After the war, Abu Ghazzala was sent to the US and served as military attaché at the Egyptian Embassy. With the unfolding of the peace process in 1979, he was appointed head of the military secret service. When 13 generals, among them the Minister of Defence, Ahmed Badawi, died in a plane crash in 1981 under peculiar circumstances, Sadat brought Abu Ghazzala in as Minister of Defense. Only a few months later, Abu Ghazzala and Husni Mubarak were sitting right next to
Sadat at the 6th of October parade, when the 26-year old officer, Khalid Isambuli, opened fire on them.

After Mubarak had been inaugurated as president, he promoted Abu Ghazalla to Marshall and kept him as Defence Minister until 1989 and as Senior Adviser until 1993. During this time, Abu Ghazalla was the second most powerful man in the state. The public debate on the vice-presidency was dominated by the option of a military successor and concentrated on Abu Ghazalla. Civilian alternatives were unthinkable.

"Even if Mubarak were fully to commit himself to the risk strategy of rapid and thorough democratization, the odds are stacked against him. In the ensuing race between the military and civilians around him for power, Mubarak’s civilian politicians are fatally handicapped by their inexperience, divisions, and by the fact that the most powerful social class, the bourgeoisie, is divided in its loyalties. When and if push comes to shove between Mubarak and Abu Ghazalla, civilian politicians will be left on the sidelines to cheer whoever emerges victorious." (Springborg 1987: 16)

Springborg’s main assumption was based on the idea of an ongoing personal power struggle between Mubarak and Abu Ghazalla. At the end of the 1980s, many authors (esp. Springborg 1987; 1989) saw major differences between the Minister of Defence, Abu Ghazalla, and Mubarak. The hypothesis that Abu Ghazalla and the army were a strong counterpart to Mubarak was underlined by the fact that the military increasingly adopted an Islamist outlook. The Islamists and the military publicly exchanged compliments and many people expected an alliance of the two. Furthermore, the revolt of the police officers in February 1986 and the interference by the army as the sole institution in a position to uphold the political system and added to its significance.

Abu Ghazalla’s term in office must be seen in the light of regional developments and, moreover, the peace process with Israel rather than a personal duel between the two men. With the implementation of the Camp David Accords and the demilitarization of Sinai, the role of the military diminished significantly. Internally, Mubarak also continued the process of gradually absorbing the military into the private sector and restricted the army to fulfilling its duties. With the handing over of the last national territory under occupation in 1989, Abu Ghazalla had outlived his function and was replaced as Defence Minister by Yusuf Sabri Abu Talib. The total withdrawal of Abu Ghazalla from the political scene in 1993 was regarded as a further step in Egypt’s ‘demilitarization’. Abu Ghazalla was put out of office with surprising ease and in degrading circumstances. No military personality of similar caliber emerged in politics between 1993 and 2001. The state’s strategy to absorb the military into the civilian field is still under way and has so far worked in the intended direction. Since the breakdown of the peace process, however, the military option for succession cannot be excluded, as debates surrounding potential candidates such as the relatively young Magdi Hitata, Army Chief of Staff, or ‘Umar Sulaiman, Head of Intelligence, have shown. For the first time, however, there has also been a serious public debate on at least two possible civilian candidates for succession: ‘Amr Musa and Jamal Mubarak. The latter only very recently entered politics and has not commented on foreign policies so far. In February 2003, Jamal Mubarak for the first time headed an official delegation that was received at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon (Diel 2003). Jamal Mubarak comes in on two tickets: on the one hand, as the son of the president and, on the other hand, as a representative of the third sector (business community and NGOs). A breakthrough of the civil-liberal current he represents is only conceivable within the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

In a region like the Middle East, which is the biggest market for weapons, and which took part in a costly high tech war over its oil resources in the 1990s, we may safely assume a further substantial role of the military. Today, Egypt is a country that both imports and exports weapons. It imports weapons worth 1,6 billion dollars (that is 12,1 % of the total Egyptian imports) and ranks sixth in absolute numbers on a level with the US (sic!). The official arms imports amount to 5 million dollars only; i.e., 0,1 % of the total exports (U.S. Department of State 2000). But the real number is hard to decipher since many of the light weapon exports do not appear in the GDP calculations or the terms of trade. Buyer countries are mostly the Southern states of the former Soviet Union and a number of sub-Saharan African states.

Today, former young officers of the October War have become army leaders or occupy important posts in the non-military field. The most prominent example is the current Defence Minister, Husain Tantawi, who served as an officer in the seventies and participated in the 1973 war at the age of 25. This means that the current second and third rank of the civilian and military elites that will emerge within the next ten years did not witness the October War. They are the next generation and will need to build their legitimacy on something new. Part of the required legitimacy will have to come with a reform of the constitution and the party system under a new president. For more than 15 years, the opposition parties and the judiciary have been demanding that the central audit authority, which is placed directly under the command of the president, be referred to and controlled by the upper house in order to have individual budgetary issues discussed in parliament. The military production sector is to be separated from the army and function according to market laws. The opposition also demanded transparency of the military budget so that it could be audited. Since the mid-1980s, it has rejected the renewal of the law permitting the president to decide on issues related to military production and military import and export without a parliament, but was always in a minority. Furthermore, it was
claimed that military courts should be confined to military issues only and the state of emergency abrogated. At the time, it was also decided that the Minister of Defense should no longer be a member of the central committee of the National Democratic Party, although this decision only came into being in the 1990s after the Second Gulf War.21

Even close observers, who are not allowed into the military zone itself, can see from outside that the military constitutes a state within the state or is even its heart. It is an institution that has its own means of economic production22 and dispossession of its own third sector (hospitals, engineers, services etc.). It makes use of five military colleges and one college for advanced training where it schools part of the emerging elite. The military has its own secret service and a public relations department that includes clubs and museums (e.g., the October Panorama in Nasr City). Whereas military control over the civilian sector exists, there is no reciprocal control over the military.

Military graduates played a decisive role in the internal elections of the professional association of engineers against the Islamist bloc that constantly tried to infiltrate professional associations as these. The former managed to stake their claim in the engineers' association as against other professional associations, such as the medical association. During the 1980s, the economic role of the military increased, especially in the area of basic non-military infrastructure (telephone lines, housing, bridges, land reclamation etc.). The military were contracted by the state and projects were headed by well-trained engineers who received a second salary on top of their army salary. Over time, their business expanded to the tourist areas and many investments were made at Red Sea resorts. Army members enjoyed the benefits of the best health services and hospitals in the country. As an incentive for members of the army to set up non-military businesses, the state proposed generous early retirement schemes with a high indemnity.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, strong criticism over the substantial role of the military in society intensified: opposition newspapers of the Left opened a discussion on the manifold advantages of the military sector23 and demanded transparency of the military budget.24 The Left also rejected the concept that national security should be the monopoly of the military.

The Islamist movements heavily condemned the - at the time, prudent - use of military courts. It is no coincidence that the Muslim Brotherhood, which was represented in parliament through the lists of the Labor Party (hizb al-'amal) and the Liberal Party (hizb al-'ahrar), voted in 1987 in favor of a second presidential term for Mubarak, since he stood for withholding the military from the political arena and paving the way for a civilian elite. This is a pertinent characterization of Muslim Brotherhood tactics.

The Islamist Project

Numerous empirical studies have given evidence of the rising role of religious values and practice in Egypt since the seventies. As Sonbol (2000) argues, the Islamist movement established a religious mass culture, which has reached the elites and is currently in the process of terminating the "duality of culture" (i.e., Muslim as well as Christian-European) that has existed since the invasion of Napoleon. Waterbury (1999) figures out four possible scenarios for elite change in Egypt: a) continuation of the status quo, b) increasing democratization, c) an Islamist government and d) a militant Islamist government with a social revolutionary agenda.

The authors exclude the last option here for two reasons. 1) The moderate Islamist wing, i.e., the Muslim Brethren, entered the political game in the 1990s, took part in the parliamentary elections of 2000 and changed its slogan from "Islam is the solution" in the 1980s to "Honour to the constitution" in the second half of the 1990s. With 17 seats, they are the strongest opposition faction in parliament today, i.e. Realpolitik prevails. 2) The assassinations of Ramzi and the subsequent stalemate in the peace process prompted the radical Islamist currents to orient themselves towards the "external enemy" rather than their own governments, culminating in the September 11th attacks (see az-Zayat 2002). In the case of Egypt, we therefore do not anticipate a violent takeover.

The axis for understanding the relation between the proponents of political Islam and the succession to the president is the concept of excommunication (takfir). Throughout its history, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has never used the idea of expelling a political leader (king or president) from the religious community (takfir al-hakin), thereby questioning his basic legitimacy. The Brotherhood even condemned this approach. Others, such as al-jihad or the jam'a al-islamiya, used this reasoning, e.g., to justify the assassination of Sadat.

The public condemnation of the use of violence in 2002 by prisoners of the al-jama'a al-islamiya in a series of publications explaining their ideological revision comes at a precarious moment in the fight against terrorism. It shows Egypt's gradual change of policy towards these prisoners. The surprising revision of the historic leaders of al-jama'a al-islamiya can be read as one way of consolidating Egypt's internal political field and preparing the ground for a civilian successor. The obvious cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior and the imprisoned leaders suggests this conclusion.

The outlawed Muslim Brotherhood returned to informally participate in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Elections took place while the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were being tried by a military court in what is known as the "professional syndicates lawsuit". Their candidates therefore ran as independ-
ents and originated mostly from the second rank. The Muslim Brotherhood nominated a woman for the first time, in order to counter accusations that they underrate the status of women. In spite of the hunts carried out by the state security prosecutor (an extraordinary investigation organ) and the arrest of hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood during the election campaigns, 17 candidates were elected to the new parliament. They form the largest opposition block, with more seats than all of the “legal” opposition parties together. They show overwhelming vitality and represent the most serious threat to the ruling party. In an optimistic reading of the Islamist scenario, the Muslim Brotherhood could be recognized as a political party and play the role of a conservative-religious backstopper of the regime after 2004/2005. Should the state of emergency be revoked or the Muslim Brotherhood become a legal party, it will pose a serious challenge to the political regime and its credibility. The transition to a wholly civil state and rule of law would need the continuation of the peace process with Israel and, consequently, the possibility of further dissolving the military bloc.

A pessimistic reading of the Islamist challenge is based on the assumption that relations between Egypt and Israel will revert to the situation even prior to Camp David. The danger in this scenario is not only that the Oslo process will have come to an end but that the region will be thrown back 30 years. Whereas nationalist ideologies determined politics in the region in the 20th century (Zionism on the one side and pan-Arabism on the other), a blockage of politics by the religious groups in Israel will create a military-religious response on the Arab side as well. In this sense, talk of the return of 1948 in Israel is not only true for Israel; we will witness a complete change of elites as in 1948, with a military elite adhering to a populist-isolationist Islamist outlook to replace the incumbents. This will not only concern the neighboring countries but also the Gulf states.

In this scenario, Egypt will be governed by someone who can present himself as a ‘heroic figure,’ from the same generation and educational background as Khalid Islambuli (who assassinated Sadat at the age of 26). Today they would be about fifty years old and not have fought against Israel. In this scenario the Muslim Brotherhood would be a civilian cover-up for a more radical regime. The compromise between the radical wing in prison and the parliamentary members would read as follows: the external enemy must be defeated first. 25

The Liberal Project. Scenario A: Diplomats

Born in 1936, "Amr Musa studied law in Cairo. In 1958, he began his career as a civil servant in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He became Egyptian ambassador to India in 1967, ambassador to the United Nations in 1990 and was Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1991 to 2001. The Oslo process and Egyptian negotiations with the European Union in the framework of the Barcelona conference took place during this period. During the first half of his assignment, Musa belonged to the Egyptian politicians who supported the integration of Israel in the Middle East and who were involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in 1993. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry took a strong stance with regard to negotiations with the EU in particular, which was appreciated by the national press. Known for his pan-Arab views, Musa is currently serving as General Secretary of the Arab League, which he successfully brought back as a political broker. What was regarded by external observers as a weakening of Musa’s position and a result of Mubarak’s fear of his strong Foreign Minister could well be considered as a measure to get rid of him in a political bottleneck situation, only to bring him back at the right moment in time. Musa is regarded as a brilliant, charismatic personality. There was even talk of “Musa mania” in Egypt. 26

In 2001, there was considerable speculation as to who would replace "Amr Musa as Minister of Foreign Affairs, comparable to the debate after Abu Ghazala’s term drew to a close in 1989. In both cases, Mubarak chose two unknown personalities from outside; the Governor of Cairo, Yusuf Sabri Abu Talib, became Minister of Defense in 1989 and the 67-year-old Ahmad Mahur, a retired diplomat from the Foreign Ministry, succeeded "Amr Musa in 2001. Mahur had been nominated by Mubarak as ambassador to the US in 1992. He belongs to Mubarak’s peace-process generation and served Sadat in Camp David as security adviser.

Since few accounts leak out from these two ministries (Defense and Foreign Affairs), it is difficult to judge what exactly went on inside. The authors suggest, however, that a split in the institutions can be deducted in both cases: in the former on a) the cooperation with the Allied Forces during the Second Gulf war 28 and in the latter on b) politics concerning Israel after the breakdown of the Oslo process. Thus, it was necessary to bring in a personality who could moderate the split and mediate between the two factions, which illustrates Mubarak’s pattern of choice and partly explains why he resorts to surprises in the end. As Singh points out, "intra-regime rivalries in Egypt have not equated with significant elite fissures as understood by comparative theorists of regime change. Egypt has experienced its share of perhaps unavoidable elite 'power games.' Examples include Nasir's rift with Chief of Staff "Amir, Sadat's struggle to consolidate power after Nasir, and Mubarak's conflict with Field Marshal Abu Ghazala. Yet the pattern of regime politics to the present day has not reflected the expectations of current theory, where crisis-induced, public elite fissures produce increased collective action and strategic behaviour." (2002: 17)

Egyptian diplomacy marked the region in the 1990s significantly. Under Musa, the Foreign Ministry developed into an independent entity that not only regarded
itself as a state organ that implements decisions but also one that makes them.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be the most hybrid public agency in Egypt, drawing its experts from the faculties of political science, intelligence, the military, and other parts of the administration." (Waterbury 1999: 21)

In 2001, the State Secretary for International Cooperation was transferred from the Ministry of Planning to the Foreign Ministry, which gave the latter even more weight.

After the assassination of Rabin in 1995 and the beginning of the end of the peace process, its independent role became even more apparent and Amr Musa was known to take a much harder stance vis-a-vis Israeli politics. To summarize, Musa could be a suitable next president since he is a perfect "untainted middle man" who would be able to work with the moderate Islamists as well as ardent liberals or confined military men and who could direct Egypt over the threshold to a civil state.

The Liberal Project, Scenario B: Economists

The public discussion on who was to succeed Husni Mubarak increased after the death of the Syrian President, Hafiz al-Asad (1930-2000). The Egyptian opposition press openly compared the Syrian case with Egypt and asked whether Jamal Mubarak would succeed his father as Bashar al-Asad had done.29 The parallel seemed even more striking because the older sons of the two families ("Ala Mubarak and Basil al-Asad) were both focused in the media until the mid-1990s when Bashir died in a car accident and "Ala's role in the business world suddenly diminished for no apparent reason. The Syrian scenario set off a general debate on hereditary successions in Arab republics and kingdoms.30 There was considerable trepidation among certain Arab intellectuals as to whether more Arab states (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Yemen) would act along the same lines. The opposition newspaper al-Wafd voiced these concerns. What had determined their view was the growing political role taken by Jamal Mubarak since the mid-1990s, when he became the spokesman of the Egyptian-US Presidents' Council for the Egyptian side, a confederation of Egyptian and US-American businessmen who try to promote investment in Egypt and advise the government on economic issues. In 1999, the press reported that Jamal Mubarak was interested in founding a new political party called "al-Mustaqbal" (The Future) representing business interests, which in the event did not materialize. In the same year, he became involved in youth issues and founded the "Future Generation Foundation" that works in the field of housing for young people, training for graduates and political awareness-raising. He officially devoted himself to "preparing today a second and third generation of administrative and technical leaders for the challenges of the future" and stressed the fact that "the door is open for young people, NGOs and political parties to engage in political activity" (Al-Ahram Weekly, 11-17 May 2000). In February 2000, Husni Mubarak reshuffled the NDP's political bureau and the general secretariat. The former had not been changed since 1993. Jamal Mubarak became a member of the general secretariat along with the Minister of Economics, Yussuf Butrus Ghali, the Minister of Environment, Nadia Makram 'Ubaid, and the Minister of Youth, 'Ali ad-Din 'Hilli Dissuki, and two highly respected businessmen: Ibrahim Kamal (Kato Investments) and Ahma 'Iss (Ezz Steel). These changes reflect efforts to include popular and highly respected members of the cabinet who are not considered party bloc heads in the party's top decision-making organs. It also demonstrates the growing influence of the private sector.

After the parliamentary elections in 2000, during which Jamal Mubarak did not run as a candidate despite rumors to the contrary, he was appointed as one of four members responsible for party reform and officially charged with drawing younger Egyptians into the ruling party. Cadre-building and rejuvenation of the parties and the parliament gradually began in the 1990s and has produced well-qualified second and third rank politicians in the non-military field (Abdelnasser 2001).

All these activities can be seen as an attempt by Jamal Mubarak to gain political credentials and start building up a minimum of legitimacy, since "[t]he meteoric promotion of Bashar Assad to the rank of Field Marshal in the Syrian army cannot be repeated in Egypt", as Feldner (2000b) rightly pointed out. Moreover, for several reasons the Egyptian case will not automatically occur analogous to the Syrian case: Asad had been cautiously preparing the public for a quasi-dynastic succession since the beginning of the 1990s, whereas several times Husni Mubarak openly excluded the handing over of power to his son quite clearly (Mubarak 2001b) and Jamal Mubarak re-echoed this line more than once (e.g., Financial Times, 24.4.2001). A majority of the Syrian political elite and public opinion arguably supported the succession of Bashar, which was reflected in the alteration to the Syrian constitution. In Egypt, the majority of the political elite and the general public does not subscribe to the idea that Jamal Mubarak should succeed his father. They argue that the state of law is more mature in Egypt than in Syria and that civil society and the press are strong enough to resist from this model. Bashar could also rely on inherited legitimacy as part of the Asad family and the 'Alawi sect. Jamal Mubarak does not have this kind of backing, since Egypt is not a sectarian system like the countries of the Fertile Crescent. Despite opposition to the model à la syrienne, supporters of Jamal Mubarak, such as Yasin Siraj ad-Din (Brother of the Leader of the al-Wafd Party) or Wahid 'Abd al-Majid (Editor-in-Chief of the al-Ahram Strategic Report) have two arguments on hand: for one, they assert that Jamal has a genuine chance if the only alternative is a man from the military and
secondly they demand he should not be the successor simply because he is the 
president’s son but that neither should he be discouraged simply because of his 
family name (Feldner 2000b). Jamal Mubarak surely has a political future in 
Egypt but succeeding his father directly is an unlikely scenario.

Conclusion

If regional tensions rise, a pessimistic scenario for elite change in Egypt needs to 
be taken seriously. Then the Islamic awakening current could become predomi-
nant. Their first step might be to reverse the established “American/European-
Egyptian” platform in favor of strengthening ties with other Muslim countries, 
especially in Asia.

If signs of real peace between Israel and the Arab World re-emerge, we 
could think about the more optimistic liberal scenario. Someone from the diplo-
matic pro-two-states lobby, such as Amr Musa, might become president. In this 
scenario, Egypt crosses the threshold to a civil state. The army will still be 
dominated by the generation that did not take part in any war against Israel and 
those who can imagine taking orders from a civilian superior will prevail.

In any case, the political agenda of the successor will have to take up all 
the demands currently voiced by the political opposition, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in order to consolidate his rule. The next president will have to 
open up dialogue between the various political currents. This debate will center 
a round the legal framework for government and non-government politics. The 
most influential currents will be the business lobby and the trade unions, who 
will exert pressure over the distribution of wealth and political influence in soci-
ety. Today, both bodies are still represented within the NDP but a number of 
new party foundations assembling various interests can be expected to emerge.

In this scenario, Mubarak’s successor could come from a civilian background 
for the first time in the history of the republic. This reading of events might give 
us an insight into why Egypt has been faced with a vice-presidency surrounded 
by mystery for the last 21 years.

Anmerkungen

1 These hopes seem to be based more on illusions than on a thorough analysis of the space for 
maneuvering. Gudrun Kriemer suggested that it might be a problem of perspective: “The 
focus on change in the Middle East could be the reflection of a Western academic bias.”
The 1952 revolution, after which the King was exiled to Italy, was therefore called the 'white revolution'. In 1981, seven people who had attended the military parade with Anwar Sadat were killed.

When the Achille Lauro was hijacked, the Egyptian government agreed to guarantee safe passage for the Palestinian hijackers from Port Said. But as soon as the hijackers had boarded the Egypt Air plane to be flown out, US forces from Sicily intercepted. Rumors that Abu Ghazala had cooperated with the US against Mubarak never ceased.

In 1997, the Middle East alone accounted for 36.4% of the world market arms imports (U.S. Department of State 2000).


21. This surprisingly long span of time was due to the exceptional circumstances after entering into peace negotiations with Israel.

22. Law 203/1991 excluded companies producing military weapons in the public sector from privatization.

23. High-ranking officers had the advantage, for example, of being allowed to import a car tax free, which would normally amount to 300%. Many used this opportunity to make a fortune.

24. According to official numbers, Egypt spent 3.4 billion US$ on military expenditures in 1985, which amounted to 15% of the total government budget and 3.28 billion US$ in 1997 or 8.2% of the budget (World Fact Book 1986 and 1997).

25. For an understanding of the future of the Islamist project, see az-Zuwahiri 2001 and az-Zayyat 2002.

26. With the unfolding of the second intifada in 2000, a popular song emerged in Egypt by Shaaban Abderrahim with the title: "I love Amr Musa and I hate Israel" that confirmed the widespread image that Moussa had acquired a much stronger position against Israeli policies than Mubarak.

27. About ten names of possible successors to Amr Musa were in circulation, with Maher at the very end of the list. The degree of confusion even led to a false announcement by the new Foreign Minister on television. Instead of Ahmed Maher they gave out the name of Ali Mahir, his younger brother, who is the Egyptian ambassador to France.

28. Some of the accounts of this split became visible when the first Egyptian General, Ahmed Bilal, was called back by Mubarak even before the war had started because of differences of opinion with the Saudi generals. Salah Halabi, head of the presidential guard, took over the command of the Egyptian troops in his place. Other accounts tell of the salute fire that broke out among the 4000 Egyptian soldiers when Iraqi rockets were fired onto Israel. Halabi was later promoted to chief major.

29. For a detailed account of the positions of the Egyptian press, see Feldner 2000a.

30. In its July issue of 2000, the Saudi journal 'al-Majalla' therefore coined the term jumhuriya (a mix of the Arab words jumhuriyya = republic and malakiyya = kingdom). The unconstitutional 'humanization' of the sons of the republics is a sensitive issue.

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Politisierung und Entpolitisierung von Religion in den euromediterranen Beziehungen: Welchen Stellenwert für den interreligiösen Dialog?

