

Young Authority: Quantitative and Qualitative Insights into Youth, Youth Culture, and State Power in Contemporary Morocco

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ABSTRACT *This article presents the results of a quantitative survey among 622 young Moroccans in 2003/04 on concepts of legitimacy under Mohammed VI. The article regards itself as a contribution to the debate about authoritarianism in the Middle East and the production of social consent in Muslim states. It explores changing state–society relations with quantitative as well as qualitative means. The findings show that traditional sources of legitimacy are declining whereas modern rationales and a ‘youthful spirit’ rise as reasons for accepting the young king’s authority. The habitus of youth needs to be regarded as a major contributing element to the stability of the Moroccan monarchy today. The results show clearly that processes of political modernisation and democratisation are more crucial to women than men.*

Introduction

This article presents the results of a quantitative survey on different concepts of legitimacy under the young Moroccan king Mohammed VI, positioning them in the context of changing state–society relations. It seems particularly insightful to understand why youth today accepts Mohammed VI as an authority in a society that is said to be based upon the authority of a mystical father figure—be it the head of a family, the leader of a tribe, or the father of a nation. The term authority—rather than domination—is a conscious choice, as the focus of the article is on legitimacy as a component of *Herrschaft* and not on force. Legitimacy is understood here as a dynamic continuum on a scale that ranges from the use of force at one extreme to (rationally, normatively, or otherwise) established reasons for accepting another’s authority. In between, there are forms of direct or indirect coercion, of spatial and political ordering, the exertion of spiritual and/or political authority, social welfare politics, merit by efficiency, and possibly other elements, all of which

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stress the interactive character of legitimacy. Using this approach, I intend to distance myself from theories that regard the ‘submissiveness’ of Arab societies or the intelligent *divide et impera* politics of Arab autocrats as main reasons for continuity of power and authoritarianism in the Middle East. As Max Weber pointed out, ‘[...] every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’ (Weber, 1978, p. 212). Following Bettina Dennerlein, Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore argue that even in pre-colonial Morocco ‘political “belonging” was not based on unquestioned belief, but on a continuing process of contest and reaffirmation’ (Eickelman and Salvatore, 2002, p. 92).

As part of the manifold research on regime durability in the Arab world it is worth examining how a king secures his legitimacy in the twenty-first century. I started from the hypothesis that the spiritual, religious, patriarchal, divine, and holy dimensions of authority (in other words, traditional authority¹) are diminishing, whereas the importance of its worldly, profane, merit-based and individual qualities (i.e. more modern rationales) are increasing in legitimising authority. I deliberately talk of decrease and increase, not of replacement as there are of course still elements of traditional authority under Mohammed VI in use; for example, ‘[r]ules which in fact are innovations can be legitimized only by the claim that they have been “valid of yore”, but have only now been recognized by means of “Wisdom”’ (Weber, 1978, p. 227).

Secondary literature uses very sophisticated arguments with regard to Muslim notions of legitimacy (see Hammoudi, 1997; Joffe, 1988; Krämer, 2000; Tozy, 1999). There are at least three common perspectives. In the first of these, the emphasis is on the ability of the Moroccan monarchy to trace legitimacy back to its genealogy, as well as on the skilful use of Muslim symbols (be it Malikite orthodoxy, mysticism or the popular veneration of the prophet). A second perspective stresses the eminent role of religious scholars and holy figures in procuring legitimacy. A third perspective concentrates on authoritarianism and subservience, transmitted through the family, the brotherhoods or the state bureaucracy, as the basis for the stability of the Moroccan dynasty. Historically, the king is regarded as supreme mediator who binds together urban and rural Morocco. Today, this approach concentrates on clientelism and patronage networks that buy support or secure it through co-option. Such ‘neo-patrimonial’ states prevent the emergence of autonomous interest groups as much as they can according to this reading. Those groups which exist are very often used as input structures in order to introduce certain political topics in the interest of the authoritarian state from top to bottom. This perspective though neglects that agenda-setting also occurs successfully from bottom to top in the Arab world (see Hegasy, 1997) and that NGOs have won enough credibility to establish themselves as independent voices in Arab societies. In this sense this article regards itself also as a contribution to the debate about authoritarianism and the production of social consent in Muslim states.

Primogenital rule has always been a controversial issue among Muslim religious scholars (see Sourdel et al., 1978). It has only a very limited tradition in the Muslim world. In Morocco it was installed through constitutional change in 1961 by the grandfather of today’s king. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the successor was appointed or appointed himself and had to be recognised by religious and legal scholars, notables, as well as military leaders.² Clifford Geertz mentions several times how surprising it is that the Moroccan Sultanate managed to fuse two antithetical principles: ‘the principle

that the ruler is ruler because he is supernaturally qualified to be so; and the principle that the ruler is ruler because the competent spokesmen of the Community have collectively agreed that he is' (Geertz, 1971, p. 77). Geertz has shown the importance of the 'doctrine of the exemplary centre' for both the Indonesian and the Moroccan state. The king became

[...] not just a ruler, but the center of a royal cult: the official religious leader of the country, the supreme expression of the sacredness of Prophetic descent, and the possessor of large and undefined magical powers. That [...] the strong-man aspects of his role inevitably clashed with and usually dominated the holy-man aspects is both true and, for an understanding of the nature of the Moroccan state, critical. (Geertz, 1971, p. 53)

These two concepts of legitimacy have clearly changed with the ascendance of Mohammed VI in 1999: he is neither depicted as the strongman nor the holy man. To the observer it is striking that Mohammed VI's public portraits show him as a shy person, very often obviously not at ease on the throne. One would assume that it is counter-productive if the young king looks miserable and thus inappropriate to succeed his father. Public opinion regarding Mohammed VI agrees that he has little personal charisma. This has to be recognised as an important weakness of the monarchy today. How does the monarchy respond to this? Mohammed VI tries to present himself as the 'King of the Poor' and the king who blends in well with his citizens. For the first time in Moroccan history, a king introduces his wife to the public. The citizens could even follow his 'middle-class' marriage festivities through the media. But can he still retain the highest religious authority, act as ultimate arbiter in the country, and at the same time be a 'modern father carrying his newborn', i.e. be an icon of globalised popular middle-class youth culture?

In the case of the twentieth-century Omani monarchy, Eickelman has shown that 'the failure of the monarch to respond constructively to shifting popular expectations of what rulers should do [...] contributed significantly to the deteriorating political situation' (Eickelman, 1985, p. 3) and finally to the *coup d'état* in 1970. This challenge holds true for the new generation of rulers in the Middle East in general as rapidly changing young societies are increasingly pressuring their leaders to react to popular demands. Observing Morocco and the Middle East at the turn of the century, I have increasingly come to the opinion that 'youthfulness' is a concept at the heart of issues of continuity and stability of state power in many Muslim countries. The unexpected election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in July 2005 can also be better understood if—as paradoxical as it might sound—'youthfulness' as an important element of establishing authority is taken into account. His election signifies a generational change that was obviously a demand by a majority of voters in the country which according to many observers cannot be reversed.

'Youthfulness' as understood here is less a primordial quality than a social one. It does not imply any ideological stance, i.e. the younger are more inclined towards democratisation and modernisation. As Asef Bayat and Martijn de Koning pointed out it is rather a category of habitus than ideology: 'Although gender, class, and cultural divisions may make it untenable to render youths homogenous as an analytical category, it is equally true that the young do share certain important habitus, which both the young themselves as well as the political and moral authority recognize' (Bayat and de Koning, 2005, p. 60). This article attempts to show such complex realities in the case of Morocco. It explores motives for recognising the ruler, assuming that the young are not driven by 'sheer

docility'. Reasons for being loyal must be examined as part of changing social practice and cannot be considered a static given. Abdellah Hammoudi has stressed that 'there has been no consideration, or at best only implicit consideration, of the exact ways in which these abstract principles of legitimation are vested with an emotional impact sufficient to foster action' (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 2).

The Survey

Opinion polls are very rare in Morocco³ as well as the rest of the Arab world and seldom reach out of the universities or the urban centres.⁴ A study by Bernard Sabella on the political socialisation of Palestinian youth was the first of its kind in the Arab world, using annual investigations from 1998 to 2001 (Sabella, 2004). The survey presented here was carried out between May 2003 and January 2004 in eight different areas from south of Marrakech to the Rif mountains in the north of the country. It is based on a random sample in the big cities of Casablanca and Rabat (42.8 per cent), smaller towns (Settat, Fès 29.4 per cent) as well as rural areas (27.8 per cent) Figure 1.




Figure 1. Locations of the survey

Since we could not access a structured sample, the study cannot claim representativity. But contrary to the vast majority of surveys in the Arab world it was not restricted to only university students or only urban youth. It is important to note that 20 per cent of all the interviews were broken off with the first question that directly dealt with the monarchy, as people were not willing to talk about characteristics of the monarch or stated they could not answer the question honestly. In one case, two women seized the questionnaires from Male 2 and tore them up. For these reasons the questionnaire had a neutral title: 'Youth and Political Change in Morocco'.⁵ In the course of 59 mainly multiple-choice questions, interviewees were asked about their attitudes toward politics and society in general and more specifically about their perceptions of the young king. Of the 622 young adults who participated, 84.4 per cent were between 18 and 34 years old; the rest were older (age distribution see Table 1).

It is difficult to define 'youth' strictly according to age. Those who have not yet completed their education or taken on responsibility for a family are normally subsumed

Table 1. Age distribution (Q 8)

18–21	23.6%
22–24	15.6%
25–29	28.8%
30–34	16.4%
Over 34	15.6%

under 'youth'. Now that marriage has also been postponed in the Arab world and the education period extends to the age of 30, the definition has been broadened. It is not surprising that 70 per cent of our participants were still single. Nearly a third of the Moroccan population fall into the age category of 18 to 34.⁶ This generation had not known any other reign than that of Hassan II since 1962. Today, they are the politically most relevant part of society and will decide over the stability and continuity of the Moroccan monarchy.

A total of 36 per cent of the participants were women; 64 per cent men. Eighty per cent spoke Arabic as a first language; 19 per cent grew up with a Berber dialect. With 32.5 per cent, students were the largest group we polled (see Table 2). The younger people were, the better educated they were. This was especially true for women. This means that there is a bias towards youth with higher educational levels (see Table 3). Still 69.2 per cent of the mothers had no schooling at all as well as 29.6 per cent of the fathers. Thirty-five per cent of the questionnaires were conducted in Arabic and 65 per cent in French.⁷ Twenty-eight per cent of the respondents were married.⁸ Remarkably, 44.7 per cent replied that their household economic situation had improved during the last ten years, 32.2 per cent said that it had not changed and 23.1 per cent answered that their circumstances had deteriorated.⁹ Three-quarters did not have their own means of transport, which shows that we did not deal with the rich Moroccan elite.¹⁰ A total of 86.9 per cent had never been outside of Morocco. This is the generation in which people have started spending more time with their friends than with the family (see Table 4). Forty-seven per cent said they do not spend time at the mosque. A total of 63.3 per cent stated that they prayed. Only eight people said that they belonged to a religious brotherhood. Questions 38 and 39 were reproduced from a survey by Adam (1963) dealing with the generation gap (see Table 5). A total of 71.4 per cent think that their responsibilities today are more difficult than their parents' (see Table 6).

Table 2. Employment (Q 9)

Students	32.5%
Farmers	10.3%
Unemployed	9.4%
Engineers	2.9
Civil servants	9.0%
Liberal professions	6.6%
Housewives	6.3%
Services	5.3%
Small merchants	5.3%
Workers industry/agriculture	4.5%
Handicapped	0.8
Other	7.1

Table 3. Educational level (Q 6)

University degree	52.4%
High school	11.8%
Coranic school	9.6%
O-level	9.1%
Left school after 7th grade	8.3%
No formal education	6.3%
Other	2.5

Since we were dealing with youth, it was obvious that the vast majority (98.3 per cent) had not performed the pilgrimage so far (although 65.6 per cent wished to do so at some time). A total of 91.6 per cent were not member of a political party. Half of the sample participated in the 2002 parliamentary elections (voting behaviour in 2002; see Table 7).

A limitation of the survey is the fact that we do not have an older age group to compare attitudes with. Therefore we cannot be sure at this point that the attitudes are specific to youth. But the conclusions show that certain attitudes increase within the age group of 18–34 the younger people are. We also tested whether these attitudes might be connected to education rather than age as the young tend to be better educated than the old. But education was only significant for the importance of religious aspects of the king's authority.

To meet these limitations I used qualitative means as well. The explorative value of this study lies not only in the quantitative part, but also in analysing its context and the events surrounding its implementation. Five interviews were carried out up to three hours and noted separately. Observing the context of the study was at least as indicative as the survey itself. It served as a vehicle for discussion with young people that would otherwise have been very arbitrary. I was often confronted with an attitude of 'I can only answer this question because the survey is anonymous'. Or people explained half-laughing, half-serious, 'I could go to prison for answering this question', or 'I can only give you back the questionnaire written in invisible ink'. Anonymity was vital to the interviewees and was doubted on several occasions.¹¹ Such was the context in which the survey was administered; training interviewers in advance, as had been planned in the beginning, was thus not possible.¹² Since a question about the degree of Mohammed VI's acceptance could be answered negatively, i.e. that he has no authority at all, the issue was too sensitive to be investigated publicly in the streets. It became clear in the course of the survey that only a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods provides valuable insights into changing state–society relations in contemporary Morocco. I will therefore also elaborate somewhat more extensively on political and cultural change in Morocco in 2003/04 in order to put the findings in its context.

Table 4. How much time do you spend . . . (Q 32)

	At the mosque	With your family	With friends	Doing sports	On the Internet	In an NGO
A lot	4.9	29.7	33.9	8.5	7.4	6.0
Quite some	15.5	33.3	38.6	16.3	18.3	6.5
Little	32.6	35.2	23.2	32.3	26.0	11.0
None	47.0	1.8	4.2	42.8	48.4	76.2

Table 5. Do you feel very close to the generation preceding your own, or, on the contrary, do you think that there is a major gap between the two generations? (Q 38)

	2003/4 ¹³
Very close	6.0
Close	27.8
Distanced	28.8
Very distanced	29.8
No response	7.6
Total	100.0

Findings

Regarding characteristics that were ascribed to both the former and the current monarch, differences can be identified very clearly. But we have to keep in mind that we are dealing here with perceptions of Hassan II at the end of his reign and of Mohammed VI four years into his reign. This article obviously can only provide us with a snapshot of changing state–society relations at a given point in time. Hassan II was also not regarded as a charismatic leader right from the beginning of his reign. In 2003/04, 54 per cent of the participants regarded Hassan II as a father of the nation, whereas 46 per cent did not. For Mohammed VI the result was the opposite: 46 per cent saw him as a father of the nation and the rest did not. Whereas 78 per cent attributed the characteristic ‘severe’ to Hassan II, only 22.9 per cent did so to Mohammed VI. Hassan II is widely perceived as a ‘génie politique’ (89.1 per cent), whereas Mohammed VI only convinces 31.1 per cent in this regard. In comparison with his father, Mohammed VI is regarded as more just (39.8 per cent vs. 30.6 per cent for Hassan II). A total of 76.4 per cent attributed the term ‘authoritarian’ to Hassan II, but only 29.9 per cent to his son. A total of 83.1 per cent deemed Hassan II eloquent, whereas only 32.1 per cent connect this feature with Mohammed VI (see Table 8). In an earlier work I surveyed 103 speeches by Mohammed VI given between August 1999 and October 2001. It showed that one of the aims of Mohammed VI’s public speeches is to demonstrate his proficiency in the most pressing issues of the country. He displays awareness of a wide array of problems and he expresses his emotional understanding of as well as his professional competence in these issues.¹⁴

One characteristic that is often referred to in secondary literature about Morocco is the notion of *baraka*, i.e. divine blessing. Here the results show no major differences between Hassan II and Mohammed VI. Secondary literature refers to it as one the main pillars of

Table 6. Do you think that your responsibilities in the society are more difficult than those of your parents’ generation? (Q 39)

Easier responsibilities	9.3
Similar responsibilities	19.1
Responsibilities more difficult	71.4
No response	0.2
Total	100.0

Table 7. Voting behaviour 2002 (Q 26)

Leftist block (USFP, PI, PPS)	25.0%
Wifaq (UC, MP, PND)	12.7%
Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD)	11.9%
Centriste (RNI, MNP, MDS)	8.8%
Blank ballot	7.3%
No response	25.0%

Moroccan rule (see Geertz, 1971). But a number of interviewees asked me what I meant by this. From their reactions it was clear that my target group regarded this concept as completely outdated. One commentary was: '*Baraka? J'ai jamais pensé à ça*'. The oath of allegiance (*bai'a*) was regarded as another outdated tradition by a third of the interviewees. Slightly more than half of the respondents attributed to it an important tradition, a contract between king and citizens or the basis of his legitimacy (see Table 9). Still, the fact that the other half considered it as outdated or did not know how to judge it, shows that 'charisma of office' (*Amtscharisma*) (Weber, 1978, p. 248) is losing its effectiveness.

The relationship between the Moroccan king and his subjects is one of direct allegiance. The televised allegiance ceremony, performed annually on 3 March, is tantamount to the submission of the entire population in one instant (see Combs-Schilling, 1989). The monarchy becomes the sole point of reference for the vast majority of Moroccans. The opposition journalist Hamid Berrada pointed out that when the people mourned the death of Hassan II and the loss of 'their father' in July 1999, it was not a metaphor; they had literally become orphans. The strength of the monarchy lies in the close religious ties between the king–sultan–caliph and the subject–believer–citizen. Hammoudi stresses that '[A]ttacking him would be both a crime and a sacrilege—inseparable notions in this logic—at once a violation of divine law and the desacralization of a figure of Islamic piety' (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 13).

In October 1999, Mohammed VI introduced a 'new concept of authority' (Mohammed VI, 1999), where he promulgated the protection of individual and collective rights and the safeguarding of social peace in the country. The results in Table 8 show that Mohammed VI is regarded as a much more open, just, benevolent and less patriarchal ruler than his

Table 8. Which characteristic do you attribute to Mohammed VI and Hassan II? (Q 42/55)

	Mohammed VI			Hassan II		
	High	Medium	No	High	Medium	No
Just	39.8	22.8	20.9	30.6	20.1	49.4
Severe	22.9	40.3	36.8	78.0	13.6	8.3
Political genius	31.1	31.1	37.8	89.1	6.5	4.4
Authoritarian	29.9	36.9	33.0	76.4	13.4	10.1
Eloquent	32.1	30.0	37.9	83.1	11.4	5.5
Arbitrary	26.6	36.6	36.8	47.3	30.9	21.7
Charismatic	42.2	22.9	34.9	74.0	13.8	12.3
Blessed (<i>baraka</i>)	34.7	15.0	50.2	30.2	16.0	53.8
<i>Bienfaiteur</i>	57.8	23.3	18.9	30.3	22.3	47.4

Table 9. What does *bai'a* signify for you? (Q 56)

A contract between king and subjects	18.4
A folkloristic celebration	15.5
An important tradition	18.3
An outlived tradition	14.3
The basis of the king's legitimacy	14.8
I do not know	18.6
Total	100

Table 10. Satisfaction with political reforms (Q 45)

1. Very satisfied: 9.2 per cent
2. Satisfied: 24.9 per cent
3. Not satisfied: 30.1 per cent
4. Not at all satisfied: 35.8 per cent

father among young adults. Asked whether less authoritarian relations had been installed between state and citizens, 41.3 per cent said yes and 32.6 per cent no.¹⁵

None of the various political institutions like political parties, the government, the judiciary, the trade unions, and non-governmental organisations had a high degree of trust. Even Islamist NGOs were deemed very trustworthy only by 10.2 per cent of the respondents, whereas the highest score was achieved by the human rights NGOs, with 22.7 per cent. All other institutions (including the media) scored around 10 per cent.

Surprisingly, the issue that the king improves their standard of living was not a priority.¹⁶ But the younger the people were, the more essential this aspect was for them. The role of the king as President of the Jerusalem Committee played an insignificant role (52 per cent: not important; 18 per cent: important¹⁷). Installing the rule of law was also ranked relatively low.¹⁸ Again, the younger the respondents, the more essential was this aspect. The two possible answers related to religious aspects (descendant from the prophet and the king's status as Commander of the Faithful) showed no significant connection to either sex or age. Attitudes towards these two elements highly depended on the level of education, i.e. the higher the education, the less important were religious features. In contrast, the importance of his good relations to Europe and his cleverness to guide the country in times of globalisation were highly determined by age.

Political Context

16 May 2003 was a turning point in Moroccan domestic politics. Twelve young suicide attackers killed 33 people in five different places in Casablanca.¹⁹ The attacks left the country in a state of shock comparable to the aftermath of 9/11 in the United States. This had a severe impact on the interview situation of the study which started during the same week. People wondered why someone was enquiring about attitudes toward the king at precisely this moment. Civil police presence was increased all over the country, thereby hampering the interview situation in the coffee shops used by two male interviewers. Both interviewers were of the opinion that they would have had wider access if the survey had been carried out before May 16 2003. They decided that under the

circumstances they could no longer ask close acquaintances to participate in the survey, in order not to jeopardise them.

The attacks triggered off two political debates of relevance to the survey. The first discussed social disparities in Moroccan society, since the attackers had come from the Sidi Moumen slum area around Casablanca. The second public debate addressed the authority of the young monarch directly. Voices could be heard everywhere in public claiming the attacks would not have happened under Hassan II. His iron fist policies and penetrative secret service would have nipped such plans in the bud. This clearly put Mohammed VI under pressure and unhinged the authority of the monarchy. With the royal photo of Mohammed VI as a proud father carrying his son, Hassan III, in his arms still on every wall when the attacks occurred,²⁰ people immediately began looking for a strongman—not for a modern, enlightened father with a newborn baby. On 30 July 2003, the fourth anniversary of his succession to the throne, Mohammed VI attempted to meet these expectations. Partly blaming the political parties, he openly referred to the ills of Moroccan society, such as corruption, unfit housing, growing slums, poverty, and a poor educational system, for which he took responsibility as ‘First Servant’ of the country: ‘In fulfilling the highest mandate entrusted to me, I shall not tolerate any slackening in the management of public affairs. I firmly intend to apply all mechanisms needed for strict control and audit. Although each one of us is accountable for a specific area of responsibility, the highest mandate to run this country and its public affairs lies with the First Servant of this nation’ (Mohamed VI, 2003).

Since the ascendance of Mohammed VI to the throne, his holiness was put into question. Although a secular instrument, the constitution stipulates the sacredness of the king in Article 23 placing him above the constitution. Critics of the monarchy did not go as far as demanding the abolition of this article, but the media initiated a debate on the monarchy’s sacredness, despite the fact that the monarchy as an institution is still one of three taboos in Moroccan politics.²¹ In November 2002, *Le Journal hebdomadaire* asked about the religious foundations of the regime. The topic was taken up again two weeks before the attacks in Casablanca under the heading ‘Le sacré contre la démocratie?’ Four weeks later, *Le Journal* asked about the consequences of the attacks for the stability of the monarchy.

The radical changes in Moroccan family law announced by Mohammed VI at the opening session of parliament on 10 October 2003 can be regarded as immediate fallout of the attacks. Prior to this, Mohammed VI had not been able to push his family law reforms through against the widespread societal opposition voiced especially by well-organised Islamist organisations. In January 2004, the parliament finally passed the reforms with the inclusion even of restrictions on polygamy. The reforms exceeded the demands of the feminist movement, which had been struggling for change since the mid-1980s. But the feminist demand for the abolition of polygamy had mobilised the Islamists time and time again, thus blocking other vital reforms. The Islamist movement uses polygamy as a core element of classical, Muslim identity, albeit today it is in fact a marginal social phenomenon in all Arab countries. With the reform of 2004, grandchildren can now inherit from their grandfather through both father and mother.²² Furthermore, the reforms gave women equal rights with regard to custody of their children and divorce. The obligation of obedience to a husband was abolished. The reform of the electoral code shortly before the parliamentary elections in 2002 introduced a quota of 10 per cent for women and represents a novum in Moroccan politics as well. Before, only two

women had been elected into parliament. That women participated in swearing the oath of allegiance to Mohammed VI in the royal palace was another innovation that is both cause and result of changing patterns of meaning. The public marriage of Mohammed VI and Lalla Salma opened up the secretiveness of the royal palace. According to the survey presented here, 55.1 per cent regarded the public marriage as the king's private matter; 16.4 per cent found it important for the role of women in politics; 7.7 per cent thought it was not dignified for a king; 13.7 per cent regarded it as a symbol of the reform of the monarchy. Interestingly enough, there are basically no differences between men and women in answering this question. In the survey we also did not find a significant difference in political interest between men and women.

As in neighbouring Algeria, the role of the Berber in constructing a legitimate, national identity has changed in recent years. The Moroccan Berber movement has become more and more outspoken. Daily journals in Tamazight have been published and schools are starting to introduce Berber dialects into their curricula. On 30 July 2001, during a royal speech, Mohammed VI called the Berber culture an indispensable part of Moroccan historic identity. This is part of the *new makhzen's* strategy to include all societal groups and was an unprecedented step.²³ The appointment in 2002 of Mohamed Chafik, a renowned historian and activist in the Berber movement, as new director of the 'Royal Institute for Berber Culture in Morocco' (Ircam), supports this interpretation. An appointment of this kind can be interpreted, on the one hand, as co-optation and regarded as one way of suppressing dissent, but on the other hand, it can also be understood as part of a long history of implicit mediation between the opposition and the *makhzen* and as pluralisation in its effect. To denominate the model exhibited by the young king and his court reflecting societal change and the new faces that have moved into the political elite, the *makhzen* is today called *new makhzen*. The central role of the palace's self-representation in maintaining the idea of the king's court as a model for the social order has been repeatedly pointed out by Geertz (1971, p. 36ff.).

Youth Culture

Besides the attacks in Casablanca, two other domestic events intimidated young adults in responding to the questionnaire in 2003: the case of the journalist Ali Lmrabet and the case of the hard rockers, referred to in the Moroccan press as 'satanists'. In March 2003, nine members of the Moroccan heavy metal bands Nekros and Reborn and five of their fans were sentenced to prison for one year for supposedly violating public order and adhering to a satanic cult. In fact they had done nothing more than other young people all over the world: they wore black t-shirts and played heavy metal music. This can be termed a conflict between 'globalised youth culture' and 'monopolist state-culture'.²⁴ The arrests provoked major protest from their fans. They published petitions on the Internet and organised sit-ins in front of the court in Casablanca, where they were joined by 4–5,000 people. Four weeks later, 11 of the so-called culprits were acquitted by the court of appeal and three one-year sentences were reduced to 45 days. The opposition weekly *TelQuel* assumed that Mohammed VI was behind the acquittal of the young hard rockers. Although generally very critical of the monarchy, the editor of *TelQuel*, Ahmed R. Benchemsi (2003), thanked the king, showing him on the front page in a leather jacket wearing sunglasses.

The Mawazine music festival has been bringing young bands together in Rabat since 2002. Similar to the Boulevard des Jeunes Musiciens in Casablanca, frequented by Moroccan rap, hip-hop, rock and heavy metal bands, it is not a festival directed at tourists. In 2003, 7,000 young adults visited the Boulevard des Jeunes Musiciens, a festival of underground music that staged 36 Moroccan and four European bands. Bands from all over the country, such as Tora Bora, Blad Bomb, Kif Kif, Reborn, and Nekros, performed in the streets of Casablanca. These groups sing about ‘social hyperconformism’ in Moroccan dialect as well as in French. Kif Kif, for example, raps with provocative texts about the Islamist appeal for Mohammed VI to repatriate his fortune or about the hunger strike of Ali Lmrabet: ‘Dis-moi où sont parties les richesses du pays / Dis-moi qui a volé ses biens/Ta réponse tu la trouveras chez un journaliste auquel on a arraché son gagne-pain/A cause de ses idées, de sa feuille et de son stylo / Ils lui ont dessiné une ligne rouge et lui ont dit attention à ne pas la dépasser’. Such mass gatherings of young people are unthinkable in most Arab countries, because security forces fear that they could get out of control.

The second incident that strongly affected the interview situation in 2003 was the court case of the then editor-in-chief of the satirical *Demain* magazine and *Douman*, Ali Lmrabet. A week after my arrival, he was sentenced to four years in prison for lese majesty and assault on the monarchy as well as on the national integrity. Although the sentence was reduced to three years and Lmrabet was pardoned by the king in January 2004, he was again punished to a ten-year writing ban in 2005. Many interviewees referred to the arbitrary case against Lmrabet while we carried out the survey.

Youth NGOs have risen as part of the youth culture. The Association Nationale des Diplômées Chômeurs du Maroc (ANDCM) founded in 1991 had 20,000 members by 2001 (see ATTAC, 2001). They organise sit-ins, hunger strikes, public demonstrations, and national conferences to put the problem of youth unemployment on the political agenda. Official statistics speak of an unemployment rate of 13 per cent in 2004; 27.5 per cent of the unemployed are university graduates. They lobby their cause without foreign funding. ANDCM exists both in urban and rural areas of the country and is organised in 140 branches. It was not legally recognised until 2003. ANDCM constitutes a unique youth phenomenon both in the Arab world and in global terms. It is democratically organised with regular meetings where local and national representatives are elected.

ATTAC Maroc was founded in 2000 and shows how Moroccan youth participates in global activism. As part of the international movement against globalisation, it is their intention to add the specific local perspective to the ATTAC movement. They work on the EU–Morocco partnership agreement for the establishment of a free trade zone by 2010, and they promote local networking against neo-liberalism. ATTAC Maroc also wants to raise civil awareness toward processes of globalisation on the regional, i.e. the North African, level in order to develop their own vision of a just global society.

The marked growth and diversification of newspapers and magazines in Morocco²⁵ since the mid-1980s is another startling phenomenon related to a changing youth culture—both as readers and as editors/journalists. Although these journals are expensive, new ones continue to appear on the market. Many of them are fashion magazines or deal with youth leisure activities such as music, sports, and computer or new information technology.

From my point of view, the young generation’s activities in global music trends, national and international NGOs, and the rise in media production as well as consumption

show that, contrary to prevailing assumptions, there is a young Moroccan generation actively partaking in and appropriating processes of globalisation for themselves. The survey adds to this a dimension that shows that the monarchy's stability is tied to the king's ability to include Morocco in the rapidly changing global environment. The majority of the interviewees here are not exposing an isolationist viewpoint that puts a—however defined—specific Arab-Islamic culture first and rejects any merging with the international context. Quite to the contrary, it is a generation that not only simply expresses its will to migrate to the North at any cost, but that also is actively and creatively involved in 'bringing the North south'. This youth does not regard globalisation as the irresistible export of the Anglo-Saxon model, but as a process of modernisation that any culture ought to aspire to. Question 41 of the survey inquired whether the process of globalisation was considered an advantage or disadvantage to them. Contrary to a simple rejectionist attitude, which one might expect in the Arab world, half of the respondents saw both, advantages as well as disadvantages.

Conclusion

Only between 75 and 80 per cent of the interviewees²⁶ answered the main question about the primary pillar of the new king's authority (see Table 11).²⁷ The answer how central it was that the king reflected a 'young spirit' achieved the highest approval.²⁸ The habitus of youth can thus be regarded as a major contributing element to the stability of the Moroccan monarchy. But age was not the highly determining factor here. Most significant were sex and the economic standard of the household. For women the 'young spirit' was very important as well as for those people whose economic situation had improved during the last ten years (see Table 12). The fact that some people also expressed their disappointment about the king's banal behaviour (sports, marriage, dress code) shows that his endeavour of self-renewal could also run counter the monarchy's claim to sovereignty.

Two answers were not related to gender: the importance attributed to closeness of the people and the king's ability to improve the people's standard of living. But women favoured the king's youthful spirit more than men, his efforts for democratic reforms, good relations with Europe, good governance in times of globalisation, his role as president of the Jerusalem Committee and his efforts to introduce rule of law. In all of these aspects education was not a significant variable whereas age was. The younger the interviewees were, the more important these aspects became. The results show very clearly that processes of political modernisation and democratisation are more crucial to women because they expect to gain more rights through this process.

Charisma has been regarded as a sovereign force in Morocco since the founding of the Almoravid and Almohad kingdoms in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Geertz, 1971, p. 47). With the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999, personal charisma, or even just institutional charisma, and traditional authority have lost their main legitimising potential. Significant political and demographic change affected the monarchy's search for legitimacy and thus its pattern of domination. Growing popular expectations for social and political justice forced the king to adapt his rule and especially his concept of authority. The king and his advisers are obviously aware of this challenge and have reacted to it on the level of royal iconography and discourse, as well as with several far-reaching political reform initiatives (the inclusion of Tamazight in the national education plan, the reform of the election code, the reform of family status law, etc.). Without neglecting the

Table 12. Dependent variable: his youthful spirit

$R^2 = 0.141$	Beta	Significance
Konstante -1.142		0.004
Sex	0.223	0.000
Changing economic situation	0.139	0.002
Spending time at the mosque	0.184	0.000
Age	0.113	0.010

authoritarian character of the Moroccan monarchy, the importance of manipulation or the use of open violence, the current adaptation of its image or style to the demands of a young, modern society are all part of securing the dynasty's continuous rule. The dynamic that has been set free during this process has been described here. As Max Weber pointed out, '[i]n traditionalist periods, charisma is *the* great revolutionary force. The likewise revolutionary force of "reason" works from without: by altering the situations of life and hence its problems, finally in this way changing men's attitudes toward them' (Weber, 1978, p. 245).

This limited study suggests that instead of charisma, negotiating reasons for legitimate order is becoming a major contributing force for stable rule under the young king. Surely, the interpretation presented here is only one possible reading of the more recent events in Morocco. It is a reading which goes counter the dominant perception of authoritarianism and stagnation in the Middle East based on an estranged political elite which secures its stability primarily through violence and co-optation. One could interpret the events gathered here as mere royal propaganda or subsume it under semi-authoritarianism. But the aim of this article was to propose a different reading, i.e. to show how the central power in a Middle Eastern state responds to popular expectations (see Catusse and Vairel, 2003). The king's newly defined role has the semblance of being closer to the reality of young adults. His self-image consciously exhibits a popular modern athletic and accessible king with youthful habitus. Mohammed VI obviously wants to position himself on the side of globalised youth. In the case of the so-called 'satanists', he embodied justice for parts of the young generation. Although there has not been a change of regime in Morocco, Mohammed VI admitted the abuse of human rights during his father's regime contributed actively to the public debate and pronounced compensation for the victims and their families. We might go so far as to say that the deliberately chosen iconography (public marriage with a middle-class working woman, praying in a suit instead of the traditional *jellaba*, wearing hip-hop gear, etc.) leads to a profanation of the holy monarch.

Young women in particular favour the opening up of the monarchy and its new political iconography. The new *makhzen* has successfully managed to create a different image both for itself and for the king. If we follow the argument that Morocco refuses individuality out of the conviction that 'individual autonomy undermines the state that upholds the religion that the monarch invokes for sanctification and, ultimately, political legitimacy' (Loudiy and Smith, 2005), then professing individuality at the top of the state is an act of modernising the state. The Moroccan king is mirroring the part of his society's youth that attributes high values to glocalised culture and close ties to Europe, thus securing his authority in the twenty-first century.

All the elements discussed here have to be considered when we look for an explanation for regime durability in Morocco. The ‘new concept of authority’, a new style, and legal and political reform under Mohammed VI are part of cultivating the belief in his legitimacy (*Legitimitätsglaube*) that has become a secure basis for his rule. Contrary to widespread belief, we do not automatically have to anticipate more turmoil in the Arab world as we are dealing with increasingly young societies. Where state–society relations are changing from authoritarian rule not to semi-authoritarian rule, but to a more rationally negotiated order, the probability of regime durability is high. In Morocco, this is not necessarily a more legal order, since the king is still not bound by the constitution. But the ‘young authority’ in Morocco has introduced forms of legitimate domination by modernising the *makhzen* and more importantly answering to popular expectations of just rule.

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Notes

1. Weber defines the pure type of traditional authority as follows: ‘Authority will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers’ (Weber, 1978, p. 226).
2. For an in-depth discussion of succession and the act of allegiance, see Dennerlein (2001).
3. About 12 empirical studies addressing youth or young adults have been published in Morocco since Adam (1963).
4. Even the Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Views of a Changing World* (Washington, DC, 2003) chaired by Madeleine Albright did not get a research permit in Egypt to poll outside the city of Cairo, for example. Exception are the World Values Survey and the studies by Mark Tessler (1993, 2000).
5. We began the questionnaire with an introduction: ‘Je m’intéresse à l’étude des jeunes au Maroc et notamment à la connaissance de leurs attitudes concernant les récents changements politiques et sociaux survenus au Maroc. Il s’agit d’une étude scientifique du Centre de l’Orient Moderne à Berlin pour la réalisation de laquelle votre coopération est vivement souhaitée. Votre réponse restera anonyme et ne sera transmise à aucune autre personne ou institution’.
6. Projection for 1999 on the basis of the 1994 census.
7. Moroccan university education is still francophone to a high degree. We had discussed translating the questionnaire into Berber. However, the cost was prohibitive.
8. Eight participants were divorced, and four were widows.
9. Only 1.8 per cent of interviewees did not answer this question.
10. Ten per cent owned a car and 7 per cent a bicycle.
11. As Oswald mentions, Sabella encountered similar problems while carrying out his poll in the West Bank. ‘[Q]uestions related to influences among peers had to be abandoned completely, because the anonymity of the questioning would have been cast into doubt if we had asked for the names and addresses of the young people’s friends’ (Oswald, 2004, p. 12).

12. My thanks and respect go to the interviewers for their courage and commitment. Without their help, the work presented here would not have been possible.
13. In 1962, 20 per cent felt very close to the preceding generation. But nearly three-quarters saw a gap.
14. MESA presentation by Sonja Hegasy.
15. A total of 26.1 per cent said they do not know.
16. Only 30.7 per cent rated this as very important.
17. For women it was slightly more important with 22.2 per cent.
18. Only 36.8 per cent of the participants regarded it as very important.
19. The (empty) Jewish Cultural Center, l'Alliance Israélite, a Spanish (middle-class) hotel, and two restaurants were the targets. The Jewish cemetery was probably also targeted, but the perpetrators never reached the location. The police subsequently arrested 634 people, four of whom were sentenced to death on 8 August. A total of 79 others, members of the *Salafiyya Jihadiyya*, were found guilty. Two radical preachers, Miloudi Zakaria and Mohammed Fizazi, who had openly advocated their ideas, were also sentenced.
20. Two days before the attacks, the *subu a* (a Muslim festivity to mark the seventh day after birth) of Hassan III had been celebrated with fireworks and festivities all over the country. The population was in a mood of hope and joyfulness when the attacks took place.
21. For a deeper analysis of the monarchy's image in the media since 1999, see the excellent masters thesis by Yasmine Berriane (2004).
22. Reforming the law of inheritance is also significant outside of Morocco, since it is regarded as sacrosanct in the whole Muslim world. Husbands and wives are now equally responsible for the household. Repudiation is no longer valid as a legally recognised form of divorce. The minimum marriage age for women was raised from 15 to 18 years. Women no longer need a guardian to sign the marriage contract.
23. *Makhzen*, which originally meant 'warehouse', denotes the formal royal institutions and informal networks that constitute the centre of power in contrast to the *bled as-siba*, i.e. the autonomous tribes.
24. The incident is comparable to a case in Egypt in 1997, in which 78 young adults were arrested on charges of worshipping in a satanic cult.
25. For an evaluation of the role of the independent press in the construction of democratic culture, see Ibahrine (2002).
26. Dependent on the ten different possible answers.
27. They were asked to rate the importance of ten elements on a scale from 1 = very important to 4 = unimportant.
28. A total of 47.2 per cent said that youthfulness was a very important basis of the new king's authority.

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