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Geisteswissenschaftliche Zentren Berlin e.V.

Essays on South Asian Society, Culture and Politics II

Edited by Bernt Glatzer

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Contents

Preface

Arbeitsheft No. 9 is a continuation of Arbeitsheft No. 8, *Essays on South Asian Society, Culture and Politics*, edited by Annemarie Hafner. In both volumes, members of the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin, present their contributions at the biannual *European Conferences on Modern South Asian Studies* to a wider audience. This publication is a collection of papers presented to the 14th Conference which took place in Copenhagen, August 1996.

As in the first volume, the articles in Arbeitsheft No. 9 display a great diversity of theme, reflecting the wide scope of subject matter covered by the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies. Although they represent only a small section of the Centre's activities, the articles differ widely in geographic, historical and thematic focus, with the overall programme of the Centre forging a link between them:

> "*Dissociation and Appropriation in Response to Globalization: Asia, Africa and Europe since the 18th Century.* This programme addresses local and regional perceptions, adaptations and consequences of global processes and discourses in historical and comparative perspective. Its geographic focus is on regions strongly shaped by the colonial encounter and post-colonial experience. The overall programme comprises three group projects, each consisting of several sub-projects. Group Project One, *Islam and Globalization*, examines Muslim perceptions of the 'West' and reactions to heterogeneous rhythms of change in modern history. Group Project Two, *Agents of Change*, investigates individuals and groups acting at cultural interfaces. The focus is on their own perspective, their identity as brokers, and their influence on societal change. Group Project Three, *Locality and the State*, analyses the construction of localised social order in the context of the world-wide expansion and current transformation of the territorial state."

In the first article of this volume, *Joachim Heidrich* directs our attention to the Indian Ocean as a centre of political and economic activity rather than a view of world's end in South Asia. The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming a *mare nostrum* of South Asian, Southeast Asian *and* African countries collectively, a venue of communication, of cooperation, and of integration rather than separation. The hopeful question arises of whether these promising developments can lead to an "Indic Community" and thereby substantially minimize inter-South Asian conflicts.

From there *Heike Liebau* takes us to the South Indian mainland, opening up an interesting chapter on the early history of Indo-European contacts. We learn that Christian converts did not merely absorb foreign religious ideas but played an active part in propagating Christianity in that region. Missionaries had to rely

on local intermediaries or "cultural brokers" who conveyed these new beliefs and ideas to their fellow countrymen and who, in turn, integrated local traditions and ways of life into that new religion. Unpublished material from Danish and German missionary societies gives fresh insight into missionary history in South India.

Dietrich Reetz writes on Indian Muslim activities in the early 20th century. He casts a new light on millenarian movements directed against colonial rule and mainstream Islam. By urging thousands of Muslims to abandon India, the *hijrat* and its related movements added to the crisis of the British Raj. We learn that radical political Islam is not a recent phenomenon and that, as the author puts it, concepts of Islamic militancy in South Asia owe their specifics as much to Islam as to local traditions and cultures and to South Asian religiosity in general. They are less rooted in the abstract categories of Islam than in the need and motivation of local leaders and their followers to survive and to secure a position in the existing structures of power, influence and society.

Petra Heidrich turns to more secular aspects of India's path to independence, portraying outstanding personalities of the pre-independence peasant movement. Her paper focuses on peasant leaders who combined political activity and social work with sound research on Indian village life. Thus they were able to enhance both their political effectiveness and their knowledge of rural India. Fighting colonial rule on one hand and interacting critically with the national leadership on the other, they were deeply involved in social affairs and evolved a determined political interest based on their first hand knowledge of the rural situation.

Bernt Glatzer deals with the north-western limits of South Asia. The protracted conflict in Afghanistan threatens security, stability, and economic development in the wider region. The prevailing Afghan value system seems relevant but not adequate to understand the actors and actions within the conflict. The virtues of the warrior are counterbalanced traditionally by an ideal of arbitration and social responsibility - a balance which still functions locally but is not stable enough to end a conflict of wider regional and interregional scope whose actors have long since left local values and traditions behind.

Bernt Glatzer

Emergent Indian Ocean Politics

Joachim Heidrich

The year 1997 saw the formalisation of relations of another "community of nations": the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). In March 1997 Ministers from 14 Asian and African countries sharing the Indian Ocean and from Australia gathered in Port Louis, Republic of Mauritius, and established a group to promote regional trade and cooperation in fields of mutual interests. The members are Australia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen. In 1995 Mauritius had launched an initiative for establishing an Indian Ocean Rim grouping, which was at that time a rather vague idea. Thus only two years later the initial gathering of seven countries transformed into a new forum for cooperation. According to the decisions reached at the Inter-Governmental Meeting held in 1996 it doubled its member strength on the same regional representation basis (altogether about 35 countries can claim a certain link with the Indian Ocean). The principal objectives are to build a consensus around the Indian Ocean Rim, identify areas of cooperation and foster regional understanding in the spirit of multilateralism. The new forum will work through a "consensus-based, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach"[1]. Even before the formal inauguration, the member countries already started a work programme which gave the new grouping a definite shape.

A distinguishing feature has been the tripartite nature of its functioning. From the very beginning, the Indian Ocean Rim countries agreed to provide for a formal and institutional participation by the business community and by academics. Already in March 1995, during their meeting in Mauritius the original seven nations participating in the Indian Ocean rim venture (i.e. Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South Africa) decided to set up a working group to draw up a detailed agenda for an action plan in agreed areas of economic cooperation. They envisaged to establish a structured business forum as well as an academic network. Shortly afterwards, a high official from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs explained: "We regard the Mauritius process (M-7) as a structured inter-governmental process of a tripartite consultative nature to include representatives of business and academics."[2] Accordingly the charter adopted in 1997 envisages the setting up and independent functioning of the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF) and the

Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG). Both the groups have already come forward with specific projects to be taken up immediately or in the years ahead, by augmenting research and cooperative activities which have been conducted in the past. Although the initial approach taken has been pragmatic, and the cooperative agenda is expected to be anchored in relevant and pressing economic issues, there will be a political content in the interaction. But this depends on the stepping up of collaboration on international issues of mutual concern among the participants who together constitute a grouping of utmost heterogeneity and diverse interests.

The set-up and method of functioning of the new grouping is similar to that of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985, and to the older Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has experienced considerable changes since its inception. As a corollary to the deliberations focusing on the establishment of the new forum, speculations regarding its future role and potentialities have been raised. According to one argument, by bringing together countries from the African continent, SAARC and ASEAN, in addition to Australia, the IOR-ARC could provide a genuine interaction between representatives of different regional bodies and trade groups working on their own agenda. Another view held particularly by officials connected with the process attribute to the Indian Ocean Rim grouping the potential to become the first inter-regional and inter-continental cooperation forum that can link up the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with Africa through ASEAN and SAARC. Citing the example of the Asia Europe Meeting, the forum is seen as a lever which may bring about a historic, cultural, and trade link from Africa to Australia.

The subject merits a closer analysis not merely because of its multi-dimensional nature. It is indicative of both a new stage in the shaping of regional groupings in a changing world where bilateralism and multilateralism coincide and, more specifically, of a new stage in fostering trans-Indic links. It may be regarded as part of an emerging new international economic order. But at the same time, it assumes features which have become salient of regional groupings or organisations after the Cold War, of which the outstanding one is the confluence of variegated interests. One driving force behind the move to establish the new grouping can be located in an urge for developing countries to steer clear of super power or big power domination of existing trade blocs, another propelling factor is the search for creating favourable preconditions for augmenting national (material and man-power) resources and the determination to pursue "national" interests in an increasingly globalising situation. As a corollary

to the articulated need to find an adequate place in a rapidly globalising economy, a restructuring of national economies is under way since the nineties in order to make them complementary or competitive to current international trends - both as a means for survival and development. It is the "export-led growth strategy, supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), [which] became the cornerstone of the 'new economic' strategies in these countries"[3]. The adoption of the new strategy raised questions concerning the economic priorities of the people, particularly in view of the necessity to rally adequate domestic support for government policies. The governing circles of the mainly developing countries involved in the Indian Ocean project are in this context compelled by the circumstances to lend their policy a "pro-poor orientation". This again is bound to lead to clashes with neo-liberal prescriptions and paradigms. Thus, a wide range of problems will have to be tackled by the political decision makers.

The geostrategic environment of the Indian Ocean region which has the South Asian subcontinent at its centre changed considerably in the post-Cold War era. Earlier studies on major extra-regional sources identified chiefly the superpowers USA and Soviet Union, China, Japan, and perhaps the ASEAN countries as major players in the region. More recently, the cast of actors expanded considerably and the emphasis in the perception shifted because of at least four major events. Two of them will certainly exercise a considerable impact in the long run; they consist in the increasing role played in economic affairs by the countries of the Asia-Pacific basin at the one pole and the emergence of independent states in Central Asia after the demise of the Soviet Union on the other. Simultaneously new areas of international competition have been constituted into which at least South Asian countries are bound to be drawn. More immediately, the affairs in the Indic region will be influenced by two other developments: In recent decades Australia, the largest "western" country located in the geographical South, turns its face towards Asia and in the nineties a new democratic South Africa emerges on the stage demonstrating right from the beginning its intention to enter into fruitful mutual relations with the countries of Asia and specifically with the Indian Ocean rim states. The factors mentioned are likely to support efforts to establish cooperative relations between the littoral and island states. Finally, the foreign policy and external economic initiatives launched by the countries concerned and directed at establishing an Indian Ocean grouping take place in the specific context of the South, an area now regarded by diplomats as the "universal dominion" of the United States of America. Against this background, a vision has come

about which envisages the building up of an "Indian Ocean Community". By all indications the Indic region is coming into its own and can no longer be treated as merely "an extended arena in the domain of South Asian politics"[4]. Yet the close historical and contemporary economic and political bonds with the surrounding Asian continent doubtlessly constitute an important frame of reference. Instead of indulging in speculations about the prospects of the new grouping, let us trace the history behind the perception and examine some aspects of the international relations or security implications of the venture.

In the early 1980s, Ashok Kapur argued that "the Indian Ocean region is ripe for intellectual inquiry because world crises today are crises in the Indian Ocean arch"[5]. His point of departure was the contemporary world situation. As one researcher pointed out at that level the region owned the distinction of being the meeting ground of three types of international relations: relations of the "East-West", the "North-South", and the "South-South" category.[6] Actually, the emergence of a community consciousness among the Indian Ocean nations has been noted already in the seventies, when the emphasis was confined to keeping the Ocean free from great power rivalry and turning it into a nuclear free zone.[7] Meanwhile the newly coined term "Indian Ocean rim" has established itself firmly in the political language and entered policy programmes.[8]

The Indic scenario

Considerations about the perspective of the idea of establishing an Indic community will have to bear in mind one basic fact: The economic profiles of the South Asian nations including India's (not to speak about the small island states of the Indic) reveal considerable weakness in their ability to influence and determine events around them.[9] In the more distant as well as more recent past, a "characteristic of the power relations between littoral nations of the area is their dependence on the balance of power existing outside the area"[10]. For long, extra-regional powers dominated the maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. In the period immediately after World War Two South Asia occupied only a peripheral position in the great power strategy. The Indian Ocean was still rated primarily as a "British lake", at least until the British government in 1959 announced the intention to withdraw its naval presence from East of Suez. From this advanced stage in the Cold War, the Indic gradually emerged as a pivotal region in the geopolitical configuration and competitive strategy of the super-powers.

In 1965, three years prior to the withdrawal from "East of Suez" and Britain's termination of her self-imposed "peace keeping mission" in the area, when the island states of the Seychelles and Mauritius were on the threshold to independence, the former colonial power detached three islands from the former and the Chagos archipelago from the latter to establish the "British Indian Ocean Territory" (BIOT). In 1966, the Chagos archipelago was leased to the USA for a period of 50 years with the option to extend the agreement for another twenty. The USA began to develop the island of Diego Garcia into a naval base and communications facility. Between 1967 and 1973 the implementation of the plan implied the "furtive and illegal removal of the inhabitants of the entire archipelago (labelled as 'migrant workers' by the British government and therefore deportable)"[11] and the destruction of their culture. Most of the 2800 odd people were transported to Mauritius but hardly resettled there. In March 1968 the developments in the Indic prompted the decision of the then Soviet Union to deploy their own naval forces in the Ocean. As a parallel development, the built-up of the American military presence in the Indic continued, the regional military facilities being linked up with the US global military establishments. Diego Garcia, centrally located in the Indian Ocean and in a politically calm area, became a formidable naval, air and nuclear base, particularly since the Middle East crisis of 1973. To quote an Indian military expert, the United States eventually "succeeded in deploying a preponderant naval power here in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war, under a somewhat specious argument that western naval power in the north Indian Ocean had to balance Soviet land power in the hinterland"[12]. Speaking in parliament in April 1981, Mrs Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, expressed grave concern at the growing threat to stability and peace in the world and declared: "The focus of the Cold War has shifted from Europe to the Indian Ocean littoral."[13] From the middle of the seventies to the middle of the eighties the political and strategic environment in the "arc of crisis" changed considerably; these changes have complicated the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean.[14]

Several leaders of littoral states were deeply concerned about the moves of the extra-regional great powers. The concern was first expressed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, at the Lusaka Summit of Non-aligned Nations in 1970. She proposed that the concept of nuclear free zones should be extended to cover the areas and oceans which were free from nuclear weapons earlier. The proposal was then placed before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in 1971 and presented to the United

Nations General Assembly in the same year. India broadly agreed with Sri Lanka and both states called for a "zone of peace". Both states also favoured declaring the Indian Ocean a "nuclear free zone". In 1972 the UN Assembly appointed an ad hoc Committee to devise ways and means of implementing the resolutions on the Indian Ocean peace zone. The idea was not liked by the superpowers. They disagreed arguing that such a zone would interfere with international trade and the laws of the sea which were being re-negotiated at about the same time. Since 1985, however, the Soviet Union in the context of a "new thinking" gaining ground, found herself able to agree with the "nuclear free zone"-proposal. In April 1991 China re-affirmed her support for the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean region demanding from outside powers to respect the sovereignty of the region. China also called for an early convening of the Indian Ocean conference.[15] India, however, backtracked on the idea. The initial rationale behind her support of the concept was that such a zone would exclude all extra-regional presence, and in particular, those of the superpowers, from the Indian Ocean. But a different situation arose in the late eighties when India commissioned nuclear-powered submarines for her growing navy. A cleavage surfaced between India and her neighbours Pakistan and Sri Lanka who continued to support the concept of a nuclear-free zone and a peace zone on the condition that it covered all naval and military deployments including the regional states. The smaller South Asian states were not enthusiastic about the prospect of the Indian Ocean being turned into an "Indian lake".[16] In a strange coincidence after the demise of the Soviet Union India and the United States became the main opponents to convening the long overdue Indian Ocean conference which has since been held in abeyance.

Escape from the periphery?

The vulnerability of the region to external influence, control and dominance has been traced chiefly to the conflictual patterns of regional interactions. Discussing various models of interpretation Rasul B. Rais identified the "intrusive system" paradigm as the most appropriate for understanding the Indian Ocean reality. "An 'intrusive system' is defined as consisting of the 'politically significant participation of external powers in the international relations of the subordinate system'." It implies outside participation in the balance of power of the subordinate system.[17] The concept appears to be equally relevant to the trends in the South Asia-cum-Indic region during the last decade of this cen-

tury. There we witness a continuation of neo-imperial designs in a different shape and, simultaneously, a growing urge on the part of those entangled in the "subordinate system" for getting released from the subordinate or peripheral position in a proposed unipolar world system called a "new order".

A recent analysis focusing on US-India relations points to the renewed US interest in India and relates it to Washington's broader strategic perceptions about the Indian Ocean.

> "As it progressively draws down its forces and reduces its presence in the Indian Ocean in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is important to the United States to have a large, democratic, and essentially status quo power such as India on its side and positively engaged in regional security maintenance."[18]

The author feels the P.V. Narasimha Rao government (1991-1996) had accepted that role. He mentions *inter alia* the several joint naval exercises conducted since 1991 by India, quite a few were with extra-regional powers, e. g. from South-East Asia, but also with the US Navy. This illustrates a reversal of India's earlier stand of maintaining a stiff opposition to the deployment of armed forces from outside powers in the region. Going by this standard one could refer to the recently held joint military exercises which even included US ground forces, i. e., detachments of the troops under the Central Command. Significantly, the earlier criticism of the US military presence on the island of Diego Garcia - which functioned as a support base during the Gulf war - has practically died down, as has the earlier claim by Mauritius for the restitution of the entire Chagos archipelago to that country. Simultaneously, since the early nineties US-Pakistan joint exercises were also held, although the relevance of Pakistan in US strategic thinking has clearly diminished in recent years, except for keeping India in line. If the US wants India with its vast size and resources to help to maintain a balance in the Indian Ocean the role reserved for India resembles that of Japan in the Pacific which has been entrusted with policing the seas around.

India certainly is interested to control the area adjacent to its coast line, the more so since the shipping lanes linking South, Southeast and East Asia with the West lie on this route. India, after all, is still rather heavily dependent on oil supplies from the Gulf area. At the same time, it seeks to find new avenues for supplies from Central Asian republics, and trade routes for Indian goods into that area. In this context and given the still unsatisfactory state of bilateral relations with Pakistan, Iran has shot into prominence. Its self-perception of

occupying a unique role in the Middle East has received a boost.[19] A pointer to relevant developments is the tripartite arrangement concluded in 1995 between India, Iran and Turkmenistan which envisages, inter alia, the provision of land routes between India and the Central Asian republics and a new and much shorter alternative trade route to Indian traditional markets in Russia and the CIS countries via the Iranian port of Bander Abbas.[20] Discussions about the feasibility of laying oil or gas pipes from Central Asian republics via Iran to the shore of the Indian Ocean were initiated but met immediately with a negative reaction from Pakistan. Such moves are likewise to be viewed in conjunction with the new kind of relationship between India and Russia which was ushered in when the earlier Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was replaced in 1993 by a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that discarded the "special relationship" concept. Tranquillity and good neighbourly interstate relations in the north-western quadrant of the Indic region would, therefore, be of vital interest to India. Since the "Nehruvian model" of India's foreign policy has been rendered obsolete in the altered global context a definite and comprehensive strategy specifying its foreign policy priorities in this regard has yet to emerge from the new government which was installed in June 1996. Any fresh foreign policy moves targeted at the issue will definitely influence the nature of the future inter-state relations with other South Asian countries.

At this juncture the ongoing and long-term moves among littoral states of the Indic for improving their mutual relations come into the picture. In this context the outstanding events are (1) Australia's endeavours to establish closer ties with Southeast and South Asian countries as well as with the island states of the Indian Ocean by adopting a strategy of "looking west", (2) India's policy of "looking east", i. e., towards South-East Asia and the Pacific rim, and (3) South Africa's policy of establishing trade and political links with Asian countries across the Indic thus also adopting a "look east" strategy.

Australia in a gradual but significant process developed a new outlook vis-à-vis the Third World ever since it discarded the "White Australia policy" in the aftermath of the internal political changes in 1972. As a "western" country in a "southern" environment it not only established closer state to state relations with Asian and Third World countries.[21] Since the late eighties Australia built up her trade relations with the Indic island states and embarked on aid programmes for them. People particularly from the island states of the Indian Ocean were increasingly permitted to immigrate and settle in Australia.[22] Since early 1994 Australia was involved in the dialogue on a sort of triangular cooperation linking South Africa, India and Australia. In August 1994 the

increasingly felt need to develop new approaches to the Indian Ocean led to the announcement of a "Look West" strategy. That "strategy was unique in that it was for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth of Australia that the Federal government had formulated a national strategy encompassing the Indian Ocean which extended beyond security concerns[23]".

Whereas cooperation among South Asian states did not make much headway for years, individual countries like India signed cooperation agreements with Australia which support developmental efforts and were simultaneously meant to stimulate economic links between the two sides. Circumventing the intra-South Asian malaise in the nineties India concentrated her energy on fostering economic ties with the growing economies in Southeast Asia. This included repeated attempts to join the ASEAN group of states. The ASEAN summit held in Bangkok in December 1995 finally agreed to make India a full dialogue partner, which put the country on par with the USA, Japan, the European Union, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.[24]

A step of utmost importance was the re-establishing of diplomatic and consular ties between India and South Africa - immediately upon the signing by 21 parties of the constitutional agreement to transform South Africa into a multi-party and multi-racial democracy. This took place in November 1993 after a gap of 49 years during which India scrupulously observed a diplomatic and economic boycott of the racist regime. On occasion of the resumption of the bilateral ties the South African Foreign Minister proposed the establishment of an economic grouping of Indian Ocean countries comprising India, Pakistan, South Africa, the Gulf States, and East African nations. Such a forum, he argued, could effectively meet the challenge to weaker countries posed by emerging economic groupings such as NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC. The forum would put the spirit of international cooperation in a larger framework. He added: "Perhaps such a forum can help India and Pakistan resolve or even take off the sharp edges from the Kashmir problem."[25] Both the issues of fostering mutual economic ties and of establishing the Indian Ocean rim-cooperation to ward off adverse impacts from other trading blocks[26] have continuously been put on the agenda of South African-Indian consultations. The topics figured again when President Mandela visited India in January 1995. On the occasion negotiations at the highest level explored, *inter alia,* the Indian Ocean rim strategy and agreed to hold further consultations on the issue.[27]

The moves on the part of the Indian Ocean rim countries to enter into an era of closer cooperation received a decisive impetus from the desire to

respond to the powerful economic forces which were unleashed by the end of the Cold War and aimed at global competition and expansion of trade.[28]

Conceptualising conflict configuration and security environment

In the post-Cold War era the need to reconsider the forces generating conflicts and to re-conceptualise the notion of security in regard to Third World countries has repeatedly been stressed.

The participants in the ongoing debate raised questions such as to what extend traditional and military dominated security analyses are relevant in the context of the Third World, whether an entirely new security concept was called for, or how established concepts might be broadened, and finally, which would be the implications of any broadening of the security concepts for the study of international relations within a region?[29] This will briefly be discussed by referring mainly to South Asia-related aspects.[30]

The older approach which sometimes led to a rather mechanical application of two overlapping types of interpretations has been considered inadequate: One stressed the predominance of external factors, while the other accorded a major role to the internal dynamics of crisis in shaping a particular conflict situation. Suggestions were made to locate the issues within a wider compass of state-society relations and regional stability and to overcome the hitherto prevalent one-sided or unilinear attitudes. The necessity to reconsider the conceptual tools stands out as an urgent task in the context of Indian Ocean reality. The more so, since an outdated paradigm still seems to dominate particularly the thinking of the political élites in South Asian countries. This state of affairs obviously reflects the perpetuation of a Cold War mindset which constitutes a serious obstacle to any amicable settlement of unresolved inter-state controversies. In fact, until now the unabated arms race among Third World countries, including the major South Asian powers, is a retrograde factor which, in turn, strengthens the old kind of attitude. The inability of South Asia to make use of new opportunities opened up by the changing international climate is a case in point.

> "Inter-state relations in South Asia appear highly paradoxical when viewed in the context of trends in contemporary global politics. The region seems to be prepared neither to take the advantages offered by the demise of the Cold War nor to face the challenges posed by it; the security scenario

> in South Asia remains almost unaffected. Contrary to expectations, both intra- and inter-state conflicts have become intractable."[31]

One rather pessimistic assessment of the topic not only considers the "failure in establishing stable and viable regional relations both on bilateral and multilateral levels" as a characteristic of South Asian politics since 1947. Its author even proceeds further and puts forth the thesis of "the continuity and profundity of the South Asian cold war"; he outrightly dismisses any tangible achievement of the moves towards establishing a system of regional cooperation.[32] The situation prompted one scholar to ask whether South Asia is "a region the political progress has bypassed"[33].

Additional facets have been pointed out. Some Indian scholars who studied issues of conflict, national security and development with an "insider's" view felt that arms races in the Third World "began with the emergence of the modern nation-state with the ruling elite adopting notions of national security and the national interest to meet 'mythical permanent threats' to the neglect of such real threats as hunger, natural calamities and cultural decay"[34]. This attitude in its extreme form questions the validity of "western" concepts in a Third World surrounding altogether. At the same time it holds intra-societal factors responsible for creating instability and for putting up hindrances to tapping indigenous human resources for purposes of national development which again reflect on inter-state relations. This seems to be too simple an explanation. The fact remains, however, that an interlinkage of unresolved domestic conflicts and regional instability has been sufficiently established in the South Asian context.

Other considerations created doubts regarding the usefulness of approaching intra-state and regional security issues within the narrow compass of individual nations or nation states. To quote a perceptive commentator, "the state centric geopolitical approach to international relations is inadequate for conceptualising the third world security environment"[35]. Because of "the increasingly transboundary nature" of the problems facing the South Asian nations, the "expansion of the term security" is called for "to include not just security from military threats, but also from social, economic, and ecological threats", which are affecting the contemporary nation-state system.[36] Another suggestion wishes to include in the concept of security the guarantee of the security of individuals and peoples.[37] Finally Weinbaum identifies various competing security regimes currently trying to tackle the issues in South Asia but feels that for the time being "(t)he nation-state system is the most salient of the several security regimes"[38].

In this context, the findings of investigations into the causes of current internal conflicts in South Asia are relevant. According to the editors of one set of studies, the findings tend to show that the internal conflicts have of late increased tremendously in scope and intensity. This is basically attributed to the dominant models of development in South Asian countries, which "have given rise to social tensions and conflict by generating new insecurities for the most vulnerable sectors of society"[39]. To put it differently, the much talked about "crises" which continue to engulf the societies of the region are identified in the approach as primarily home-made.

The obvious shift of emphasis in current research is motivated by a change in the perception of the comparative role played by the various factors which together constitute the matrix of a particular security or conflict constellation. In the post-Cold War world of the 1990s there has been a greater realisation that "national security and the retention of a high degree of policy autonomy are crucially dependent on strong economic performance and the formation of economic alliances"[40]. Acknowledging this argument it is quite natural to arrive at the conclusion that the withdrawal of competitive involvement of the extra-regional great powers from regional conflicts have "only removed the external inputs to the conflicts"[41] which obviously draw their main sustenance from other sources. Hence, any attempt at eliminating unresolved conflicts are bound to fail unless adequate measures will be implemented to improve the internal conditions.

Perceiving the Indian Ocean Rim

Both from the point of view of strategic analyses as well as from the angle of historical and culture-related studies the Indic is increasingly attracting attention. The increasing salience of Indian Ocean issues have induced scholars to accept the Indian Ocean region as a concept and caused academicians to deal with the region from different disciplinary perspectives.[42] "In the Asian context the Indian Ocean is one of the strategic entities", whereas in the western perception, at least until very recently, the region was split up into many fragments.[43] While a number of studies on the links between the Indian Ocean littoral have been published, organisations like the (Indian) Society for Indian Ocean Studies with its various chapters, or institutions like the Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Perth, Australia, the Centre d' Études et de Recherches sur les Sociétés de l'Océan Indien at the University

d' Aix-Marseille III, and the International Institute for Asian Studies in Amsterdam established the Indian Ocean firmly as a subject on the map of international scholarship, thereby supplementing the work already done by academic institutions of countries of the region itself, e. g. in Mauritius. Interestingly, a sort of re-categorisation is taking place. Whereas the island world of the Western sector of the Indic has traditionally been treated as a part of the African continent and still figures under the respective caption in general works, more recently the designation of "Insular South-West Asia" has been introduced, for instance, in the Newsletter of the International Institute for Asian Studies, Amsterdam.

Apart from investigations devoted to the age-old historical and cultural relations and interaction between Africa and Asia or even the Pacific across the Indian Ocean, a remarkable scholarly activity surfaced which focuses on praxis-related aspects.[44] Shortly after the initial steps were taken by the group of nations code-named "M-7" to form the Indian Ocean Rim Community, an Independent International Commission on the Ocean held "hearings" at various places in India in which questions regarding peace and development in the Indic were discussed. The Indian Society for Indian Ocean Studies organised a meeting with the Indian Ocean Research Network agencies and the Directors of the Indian Ocean Centre, Perth for an assessment of the progress made. In November 1996 finally the Institute for Politics and International Studies in Teheran jointly with the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines convened an International Conference on the Indian Ocean Community, in which no less than 26 countries participated, and which was followed in March 1997 by a similar meeting at Durban, South Africa. The deliberations held even prior to the formal inauguration of the Indian Ocean Rim Association dealt with various fields and aspects of multilateral economic relations, with aspects of the use of maritime resources, but also with a number of security-related problems which may affect the cooperation in the region, and with the issue of the Indic as a nuclear-free zone. Already the Teheran meeting recommended to set up, *inter alia,* a workshop devoted to Central Asia and Caucasia cooperation and called upon research institutions to study the possibility of defining the geographical and legal limits of the Indian Ocean Region. The issues discussed by the participants of the gatherings at various levels and their approaches convey an idea about the direction into which the new trend and movement is likely to proceed.

Conclusion

A multilevel process has been set in motion which might eventually contribute to improving not merely the economic, but also the political situation in the Indian Ocean region, which is the home of about 1.5 billion people. The preconditions need to be assessed realistically. Even the economic interrelations between the littoral countries have not advanced very far. The investment flow within the region is at a low level, and estimates put the share of the intra-regional trade at approximately 20 per cent.[45] Certainly, the mere increase of the economic interaction will not automatically result in diminishing inter-state contradictions or conflicts. On the contrary, given the extremely different situations in which the participants of the emerging Indian Ocean community find themselves placed, growing interrelations could even contribute to widening existing gaps and enhance diversities, unless cleverly handled in a spirit of cooperation.

The process towards establishing a mutually satisfactory cooperation has hardly passed out of the initial stage. Apart from its economic dimensions, will the movement towards establishing an Indic community provide levers for substantially minimising inter-South Asian conflicts by diffusing contradictions and for putting overriding considerations on top of the priority list? Could the military aspect of as yet unresolved inter-state tensions and conflicts be eliminated? Would the process be able to significantly broaden the prospect for more peaceful relations in the wider area, possibly with a positive fall-out on West Asia or other hot-spots? And finally, will the efforts to make the languishing SAARC a lively and effective organisation receive a fresh impetus from the developments in the larger region? The processes described should be perceived as part of the transitional phase in the post-Cold War international situation in which the existing global system provides no more strategic leverage and in which regional cooperation acquires enhanced significance, particularly against the background of neoimperial designs to construct a unipolar world. It appears rather pertinent from the viewpoint of developing countries that for all the globalization that has taken place, national interests continue to dominate the foreign policy of individual countries.

Notes

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Missionary Encounter. Interaction between Indian Mission Servants, European Missionaries and Local Population in 18th Century South India

Heike Liebau

Since the beginning of European expansion in Asia, Christian missionary work constitutes an important field of encounter between Europeans and parts of the local population. Unlike the spheres of trade and diplomacy, where mutual relations cover the exchange of goods or diplomatic missions, Christian missionary work seems to be mainly the exerting of influence on the local population by the missionaries.

However, the response of the local people to missionary activity does not only find expression in the number of converts. The fact is that interaction took place between European missionaries and the local people. Although this has been accepted by social scientists and other scholars involved in research on mission history[1], the role of indigenous factors and local people within these missionary encounters has scarcely been examined. Usually, the attitude and behaviour of the missionaries or their reaction to local events attract the attention of scholars.[2] Native missionary agents are rarely the subject of research although they contributed largely to the success of missionary work and the missionary perception of local society. Only a few works on the social history of missionary work contain longer passages on the native agency within the European missions.[3]

This paper is an attempt to work out the position of native agents within the mission structure and to show their interaction with European missionaries and the local population. It deals with a group of South Indian Christians in the 18th and early 19th centuries who were native assistants in the service of the Danish-Halle Mission (better known as Tranquebar Mission, named after the main locality of their activity). My interest is concentrated on this particular group of Indian Christians which differs from the larger part of the Christian community because of its close contact with and direct dependence on the Europeans. To some extent this group can be compared to the role of other intermediaries such as Indian *dubashes* (Urdu: *dobhāṣiyā*, translator) in political affairs or to the position of Indian brokers in trade matters. All foreigners in Indian history, be they travellers, traders or diplomats, have depended on support and cooperation from sections of the local population in order to reach their aims. But *dubashes* and brokers have already been the object of

research[4], whereas native agents in European Christian missions have almost entirely escaped the attention of historians.

This paper consists of three parts:
- the first part gives a general idea of the sources used for this research;
- the second part gives a description and characterisation of the group of native agents within the mission;
- the third part provides an analysis of the interaction between native mission assistants and the local population.

The sources

Before studying the make-up and status of this intermediary group in detail, it is necessary to say a few words about the source material. When similar questions are raised it is often lack of records that leads to a Europeanised view. There is probably a certain risk but, nevertheless, sources are available and should be used. With regard to these documents one has to take into consideration that most of the letters, diaries and reports were written by European missionaries. The Archives of the Franckesche Stiftungen (Francke Foundations) in Halle and the National Archives in Copenhagen house the correspondence between German missionaries in India and individuals and institutions in Europe. In addition, since the beginning of missionary activity in 1706 many documents have been published in the so-called "Hallesche Berichte"[5] and later in the "Neue Hallesche Berichte"[6]. A study of this material and comparisons with original manuscripts present a comprehensive picture of what missionary work entails. Apart from their theological and ecclesiastical content, the documents reveal detailed information on the surroundings.

The role of native missionary servants and their work are described from the German missionary point of view. As a rule, a missionary only mentioned "his" native agent on special occasions that were worth reporting: baptism, ordination, death. The reader then learns something of the person's origin, caste and educational background as well as the social situation of his family. The "national worker" acts under the direction of "his" missionary as is evident to the administration of the mission society. Lists with names and numbers of native catechists, semicatechists and priests at missionary services appear in the sources at irregular intervals. The names of schoolmasters, prayer leaders, washermen and other people on "lower" duties are usually not mentioned. The

mission accounts, occasionally including lists of payments to local workers, belong to some of the most revealing documents

In addition to these missionary reports and statistics, there are documents written by Indian country priests, catechists and other agents. These authentic documents can be divided into four categories:

First, letters written by catechists or country priests to the mission board in Copenhagen, to representatives of the Francke Foundations in Halle, to the Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge (S.P.C.K.) or to the Society for Propagating the Gospel (S.P.G.), both in London. Compared with the large number of missionary letters this source group is admittedly a small one. However, looking at these documents produced over a period of more than 100 years we can draw comparisons between the matters and their way of expression.

Second, working reports and diaries written by local catechists and priests during their trips to Christian congregations in the district. Indian mission assistants were obliged to present a monthly report on their work. They came to the mission station in Tranquebar/Tarangambadi(Taraṅkambāti) for this purpose.[7] It must be assumed that not all reports were written. The dates of reports are mentioned in the "Hallesche Berichte" and usually a few words are said about the contents. Some of the more extensive reports were translated by a missionary and printed in the "Hallesche Berichte" or the "Neue Hallesche Berichte". Original working reports written on palm leaves have been discovered in the Royal Library of Copenhagen.[8]

Third, biographies and autobiographies of Indian catechists and country priests. On the recommendation of the missionaries, several Indian assistants wrote their life stories or rather told their stories to the missionaries who wrote them down.[9] The biographies of some representatives of this group are now being investigated either by scholars or descendants of the Indian assistants.[10]

Fourth, documents not connected with the Christian mission. In exceptional cases the career of a former mission assistant can be traced in very different circumstances such as in politics or arts.

The position of the "national workers" within the mission structure

The composition of the group

There was no official term to define this group during the period I am dealing with. Terms used by missionaries in their reports vary between "workers of the nation" (*Arbeiter der Nation*), "national assistants" (*Nationalhelfer*) and "national workers" (*Nationalarbeiter*) or "native assistants" (*eingeborene Helfer*). Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg (1683-1719) made a distinction between the "workers of the word" (*Arbeiter am Wort*) such as country priests, catechists, catechist assistants and schoolmasters and the "workers in the external institutions" (*Arbeiter in den äußeren Anstalten*), such as bookbinders, printers, washermen, accountants, cooks or gravediggers.

> "Die Arbeiter bey diesen Anstalten theilen sich in zwo Classen. Erstlich sind die Arbeiter am Wort... Zum andern sind auch zu erwehnen die Arbeiter in den äusserlichen Anstalten..."[11]

During the 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th century, the Tranquebar Mission employed approx. 500 Indians, including country priests, catechists, schoolmasters, prayer leaders, washermen, cooks and others.[12] To date I was able to register the names of 192 native agents. They include nine ordained country priests[13], 79 catechists (one woman), 35 schoolmasters (three women), 32 assistants and 11 prayer leaders (three women). The sources indicate that the number of women was about 25 at least. The names of the native agents belonging to the external institutions are not usually mentioned.

In 1716 the following people were employed in the two urban and four rural congregations belonging to the Tranquebar Mission: six European missionaries and one European assistant, six local catechists, nine local catechist assistants, four native schoolteachers and two local women working at schools. In addition, one European typefounder and his son, two local bookbinders with two native assistants, one local church guard, three Indian "heathen" accountants (*kañakkappiḷḷai*), one Indian "heathen" washerman, one native house servant who was also the gravedigger, one Indian female guard in the women's house, two local female buyers for schools, one local needlewoman, one local nurse and several female water carriers were employed at the mission.[14]

The index of national workers ("*Index der Nationalarbeiter*") drawn up by Jacob Klein (1721-1790) in 1776 presents the following picture: three country priests, two catechists, four lower catechists, ten assistants, one male prayer

leader, one female prayer leader, seven schoolmasters and one schoolmistress.[15]

Recruitment and payment

The recruitment policy varied from one missionary society to another. Native agents were chosen according to the social and caste structure of the local Christian population. In the 19th century the French mission in South Arcot recruited its native clergy from high castes because they were preaching to high caste people[16], whereas the Danish-Halle Mission initially recruited its native assistants from low castes, primarily from the *paṟaiya*, because most members of the congregation belonged to this segment of society. This recruitment practice had to be altered when more and more *śūdra* became members of the Christian congregations. The missionaries then needed the help of catechists from a śūdra caste.

The native agents were chosen by the missionaries. Their religious origins can be classified in three groups:

The first group belongs mainly to the initial phase of missionary work. A great number of people descended from Hindu families or related strongly to traditions of local Indian religious beliefs. A change of religion for these people was not only synonymous with the loss of their social environment (extended family, village community, affiliation to a certain caste) but at the same time it led to a complete break with their previous everyday life (i.e. naming in the Indian traditions, eating habits; clothes). The first Indian ordained priest, Aaron, (1698-1745) belonged to this group. He was a descendant of a *vēḷāḷa* caste family. His father was a merchant in Cudelur. He became familiar with Christian literature through the catechist Shawrimuttu. Aaron was ordained a country priest on 31 December, 1733.[17] Most family members of the catechist Dewanesen who worked in the 1760/70's with Christian Friedrich Schwartz (1726-1798) in Tiruchirapalli remained Hindus. The records report various acts of violence against him.[18] Another example of this group was the country priest Philipp (?1731-1788) or Pulleimuttu. He was ordained in 1782. Vormbaum and Germann tell the story of his abduction by a slave trader. In desperation his mother promised to convert to Christianity if he was set free.[19]

A second group of native agents is of Roman Catholic origin. As disciples of this religion they already had a deeper approach to Christianity and the encounter with Tranquebar missionaries offered them a new type of Christian

religion which gave rise to contradiction with their ideas of Christian faith. Although these people "only" changed the denomination within their religion, the consequences were often painful. The most interesting figure within this group seems to be Rajanaikken (1700-1771) whose grandfather had become a Roman Catholic at the age of 30.[20] His parents converted to the Protestant Church in 1728. Another example is the country priest Diogo (?1705-1781) who converted from the Roman Catholic church to Protestantism.[21] After his ordination on 28 December, 1741 Diogo was appointed a country priest in the rural areas. Ambrosius (1709-1777) converted to the Protestant church in 1717. Having worked in Cuddalore as a teacher and catechist with the missionary Johann Ernst Geister (missionary in India from 1732-1746), he came to Tranquebar in 1748 and was ordained in 1749. Towards the end of his life he almost completely lost his eyesight.[22]

The third group of native agents consists of Protestant Christians of the second and susbsequent generations. In time, this group became more and more significant. The missionaries stressed that primarily members of Protestant Christian families were to become catechists or be ordained.

> "Es werden die Catecheten ordentlicher Weise aus denen genommen, die am Seminario erzogen sind, und in der Schule eine Weile gearbeitet haben. Im Anfange des Wercks hat man auch Erwachsene, die theils von der Römischen Kirche, theils aus dem Heydenthum sich zu uns gewandt, nehmen und hinlänglich praepariren müssen: welches auch noch zuweilen im Nothfall geschieht."[23]

Having been engaged in missionary service, Indian families wanted their children to grow up in the same tradition. They began to take part in mission life at an early age. In the process of studying national workers within the Tranquebar Mission for a period of over 100 years, entire genealogies of Christian families come to light.[24]

The Indian missionary workers drew their wages in several different ways. They were either paid by the mission in Tranquebar, from special donations received from mission friends in Denmark and Germany or from some missionary's private income. Donations given by German Christian congregations or individuals were often used to support a particular person. Missionaries wrote regularly about these sponsorships and sponsors were informed about the lives of their godchildren.[25] The Tranquebar Mission did not work out any special rules or norms to finance native assistants, catechists or priests. Wages were not fixed and varied from place to place and from time to time (depending on local conditions, harvest etc.). Proposals regarding salary amounts were made by the

missionaries. Before leaving Tranquebar for Madras in 1725, Benjamin Schultze made a detailed and differentiated list of wages for all mission workers stationed in Madras. According to this proposal, mission workers were to receive the following annual wages: missionary (European): 300 Rthl.; assistant (probably European): 120 Rthl.; catechist (Indian): 36 Rthl.; schoolmaster (Indian): 36 Rthl.; *kaṇakkappiḷḷai* (Indian) 28 Rthl.; *warugian* (Telugu) schoolmaster (Indian): 25 Rthl.[26]

In 1771 the cost of living for country priests, catechists and schoolmasters amounted to more than 1000 Rthl., "ob sie gleich alle nur in einem nothdurftigen Gehalt stehen"[27]. Normally, payment was in cash and kind. In 1765 Habacuc, a catechist working in Cuddalore, received a monthly salary of 9 *pagoda*[28] and 10 *fanam (paṇam)* cash and, in addition, 120 *marakkāl*[29] rice.[30] It is reported that in 1767, when a heavy storm destroyed a large part of the harvest, the "national workers" could only be given cash.

> "Unsere Ausgaben im vorigen Jahre sind ungewöhnlich groß gewesen. Ein starker Sturm womit Gott am Ende des 1767sten Jahres diese Gegend von Cudelur bis Diwecotta heimsuchte, und die Plage einer seltenen Art von Raupen, nebst der Lieblosigkeit des Compagniepächters von Diwecotta, wie davon im Diario mit mehrerm Meldung geschehen, haben durch Gottes Zulassung unsere Ernte so verdorben, daß wir zur beihilfe der armen Christen und zum Lohn der Arbeiter an der Mission nichts in Nellu haben geben können, sondern alles in bare, gelde haben auszahlen müssen..."[31]

In some cases, country priests, catechists or other missionary workers possessed their own land. Taking into consideration the fact that native workers had large families to support with their monthly salaries, it was hardly sufficient. Writing about the catechist Sattianaden, the missionary Schwartz wondered:

> "Wie er (Sattianaden - H.L.) mit seinem Gehalt auskommt, kann ich nicht begreifen, weil er nebst Frau und zwey Kindern, auch seine Mutter, Schwiegermutter und der Mutter Schwester im Hause hat, welche zwar spinnen, aber davon nicht Speise und Kleidung erwerben können."[32]

Determining real purchasing power is admittedly a daunting task. Limited conclusions can be drawn as a result of comparing the salaries of the different groups of mission workers. With all due caution it can be said that the wages allowed the native workers to live in humble circumstances. The most decisive advantage for them was to have a regular income guaranteed in mission service.

The motivation

According to the documents analysed, it is evident that most baptized Indians and most native mission servants were of low caste origin. To understand the motives for conversion, the specific living conditions of the individual or group must be taken into consideration. In the case of group members, looked into for the purpose of this paper, we are confronted with acts of individual or family conversion. Mass conversion became a noteworthy phenomenon only in the 19th century. Dick Kooiman regards mass conversion in South Travancore in the 19th century as a complicated process "in which social, economic, psychological and spiritual motives were blended into one complex whole"[33].

When considering the motives of local people to change their religion and become mission servants we have to bear several factors in mind:

- religious and caste origins,
- the level of education,
- the social and material conditions under which they were living,
- acquaintance with Christians.

A whole series of circumstances caused Hindus to change their religion. The more facts we can collect about the life of a convert, the better we can reconstruct his motives. Generalisations here involve a certain risk. In the 18th century on the Coromandel coast we are not dealing with mass conversion as a result of a group crisis but with personal destinies. Nevertheless, on the basis of the source material used for this paper it can be assumed that as a rule Hindus approached Christianity as a foreign religion. Reasons and occasions for changing denomination varied individually. In some cases the person had direct contact with European missionaries and compared them to Europeans they had already seen, in other cases they had heard or read about them and their faith.

As a rule, people of high caste origin, particularly Brahmins, tend to analyse religious beliefs critically before changing their faith. In the case of the Tranquebar Mission, only one Brahmin, Tiruvengada Asarier, is mentioned as having close contact with the mission. He was an assistant in Conjeeveram/Kanchipuram. He translated texts into Sanskrit and had talks with young Brahmins. He was paid by the mission but he did not convert and continued wearing sacred marks on his forehead.[34] As far as people of low caste origin are concerned, a more detailed study of their material considerations and underprivileged social position should be undertaken.

Interaction with missionaries

The number of Indian mission workers and assistants increased proportional to the growing congregations in Tranquebar and the surrounding areas. At least six Christian congregations were attached to the Tranquebar Mission station. In 1716 the following congregations were mentioned: the Tamil urban congregation in Tranquebar, the Portuguese urban congregation in Tranquebar, the rural congregations in the Māyavaram, Tanjore (Tañcāvūr), Madewipatnam and Marrawer districts. Around 1740 the congregation of the Marrawer district was divided into the Tirupalaturey (Tiruppālatturai) and Kumbakonam (Kumpakōṇam) congregations.[35] As well as this, missionaries from the Danish-Halle Mission were active in Poreiar (Poraiyār), Cuddalore, Tiruchirapalli (Tirucci-ṟappaḷḷi), Tanjore and Madras. Occasionally they were employed by the S.P.C.K. In Tranquebar itself the main missionary work was carried out by the resident European missionaries whereas in the rural areas the only people Christians or people who wanted to convert could turn to were native workers. The Tranquebar missionaries explained the necessity of incorporating local agents in missionary services primarily with better knowledge of local languages and local living conditions. There were occasions when political reasons prevented European missionaries from expanding their field of work. Thus the Tranquebar foreign missionaries were not permitted to act on the territory of the Tanjore kingdom until the 1750s. In 1728, Rajanaikken (1700-1771) became the catechist of the Tanjore region.[36] European missionaries began to visit Tanjore periodically in the 1750s and in 1778 Christian Friedrich Schwartz (1726-1798) settled there permanently.

At first missionaries usually visited different places with catechists and assistants. Then the native agents were instructed to look after the population of these villages. They resided permanently in the district they worked in, periodically visiting other villages, and continued to explain Christian religious doctrine. Whoever was interested in conversion was taken to Tranquebar for Christian education until he/she was ready for baptism.[37] In addition to this, Christians from surrounding villages were brought to Tranquebar to attend church services on Sundays and religious holidays.

Corresponding to their position in the hierarchy of native agents each person had his own area of responsibility and duty. First of all there were common duties for each post. As well as these common responsibilities each native agent had to fulfil special duties depending on his working place, "his" congregation and his individual abilities. In general, each mission servant had to show rigid

piety and absolute discipline. Furthermore, they were expected to give periodical accounts of their activities to their superior. This system was very hierarchical: as a rule, catechists had to report to country priests and country priests had to render account to the missionaries. Consultations were arranged at intervals between missionaries, country priests and catechists. Catechists also had meetings among themselves in order to exchange views on "what are the obstacles for not widening the church"[38]. As well as general principles and directions for catechists or country priests, each representative of the native agents received special instructions regarding his area of work. Responsibilities were coordinated and distributed among the "national workers" at common meetings.[39] Moreover, missionaries arranged special training programmes to instruct assistants in special problems.[40] In the initial years in particular, native agents were treated as subordinate servants and assistants under the guidance of European missionaries. Later on, some of these agents were able to improve their position within the mission hierarchy.[41]

I consider the interaction between European missionaries and their native agents to be the key issue in understanding the role of the native agents within the European mission. Missionaries and "national workers" were not two independent groups. They depended on and were governed by a social and religious background and obligations respectively. At first glance it would seem that native agents were totally dependent - financially and spiritually - on "their" European missionaries. In any case, it cannot be denied that missionaries used a tight system of control and punishment. The missionary Benjamin Schultze (1789-1760) occasionally reported having to put native assistants behind bars for several offences. Timotheus and his brother Titus were put behind bars for one day for being drunk and disorderly.[42] It is reported that Rajanaikken, one of the best known catechists of the Danish-Halle Mission, was discharged after many years of service because of drunkenness.[43] Native agents felt obliged to the missionaries because sometimes they received their financial support directly from them.[44]

The individuals I mentioned are usually not famous for presenting their own religious-philosophical ideas. Some of them translated Christian literature and songs into Tamil, using Indian rules of poetry or music. It is not possible to measure the influence Indian native agents had on the knowledge and scientific work of the missionaries. Native mission agents of the Tranquebar Mission must have been far more involved in translations and research ascribed to the missionaries than has been accepted up to now. It is very probable that much of the work done by Indians or with great support from Indians is still

attributed exclusively to European missionaries. In many cases the real authorship will never be established. The missionaries attached great importance to their authorship of translations and other works. However, if they reported the authorship of an Indian assistant, it was unlikely that this information was publicised. On 14 August, 1720 Benjamin Schultze wrote in his diary that Peter Maleiappen finished the translation of the Communion Book.[45] Considering the mission's treatment of native agents, this announcement was never printed.[46]

> "Ich setzte mich demnach hin, nahm einen Kanakappel oder Schreiber zu mir, legte den Hebräischen Grund-Text vor mich, nahm auch alle bey Händen seyende Versiones, nebst andern nützlichen adminiculis zu Hülfe, und fieng das Büchlein Ruth im Namen Gottes zu übersetzen an."[47]

From printed documents the reader merely learns that Maleiappen corrected Schultze's translations. But precisely this description of the cooperation between Schultze and Maleiappen shows that Maleiappen must have had comprehensive knowledge of the German language and the Holy Scripture. From October 1714 to September 1716 Peter Maleiappen accompanied Ziegenbalg on a journey to Europe (Denmark, Germany, England) and worked on the enhancement of his linguistic proficiency.[48]

Indian country priests and catechists represented significant line of communication between European missionaries as representatives of European churches and sections of the local population. Native mission workers contributed not only to putting missionary ideas into practice among the "heathen" population but at the same time had to cope with other problems within the Christian congregations. If, due to social or economic problems, Christians left their villages, mission assistants were expected to follow them and bring them back to their homes. During the disturbances which lasted from August until December of 1787, Daniel Pullei acted as an interpreter, mediating between the missionaries and the insurgents. The DHM was involved in these disturbances because many of the insurgents belonged to the Christian population of Tranquebar. They left their homes and moved to the territory of the Tanjore king. The majority were agricultural workers and the Mission was interested in getting them back quickly.[49]

Interaction between "native agents", Indian Christians and the non-Christian Indian population

When religion takes shape in day-to-day life it must co-exist with cultural traditions of the region.

> "It is not possible for a religion with a missionary purpose to remain a corpus alienum, residing in a splendid isolation... It has to be confronted with the life of the people among whom it is working."[50]

Probably European Christian missionaries began their work on the assumption that they could spread a European form of Christianity under Indian conditions. When they first came to India one of their major aims was to establish Christianity with no caste distinctions.

Since the introduction of missionary practice in India, the attitude towards the caste system has been a key issue for all missionaries. As all Christians have equal rights before God, the Indian caste system and Christianity appeared to be incompatible. In their endeavour to spread the Christian faith and religious practices among the Indian population, the early Danish-Halle missionaries tried to prevent caste differences within the Christian congregations. Christians had to sit side by side in the Church regardless of caste differences. At Holy Communion Christians of higher castes were expected to drink from the same communion cup as Christians of lower castes. Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg, the first worker of the Tranquebar Mission, condemned the caste system because of the oppression and inequality that resulted from it.[51] At the same time he showed a great interest in understanding the structure and rules of the caste system in South India.[52] In the case of the caste system, missionaries found that their religious responsibility was at variance with practical needs arising from the local social reality. Benjamin Schultze, who is generally seen as a missionary opposed to caste differences, used shortage of space in the praying room as an explanation for building a Christian church in Madras. Due to lack of space, members of the *paṟaiya* caste could not sit adequately apart from higher caste Christians.

> "Allein da mangelt es uns noch (1) An einer Kirche... e) Weil die, so Bareier sind, den andern Geschlechtern nicht nahe kommen, noch bey ihnen sitzen dürfen; wir aber nicht genugsamen Zwischen-Raum machen können: so entsteht daraus ebenfalls ein Anstoß."[53]

Missionaries were made to realise that it was not possible to continue spreading Christianity throughout India while ignoring the existence of caste differ-

ences in all spheres of life. The issue of the Danish-Halle missionary attitude towards caste has not been finally settled. Daniel Jeyaraj accuses later missionaries, Walther and Pressier, of giving up the strong anti-caste position practised by the earlier missionaries such as Ziegenbalg, Gründler and Schultze. He concludes: "Mit der Einführung der Kaste in die Kirche stellte sich die Mission ein Armutszeugnis aus."[54]

But the decision to take caste differences into consideration can hardly be declared a subjective fact. The Indians had a strong caste attitude. Every Indian Christian was aware of the caste he belonged to and of his status within the new Christian community. Caste continued to exist at least as a social institution.

Former caste differences could not be completely ignored when choosing country priests from a group of catechists. Since Rajanaikken (1700-1771) belonged to the *paṟaiya* caste the missionaries did not want to ordain him. He merely received the title of a high catechist.[55]

Missionaries had to bear original caste differences in mind in relation to the hierarchy of native agents. Catechists and assistants were usually appointed to work in their native villages. There they were most certainly exposed to assault, violence and persecution. But that was where they were accepted most and came closest to the local people. On 29 September, 1768 an old Christian woman lying on her deathbed only wanted Rajanaikken near her because he was a member of the *paṟaiya* caste. The other catechist, Arulappen, was not allowed to enter the hut because he belonged to a different caste.[56]

Dewanesen, a schoolmaster and catechist in Tanjore and Tiruchirapalli, belonged to the Suttirer (Śūdra) caste. When his wife and children were expelled from their family home by Hindu family members they received help from the village headman.[57] Most converts belonged to the *paṟaiya* caste. But in Tiruchirapalli particularly, Christian Friedrich Schwartz baptized a number of *śūdra*. For this he required the help of a catechist from a *śūdra* caste.

> "Denn es kann hierbey angemercket werden, daß man für die Sutiersleute, das ist, Bürgersleute, und für die Bareier, das ist, Bauersleute, für jede Art Catecheten ihres Standes haben muß, sonderlich im Lande. Es kann zwar zur Noth ein Sutirer-Catechet zur Aufsicht der Bareier-Leute bestellet werden, aber nicht umgekehrt."[58]

I discovered the caste affiliation of only 40 people in the documents. These were composed as follows: 11 *śūdra*, 16 *paṟaiya*, one Brahmin, one declared himself a "Suttirer" (śūdra) although he was considered to be a *paṟaiya*; one Kaffer (thieves caste), one potter; one *paḷḷa* (untouchable caste). In eight

cases the sources only mention the Christian origin of the person. But even if the caste origin is mentioned, it is possible that the person was a Christian of the second or third generation. For those whose caste affiliation is not mentioned directly, it is possible to find out their origin. The relationship within the group of native assistants and the population structure in the locality of their activity must be considered. A *paḷḷa* prayer leader (Vorbeter), for instance, must belong to the *paḷḷa*-caste. Upholding caste differences allowed Indian Christians to maintain their Indian Tamil identity.

The so-called caste controversy continued in the 19th century within the Leipzig Mission. The missionaries found a compromise. They saw differences in caste practices between Christians and Hindus. In 1861, Karl Graul postulated that for Hindus, caste and religion are inseparably connected whereas Christians only regard caste as a civil construction.[59]

For the local population it was evident that Indian native mission workers were acting on behalf of the European Christian mission. Sometimes they were accompanied by Europeans. As country priests they even wore similar clothing to the missionaries. They brought palm leaves and books to teach the Christian faith.

Giving up original names and using Christian names was an important indication of conversion. Baptism was important because it endowed the convert with a new Christian name. According to the missionaries, the original name of a local person represented his former faith and could therefore not be used by a Christian. Degrees of relationship and honorary titles are a constituent part of Tamil names and usually contain the affiliation to a caste or special religious group.[60]

For several reasons missionaries could not give every convert a Christian or biblical name. A baptized person could not be sent back to his village with a biblical name. Nobody would call him by this name but would use his original Tamil name. For this reason missionaries started to look for Tamil equivalents for Christian and biblical names or created new Tamil Christian names for their converts. In the course of translating the Bible into Tamil, missionaries used Tamil equivalents of sacred Christian names. For Peter (Petrus) they started to use the names Maleiappen or Rajappen, for Johann - Arulappen.[61] The convert was often christened both names. Friedrich Christian/Kanabadi Wattiar (*kaṉapāṭi vāttiyār* - the singing teacher) was an assistant of Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg (1683-1719). Peter/Maleiappen (around 1700-1730) was the assistant of Benjamin Schultze (1689-1760) and Christoph Theodosius Walther (1699-1740/41). Composed Christian names were directly translated into Tamil,

for example: Theodor into Dewapirasadam, Gotthilf into Dewasagajam.[62] If the heathen name was not directly connected to a local goddess or to some other heathen background, the missionaries decided to maintain the original name of the person.[63] Another way of creating Christian Tamil names was to use idioms which described valuable human qualities such as: Seganaden - ruler of the world; Sattiananden (*satyanātaṉ*) - master of the truth; Wedappen (*vēdappaṉ*) - father of law; Njanamuttu (*ñāṉamuttu*) - pearl of mind; Kurupadam - the one who worships the teacher, a disciple (*kurupatti* - reverence to a guru).

Among the 192 (registered by name) native agents of the Tranquebar Mission, one third were known by European names, five had both a European and a Tamil name. The remaining native agents had Tamil names, most of them composed with the elements -appen *(-appaṉ)* (24) father, -muttu (*-muttu)* (13) pearl or -naden (*nātaṉ)* (9) man, master. Tamil converts were only prepared to change their Indian names if they had a clear Hindu connotation.[64]

Similar to Tamil names, clothing indicated the strata of society to which a man or a woman belonged. Clothing as a symbol of Christian authority was not insignificant for Indian country priests or catechists. European missionaries of the Tranquebar Mission wore the typical black robes with the collar worn by priests in Europe. In the beginning they even had to wear a wig. When he needed a new wig Johann Philipp Fabricius (1711-1791) asked for a smaller, lighter one.[65] When Aaron, the first Indian priest, was ordained in 1733 the mission had to make a decision about his clothes. Aaron wore a long grey collarless tunic tied at the waist with two sashes, a turban and typical Indian slippers.[66] The Tamil catechists probably wore clothes in accordance with their social class. There is an illustration of a Tamil catechist from around 1730. He is wearing wooden slippers with a single knob and a canvas cloth held together around his hips, one end of which is either placed on his arm or wrapped over his shoulder.[67] In 1801 Christian David (1771-1852), a catechist in Tanjore and a priest in Jaffna, was instructed to wear clean national clothes.

> "Sie müssen Sorge tragen, in Ihrem Äußern anständig zu erscheinen, und bis auf weitere Verordnung und auf besondere Erlaubnis die weiße Musselinkleidung tragen, die bey Ihrer Nation üblich ist."[68]

The native missionary workers had to manifest authority towards the local people on one hand, but on the other hand needed to be close to the locals in order to be accepted by them and win their confidence. In the rural areas in particular, where missionaries were not constantly present, the assistants lived

closely with the local population. Although the missionaries visited the Christian congregations and native assistants in the villages regularly, the essential contact for the local people was the Indian country priest, catechist or schoolmaster. The above-mentioned catechist, Christian David grew up in the Danish-Halle Mission and was sent to Ceylon where he worked alone for many years among the local population. He was responsible for the guidance, control and recruitment of local assistants and schoolmasters. In a letter of 20 March, 1802 he wrote that he was directed "to visit three times in the Course of the Year the Different Churches of the Districts of Jaffnapatnam and Manar, being in all Forty Seven Churches and Schools..."[69]

The attitude of the different social classes of the population towards this special group of Indians was dependent on various circumstances. For members of Christian congregations and those who wanted to be converted, Indian catechists and country priests represented an authority constantly in touch with the main mission stations. Every native agent acted on special instructions appropriate to his individual abilities and working field. These instructions described in detail exactly how to deal with different sections of the population and became a guideline for the everyday life of a catechist. Some of the main tasks for Sattianaden were described as follows:

- to convert "Heathens" to Christianity;
- to hold an hour of prayer in his house and repeat the Catechism in the morning and evening;
- to go to a place of Christians and observe them, punish them and settle quarrels and disagreements between them;
- to be careful that Christians do not take part in "heathen" religious ceremonies (for example smearing their bodies with holy ashes);
- to bring a new born child to the missionaries to be baptized; if the child is not capable of surviving he is to baptize it himself;
- if Roman Catholics talk to him he may tell them the "one truth", but he is not allowed to pursue them just as Roman Catholics do not pursue Lutherans with the intention of converting them.[70]

The attitude of non-Christians towards converts in general and mission assistants in particular can probably be characterised by disapproval and persecution. When Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg received 99 letters from non-Christian correspondents[71] on the question :"Why do the Tamils refuse to embrace the Christian religion?" he received this answer:

> "Christianity is being despised by us for the following reasons: because Christians slaughter cows and eat them; because they do not wash after easing themselves; because they drink strong drinks; because they do not do many works, when someone has died, in order to help the soul of the deceased to reach the place of bliss; because they do not do many works of joy at weddings."[72]

This passage clearly describes their perception of Europeans. It was mainly based on their own visual perception of the European way of life in South India. But it is against this background that we should try to assess the encounter between Indian Christian mission agents and the Indian local non-Christian population. The first question to be raised is why was it necessary for Indian non-Christians to get in touch with missionary agents? Different interests, indifference, and rejection on both sides should be worked out. The main reason for native agents to come into contact with non-Christians was to convert "heathens" to Christianity. Thus, they were expected to be in touch with the population and enter into conversations. On the other hand, most representatives of the non-Christians had no urgent need to have contact with mission native agents. Exceptions were possible in the following situations: hope for support in situations of material difficulty or disease; conversion to Christianity of a family member; existence of Christian congregations, schools or hospitals in the neighbourhood. According to individual situations and personal experience, an interest in Christianity could be either positive or negative.

Beginning with the above facts I would like to examine the approach of non-Christians to Indian mission workers. As already mentioned, native agents were often sent back to their native villages. Where family members had not converted, they were cautious and distrustful of their relative. There are several cases of open violence from their families or from village inhabitants against missionary workers. The native assistants Ignasi and Canagappen were arrested by village inhabitants when they tried to bring a group of Hindus to Tranquebar for education.[73] Sometimes the whole family of a catechist or missionary assistant was persecuted even though they had not changed their religion. Anger towards Indian mission servants was often expressed not against their Christian faith but in situations where Christians had offended the religious feelings of the Hindus. On 8 September, 1769 the lower catechist in the Cumbagonam district, Sinappen, a brother of the above-mentioned Rajanaikken, was asked by the head of the village Padtisuram to give medicine to a sick Hindu.[74] Powerful local Hindus expected gifts from the district catechists as a sign of honour on the occasion of assumption to an important post. Sinappen

was punished for not giving a present to the Nayak (*nāyakan*, local ruler) "Tondaman-padeiatschi" in December 1763.[75]

In trying to explain inconsistent behaviour, one has to consider the composed and sometimes contradictory identity of the missionary assistants themselves. As a rule, converted Indians continued to regard themselves as caste Christians. I was unable to find an example of a converted Christian who tried to leave his caste, village and family by moving to another place. On the contrary, they used to return to their native villages and keep in touch with their relatives even if they had remained Hindus.

Conclusion

Acting as intermediaries and "cultural brokers" between Europeans and Indians, between European Christians and Indian Christians and between Indian Christians and local Hindus and Muslims, native mission agents permanently crossed social and religious borders. They worked in an atmosphere of tension and played their roles differently, according to their individual capabilities or social status. They tried to compensate for the consequences of conversion by compromises between and synthesises of the different worlds they lived in.

The encounter of European missionaries and Indian assistants is not a linear history of conquest, not just control exercised by the missionaries over their "objects". Working together, they depended on each other, controlled and influenced each other. Activities on the Indian side seem to have been very strong, especially with regard to the struggle for symbols and social status. As authorities, native agents contributed to the knowledge of the missionaries on Indian society and the Hindu religion. The intensive research work on Indian society, languages and religions would not have been possible without the help of the native people. A thorough study of the phenomenon should be carried out, breaking down the hierarchy which shows the missionary as the leader and the native worker as the unskilled worker who assists his teacher.
In the perception of the local population, native agents were a numerically small elite who were close to the locals but had a broader sphere of action due to their contact with Europeans.

The "native agents" of the Tranquebar Mission, although closely attached to the European missionaries, continued to be strongly influenced by their local and social origins. It can be assumed that they brought a large part of their Indian life into their Christian life after they were baptized. The European

missionaries had to take this fact into account when laying down the conditions and norms of cooperation.

Notes

Abbreviations

AFrSt	-	Archiv der Franckeschen Stiftungen/Halle
DHM	-	Dänisch-Hallesche Mission
HB	-	Der Königlich-Dänischen Missionarien aus Ost-Indien eingesandte Ausführliche Berichte, Halle 1710 - 1760 (Hallesche Berichte, HB)
Cont.	-	continuation (part of the HB)
MA	-	Missionsarchiv (Missionary Archives; part of the Archives of the Francke Foundations in Halle)
NGEMA	-	Neuere Geschichte der Evangelischen Missions Anstalten zur Bekehrung der Heiden in Ostindien. Vol.1, Halle 1776 ... Vol. 6, Halle 1825 (sometimes also given with NHB for Neue Hallesche Berichte)
Rthl.	-	Reichsthaler (currency)
St.	-	Stück, part of the NHB
U.T.C.	-	United Theological College, Bangalore

1 Cf. Robert A. Bickers/Rosemary Seton (eds.), Missionary Encounters. Sources and Issues, Richmond 1996, p. 2.

2 Cf. Gabriel Rantoandro, Die britischen Missionare und ihre Einstellung zur Sklaverei im 19. Jahrhundert auf Madagaskar. In: Wilfried Wagner (ed.), Kolonien und Missionen. Referate des 3. Internationalen Kolonialgeschichtlichen Symposiums 1993 in Bremen, Münster 1994, pp. 258-278; Katja Füllberg-Stolberg, Die "American Presbyterian Congo-Mission" und die Kongo-Greuel, 1890-1910. In: Ulrich van der Heyden/ Heike Liebau (eds.), Missionsgeschichte - Kirchengeschichte - Weltgeschichte. Christliche Missionen im Kontext nationaler Entwicklungen in Afrika, Asien und Ozeanien, Stuttgart 1996, pp. 425-438; Geoffrey A. Oddie, Missionaries as social commentators: the Indian case. In: Bickers/Seton, loc. cit., pp. 197-210.

3 Cf. Henriette Bugge, Mission and Tamil Society, Richmond 1994, pp. 79-95; Dick Kooiman, Conversion and Social Equality in India. The London Missionary Society in South Travancore in the 19th Century, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 59-69; see also: Heike Liebau/Margret Liepach, Christliche Hindus - indische Christen? Die "Nationalarbeiter" der Dänisch-Halleschen Mission in Südindien im 18. Jahrhundert. In: Joachim Heidrich (ed.), Changing Identities. The transformation of Asian and African societies under colonialism, Berlin 1994, pp. 307-322.

4 The role of local brokers in trade affairs has been studied by Sinappah Arasaratnam, Maritime Trade, Society and European Influence in Southern Asia, 1600-1800, Variorum Collected Studies Series 1995. Regarding the role of native informants within the colonial system see: C.A. Bayly, Empire & Information. Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870, Cambridge 1997.

5 Der Königlich Dänischen Missionarien aus Ost-Indien eingesandte Ausführliche Berichte, Halle 1710-1769 (HB).

6 Neuere Geschichte der Evangelischen Missionsanstalten zur Bekehrung der Heiden in Ost-Indien aus den eigenhändigen Aufsätzen der Missionare (NGEMA), Vol. 1, Halle 1776 ... Vol. 6, Halle 1825.

7 For geographical names not generally known I use the English spelling given in: Alphabetical List of Villages in the Taluks and Districts of Madras Presidency. Corrected up to September 1930, Madras 1933, Reprint 1952. Using the first time in some cases the original Tamil spelling has been added in brackets. Tamil terms are given in transliteration according to Tamil Lexicon, University of Madras 1982. The names of the national workers are given according to their spelling in the missionary sources.

8 A list of Tamil palm leafs available in the Royal Library of Copenhagen is given by Daniel Jeyaraj, Inkulturation in Tranquebar. Der Beitrag der frühen dänisch-halleschen Mission zum Werden einer indisch-einheimischen Kirche (1706-1730), Erlangen 1996, pp. 330-334.

9 See for instance the biography of the *dubash* Daniel Pullei (1740-1802) written by Christoph Samuel John (1747-1813), AFrSt MA, I K 5: 16.

10 Recently published has been the work of the grand-niece of the great-grandson of the Christian Tamil poet Vedanayaka Sastriar: Grace Parimala Appasamy, Vedanayaka Sastriar, A Biography of the Suviseda Kavirayar of Thanjavur, Madras 1995.

11 HB, 33. Cont., Halle, 1733, p. 870ff.

12 The statistical data provided in this paper represent only provisional figures.

13 Their names and dates of ordination are: Aaron (1733), Diogo (1741), Ambrosius (1749), Philipp (Pulleimuttu) (1772), Rajappen (1778), Sattiananden (1790), Abraham (?), Wedanayagam (died 1812), Adeikalam (around 1812).

14 Cf. the description of the mission structure for the year 1716 given by Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg (1683-1719) and Johann Ernst Gründler (1677-1820), HB, 33. Cont, pp. 870ff.

15 AFrSt MA 2 B 3:21.

16 Cf. Bugge, loc.cit., p. 82.

17 AFrSt, MA, I K 5: 10; Aaron's lifestory.

18 Cf. HB 101 Cont., p. 504: Report given by Rajanaikken.

19 Cf. R. Vormbaum, Eingeborene Lehrer des Evangeliums in Ostindien (= Evangelische Missionsgeschichte in Biographien, Bd. II), Düsseldorf 1851, p. 57ff. and Wilhelm German, Johann Philipp Fabricius. Seine fünfzigjährige Wirksamkeit im Tamulenlande und das Missionsleben des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts daheim und draußen,... Erlangen 1865, p. 102.

20 P. Vormbaum, loc. cit., p. 7ff.

21 Ibid., p. 30.

22 Cf. Vormbaum, loc. cit., p. 48.

23 Cf. HB, 33. Cont, p. 881: "Ausführlicher Bericht von der gegenwärtigen Verfassung des Evangelischen Missions-Wercks zu Trankenbar. Anno MDCCXXXII".

24 Christian, a school assistant in Cuddalore, was the oldest son of the catechist Habacuc. Habacuc on the other hand was the father-in-law of the school master Manoel in Puleiarkuppam. The descendants of the blind school master d'Almeida who was baptized by Ziegenbalg could be followed at least over three generations up to his grand son Daniel Pullei.

25 This praxis had been used by other missionary societies also. Cf. Otto Waak und Mitarbeiter, Indische Kirche und Indien-Mission I. Die Geschichte der Jeypore-Kirche und der Breklumer Mission (1876-1914). Erlanger Monographien aus Mission und Ökumene, Vol. 20, p. 428.

26 AFrSt, MA, I H 3, p. 15.

27 NHB, I 5. Stück, p. 142, Opening words given by G.A. Freylinghausen.

28 South Indian coin, until the arise of the rupee in 1818. Around 1740 one pagoda was equivalent to 36-42 silver fanam or 24 golden fanam.

29 A grain measure in South India, varying in different places.

30 AFrSt III J 3, accounts of Madras and Cuddalore.

31 NHB I, p. 153, 1768 Cuddalore, letter written by the missionaries Gericke und Hüttemann to Consistorialrath D. Francke, 23 January 1769.

32 Cf. NHB, Vol. 3, 25. Stück, p. 148, letter from Chr. Fr. Schwartz to Pasche in London, written in Tanjore, Oktober 10, 1780.

33 Cf. Kooiman, loc. cit., p. 8.

34 Cf. NGEMA, Vol. VI, 69. Stück, pp. 910-911. A Letter written by the missionary Ludwig Bernhard Ehrengott (1788-?) to the Editor, Madras 1818.

35 Cf. HB, 33. Cont., pp. 870; cf. also AFrSt, MA, 2 a 2:7.

36 Cf. HB, 26. Cont, p. 12.

37 In May 1770 the country priest Rajappen (1742-1797) took a Roman-Catholic family from Tanjore to Tranquebar, who wanted to become members of the protestant confession. NGEMA 5. Sthck, p. 609.

38 Cf. HB, 37. Cont., p. 65ff. Report from September 1733.

39 Cf. HB, 39. Cont., p. 295ff. Diary from 1734 reporting about a meeting with rural catechists, where they had been given instructions for their work.

40 Cf. HB, 45. Cont., p. 1113. Report on a meeting with the country priests being held in April 1737 about the mistakes of the Catholic church. Cf. also HB, 46. Cont., p. 1244. Meeting held on 9 February 1737 with catechists and country priest about the relation to the Catholics and with the confession.

41 In 1990, when Sattianaden, a catechist in Tanjore, was ordained the missionaries Schwartz, Jänicke and Kohlhoff conveyed to Halle "Fragen welche dem neuen Landprediger Herrn Sattiananden zur schriftlichen Beantwortung vorgelegt worden sind nebst seinen Antworten darauf"(questions addressed to the new country priest, Sir Sattianaden and his answers on them) (AFrSt, 1 C 32a: 35). The missionaries reported on Sattianaden like a gentleman, they called him very politely "Herr", "Sir". Significantly, in the printed version this polite version of address had been omitted. NGEMA, IV, 40. Stück, p. 390; Report from Tanjore, 1791.

42 Cf. AFrSt d16a. Diary written by Benjamin Schultze, July, 22 1720.

43 Julius Richter, Indische Missionsgeschichte, Gütersloh 1924, p. 121.

44 With the monthly payment of 20 Pagodas from the East-India Company, Christian Friedrich Schwartz (1726-1798) supported 8 native assistants. Cf. NGEMA 20, p. 363. Letter from Schwartz to Freylinghausen dated 25, September 1777.

45 AFrSt d16a. Diary of Benjamin Schultze, 14 July 1720.

46 HB, 20. Cont. In Schultze's printed diary from August 1720 there is no entry on 14 August, only entries from the 5, 13, 15, and 21 August 1720.
47 Cf. HB, 20. Cont., p. 479, 18 March 1723.
48 Cf. Kurt Liebau, Die ersten Tamilen aus der Dänisch-Halleschen Mission in Europa. Vom Objekt zum Subjekt kultureller Interaktion?, In: Gerhard Höpp (ed.), Fremde Erfahrungen. Asiaten und Afrikaner in Deutschland, Österreich und in der Schweiz bis 1945, Berlin 1996, pp. 9-28.
49 Cf. Heike Liebau, Indische Angestellte in der dänischen Kolonialadministration während der sozialen Unruhen in Tranquebar und Umgebung im Jahre 1787. In: asien, afrika, lateinamerika 25 (1997), pp. 111-126.
50 Cf. Bror Tiliander, Christian and Hindu Terminology. A Study in Their Mutual Relations with Special Reference to the Tamil Area, Uppsala 1974, p. 16.
51 Cf. Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg, Ausführliche Beschreibung des Malabarischen Heidenthums, darinnen aus dieser beiden eigenen Schriften ihre Principia und Lehr-Satze sowohl in Theologicis als Philisophicis umständlich entdecket und zur dienlichen Unterricht dem geliebten Europa communicirt werden..., ed. by Wilhelm Caland, Amsterdam 1926.
52 Ibid., pp. 195-199
53 Cf. HB, 33. Cont., p. 990ff. Letter written by Benjamin Schultze and Johann Anton Sartorius (1704-1738) to the editor of the Hallesche Berichte dated Madras, 26 January (6. February) 1732.
54 Cf. Jeyaraj, loc. cit., pp. 235.
55 HB 52. Cont., S. 701. Letter written by all missionaries to the editor dated 30, December 1740.
56 NGEMA Vol. I, p. 185ff.
57 HB, 101. Cont. p. 504. Report given by Rajanaikken and Dewanesen from 1764.
58 HB, 33. Cont., p. 882; see also NGEMA, 4. St., S. 422, 3 July 1768.
59 Cf. Karl Graul. Die Stellung der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Mission in Leipzig zur Ostindischen Kastenfrage, Leipzig 1861, p. 3.
60 Cf. Jeyaraj, loc. cit., pp. 254-258.
61 Christoph Samuel John, Nachricht von den in den Missionsberichten vorkommenden Namen der Tamulischen Christen, nach ihrer Orthographie und Bedeutung. NGEMA, 38. St., pp. 205-210.
62 Christoph Samuel John, loc.cit., p. 208.
63 HB, 59. Cont., appendix.
64 Cf. Stefen Neill, A History of Christianity in India 1707-1858, p. 198.
65 Wilhelm Germann, Johann Philipp Fabricius. Seine fünfzigjährige Wirksamkeit im Tamulenlande und das Missionsleben des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts daheim und draußen, Erlangen 1865, p. 96, remark 2.
66 Cf. HB., Vol. 6a. Copperplate engraving at the inside of the cover.
67 For the illustration see: HB 31. Cont., non paginated pages at the end of the continuation. For explanations see: HB 31. Cont., p. 748.
68 Cf. NGEMA Vol.V, p. 1085. Instructions given to Christian David by the gouverneur of Colombo, Friedrich North, February 4, 1801.
69 U.T.C.; Microfilm collection, S.P.C.K. Reel 5.
70 HB, 26. Cont., pp. 1-3.
71 HB 7. Cont., pp. 337-504 (1714); HB 11. Cont. pp. 871-959 (1717).
72 Quoted from: Hugald Grafe: Hindu Apologetics at the Beginning of the Protestant Mission Era in India. Indian Church and History Review, 1972, p. 47.

73 HB, 67. Cont., p. 1142 (1747).
74 NGEMA Vol.I, 4. St., p.446 (Diary of the Tranquebar missionaries from the second half of 1769).
75 HB 100. Cont., p. 427.

Muslim Concepts of Local Power and Resistance. Islamic Militants in the Indian Frontier Province between 1900 and Independence

Dietrich Reetz

When talking about Islamic militancy on the north-west frontier,[1] the objective is to understand the conceptual framework by which movements of this description were driven. Muslim militancy on the frontier can provide clues to understanding the mechanism of the fusion of politics and religion within Islam, or, more specifically, within Southasian Islam. It is an attempt to look closer at the pretension of Islamic movements of harbouring a radically and fundamentally different world view, and to see how Islamic ideals fared when confronted with western political concepts and local power considerations. Since the problem is acute even today, it may provide some insight into how Islamic religious injunctions are reconciled to the need for adaptation to western political concepts. The latter prevailed at the time in India through colonial domination and continue to dominate the political discourse in Islamic countries today.

No extensive research on this aspect of Islamic politics has been done so far, *i.e.* on the specific political views and concepts of regional Islamic movements. The north-west frontier region comprised the North-West Frontier Province belonging to British India, carved out of the Punjab in 1900, and the independent tribal territories under the direct rule of the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier Province on behalf of the Government of India. Frontier politics in the north-west have so far mainly been described within the framework of the Pakhtun movement under Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988), the so-called Red Shirt movement which started out as the *Khudai-Khidmatgaran*, or Servants of God, doing social service in the countryside. Other research focused on Frontier politics as part of the Pakistan movement. Thus, frontier politics have mainly been treated from the perspective of the two dominating discourses of (1) the nationalist Congress movement, with which the Red Shirts were aligned[2], and (2) the Pakistan movement, led by the Muslim League[3]. Although anthropological and cultural research on local Islamic traditions of the frontier has been carried out, the political implications of local Islam have rarely been discussed. It is assumed here that mainstream politics on the north-west frontier in the 1930's and 1940's, which have been widely covered by researchers,

originated from the kind of local political mobilisation, of which the Islamic discourse was an important element.

Most of the rare case studies conducted provide little more than an assemblage of random facts on the movements covered by this paper. They are often lacking in clarity and concept as far as political consequences or historical meaning are concerned. An ideological approach is also discernible, claiming these movements exclusively either as doctrinal Islamic traditions or as a separate Muslim liberation movement leading to the creation of Pakistan. This is typical of the studies on the *mujahidin* where there is another drawback: with the exception of an article by Lal Baha, the twentieth century is not covered.[4] In the 1920 *hijrat*, an unpublished dissertation was written at Peshawar University, Pakistan, which, despite a wealth of material from the local archives, treats the subject strictly within the parameters of an Islamic ideological framework.[5] This disallows for an independent evaluation of other contributing factors going beyond the interpretational boundaries of Islam such as economic calamities, social upheavals etc. The same limitations apply to the usual articles on the *hijrat* that cover only selected aspects of the phenomenon.[6] A recent monograph by this author limits itself to one British file from the India Office Library, though within a more comprehensive regional framework.[7] Little is available on the "provisional government" at present. It is usually mentioned in passing only,[8] no recent independent study of it has come to this author's knowledge. Activities of militant mullahs on the Frontier have not been politically conceptualised so far. They have either been mentioned in reports and writings on tribal uprisings[9] or in anthropological studies of Muslim customs in the Frontier region.

After a cursory explanation of the conceptual framework on which the understanding of Islamic movements in British India could rest, a sketch of their forays into politics will follow, rounded off by a number of points tracing some structural features of the correlation between Islam and politics. The paper mainly concentrates on the beginning of the 1920's when all four movements mentioned were active in the province almost concurrently and thus a number of cross-connections became evident, pointing to similarities as well as to certain differences.

Root causes of Islamic activism - an overview

Conceptually, the question arises whether Indian Muslims had a political concept of their own, sufficiently different from mainstream nationalism to merit special distinction. It would be illuminating to understand to what extent they produced indigenous concepts of political power, authority and society and how these were linked to classical political concepts of the time. Islamic movements were trying to position themselves within a triangular reference scheme of (1) the Islamic doctrine, (2) the western constitutional reforms project pursued by the colonial British government in India and (3) the nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru from the Indian National Congress, with the latter, through Gandhi, drawing substantially on Hindu ethics and unitarian religious beliefs. The British-sponsored political project aimed at the slow but gradual and steady process of introducing constitutional parliamentary reforms to increase a certain measure of self-rule and popularly elected local government. The reality of the Indian constitutional reforms in terms of limitations and conditions imposed upon India fell considerably short of the radical demands of Indian nationalists who wanted a fully responsible government elected by a parliament based on adult franchise. The acts of 1919 and 1935, reforming the British-Indian constitution, nevertheless broadened and strengthened western political institutions and structures. Indian Muslims constituted the largest religious minority in India, comprising twenty-one percent of the population. Their impact on political life and on society increased further by way of clustered settlement in certain areas where they constituted the majority, i.e. Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, and Bengal in British-India, and among the larger principalities, Kashmir and Haiderabad. However, centres of Islamic learning and culture were located in the United Provinces, the largest and most populous province up to today, where Muslims made up a minority of 15 per cent.[10] Based on the comprehensive interpretation of Islam as *deen*, i.e. way of life, instead of the narrow approach as *mazhab*, or religion, politics were supposed to form part of Islamic doctrine by implication. But it was not formulated as a separate concept, as yet.

This changed with the concept of Muslim nationalism which assumed that all Muslims belonged to one separate nation, *qaum*, similar to the Bengalis or Indians in general. This concept presumed that the Muslim community in India would seek self-determination for very much the same reasons as the all-India nationalist movement fought for independence. The Muslims were seeking constitutional safeguards against alleged domination by a non-Muslim statutory

majority in elected bodies. Otherwise, goals and methods of policy-making were hardly different from secular nationalist movements. To demand a separate territory for this imagined Muslim nation was supposed to be the aim of the Pakistan movement when it demanded a homeland for Indian Muslims. It was led by the Muslim League founded in 1906 which had come to be a synonym for Muslim politics in pre-independence India. The Pakistan movement was no doubt the major political movement of Indian Muslims both in terms of scope and resulting success and it has also been covered extensively by researchers.[11] However, from the point of view of Islamic doctrine, the Pakistan movement could only partially and in a very limited way be called an AIslamic movement@. It was conducted by the Muslim League, a political party which - beyond its Muslim subject members and its Muslim majority area concept - followed rather orthodox bourgeois political ends, that is power and control of legislatures and over the allocation of resources, for which it also employed fairly established political means. The Muslim League was a mainstream party which more or less strictly followed the example of the British parliamentary system, complete with office bearers and conventions, programs and all the trimmings of Westminster-style democracy. In this respect it can hardly be considered representative of a particularly Islamic way of politics. Prior to 1935, in terms of size and influence it also remained a small, so-called leader party, representing a certain elite. It broadened its support only after the rather disastrous outcome of the 1937 provincial elections in which it could not prove its claim to be a major spokesman for Indian Muslims. The Muslim League was not in a position to form a government in any single one of the provinces where Muslims constituted the majority of the population.

To study specific Islamic responses, one may therefore have to look for other parties and movements. The grouping of these parties brings up the question as to what could be called a specific Islamic response to western political categories. For the purposes of this study, a movement or party will be considered to be Islamic if it was not primarily founded to participate in a parliamentary system, but whose aims were directly related to Islamic doctrine or the furtherance of Islamic belief.

Colonial India sported a great variety of Islamic parties and movements. With regard to political identity, one can broadly distinguish four major groups: (i) *Islamic mass activism* where a large number of Muslims showed more or less spontaneous responses to political challenges, such as demonstrations, unrest, and riots, and where these responses were legitimised with reference to a threat to Islam. If organisation preceded these outbreaks it played the role of a trigger

and was usually eclipsed by the magnitude of the spontaneous mass response which often moved away from the original intention of the organisers. This category could perhaps include movements like the Indian Wahhabis or *mujahidin*, the *moplah* rebellion of Muslim peasants on the West Indian Malabar coast in 1921, the *khilafat* movement in the 1920s in support of the continued authority of the Turkish *khalifah*, despite Turkey's defeat on the German side by Britain in WW I, and the Frontier *hijrat*, which was an exodus of Muslim peasants from the North-West Frontier in 1920. Presumably, communal riots would also qualify for inclusion in this category.

(ii) *Institutional Islamic activism* centred around Islamic institutions of learning such as the Dar-ul-Uloom, the religious seminars, in Deoband, of the Barelwi and of the Nadwa in Lucknow. They represented different doctrinal approaches when responding to political issues with reference to Islam. Their political influence, and also their interest in politics, was often substantial. Building up a large cross-regional following, they wielded significant social and cultural influence with political implications. The Muslim University in Aligarh would qualify for inclusion in this category insofar as it also represented a distinct school of doctrinal thought which stood for a reconciliation of Islam with modern western influences. Though being a university and not a seminar, teaching Islamic subjects was an important part of Aligarh's brief. Aligarh created a group of followers on this count, not less numerous and influential than those from the Islamic seminars.

(iii) *Islamic sectarian and revival movements* usually wanted to restore some of the original meaning of the Qur=an and the Hadith within Islamic practice. In a way, they were reform movements representing a form of purification drives inspired by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) and emphasised by the Deobandi school. Their political impact was mainly felt by implication, usually emphasising one element or another of the Islamic discourse which was then seized upon by more established political forces. For the purpose of self-definition and self-projection, they gave prominence to certain Islamic injunctions or institutions and their re-interpretation. These movements included the Ahl-e-Hadith, the Ahrar, the Ahmadiyya, the Khaksar, and also the Tabligh and the Tanzim movements.

(iv) *Established Muslim political parties and mainstream movements* would then form a separate group characterised by their intention to participate in the elective institutions and processes for which they were often - but not always - founded. They mainly operated within the parameters of Muslim nationalism and its regional variations. These parties comprised the Muslim League, the

Unionist Party in Punjab, the Red Shirts from the Frontier province, the Bengal Peasants Party, Krishak Praja, and the Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference under Sheikh Abdullah.

The definition of an authentic Islamic response to political challenges set out above would imply that it was groups (i) to (iii) from which such a response could be expected. While Muslim nationalists wanted to participate in the game but to change the rules in their favour, the first three groups were not constituted for this purpose. Yet, although they had not intended to play by the rules of the British game, they were forced to respond because the gradual introduction of popularly elected representation created a set of pressures which threatened to undermine the position of the Islamic as well as all traditional, non-political religious and cultural elites in society. Although their control over society had long since been eroded, elected representation was to put the seal on their demise. In order to retain their mostly local position of influence and importance they had to adapt to the new system. The purpose of the larger project is to show how they adapted to these circumstances and what responses they developed.

Islamic militant movements on the north-west Frontier

The movements which will briefly be discussed here in relation to the North-West Frontier Province belong to the first group, Islamic mass activism. The period which is covered is the 1920's when these movements were at the height of their activities, leaving aside earlier peaks in the nineteenth century.

The mujahidin as "Soldiers of the Faith"

The twentieth century *mujahidin* in the Frontier area had taken their name, meaning holy warriors, from the Qur'an. They had survived from a nineteenth century movement which contemporaries called the *Indian Wahhabis*. Yet, their link with Arabian Wahhabism was very remote. The eighteenth century Islamic scholar Shah Waliullah had been inspired by Wahhabi ideas to cleanse Islam and to free it from later accretions, to restore the central position of the Qur'an and the Hadith in the teachings and practice of Islam. However, Indian Sunni Muslims and their reformers mostly continued to follow the Hannafi *fiqh* and not the Wahhabi rite. In this sense, the term Indian Wahhabis was a

misnomer. But their idea of the purification of Islam proved a powerful influence, also with Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of Rai Bareilly (1786-1831) who founded the *mujahidin* movement. Their *jihad* activities began in 1826. Being also called the *tariqa mohammadiyya,* they wanted to follow the way of life of Mohammad the Prophet. They engaged, first with the Sikhs and later with the British, in military encounters, their form of *jihad*, by which they hoped to liberate their homeland from alien forces although their strongholds were limited to a relatively small area in Punjab, on the north-western Frontier, and in Bengal. They were militarily defeated and many of their members were tried in a series of so-called Wahhabi trials in the 1870's. Groups of activists withdrew into the Black Mountains in Mansehra subdivision, where they founded colonies in Smasta and later near Chamarkand in Bajaur. From 1915 they were ruled by Amir Nimatullah of Smasta. In 1915 and 1916 they participated in local attacks on British positions. By the end of 1916 the Government of India decided to get tough with the *mujahidin*, keeping in mind the ongoing war with Germany and Turkey both of which exploited the special relationship they supposedly had with Indian Muslims. The Government instituted a blockade of *mujahidin* settlements, intercepted messengers and money. The Amir then began secret negotiations with the Government, claiming his *mujahidin* were sandwiched between the fighting Mohmands and the British troops. In opposition to the governor on the Frontier who felt that the defeat of the *mujahidin* was close at hand, the British-Indian administration decided to clinch a deal with the Amir which was signed in December 1917 in exchange for a grant of some land to the Amir. The deal was to remain secret for most of the time but during the 1920's the significance of the *mujahidin* steadily declined.[12] Eight people were tried in the *mujahidin* and conspiracy case in 1921-22. The colonies of the *Hindustani Fanatics* were declared unlawful associations in 1923 and thus prohibited though they lingered on for some time.[13] The Chamarkand colony acted more independently after 1923. They provided shelter to various political activists and participated in tribal risings of the Mohmands in 1933 and 1935.[14]

The British called the *mujahidin* also *Hindustani Fanatics* under which name they gained prominence in the intelligence reports from the Frontier province.[15] The latter showed how their movements had been followed in detail and their activities in terms of contacts and travels covered a large area of the Province as well as of the so-called independent territories. Political responses were visible in two ways. One was the emphasis on a code of conduct or guidelines for their camps at Charmakand and Smasta which were supposed to make life conform to Islamic tenets.[16] This implied contrast and critique of the

social and political ills of life which had come to dominate the Frontier areas, loosely called the commercialisation of society and the oppressive rule of the British. Another political response was their thorough opposition to British rule over the Frontier province. They would seek to support tribal forces who rose against the British. This often took the form of local encounters or skirmishes for which the *mujahidin* provided weapons, collecting money, sometimes calling the tribes into action when a local dispute arose, and sometimes participating themselves. Their political response was mostly violent and unrelenting, and could hardly be called withdrawal protest. Yet, they withdrew into mountainous areas which were difficult to access in order to protect themselves from the British. At the same time, their solitary settlements also revealed elements of cultural isolation. Their violent protest culture could only function through withdrawal into seclusion. Another prominent feature of their protest is the linkage they provided between different strands of anti-British activities. Acting in a strategically important region, they had links with Afghanistan, the Russian Bolsheviks, Turkey, Germany, and the Indian nationalists. At one time or another, they played host to activists with these affiliations.

The muhajirin as "Refugees of the Faith"

The Hijrat movement[17] was a mass movement of excited Muslims from the Frontier province and the Punjab, mainly peasants or landless agricultural workers from rural areas who wanted to leave India in 1920 in the wake of calls and rumours that Islam was in danger. India was considered to be no longer *darul islam*, but became *darul harb*, which meant there were major obstacles to practicing Islam. It was partly inspired by the *Pakhtun* movement. Since Britain was a party to the peace negotiations with Turkey in 1919-20 which resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the reduction of Turkish sovereignty to its Anatolian heartland, Britain was accused of wilfully undermining the authority of the Turkish *khalifah*, the spiritual head of all Muslims. The Pakhtun cause was made popular in India by radical Muslim nationalists like Mohammad Ali who agreed with Gandhi that strong emotional impulses were required to start a nation-wide protest campaign against British rule in India. They calculated that India's Muslim minority should be made a prime target for mobilisation as it had been sitting on the sidelines so far. They considered, not without reason as was established later, that the success of the Indian nationalist movement without Muslim participation would be difficult

but not impossible whereas Muslim participation would make the nationalist movement almost irresistible.

The logic of the argument of Muslim activists was that when Britain became an enemy of Islam through its deeds against the *khalifah*, Muslims were obliged by their religious duty to leave the country, that is to migrate, possibly to Afghanistan where the young Amir was striking a strong Islamic posture for his own purposes. What was thought of as a publicity stunt, designed merely to increase pressure on the British, turned into grim reality. The call for migration or *hijrat* was taken up in 1920 by local politicians and by the Islamic clergy on the Frontier and met with an overwhelming response. At the height of the campaign in August 1920, almost 40,000 people had migrated to Afghanistan. They had done so under most difficult personal conditions, selling all their belongings, going practically bankrupt, banking on the good promises of the Afghan Amir, who had pledged support to the *muhajirin* to grind his own mill with the British. The Afghans, however, were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the response and feared a catastrophic drain on their own meagre resources. When the migration was halted by the Afghans in August 1920, the *muhajirin* party which was stopped at the frontier could not believe it. However, having been turned back they were saved the fate of their fellow pilgrims who had made it to the other side but were often plundered by marauding tribes. Several hundred *muhajirin* died on the road to and from Afghanistan.

Comparable to the *mujahidin*, the *muhajirin*'s political response was likewise directed against British rule, particularly against the un-Islamic character of British rule and its consequences for the practice of Islam. The dogmatic debate about the inception of the 1920 *hijrat* was derived from the question whether or not India under the British, and particularly owing to the war with Ottoman Turkey, was inimical to Islam, that is *dar-ul harb*.

There was no unanimity on this issue among the *ulama*. The influential but pragmatic Abdul Bari from *Firangi Mahal* in Lucknow wanted to keep his options open. He refused to outrightly declare India *dar-ul harb*, probably because he feared the repercussions of a mass exodus of Indian Muslims which would have been its logical consequence. Bari carefully argued:

> "In my opinion migration is neither obligatory nor is it meant for one's own advantage or good. It is only to attain the object of protecting Islam and hence no one has a right to stop those who want to migrate and in the same way no one has a right to compel those who do not want to go."[18]

By contrast, Maulana Abul Kalamn Azad in his *fatwa* was satisfied "that from the view-point of the Shari'a, the Muslims of India have no choice but to migrate from India... Migration from India before World War I was desirable, now it is mandatory in order to restore the Caliphate[19]".

Yet, the local mullahs and the organisers of the *hijrat* campaign in the Frontier and the Punjab remained somewhat aloof from this theological dispute. In order to compel people to join the movement they made strong references to the spiritual advantages of going on *hijrat*. From their arguments as well as from activities related to the establishment and regulation of the *muhajirin* colonies in Afgha-nistan, it transpires that the whole affair had infused its followers with strong millenarian hopes of deliverance from earthly dilemmas. They sought to establish a counter-model of an Islamic society of brotherhood and common good. This was evident from the spirit of some of their caravan journeys, their *qafilas*, by which they travelled to Afghanistan, which were conducted in an exulted and celebratory, almost festive mood.[20] Also the way they intended to manage the affairs of the settlers' colonies in Afghanistan through committees with common guidelines, strangely reminiscent of the communist collective communes, pointed to the ideal of an Islamic community.[21] However, in contrast with the *mujahidin*, the *hijrat* was not primarily thought of as an offensive measure against the British. If force or pressure were applied in the course of the *hijrat*, it was indirectly and by implication. Pressure was mounted on the British through resignations by government, police and army officers in the course of the concurrent civil disobedience movement. These officers resigned in order to go on *hijrat* which made the *hijrat* also appear to be part of the non-cooperation campaign. Pressure was also exerted on the Muslim masses in the Frontier region by the local mullah who threatened the unwilling in case of failure to join the *hijrat* with dire consequences such as foregoing their marital rights in the case of "un-Islamic" behaviour. The convergence of the *hijrat* and the civil disobedience movement, that Gandhi had launched at the time along with the Pakhtun movement, was significant. The withdrawal of the intending *muhajirin* from public life in India, and from India as such, was in a way civil disobedience carried to the extreme where cooperation with the colonial power is abandoned and its territorial domain deserted. This form of response is sometimes called "avoidance protest" and as a form of archaic social protest it is found in other cultures and countries as well.[22]

"Muslim Internationalists" from the Provisional Government

Another form of local unrest proceeded in the name of the Provisional Government of India. It had been set up by Mahendra Pratap (b. 1886), a taluqdar or landowner from the Province of Oudh, in 1915. As he remembered in his autobiography, it was 1st December, his birthday, when a few friends came together to start this undertaking. He had graduated from the Anglo-Mohammadan College in Aligarh, the first and only one of its kind, later the first Muslim University of India. Under the strong influence of Islamic values and Persian education imbibed in Aligarh, yet setting his eyes on a rather romantic militant nationalism, he travelled from Afghanistan around the world to make friends with other governments and courts, with whomever was willing to assist militant Indian nationalists like himself against the British. This desire made strange bedfellows, first with the German and Turkish courts, and later with the Bolsheviks and the Third International. Strangely enough, their small group of activists always contained overtones of pan-Islamism which was regarded at the time by a certain faction of Islamic activists as somewhat akin to communism in its desire to have a world and a society of the equal. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) and Maulvi Barkatullah (1870-1928) were the most well-known Islamic activists. Sindhi functioned as the "Administrative and Foreign Minister" of the Provisional government. Ahmad Aziz described his views as a form of "Pseudo-Waliullahi communism"[23]. Barkatullah was the "Prime Minister". In March 1919, he went to Soviet Russia as the Afghan representative to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations. When Pratap came to Moscow in May 1919, he joined his party and participated in an interview with Lenin. He stayed on in Soviet Russia for several months, closely involved in Pratap's activities to popularise Marxism and Socialism among Muslims in Central Asia. For this purpose he had written a number of articles and pamphlets, the best known among which was on "*Bolshevism and Islam*" explaining Marxist Socialism as a return to the concept of the *bait al-mal*, the common treasury for the community. From a pan-Islamic perspective, he shared with the Bolsheviks the abolition of private property which he believed to be the "cause of all evil on earth"[24], and the rejection of Western parliamentary democracy which he called "a children's toy made to dupe the people"[25].

As in the two preceding cases, the support base was located in the North-West Frontier province from where the "Provisional Government" helped train militants and sent out propaganda literature, weapons and explosives. Through Sindhi and Barkatullah the "Provisional Government" remained in close contact

with the Pakhtun tribal areas and the Frontier Province of British India, particularly with the bases of the *mujahidin* in the Black Mountains. Local skirmishes occurred in Mansehra subdivision of the Frontier province in 1920 when the British raided the positions of their supporters. Maulvi Muhammad Ishak and Maulvi Muhammad Irfan had been successful in organising a series of mass meetings in Hazara district in 1920, coinciding with the *hijrat* movement and culminating in the declaration of a "provisional government" or "self-rule" in some localities. About 30 thousand people participated in their meeting at Khaki village on 22 August, 1920. After their arrest, this movement petered out.[26] On this occasion, the British-Indian government noted with imperial arrogance and ferocity that

> "The efforts of fanatical agitators in the Mansehra Sub-division resulted in the working up of wild excitement which culminated in the repudiation of the British administration and the erection in many places of a "Provisional Government. This movement collapsed with the arrest of the ringleaders; but the neighbouring Black Mountain tribes, having been persuaded that they were invulnerable to rifle fire, burnt and sacked some of our posts until they were brought to their senses by a severe repulse followed by aerial operations."[27]

Prior to these events, the activists of the "Provisional Government" gained a certain prominence in the "Silk letter conspiracy" in 1916 when a messenger was caught carrying a letter written on yellow silk, addressed by Sindhi to his teacher, the *Sheikh al Hindh*, Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, where he gave detailed instructions how Indian Muslims should be mobilised against the British. However, none of the major activists was caught at the time, except that Mahmud al-Hasan was exiled to Malta.[28]

Politically, the Provisional Government sought to end British rule over India. Coming from a radical nationalist background, their primary concern was not the un-Islamic character of British rule but the political oppression and alien rule it stood for. Yet, through the participation of Muslim leaders in their activities, their nationalist goals became fused with Islamic injunctions on the basis of the liberative potential of Islam and its potential inspiration for a quasi-communist utopian society. Initially, Pratap himself believed in the potential of true religion for the liberation of India. Lenin, when confronted with Pratap's book *Religion of Love*, called his views "Tolstoyan" which supposedly had already failed in Russia.[29] Although their group did support acts of violence against British rule in India, this was rather sporadic. They did not form the closed community that the *mujahidin* did. They represented rather a

network of radical and militant activists, moving as individuals and linking up with local activities.

The faithful Mullah as "Militant Preacher"

A fourth kind of islamist political activity highly typical of the Frontier region was the militant mullah, or preacher. This was local Islamic mass activism inasmuch as the mullahs aroused one or the other tribe into action against the British on various occasions. Mostly these were tribal insurrections.[30] The mullahs were sometimes people of spell-binding influence. During the 1920's and 1930's the Haji of Turangzai[31], the Babra Mullah[32], the Fakir of Alingar[33], and the Mullah of Chaknawar[34] retained a high profile .At one stage or other all were involved in the Mohmand disturbances of 1915-17, 1927 and 1937-38. What the Haji of Turangzai was for the Mohmands, Haji Abdul Razzaq was for the Wazirs. In a duly signed and sealed letter to the British Agent in 1920 he claimed that he had set up an independent government for the political agency of Waziristan. He believed that he had the support of a Bolshevik minister, that Afghanistan was "compelled" to assist him, and that Indians "approved" of his actions.[35] The Sandaki Baba was active in Upper Swat in the Malakand Agency in the 1920's.[36] Certain notoriety was achieved by the so-called Shami Pir in 1938. Of Syrian origin, as the honorary appellation "Shami" indicates, his name was Sayyid Muhammed Sadi, nephew of Soraya, the former queen of Afghanistan and wife of the deposed Afghan King Amanullah. He belonged to the Qadiriyya order for which he allegedly came to collect tribute among certain tribes on the Frontier. But his intention proved to be the disposal of the Afghan king Zahir Shah in order to avenge the downfall of Amanullah. The Shami Pir succeeded in mobilising a subsection of the Waziris who were stopped, however, by the British. The usual pattern of action was that a *lashkar* or group of volunteer fighters was raised from among the tribals. The latter were either lured by the promise of loot or particularly attracted by certain oratory qualities of the mullahs. The mullahs were not averse to using crafty imagery to impress the tribals. The Shami Pir was believed to be capable of rendering the weapons of the adversary ineffective. For a lump sum of 25,000 Pounds Sterling the Shami Pir was finally bought off from his endeavour by the British and exiled from South Waziristan in the same year.[37]

The mullahs largely shared the political response to British rule with the first two groups discussed here. They were enraged by the un-Islamic character of British rule, but their political activities were also very much concerned with securing a permanent position for themselves in the local power equation which was disturbed by British rule in general and, more specifically, through the impending introduction of elected institutions. Generally they were associated with one or sometimes two particular tribes or sub-tribes for some time. Beyond recruiting followers from these tribes for certain campaigns, they did not head any particular party or movement.

Islam and politics in British India - the "Weapon of Faith"

These four groups were remarkably similar in many ways despite the very pronounced differences in terms of their inception, activity and response. Their political responses suggest a number of common compulsions underlying their reactions. By way of conclusion and of a tentative agenda for further research into the nexus of Islam and politics during this period and in this region, the following eight points are suggested for deliberation:

One, there was close interaction between local, national, *i.e.* Indian, and international factors.

In the 1920's Muslim unrest on the Frontier and elsewhere in India took its root from a number of earlier political campaigns in which Muslim political opinion was polarised. One such root cause were the wars lead by Turkey or affecting it, such as the Turko-Italian war and the Balkan wars, and more significantly, the beginning of World War I in 1914. Attacks on Turkey were taken very much to heart by Indian Muslims. Solidarity movements were started by those who later played a prominent role in other forms of protest like Muhammad and Shaukat Ali.[38] Germany raised its hopes of becoming a potential ally in defeating British rule in India. Another root cause inspiring Muslim political mobilisation was, no doubt, the strengthening of the Indian nationalist movement which concluded a strategic, albeit short-lived, pact between Hindu and Muslim forces at a conference in Lucknow in 1916.

Afghanistan played a central role in these affairs. Its struggle for greater independence from the British became another Muslim cause on the Frontier, all the more since Afghanistan supported close relations with many Pakhtun tribes on the Indian side by paying regular allowances to some of their chiefs.

The fundamental changes in Bolshevik Russia also captured the imagination of Islamic activists, particularly between 1917 and 1923, when pan-Islamic schemes banked for a while on support from Russia against the British, and even more after the Bolshevik success against the allied armies in the civil war, in which Britain also played a certain role. It was typical that Maulana Muhammad Irfan declared at a meeting for the *muhajirin* in Abbottabad,

> "A strong flood would shortly set in from Baku which would sweep away everything from its path. He praised the Amir of Afghanistan who had drawn the sword in defence of Islam and would not sheathe it until he had accomplished something. The non-existence of the Pakhtun was the death-blow of Islam."[39]

Pan-Islamic causes like support for the Ottoman Empire or for Afghanistan were a strong motivating force, but they almost always underwent significant mutations when enacted in India to the extent where they became unrecognisable or inconsistent with the original source of inspiration. The compulsion for Indians to defend the Pakhtun wes entirely internal and difficult to stomach for Islamic militants from Arabia who wanted to break free from the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, the classical *hijrat,* undertaken by Muhammad the Prophet was generally a topic of consent in the *Ummah*, the Muslim world community. When this pan-Islamic issue of undertaking *hijrat* was appropriated by Indian Frontier Muslims who went to Afghanistan, their motives became somewhat divorced from the *hijrat* of the Prophet, as they were driven by dissatisfaction with the Indian political situation, pursuing the campaign to an extent which took Afghanistan by surprise. The Pakhtun and the *hijrat* campaigns showed that Indian Muslim leaders, both local and national, selected pan-Islamic courses more or less at random to illustrate or support their political intentions.

Two, all four forms of local political mobilisation were closely interrelated. Activists frequently passed from one stream of action on to another. The *mujahidin* colonies played host to almost all of them at one time or another. In the localities, there were a number of people who would be known to be active and interested in politics, they would take up one or the other course as it came along. Organising committees for the *Pakhtun* movement and the *hijrat* campaign used to be identical or overlapping in many cases. The mullahs would wait for a new tribal conflict and use it to consolidate their influence to embarrass the authorities. In a way, local activists would create an informal Islamic network which could be called into action whenever the need or desire arose.

Three, these were emotional and spontaneous responses on the mass level, invoking strong images of Islam in danger - except in the case of the "Provi-

sional Government", where Islam was held high as a romantic promise. At the same time, at least on the part of some of the organisers of these campaigns, these were intentional responses which were used to demonstrate to the British how easy it was with little means to mobilise a large following for "the right cause." They knew very well that the British were extremely uneasy about religious fervour which was irrational to them and difficult to deal with. Causes could rarely be explained to the superiors in a manner that they could be removed or dealt with administratively, forecasts about the duration and outcome of such action were difficult to make. It was very clearly a potential for blackmailing the British administration into caution and compromise. This, for instance, is supported by the decisions of the British to deal leniently by their own standards with the *hijrat* agitation where extensive rehabilitation measures were taken after the return of numerous *muhajirin*, as well as in the case of the Shami Pir who was bought off rather than arrested. The official files show that fear of the outcome of such religious campaigns prompted compromise rather than confrontation.

Four, morality was made an important element of the campaigns to make the Muslims seem superior to their British detractors. People were offered a utopian vision of a different life which would not be as competitive, and cheap and materialistic as under the British. The *mujahidin* tried to establish model communities in Smasta and Chamarkand with a clear code of conduct. The "Provisional Government" offered a utopian vision of a better life on communist lines, merged with Islamic ideals. The *muhajirin* colonies in Afghanistan in 1920 were also to follow strong moral and religious guidelines. The mullahs invoked moral injunctions branding the infidels and the irreligious ways of the British, where state schools and a state administration supposedly undermined the traditional religiosity of the people. The topic of moral improvement was later picked up by other Muslim movements like the Red Shirt movement. But it was equally shared by non-Muslim movements like those of the Sikhs and Tamils in the 1920's and 1930's.[40] Gandhi had appropriated the subject for the Congress all along.

Five, the movements seemed surprisingly oblivious to traditional measures of political success or failure. These spontaneous movements were often blessed with little success, measured by western political standards. Those described ended rather in disaster. This did not in any conceivable measure detract their followers, or reduce the stature of the organisers or of Islam as a motivating force. Although there was sometimes a short-lived rage against the Mad Mullah who had misled them, people rather quickly settled in fairly quickly to their

daily routine. The long-term effect was surprisingly positive. Political awareness and the readiness to engage themselves in protest against British rule or in defence of Islam increased. These campaigns also served as training grounds for a new generation of politicians who later entered mainstream local or national politics like Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the so-called Frontier Gandhi. In 1914-15 he considered himself a disciple of the Haji of Turangzai, particularly in the latter's educational enterprises. He had started a chain of Islamic schools which were meant to serve as an alternative to the state schools and were also used to increase public awareness about resistance against Britain. Ghaffar Khan later founded the Red Shirt movement which after the introduction of elected provincial representation under the Government of India Act of 1935 came to form the Government of the Frontier Province.

Six, seen against the background of developments in India proper, these movements sought to anticipate, forestall or rival the imminent introduction of elective representation. Although representative and elective provincial autonomy had been partly introduced in India by the 1919 Constitutional Reforms act, it was only introduced in the Frontier Province in 1932. But the mullahs and tribal elders could clearly see the importance of the principle of public representation. Traditional political authority which was mostly inherited - the position of the mullah was practically very often hereditary as well - would then be challenged by people who were voted into office. This is borne out by evidence to various inquiry commissions by the British Government in preparation for the constitutional and administrative reforms such as the Public Service Commission in 1913[41] and by the 1922 North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee led by the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, Sir Dennis Bray. This committee set out to collect evidence on whether or not the Frontier Province, created in 1900, should be re-amalgamated with the Punjab province. The issue was raised by Hindu politicians from the Frontier and at the centre, ostensibly to extend the 1919 reforms which were enjoyed by Punjab, to the Frontier districts. Witnesses like the Pakhtun members of the Civil Service, Abdul Qaiyyum Khan and Khan Bahadur Khan, repeatedly demanded limitations on the elective principle, reservation for special interests and classes like the Khans.[42]

Seven, at the time of nationalist mobilisation the campaigns contributed to establishing the Islamic discourse on the political scene. The Islamic campaigns during the First World War and immediately afterwards both on the Frontier and in the rest of India contributed - for better or worse - to linking politics with Islam and Islam with politics. Islamic activists succeeded in preserving and

adapting their traditional system of influence to the new era of elective representation and future independence. During the anti-colonial movement this was helped by the general trend in the Indian body politics not to separate politics and religion but to join them to reinforce their impact on British rule. Events in India and Pakistan since independence have shown that the religious institutions - not only those of the Islamic denominations - have survived independence and elective democracy remarkably well. Politics in India and Pakistan are still largely, though not exclusively, governed by similar assumptions on a close and inherent nexus of religion and politics as in the 1920's and 1930's. To say that this has only been to the detriment of politics, would fall short of the complexity of the issues involved. The example of the Islamic militant campaigns on the frontier in the 1920's shows that it may instead be necessary to understand the rationale of these movements better and evaluate the motives and perspectives of participants within the framework of these movements. Only then will a clearer picture of their place in national politics emerge. The militant Islamic discourse, much as any other religious discourse, should be seen as a means of negotiating a position in society for the local cultural norm, and for the local political and religious establishment.

Eight, the tendency to separate people on the basis of religion should be contrasted with continued syncretism of religious movements and practices throughout South Asia. Islamic militant movements have taken their cue from other religious revival movements, like the Hindus and the Sikhs and have in turn been copied by them. Time and again, religiosity *per se* and the wider issues of morality and spirituality have helped to foster a certain degree of understanding between adherents of different religions. In addition, the peculiar meaning which the concept of secularism has acquired in South Asia continuously contributed religious traditions and institutions to politics. In Europe the term "secularism" and "secularised society" has rather come to mean a society which moves or has moved away from religion, where people have stopped following religious practises, whereas in South Asia it amounts to the accepted and tolerated coexistence of different religions where religion is protected from the state and one faith from the other. This means that religiosity and religious institutions have continued to remain highly visible and influential under Indian secularism.

Tentatively it could therefore be argued that concepts of Islamic militancy in South Asia owe their specifics as much to Islam as to local traditions and cultures and to South Asian religiosity in general. They are less rooted in the abstract categories of Islam than in the need and motivations of local leaders

and their followers to survive and to assert a position of their own in the existing structures of power, influence and society.

Notes

1 An earlier version of the paper was contributed to the 14th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies at Copenhagen on 21- 24 August, 1996. It is part of a larger comparative project discussing the political identity of Islam in pre-independence India: "Allah's kingdom on earth. The political project of Islamic movements in colonial India" at the Centre of Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin, 1996-97. The project is still at an early stage and, therefore, conclusions drawn here are of a preliminary nature.

2 Stephen Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: the independence movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, Durham, N. C., 1988; E. Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movements in the North-West-Frontier Province, 1937-47, Uppsala 1981.

3 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement, Karachi 1990.

4 On the mujahidin movement, see Qeyamuddin Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement in India, Calcutta 1966; Lal Baha, The Activities of the Mujahideen 1900-1936. In: Islamic Studies, 18 (1979), pp. 97-168; Maulana Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Jama'at-i-mujahidin, Lahore 1955; N. D. Ahmad, Mujahidin - triumph of the British diplomacy. In: Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, 12 iii (1975), pp. 33-45.

5 Noshad Khan, The Khilafatists' Hijrat to Afghanistan (Diss.), Peshawar 1995 (unpublished).

6 F. S. Briggs, The Indian Hijrat of 1920. In: Moslem World, Princeton, NJ, (1930) 20, pp. 164-168; Lal Baha, The Hijrat movement and the North-West Frontier Province. In: Islamic Studies, Islamabad (1979) 18, pp. 231-242; M. Naeem Qureshi, The ulema of British India and the hijrat of 1920. In: Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge (1979) (13), pp. 41-59.

7 Dietrich Reetz, Hijrat - The Flight of the Faithful: A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North India to Afghanistan in 1920, Berlin 1995, pp 140. It is being revised and extended for re-edition at present.

8 See the official Government of India note by the Criminal Investigation Department, later published in book form by the author of the note: P. C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements. Delhi: Government of India Press, 1925. Cf. also Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India; with unpublished documents from National Archives of India (1919-1924), compiled and edited by Sobodh Roy, Calcutta 1971, although this note discusses M. N. Roy mainly as founder of the Communist Party of India. Recent historical studies add more details: from a leftist, Marxist perspective: Ashok Kumar Patnaik, The Soviets and the Indian Revolutionary Movement, 1917-1929, Delhi 1992, part. pp. 56-68, and Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India, Delhi 1987. The latter, again, does not expressly focus on the "Provisional Government".

9 A typical example is by Akbar S. Ahmed, Religion and politics in Muslim society, Cambridge 1983, on the controversial Mullah in Wana, Waziristan, which mentions historical antecedents only briefly and concentrates on the post-independence history of the area. For Ahmad, history and conflict of this kind in the tribal belt, in keeping with his anthropological training, mainly is agnatic rivalry which has to be sorted out in order to be solved. See also his 1978 dissertation: Pakhtun economy and society: Traditional structure and economic development in a tribal society, London 1980.

10 For an overview of the Muslim community in colonial India, see Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge 1972; W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India: a social analysis, Delhi 1985 [repr.]; Annemarie Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, Leiden-Köln 1980.

11 Cf. Hafeez Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan, New York 1980; Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge 1984.

12 Files from the India Office Library give many more details about the *mujahidin*, for example British Library India Office Collection (BL IOC) File No 4261/16: Hindustani fanatics; NW Frontier: relations of the Soviet Legation in Kabul with the Chamarkand colony; GoI recommended no action. 29-7-12 - 18-6-26. See also, Lal Baha, The Activities of the Mujahideen 1900-1936, op. cit.

13 The Peshawar Frontier Archives keep multi-volume files on the *mujahidin* as files nos. 9/12/7-Vols I-VI and 9/12/9-Vols I-VII, with single items also included in other files.

14 Lal Baha, The Activities of the Mujahideen 1900-1936, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

15 BL IOC File No. 1229/19, Provincial and Intelligence Bureau Diaries 9-7-21.

16 Cf. Lal Baha, The activities of the mujahidin, op. cit., passim; Ghulam Muhammad Jaffar, Agreement between the British Government of India and the Amir of Mujahidin, Mawlawi Ni'mat Allah. In: Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Islamabad 41 (1993), pp. 53-62.

17 For a more detailed exposition of the Hijrat movement, see Dietrich Reetz, Hijrat - The Flight of the Faithful, op. cit.

18 Letter from Maulana Abdul Bari, Al Bureed (Cawnpore) of the 4 June, 1920.

19 Quoted after Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan, Washington 1962, Appendix B.

20 F. S. Briggs, a contemporary, thus described the arrival of one of the *qafilas* at the Indian-Afghan border in an article "The Indian Hijrat of 1920". In: Moslem World, Princeton 20 (1930), p. 166.

21 For various copies and versions of the rules, regulating the settlement of the *muhajirin* in Afghanistan, see the India Office dossier on the movement, BL IOC L/P&J/6/1701, file No 5703/1920, Hijrat in N. W. F. Province tc, file pages 26-27; and Confidential Political Diaries and Special Branch Record, B. No 30, F. No 475, which also includes a version of the Nizam Nama-e-Muahjirin in Dari, quoted in: Noshad Khan, The Khilafatists's Hijrat, op. cit., pp. 96-98, 197-211.

22 Michael Addas, From Footdragging to Flight: The Evasive History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and South-East Asia. In: The Journal of Peasant Studies, 13 (1986) 2, pp. 64-86.

23 Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition 1919-1947, Delhi 1983 (2nd ed.), pp. 41-46.

24 Quoted in Patnaik, The Soviets and the Indian Revolutionary Movement, op. cit., p. 62.

25 Ibid., p. 63.

26 BL IOC File No P/CONF/59, protocol no 306, Nov 1920.

27 L.F. Rushbrook Williams (ed.), India in 1920, Delhi 1985 (repr.), p. 13.

28 For further details on the "Silk letter conspiracy" and Obaidullah Sindhi, see BL IOC File No 4260/16, Afghanistan: the Silk letter case. 1916-1918. For books, partly based on these files, see Maulana Muhammad Mian, Tehrik-e-reshmi rumal, 1971; Muhammad Hajjan Shaikh, Maulana Ubid Allah Sindh: A Revolutionary Scholar, Islamabad 1986.

29 Ashok Kumasr Patnaik, The Soviets and the Indian Revolutionary Movement, op. cit., p. 39.

30 For accounts of the role of religious figures in the tribal wars on the North-West Frontier, see Sir William Barton, India's North-West Frontier, London 1939; Arthur Swinson, North-West Frontier, New York 1967; Akbar S. Ahmed, Millenium and Charisma among Pathans, London 1976; Frederick Barth, Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans, London 1958; Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, London 1964.

31 His real name was Fazal-i-Wahid (1885-1937). He was named after a place where he was given some land: in the Maira near Turangzai, not far from Charsadda, in Peshawar district, which he used to build a large mosque and a hostel for his Sheikhs and disciples. He was mostly active among the Mohmands of Peshawar district, especially since 1914 and during the Third British-Afghan War of 1919-20. In 1915 he fled to the tribal belt of the independent territories which were loosely controlled by the British through a political agent but where tribal law reigned supreme. He played a significant role in the Mohmand uprisings of 1915 and 1927 and acted as an intermediary in the relations of the Afghans with the Mohmands. Two of his sons also achieved prominence:

Fazl-i-Akbar, known as Badshah Gul I., was the eldest son and succeeded his father in his spiritual duties and political callings. However, while his father was regarded as a *faqir* or saint, he was not. Collected tribute from the Safis whose *de facto* ruler he was. Lived in Lakarai, in Safi country. He was the leader of the Mohmands in the operations of 1933 and 1935. Was assisted by his two brothers Badshah Gul II. and III (Fazl-i-Ma'bud and Fazl Shah).

See Government of India. Who's who in the Peshawar District. Corrected up to 1 January 1931, Peshawar 1931, pp 33. Confidential. BL IOC L/P&S/20B.296/10.

32 He was one of the leaders of the Mohmand tribal uprisings in 1915 and 1927. See BL IOC L/PS/12/3125 Coll 23/4, North-West Frontier. Tribal disturbances 1930-31. Peshawar and District Situation. 7-5-30 - 14-12-32.

33 Active during the 1927 Mohmand uprising and more influential than the Haji of Turangzai at the time. See also BL IOC L/PS/12/3125 Coll 23/4.

34 See BL IOC L/PS/12/3125 Coll 23/4. Led a force of Afghans into Mohmand territory in the 1915 trouble.

35 Para 398 of the Frontier Intelligence Diary (FID) No 15, 8 April 1920, in BL IOC L/P&S/10/813, Provincial and Intelligence Bureau Diaries 1919-20.

36 FID No. 8, 21 February, 1920, in L/P&S/10/813, op. cit.

37 BL IOC L/P&S/12/3255-59, Shami Pir: adherents, movement, identity, arrest.

38 Cf. their efforts for medical relief to Turkey through a Red Crescent missions during the Turko-Italian and the Balkan wars, and more prominently the foundation of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka'aba in 1913, the "Servants of Ka'aba Society", where they were joint by Mulana Abdul Bari (1879-1926) from the Nadwa seminary in Lucknow who later played a key role during the *Pakhtun* and the *hijrat* campaigns. Afzal Iqbal, The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali: An Analysis of the Hopes, Fears and Aspirations of Muslim India from 1778 to 1931, Lahore 1974.

39 BL IOC P/CONF/59, op. cit., p. 22.

40 Cf. D. Reetz, Religion and group-identity: Comparing three regional movements in Colonial India. In: Annemarie Hafner (ed.), Essays on South Asian Society, Culture and Politics, Berlin 1995, pp. 73-89.

41 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on the Public Services in India: Appendix Vol X, Minutes of evidence relating to the Indian and Provincial Civil Services taken at Lahore from the 9th to the 15th April 1913, with appendices. London 1914, Cd. 7582, passim. The fear of the impending changes was for instance reflected in the evidence by Khan Bahadur Khan Abdul Ghafur Khan, Khan of Zaida, who demanded special consideration for the traditional tribal chiefs and Khans, as the aristocracy is "a very large and important class, and their history, traditions and ideals are based on loyalty to the Crown and support of the British rule" (p. 301). He saw no further need to broaden recruitment.

42 Government of India, North-West Frontier Enquiry (Bray) Committee 1922. Proceedings Vols. I-III: Evidence and Appendices. BL IOC V/26/247/2-4., Vol. I: 4, p. 190.

The Indian Village as Perceived by Peasant Leaders in Late Colonial India

Petra Heidrich

One of the panels of the 14th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies held in Copenhagen in August 1996 invited contributions to the theme "The Construct of the South Asian Village: History, Reality and Relevance". The participants' understanding of the topic proved to be as diverse as the composition of the panellists - they included anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and historians. From my point of view attention has been focused on the issue whether the images of the South Asian village established in the past and in the present provide us with an adequate picture of reality. The ongoing debate on orientalism and postorientalism highlights the role of conscious interests and unconscious motives of the investigating subjects as well as of the objects of their research in distorting the investigated reality, in creating a "construct". The issue, however, is by no means a new one. It has been focused upon in connection with enquiries made into the conditionality of academic studies and their correlation with the cultural and political trends of the respective period of time. Edward Said posed the question anew in a very passionate and provocative manner.

In the early sixties the thesis of the "end of ideology"[1] came up in connection with the debate on modernisation. The Indian agrarian sociologist P.C. Joshi took a very categorical stand: "There is no greater falsehood than the view that the 'end of ideology' constitutes the starting point of social science."[2] In his essay on the history of agrarian studies authored by Indian as well as foreign scholars he pointed out convincingly how economic and political interests have always affected research. They influenced the evolution and direction of research, the choice of the subject as well as the attitude of the researcher. But, P.C. Joshi also demonstrated, that studies which approached a particular subject from different points of view were, nevertheless, capable of revealing facets of social reality, of uncovering different or even new aspects. In my opinion, this continues to be relevant today too.

I have referred to P.C. Joshi because his essay touches upon an aspect which is of significance to my topic. Under colonial conditions investigations into the rural conditions of India were conducted before agrarian economics and agrarian sociology did emerge as academic disciplines. The colonial administration

was instrumental in conducting investigations which served economic and political purposes. But its nationalist opponents in India were also interested in analysing the rural conditions - although for different reasons. As P.C. Joshi pointed out that in these circumstances "the political 'activist' or 'agitator' was also the first scientific 'researcher' into the agrarian question. Later the professional scientist appeared on the scene"[3].

My paper intends to focus on a particular category of political activists, namely, peasant leaders in late colonial India, who, simultaneously, in some way or other, became researchers of village life. While fighting the colonial rule on the one hand, and critically interacting with the national leadership on the other, they deeply involved themselves in social affairs and evolved a determined political interest. Now the question may be raised whether their image of the South Asian village was far aloof from reality, was merely a "construct". I would disagree with such an opinion. I intend to show, how these peasant leaders, due to their exposure to rural reality were able to significantly enrich the knowledge about the village in colonial India.

During the first decades of the twentieth century the national movement had turned its face towards the masses. Broad strata of the peasantry were to be mobilised under Gandhi's leadership in the struggle for independence. For that purpose leading figures of the Indian National Congress in some instances took up the case of peasants, who were directly involved in an economic conflict with the colonial administration. The actions of such individuals were widely publicised. One of the leaders who - besides Gandhi - became well-known as an expert on peasant questions was Vallabhbhai Patel. He rather successfully organised the non-violent resistance of the peasants in the Province of Bombay, i.e. in Kheda 1918 and in Bardoli district in 1927, against the enhancement of land revenue. Another leader who gained fame was Rajendra Prasad in Bihar, who supported Gandhi in 1917 in his Champaran *satyagraha* against the enforced cultivation of indigo.

Even though the Indian National Congress soon began to project itself as an organisation of the peasants, its leadership continued to be dominated by representatives of the urban intelligentsia, mostly of liberal professions. The so-called peasant leaders of a national stature could frequently claim a rural background, but there was a deep cleavage between them and the masses of the rural population. As members of well-to-do families they often had been educated abroad, led a different way of life, occupied a high position in the caste hierarchy, and frequently enjoyed a high economic status. The cleavage could, however, partly be bridged by persons who, on behalf of the Indian

National Congress, went to the villages for the purpose of practical constructive and also political work and acted as intermediaries. They were indispensable for the urban Jlite of different political and ideological persuasions who wanted to maintain or even extend their political influence in the countryside.

The relationship between the leadership and these intermediaries was not unproblematic. In the course of their co-operation both sides changed. The intermediaries could not restrict themselves to spreading the ideas of the Congress in the rural areas, they were compelled to take sides in the conflict of diverging interests. In this process they came to assist the newly emerging peasant strata in spelling out their demands and in introducing them into the political arena. They finally contributed to convince the national Jlite of the necessity to bring about structural changes in the countryside. The insight of peasant leaders into village life was, therefore, closer to reality than the image of rural conditions conveyed by national leaders. Most prominent among those peasant leaders were Swami Sahajanand Saraswati and N.G. Ranga.

Swami Sahajanand Saraswati typifies the development of a Congress activist to one of those troublesome intermediaries. He was drawn into politics by the non-cooperation movement from 1920 to 1922. Initially he was a devoted disciple of Mahatma Gandhi. The orthodox Swami was impressed by Gandhi's ascetic way of life, he admired him as a deeply religious person, appreciated his identification with the tradition of the country and he drew inspiration from Gandhi's patriotism. The Swami became a Congress volunteer, a *swayamsevak*. He went to Buxar in Bihar and to Ghazipur in U.P. to propagate Gandhi's "constructive programme", in particular the spinning wheel and *khadi*, and he collected money for the Tilak Swaraj Fund. In 1922 he went to jail for one year. It was only in 1927 when he settled in an *ashram* at Bihta near Patna when his career as a peasant leader began. In the very same year he organised the peasant movement in the constituency of West Patna on behalf of the Congress leadership of Bihar. In 1929, on the occasion of the Sonepur Mela (a big periodical peasant market), the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha was established. Being a convinced Gandhian the Swami at that time pursued the task of strengthening the Indian National Congress among the peasants and kept strictly to the principle of harmonising the differing interests of *zamindar*s (landlords) and their tenants in order to promote national unity.

The efforts of the Indian National Congress to establish closer links with the peasants increased in the early thirties. The upsurge of the national movement was to be given an additional impetus by winning the support of the peasantry. The successful struggle of the peasants of Bardoli led by Sardar Patel generated

great enthusiasm and prepared the ground among larger sections of the peasantry. In order to obtain a more comprehensive idea of the rural social set-up the Indian National Congress encouraged local investigations on a greater scale. These endeavours resulted, *inter alia*, in the report of the Congress organisation of the United Provinces entitled "Agrarian Distress in the United Provinces"[4]. In Bihar also leading Congress representatives - Shri Krishna Sinha and Babu Rajendra Prasad - toured the Gaya *zila* and the Masaura *pargana* in the Patna region in early 1931 in order to obtain first-hand knowledge of the problems affecting the peasants. Unlike the U.P. report, the Bihar report was, however, never published. The later argument that the documents were seized by the police in 1932 was considered by Swami Sahajanand as a mere pretext.[5] Land relations in Bihar were based on the zamindari system introduced by the British. A layer of a few big landlords and a greater number of smaller landholders (zamindars) were the owners and payers of a permanently fixed amount of revenue. The cultivators of the soil were, however, different layers of tenants, with the actual manual work being done by undertenants and agricultural workers. With the zamindars being the main supporters of the colonial system the main contradiction in times of crisis was between zamindars and peasants, i.e., tenants. The Congress leaders in Bihar were either themselves *zamindars* or maintained at least close links with the well-to-do upper strata in the countryside who supported the Congress party. In order to maintain the status quo they held back the report which would have pointed out fundamental differences between the interests of tenants and *zamindars*.

The Swami, however, took a different stand. On behalf of the reorganised Kisan Sabha of Bihar and with the approval of the Congress he toured in 1933 with his friends the villages of the Tekari *raj*, many of which belonged to the Raja of Amavan. He was upset by what he saw. He tried in vain to negotiate with the Raja and his *amla* (administrator) with the intention to lessen the grievances of the peasants. The findings of his investigation were published in Hindi under the title "The moving story of the peasants of Gaya". After the devastating earthquake in northern Bihar in 1934 the Swami as a member of the relief committee again witnessed the ruthless attitude of big *zamindars*. In some cases the *zamindars* even claimed the compensation which was paid to the affected peasants for settling the rent debts. This experience created doubts in the mind of the Swami about the possibility to change the *zamindars'* attitude by persuasion. Bitterly disappointed by a conversation with Gandhi on the subject, the Swami dissociated himself from his idol.[6] He became an uncom-

promising representative of peasant interests vis-a-vis the Indian National Congress at the all India as well as the provincial level.

Swami Sahajanand Saraswati's perception of the Indian village was primarily based on his practical experiences and was later on substantiated by his acquaintance with socialist literature. He was convinced of the necessity to bring about fundamental changes in the agrarian structure, and his views were not those of a scholarly detached person. He believed in the ideal of social justice and was, therefore, mainly preoccupied with the analysis of class relations in the countryside. Other important aspects of village life stood behind. Through his own investigations and his insistence on acknowledging rural reality he threw light on new aspects of the social life in village India. These aspects of rural reality had to taken into account in later agrarian programmes of the Indian National Congress.

In April 1936 the Indian National Congress initiated at its Lucknow session a second round of investigations into the agrarian situation, with the perspective of forthcoming elections. The INC gave in to the pressure of Congress Socialists and the All India Kisan Sabha, which was just established on the occasion. The provincial organisations were asked to set up agrarian enquiry committees in order to study the conditions in the countryside and to submit recommendations for resolving the most pressing agrarian questions on a national level. Only the reports of the Congress enquiry committees of Maharashtra[7] and the United Provinces were published.[8] An enquiry committee was set up in Bihar, too. But the Congress leaders of the Province took pains to exclude the Swami as the foremost representative of the Kisan Sabha from it. They feared he might create trouble.[9] The enquiry was duly conducted in Bihar and some results were discussed in the newspapers. But the final report of the Bihar agrarian enquiry committee was again not published.[10] The immediate purpose of the enquiry - to win the support of the peasants in view of the forthcoming elections - was reserved for the Congress leaders of Bihar. They therefore obstructed the publication of the report in order to avoid defining their own position towards the *zamindars.*

The earlier investigations initiated by the Indian National Congress - i. e. the U.P. report on the agrarian issues of the Province of 1931 and the report of the Swami on the situation of the peasants of Gaya of 1934 - did hardly go beyond a mere description of the situation in the countryside. The reports pointed out the economic situation of the peasants or described glaring examples of oppression and exploitation as well as instances of arbitrary rule by the *zamindars.* In contrast, the 1936 enquiry committee reports already attempted to

arrive at deeper insights. In Maharashtra, for instance, not only statistical sources were utilised but also a specialist like D.R. Gadgil, the director of the Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics in Poona, was asked to collaborate.[11] The analyses also took up controversial issues like the socio-economic consequences of the colonial land revenue system. These issues were generally avoided by the official investigations conducted by government institutions.

The second of the prominent peasant leaders taken up in this paper is N.G. Ranga. Since the twenties he devoted himself to detailed investigations of the rural conditions by applying academic methods for political ends. Nidubrolu Gogineni Ranganayakulu (N.G. Ranga) received an education rather unusual for an Indian of his origin in those days. He was born in 1900 into a peasant family of the Kamma caste in the fertile Krishna district of Andhra. Its members were well-to-do and self-confident, but devoid of any educational tradition. Ranga was inspired by the atmosphere of social and political emancipation of peasant castes in the context of the non-Brahmin movement in South India. He took special interest in the social reform movement among the Kammas. Being the son of peasants with modest financial means the atmosphere of new departures inspired him to acquire the knowledge required for higher studies at schools traditionally dominated by Brahmins. Without securing for himself an admission at a college in advance, he went to Oxford in 1921. Thanks to the efforts of a patron he was admitted to an institution for "non-collegiate students" called St. Catherine's. The impact of the non-cooperation movement in India induced him to give up his plan to qualify for the Indian Civil Service. He instead decided to study economics, politics, and sociology and to take up politics as his profession. N.G. Ranga became a peasant intellectual[12], who devoted his entire life to the cause of the peasants under changing political circumstances.

A peasant's son and in addition a "non-collegiate student" was certainly an exception at the then Oxford, the place of study of sons of the educated Indian Elite. Like other Indian students Ranga got acquainted with socialist ideas, but became familiar also - and this was by no means a common feature - with practical social work. Through the Barnett House in Oxford and the Toynbee Hall in London which were both open institutions for applied social and economic studies, he was introduced to the theory and practice of social work. During his period as a student he obtained a "Distinction Certificate for Training in Social Work". In 1922 he participated in the summer school of the Workers' Educational Association at Bangor and of the Labour Research Department at Scarborough. He was impressed by Fabian socialism, inspired

by debates with C.D.H. Cole and H.N. Brailsford on guild socialism[13] and studied various forms of the Co-operative Movement in Europe. In the course of his studies he received the necessary qualifications for conducting scholarly village studies. The thesis he submitted in 1926 for obtaining the B.Litt. degree from Oxford was partly based on his own village studies. One part of it was entitled "The Social and Economic Conditions of the Indian Villages in Andhra".

In the preparation of his thesis Ranga was guided by his supervisor Gilbert Slater, who himself had initiated village studies in the Province of Madras. Slater was the first Professor of Indian Economics at the University of Madras from 1915 to 1921. He returned to Oxford in 1922 after he had served an additional year as Acting Publicity Officer to the Government of Madras.[14] When Slater took up his post in Madras he had a good knowledge of the economy of industrialised countries but was new to the Indian village. When he had obtained some first-hand experience in the new surroundings, he put up an elaborate questionnaire called "Scheme for Survey of a Ryotwari Village". He asked his students to make surveys of their native villages during their vacations on the basis of this questionnaire and he published the findings.[15] Slater's approach distinguished itself from the abstract and deductive studies produced by scholars who were educated in the tradition of Ricardo and Mills. His method of research represented a new realistic and historical approach which was also followed by scholars like Harold H. Mann and M.L. Darling as well as by the Indian pioneers in the field, K.T. Shah and Radhakamal Mukerjee.

N.G. Ranga practised Slater's research technique. Volume I of his work on the "Economic Organisation of Indian Villages", published in 1926, dealt with deltaic villages of the Guntur district in Andhra. It included a study of his native village, Nidubrolu, and drew on the experiences of his own family. He, for instance, utilised information obtained from his grandmother for putting economic conditions in a historical perspective.[16] The second volume published in 1929 continued the theme of the first and, in addition, dealt with aspects of migration and the economic conditions of villages in the dry areas of Andhra.[17] While approaching his subject, Ranga included into the range of his investigations topics like the history of the social and economic conditions of the villages concerned, the distribution of the land and the cultivation habits of the villagers. He conducted farm-cost enquiries and analysed the costs of cultivation, the composition of the domestic, farm and cattle budgets. He further tried to identify the standard of living of the peasants and the economic condition of labour. The material presented by Ranga in these volumes is

appreciated to this day as a source for the study of agrarian relations in late colonial Andhra.[18]

N.G. Ranga utilised his knowledge and experiences in economic and social matters very efficiently for his activities in different spheres of life. During his tenure as Professor of Economics and Political Science at Pachaiyappas College in Madras from 1927 to 1930 he followed the example of Gilbert Slater and encouraged students to conduct village surveys under his guidance.[19] In 1928-29 he was appointed Special Officer for Economic Survey and made investigations on behalf of the Government of Madras in the districts of the Nilgiris, Coimbatore, Salem, and Guntur. His findings were, however, never published because of their provocative contents.[20] In 1929-30 Ranga acted as the secretary of the Godavari-Kistna Resettlement Economic Enquiry Committee which conducted economic surveys of 100 villages and made special enquiries into the indebtedness of the peasants. Simultaneously, Ranga engaged himself in rural reconstruction, rural self-government, adult education and participated in the village library movement. Throughout his life-time the promotion of service co-operatives in the countryside was one of his main objectives.

In 1930 N.G. Ranga gave up his paid employment and became a full time worker in the cause of the peasants. From now on the organisation of the peasantry and the articulation of their demands gained priority for him. In 1929 he was elected President of the Andhra Provincial Ryots Association. Under his leadership the association developed from a purely economic to a political organisation of the peasants. The land holding system in the Andhra region was dominated by the Ryotwari system. The British administration collected the periodically enhanced land revenue directly from the cultivators. The *ryots* or peasants were the owners of the land while the manual work was performed by tenants or agricultural labourers. In times of crisis the peasants turned against the Government and became, therefore, strong supporters of the Indian National Congress. But one third of the Telugu speaking region was still under the Zamindari or the related Inamdari system. One of the formidable problems in the zamindari areas consisted in the improvement of the conditions of tenants. Their situation was definitely worse than that of peasants in the *ryotwari* areas. Consequently, and in the context of a fresh upsurge of the national movement in the beginning of the thirties the Andhra Zamin Ryots Association, co-established by Ranga, declared at its conference at Venkatagiri in 1931 for the first time the abolition of the *zamindari* system of land-revenue administration by legislative action as its main objective.[21]

The second Andhra Zamindari Ryots' Conference held in 1933 appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Ranga which was to study the conditions of the peasants in the *zamindari* estates of Andhra. Over five months the committee gathered facts on the spot and the very same year saw the publication of the report "Economic Conditions of the Zamindari Ryots"[22]. The minimum demands sought to put the *zamin ryots* at least in as favourable a position as the *ryotwari* peasants. The findings of the report, however, suggested even more far-reaching reforms. In retrospect N.G. Ranga attributed great significance to that event:

> "The publishing of the report of the Committee in October 1933 was indeed a great event in the annals of modern peasant movement since it was the first public enquiry of its kind into the economic conditions of the Indian peasantry whose results were made public with such revolutionary results."[23]

The investigations were of a highly political nature in a dual sense. First, since the uprising of 1857 the British colonial administration had always excluded the land revenue systems and related subjects from the scope of enquiry of their own commissions which were installed to study agrarian questions. The report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture of 1928 may be pointed out as a glaring example of this attitude.[24] Second, the policy pursued by Gandhi up to that point of time in dealing with peasant problems within the framework of the national movement restricted itself to taking up only issues which originated from a direct confrontation with the colonial power. The investigations into the conditions of the tenants in the *zamindari* areas directed attention for the first time on explosive intra-societal conflicts of interests. Only a few years later Ranga, supported by the newly founded Congress Socialist Party, put the demand for the abolition of the *zamindari* system by legislative action on the agenda of the All India Kisan Sabha. The pressure of the peasant movement and the tough struggle of the peasants at the provincial level compelled the Indian National Congress in the consecutive years to gradually change its attitude till finally, in 1945, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress decided to include the demand for "the removal of intermediaries between the peasant and the State"[25] in the election manifesto of the party.

Ranga devoted his efforts since the middle of the thirties chiefly to political and organisational work. With the establishment of the Indian Peasant Institute at Nidubrolu in April 1934 he rendered great service to the whole of Andhra. The Institute trained young peasant activists who came from middle peasant castes but also from untouchable groups for political work. It contributed to

strengthening national self-confidence and to disseminating socialist ideas. The training of public workers was, therefore, not welcomed neither by the government nor by the provincial Congress. The political and theoretical training had a close link to practical work and focused on the Indian rural conditions. Apart from the regular in-house activities of the Institute week-ends and summer schools were conducted in various districts of Andhra. The composition of songs was encouraged, peasant songs were collected and sung daily in the classes. The "Ryot Bhajanavali" (peasant songs), printed in the Telugu language at Ranga's instance, became part of the cultural heritage of Andhra. At the same time Ranga continued to tirelessly propagate the idea of conducting village studies. In his opinion they were an indispensable precondition for the effective work of political activists and reformers. In 1939 he published a "Guide to Village Economic Survey". He left no doubts regarding the justification of such studies as well as the capability of laymen to conduct the surveys. He pointed out:

> "Let no one think that these enquiries can be made only by economic experts and therefore despaire of undertaking this task. Mahatma Gandhi was not an economic expert in 1916 when he undertook the Champaran Enquiry."[26]

His publication was meant to transmit his own experiences and methods of investigation to interested students, to trade unionists and Congress workers.

In his recommendations Ranga spelt out the specific nature of village surveys conducted by political activists and stressed their advantage over highly technical studies conducted by administrative and academic specialists. As a trained economist, Ranga did by no means deny the usefulness of economic investigations conducted by specialists. He proposed to utilise them but pointed out their limitations. In his opinion such studies mostly confined themselves to describing the actual state of affairs "without any definite aim of achieving ascertainable results"[27]. Village surveys conducted by political activists, however, could lead to immediate practical conclusions. He felt that the investigations should be scholarly but at the same time "fairly general" and should be "within the competence of Kisan Sabhaites, Muzdoor Sabhaites, Students and Congressites"[28]. Ranga insisted that despite or even because of the political outlook of the authors such studies should scrupulously observe "strict accuracy and honest ascertainment of facts". In contrast to the predominant attitude among scholars in those days he advocated close contacts with the peasants. To quote Ranga:

> "It is only when our comrades love ... to imbibe the very atmosphere of our countryside and understand the mind of our rural folk, that it will be possible for them to serve our country in whichever direction they choose to work. To this end, there is no better beginning than to conduct an economic enquiry and no better means for achieving success than to live among Kisans on successive occasions."[29]

Lastly he called for making available the findings of all those who conducted such enquiries to the headquarters of the Kisan organisation.

The value of surveys conducted by political activists can certainly not only be measured by their scholarly accuracy or by the validity of the facts gathered. Their advantage consisted in the presentation of a comprehensive picture of the rural problems. Economic and social issues were seen in their mutual relationship, individual aspects put into the larger context of the society. Certainly, the activists because of their political alignment were more exposed than others to the danger of being partial. In this respect perhaps also their perception of the village may be called a "construct". In the final analysis, however, the singling out of particular aspects of village life like the exploitative nature of the *zamindari* system or the stress laid on the class polarisation in the village was fully justified. It contributed to drawing public attention to aspects which were hitherto hardly dealt with neither by the colonial authorities nor by the nationalist politicians. The issues raised in this context became a point of departure for scholarly investigations conducted from different angles in independent India. The work of the peasant activists and the image of the village in colonial India which they were able to convey had far-reaching political as well as scientific implications.

Notes

1 Cf. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, New York 1961.
2 P.C. Joshi, Land Reforms in India. Trends and Perspectives, Bombay etc. 1975, p. 6.
3 Ibid.
4 Agrarian Distress in the UP. Being the Report of the Committee appointed by the Council of the UP Provincial Congress to Enquire into the Agrarian Situation in the Province, Allahabad 1931.
5 Cf. Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Mera Jivan Sangarsh, Bihta 1952, pp. 403-404.
6 Ibid. p. 427.

7 Report of the Peasant Enquiry Committee of the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee, Poona 1936.
8 The Congress Agrarian Enquiry Committee Report. Being the Report of the Committee Appointed by the UP Provincial Congress Committee to Enquire into the Agrarian Situation in the Province, Lucknow 1936.
9 Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Mera Jivan Sangarsh, op.cit., pp. 473-477.
10 It is preserved as a manuscript in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. In: Rajendra Prasad Personal Papers, VII/37, col. I: Report of the Kisan Enquiry Committee, Bihar 1937.
11 Report of the Peasant Enquiry Committee of the Maharashtra PCC, op.cit., p. 3.
12 Steven Feierman gave the following definition of a peasant intellectual: "Intellectuals are defined ... by their place in the unfolding social process: they engage in socially recognized organisational, directive, educative, or expressive activities. Teachers, artists, political leaders, healers and bureaucrats are all intellectuals within the definition of the term." Steven Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in Tanzania, Madison 1990, pp. 17-18.
13 N.G. Ranga, Fight for Freedom. Autobiography, Delhi etc. 1968, p. 111.
14 Cf. Gilbert Slater, Southern India. Its Political and Economic Problems, London 1936.
15 Gilbert Slater (ed.), Some South Indian Villages, London 1918.
16 N.G. Ranga, Economic Organisation of Indian Villages. Vol. I: Deltaic Villages. Andhra Economic Series No.1, Bezwada 1926, p. 20.
17 N.G. Ranga, Economic Organisation of Indian Villages. Vol. II. Andhra Economic Series No. 2, Bombay 1929.
18 Cf. for instance, A. Satyanarayana, Andhra Peasants Under British Rule. Agrarian Relations and the Rural Economy 1900-1940, New Delhi 1990.
19 N. Narayanamurti, Prof. Ranga. A Short Biographical Note. In: N.G. Ranga, The Modern Indian Peasant. A Collection of Addresses, Speeches and Writings, Madras 1936, p. xvii.
20 Ibid.
21 N.G. Ranga/R.M. Sarma/N.V.R. Naidu (eds.), Economic Conditions of the Zamindari Ryots. The Report of the Economic Enquiry Committee, 1933, Andhra Economic Series No. 4, Bezwada 1933, p. iii.
22 Ibid.
23 N.G. Ranga/Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, History of the Kisan Movement, Madras 1939, p. 38.
24 P.C. Joshi, Land Reforms..., loc.cit., p. 9.
25 Cf. Indian National Congress, Resolutions on Economic Policy Programme and Allied Matters (1924-1969), New Delhi 1969, p. 16.
26 N.G. Ranganayakulu, A Guide to Village Economic Survey, Madras 1939, p. 14.
27 Ibid. p. 9.
28 Ibid., p. 8.
29 Ibid. p. 16.

Being Pashtun - Being Muslim
Concepts of Person and War in Afghanistan

Bernt Glatzer

The recent Afghan *jihad* was directed not only against alien invasion and imported ideology but also against obsolete internal political structures which had encroached on traditional values long before 1978 without improving the living standards of the majority of the people. After the withdrawal of the Red Army the country remained under considerable influence from outside powers thus preventing Afghanistan from coming to terms with its own social and political problems. A case in point is the recent emergence of the powerful Taliban movement, the success of which is partly due to Pakistan's support. The Taliban is basically an indigenous movement whose motives for action are rooted in the norms and values of a large section of traditional society. In order to analyse the present civil war in Afghanistan, both indigenous and exogenous factors have to be taken into consideration as well as the motives of those involved who consciously reflect their role in different contexts, be it local, regional, interregional, inter-ethnic or international.

In spite of Afghanistan's retrogression to a pre-state situation and in spite of the violence and terror the media are so eager to report, a remarkable process is taking place. Civil life has returned to normal in most areas of Afghanistan and rehabilitation is successfully and speedily being carried out with and without international aid.[1] This proves that civilian values and actions counterbalance those of the *"Pathan warrior"*.

This paper deals primarily with Pashtuns - the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan. "Afghan", "Pashtun", and "Pukhtun" were originally synonyms and are still understood as such by a large section of the local population although the Afghan state officially includes all ethnic groups under these terms.

One half of the 17 to 20 million Pashtuns lives in Afghanistan and the other half in the Pakistani provinces of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

They were called the world's largest tribal society (Spain 1963) because of their large numbers and their all-embracing genealogical charter which links the thousands of Pashtun tribes to one apical ancestor.

Although there is a lack of comparative research on different social groups in Afghanistan, we have no indication that there are significant differences between the ethnic groups as far as concepts of person and Islam are concer-

ned. The reason for concentrating on the Pashtuns is because there are more detailed and elaborate emic and etic sources available on personal norms and values of the Pashtuns than on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Their idea of a charter of ethnic pride and self-understanding is condensed in the term *pashtunwali.* There have been several attempts to codify it in writing.[2]

The Pashtun ideology of war and violence and the martial and heroic behaviour of men is called *turá* (lit. "sword"). Readiness for violence and war is one aspect of the traditional ideal of a male person; the other aspect is *aql*: ("reason"), particularly in the sense of social responsibility.

A man of *aql* is one who reasons and acts in an integrative social manner, who is hospitable and generous, who grants asylum, who makes balanced social judgements and is capable of acting as a mediator when conflicts arise.

The concept of *turá* and *aql* includes knowing when to draw the sword and when to return it to the sheath, when it is time to fight and when it is time to look after the welfare and unity of the family, clan, tribe or wider social units extending to the Muslim *umma,* depending on one's social horizon.

When we look at the duality of *turá* and *aql* we can understand how bands of anarchic Afghan warriors inflicted heavy defeats on the super-powers of their time and how most tribal warriors then laid down their arms the day after victory and went home to plough their fields.[3]

The image of the noble warrior

Several times in the course of Afghan history invading armies, superior in number, technique and organisation, received "bleeding wounds" (Gorbatchev). The Persians, the Moghuls and the British went through this experience. After three major defeats the British were forced to give up their plan to colonise the country. In 1842 the first attempt of the British General Governor of India to enthrone a puppet Amir and permanently occupy Afghanistan ended in complete disaster. The British ambassador was assassinated and the British garrison, retreating with more than 16,000 soldiers and their attendants, perished in the gorges of eastern Afghanistan. Even in distant Germany this event became the subject of poetry:

> "Mit dreizehntausend der Zug begann,
> Einer kam heim aus Afghanistan."
> [with thirteen thousand the campaign began,
> one came home from Afghanistan].[4]

In London this defeat was felt with particular pain and shame since it was not the armies of Imperial Russia or some other great power that had dealt this blow to British expansion but unorganised bands of *"savages"*. In the course of subsequent assessments of the disaster, the *"savages"* soon mutated to noble warriors, to descendants of Alexander the Great or to "Aryans", i.e. they were styled to be a form of European against whom defeat was no disgrace. The unspoilt Afghans were said to have preserved the male virtues of ancient times and were depicted as a model for contemporary youth, just as Tacitus had once idealised ancient Germanic virtues. It was Mountstuart Elphinstone, an officer of the East India Company, a researcher and influential writer, who laid the foundation for the idealisation of the Afghans in his famous *"Account of the Kingdom of Caubul"* in 1815. In open sympathy he compared the anarchic and fiercely egalitarian (*"republican"* as he called them) *Afghaun* tribes to the most noble human groups the Scottish aristocrat and humanist could think of, that is to Scottish clans and Greek-Roman republicans.

Afghan intellectuals, poets and authors, who were traditionally multilingual and well aware of what was being said and published about their people abroad, were naturally pleased to see their people characterised so positively and added their own writings and teachings. No wonder the ideal image of the Pashtun/Afghan as a noble, gallant, dauntless and generous warrior soon became the subject of legends, ballads, and elaborate ethnic and tribal self-representation among the Pashtun tribes living within the range of British-Indian cultural influence (at least those between Kabul and Peshawar, Swat and South Waziristan). From there the image was again taken up by European authors and elaborated further, particularly when additonal British military defeats at the North West Frontier had to be explained. Thus an elaborate image of the ideal Pashtun was created through intercultural collaboration. The eastern Pashtun tribes, who had to deal with their mighty eastern neighbour, blended this personal image into Islam and their more traditional tribal law to become a canon of Pashtunness, the *pashtunwali*.

Pashtunwali, the ethnic self-representation

Elphinstone used *"pashtunwali"* only in the sense of the customary law of the Afghans. In Raverty's Pashtu Dictionary of 1860 *pashtunwali* is defined as *"...the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes, the Afghan code."* More than a hundred years later *pashtunwali* is regarded among eastern Pashtuns as the

explicitly known part of their system of values and norms by which they believe to differ positively from all Non-Pashtuns.[5] In West Afghanistan the term *pashunwali* is unknown. There, the traditional norms are called *rawaj* and hardly differs in terminology and content from those of their neighbours.

In West Afghanistan the term for the ideal person is *ghairatman* but Pashtuns do not claim a monopoly there. An Aymaq or Tajik may be as *ghairatman* as a Pashtun, differences are manifested only in degree.[6] The *pashtunwali* of the eastern Pashtuns serves as a model and an orientation for education, as a guideline and measure of values for solving conflicts, as a mark of contrast to ethnic outsiders as well as an invitation to peaceful visitors (hospitality has top priority in *pashtunwali*). Its threatening list of martial self-images also serves as a deterrent to less peaceful visitors.

Eastern Pashtuns have codified their ideal of person, thus offering us easy access to their scale of values and motives for action but we can easily overemphasise the more spectacular or violent aspects of *pashtunwali* such as *turá* and neglect the more subtle points which complete the image of person without which we cannot understand complex sequences of action.

This paper on Pashtun ideals of person is based mainly on research carried out by Alfred Janata and Reihanuddin Hassas on "The Good Pashtun"[7], on Willi Steul's monograph on the *pashtunwali*[8] and on my own ethnographic research among western Afghan nomads from 1970-1977 and my experience as a relief worker from 1990-1993 in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Nang: dignity, honour and shame

The central term in *pashtunwali* is *nang*, honour and shame, dignity, courage and bravery. A *nangialáy* brings honour and fame to his tribe. To be called *benanga* ("shameless", "undignified") is the worst possible insult in Pashtu and a deadly threat to the social position of the insulted. Killing the insulter is an accepted form of regaining one's *nang* and social status.

Sharm is a decisive part of *nang* and can be translated by the English term *shame* which encompasses *shame* in the sense of noble modesty as well as its contrary, *shamelessness*. If a boy greedily devours his meal his father will ask him "*sharm nálare?!*" ("have you no shame?", "aren't you ashamed?"); if a man does not prevent his unmarried daughter from flirting with the neighbour's son, people will say "*sharm nálari*" ("he has no shame") which is an extremely serious insult and can only be answered by a very impressive action. *Sharm* refers

mainly to the behaviour of women in the group whose honour is at stake and to male control over the female half of society.

The relation to women can be seen more clearly if we analyse the term *namus* which belongs to the complex of *nang*. It means privacy and the protection of its sanctity. In the narrower sense *namus* refers to the integrity, modesty and respectability of women and to the absolute duty of men to protect them. In a wider sense *namus* means the female side of the family, of the clan, of the tribe and of Afghan society. In the widest sense it is the Afghan homeland to be protected.

Although *namus* includes the inviolability of women and the duty to protect their honour, it does not imply that women remain passive. In Pashtun folklore bold heroines are praised such as Malalay who played a decisive role in winning the battle of Maywand in the Second Anglo-Afghan war 1878-80.[9] Yet ingeneral, men consider young women to be less able to think and act rationally, to have less self-control and to be more inclined to sexual activity, in short they are believed to be an easy prey for any seducer who comes along. Thus men feel obliged to fight to maintain their *namus*, i.e. first of all to keep women in their families under strict control and protect them from their own "weaknesses".

Neighbours' gossip is even feared more than the actual behaviour of women. Gossip is what erodes *namus* most effectively and is the most difficult to control. It is better if no one sees women. In urban areas this has led to the increasing compulsion for women to wear full veil or to remain hidden behind the walls of the family compound. Since the early 1970's I have seen the seclusion of women *(parda)* expand to the countryside, a process which gained momentum during the recent "holy" war. My estimation is that more than a million women experienced *parda* for the first time in their lives when they arrived at refugee camps in Pakistan.

Many of my Afghan interview partners do not consider *parda* to be an indication of strength or an effective upholding of *namus*, rather the contrary, as I was repeatedly told by nomads and peasants in Northwest Afghanistan: a strong man can trust his womenfolk and be sure that no outsider would dare to come near them. Only weaklings need to hide their women and lock them up.[10] In fact, the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran were areas of disturbed social and demographic relations. During the war ca. 80 per cent of the camp population were women, children and very old men. The relatively small number of younger men felt quite insecure in this alien environment which indicates that the strict observation of *parda* in the camps was indeed a sign of

weakness but people thought there was no alternative method of maintaining *namus*.

In *pashtunwali* the inviolability of women and land is closely connected, sometimes even considered to be identical. A common saying is: "The way to the women leads over the land" or "He who cannot protect the integrity of his family cannot protect anything, anyone is free to snatch away from him what he wants, his possessions, his land". Most authors on Afghanistan agree that threatened *namus* is the common cause for violent conflicts. When *mujahedin* were recruited for *jihad* they were told, apart from religious arguments, that the (common) *namus* of the Afghans was at stake. In 1978 the first uprising against the new socialist Afghan regime broke out when it sent young activists from Kabul to the provinces to force girls and women to school. People were not against female education in principle but they felt it was neither the business of the state nor anyone else to interfere in matters where females were involved. Up to that time public and private spheres had always been kept neatly separate. People did pay tributes, however grudgingly, to the rulers and even accepted military conscription but the state's transgression of the line between public and private (*namus*) meant war.

Turá - the sword

Nang, the honour and dignity of a Pashtun, has two sides:
(1) An aggressive one meaning readiness to fight to self-sacrifice symbolised by *turá*, the sword;
(2) Reason and social responsibility (*aql*). *aql* is deliberate and prudent behaviour intended to benefit the family and a wider social environment encompassing the whole ethnic group, the nation (if such a notion exists) and even the entire Muslim *umma*. It ranges from material support to participation in councils, to jurisdiction and to mediation in conflicts. These two sides of *nang* are related to different ages in life: The ideal personality of a young man is supposed to be dominated by *turá*. He may be hot-headed and ready to draw the sword (*turá*) - or nowadays a Kalashnikov - at the slightest provocation. Aggression is his first reaction, reasoning comes second. The virtue of *turá* does not need to be tempered by the young man's own *aql* , it is supposed to be checked by the *aql* of the elders, the "white beards" (*spin gíri*). Consequently boys are educated to obey the elders.

Many Pashtun clans/tribes have tribal militias (*arbakí, lashkar*) to execute the decisions of the egalitarian councils (*jírga*). Bound by the discipline of the militia, the *turá* of the young men is guided towards socially accepted objectives.

During my time as an aid worker I noticed that in the eastern Afghan province of Paktia tribal social organisation had remained intact and continued to function despite a large pre-war German development project which had a strong impact on the local infrastructure. In 1992, after the break-down of the Kabul Najibullah regime most *mujahedin* from Paktia went home, participated in the rehabilitation of their villages and their land or rejoined the tribal militia. Organisations that assisted in the task of rehabilitation were provided with *arbakí* (tribal militia) as guards. Thus, in a situation where the state and the Government were absent, civilian life returned to normal smoothly.

Turá always relates to an individual. It is not sufficient to belong to a group or a unit of bold fighters. Each person has to prove his *turá* in courageous action. The *turialáy,* the man who embodies *turá,* gains distinction by *individual* acts. He fights primarily for his personal honour and autonomy, then for that of his family and clan. A strong motive for displaying *turá* is to demonstrate equality and autonomy and consequently that of the family and clan, and to show that one does not have to bow to any arbitrary power.

A *mujahedin* commander was usually considered to be *primus inter pares.* The *mujahedin* respected their fighting and tactical experience and, most importantly, their logistic abilities. Every *mujahed* considered himself to be on the brink of becoming a commander. Since there was no effective military structure to impose a commander arbitrarily on a band of *mujahedin,* the commander had to constantly prove his superiority.

Showing obedience to the tribal elders does not contradict egalitarian principle. The elders are regarded as the representatives of reason and tradition, of the collective will of the clan/tribe. However, they have to see that their decisions are felt to be just and in accordance with generally accepted values. The elders cannot expect to be obeyed automatically.

The highly individual style of Afghan *mujahedin* fighting was feared by military planners on both sides and seen as a serious strategic problem. Even the Afghan *mujahedin* parties in Peshawar lost control and their function was reduced to logistic tasks and public relations. I think the success of the Afghan *mujahedin* over the Red Army, with its highly organised hierarchy, was based on the anarchic acts of the Afghan rebels, unpredictable for any professional

strategist. On the *mujahedin* side there was no military command to deal with. If one commander was eliminated, several new ones replaced him instantly.

Education

Education in *turá* begins early. Fathers scuffle and mock fight with their little sons aged three to ten years of age, allowing them to punch daddy who then returns a few friendly claps in order to encourage the little fighters to another round. Harmless fighting games among boys are applauded. Education is non-authoritarian, a father is considered to be an example not a penal authority. Children are present everywhere, in guest-houses, at tribal councils and wherever serious decisions are made. In this way they are introduced to *pashtunwali* as well as to traditional values and their practical application.
Girls and boys are educated in the same personal values, parents see to it that *pashtunwali* is internalised by girls as much as by boys; girls are also present in public councils and listen carefully. It is generally believed among Pashtuns that women adhere more strictly to *pashtunwali* than men and are less ready to compromise when matters of honour and shame are at stake. The following story of a very popular Pashtun hero may serve as an example of what Pashtuns conceive to be an ideal personality:

It is the story of Ajab Khan, a historical figure who challenged the British Empire and today still serves as a model in education:

The Cantonment of Kohat, south of Peshawar, was one of the strongest military fortresses of the British Empire. From here campaigns were launched against the hostile and rebellious Pashtuns of the tribal areas along the British-Afghan frontier. *Pax Britannica* may have prevailed elsewhere but the garrison of Kohat was almost constantly at war. The year 1923 was no different. A punitive campaign was carried out against the Bostikhel, a sub-tribe of the Afridi, north of Kohat. On this occasion, British soldiers trampled into the huts of the Bostikhel and allegedly came too close to the ladies. In any case the *namus* of the Bostikhel was seriously violated, and the clan was in uproar. One night a few weeks later, young Ajab, a Bostikhel, and two companions sneaked into the Cantonment of Kohat, passing multiple security cordons. They raided the bungalow of an officer named Ellis and kidnapped his daughter, Molly. The men escaped unnoticed with the girl and for the next few days paraded in triumph through Afridi land, making a laughingstock of the Empire. In Kohat, Delhi and London emergency committees were formed and the media reported

it worldwide, expressing sympathy for the girl and mockery for the toothless English Lion.

Military action to save the girl was out of question. All the British Government could do was threaten the Bostikhel and the entire Afridi tribe with dreadful consequences.

In the meantime an English nurse had walked into Afridi land alone and unarmed, met Ajab and persuaded him to release the girl. Three weeks later Molly Ellis was back in Kohat unharmed. The British urgently demanded that the Afridi hand Ajab over to the authorities which they, of course, refused. However, it was a very serious problem for the Afridi tribal council. Extraditing Ajab would have meant a breach of *pashtunwali*, but not handing him over would have lead to very dire consequences There was little doubt that the British would repeat what they had done in 1919 when war planes had bombarded Pashtun villages.

The time was then ripe for Ajab's second act, when he completed his heroic deed which earned him the honorary title of *khan*: Realising that he had put his tribe in serious trouble, he emigrated voluntarily to North Afghanistan where he died a natural death in 1961 as a highly honoured *khan*. He had saved his tribe from drastic punitive measures from the British by renouncing everything a tribe offers to the individual - protection, social security and warmth, in short, social life. Expulsion from tribal land is the severest punishment a tribal court can award and voluntary exile is considered the highest sacrifice a Pashtun can offer.

For the British this was not enough.The Bostikhel had to pay 42,000 Rupees and Ajab's own land and village were destroyed.

As to be expected from a heroic epic, Ajab Khan and the girl are believed to have fallen in love with each other but contrary to the rest of the story, this has not been proved.[11]

Epilogue

In 1982 I met Miss Ellis in Islamabad where she had accepted an invitation from the Government of Pakistan. Accompanied by the Governor of the NWFP, she was driven in triumph from Peshawar to Kohat through parts of Afridi country. The streets were lined with jubilant Pashtuns. She politely declined an offer by relatives of Ajab Khan to carry her on their hands all along the path where she had been abducted.

This story illustrates *turá* and the core personal values of the ideal and idealised Pashtun. The colonial power had severely violated the *namus* of the Afridi. An impressive symbolic retaliatory action, an attack on the *namus* of the British was seen as the only solution tof disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Pashtuns. Disgrace is considered to be both a weakness and socially inferior. If I cannot kill the one who disgraced me, I have to disgrace him otherwise I would accept my permanent social weakness and inferiority.

With a daredevil act such as Ajab's, even disgrace can be turned into honour and fame. The Pashtuns regard Ajab's deed as brilliant because it was an individual act (with only two companions). Only individual acts lead to honour and fame which may then radiate to the whole clan or tribe.

Khan and commander

As already mentioned, the ideal male personality consists not only of *turá* but also of *aql* (reason and wisdom) as Ajab proved through voluntary exile. *turá* unchecked by reason is expected of boys, social virtues should come later on: responsibility for the family and for the wider social world. An ambitious Pashtun wants to become *khan* , a person who has proved *turá,* who is sharp-witted and just and prudent in his judgements, who is an acknowledged expert of *pashtunwali* , who exercises generous hospitality and is ready to share his wealth with adherents, guests and all those under his protection. A *khan* also provides economic benefits to his clients, e.g. a nomad *khan* organises access to pastures for his people and deals with state authorities. Among peasants the *khan* looks after irrigation, provides access to improved seeds or even attracts foreign aid organisations to carry out development projects in his area. The *khan's* opinion has weight in the local councils and tribal assemblies. His power and influence is measured by the number of his clients and of the guests in his *hujra,* his guest-house, whom he can expect to take sides with him in a conflict. A *khan* is called to settle quarrels and act as a speaker for his adherents.

I met one *khan* who used his fluent German to speak for Afghanistan at solidarity functions in Germany in order to raise funds for his people in Tani (East Afghanistan) - an honourable task for a *khan.*

During the last war, the *khan* was replaced by the commander (*qumandan*) in many Afghan areas. Now other leadership qualities were demanded, e.g. access to weapons, money and food supplies from Pakistan or Iran. Commanders had to join one of the *mujahedin* parties who were the main distributors

of military supplies. The new leaders were required to possess military abilities and be physically able to march long distances on foot because the fronts were constantly shifting. Many of the old *khan*s could not cope with these new tasks and fled with their clients to Pakistan, leaving their positions to the commanders.

Islam, martyrs and victors

Islam has not been mentioned a great deal in this paper so far. The Pashtuns understand *pashtunwali* to be an expression of practical and true Islam. Other Muslims may be of a different opinion. During the war, Arab mercenaries criticised their Afghan comrades for deviations in Islamic practice and caused bloody conflicts, e.g. when the Arabs tore down flags at Afghan graves. Pashtuns claim to be genuine Muslims and not converts like the Iranians, Turks or Pakistanis. As legend has it, in the Afghan mountains Qais Abdurrashid, the apical ancestor of all Pashtuns, heard about the Prophet in distant Arabia, travelled there and became one of the Prophet's first disciples at a time when most Arabs were still fighting against Islam.

In fact, the basic values of honour, shame and readiness to fight (for a just cause, of course) do not contradict the canonical scriptures of Islam. On the contrary, the *pashtunwali* elaborates on them or emphasises slightly different features. Fighting without a "just" cause is not acceptable in official Islam, even the honour and fame of an individual do not justify violence. A Pashtun would argue that the unbridled fighting spirit of young men has to be guided towards reason and responsibility and this is where Islam comes in.

The Islamic concept of *jihad* is not new in Afghanistan. Afghan mullahs called for *jihad* against the British infidels many times. When a new *jihad* was declared after the Soviet invasion in 1979, the complexity of the Islamic concept of warfare and its terminology was ready and available. Now the warrior was not only an *arbakí* and a *turialáy* but a *mujahed* too, "one who fights in the *jihad*". The refugees were not just pitiable displaced persons who lost everything but were those who bear the honorary title *muhajer* (plural *muhajerin*) like the Prophet on his Exodus (*hijra*) to Madina. One who aids the *mujahedin* and *muhajerin* and gives them asylum such as the Pakistanis or the Iranians is an *ansar* like the Prophet's friends in Madina.[12] He who dies in a just war is a religious martyr, a *shahid* ("one who bears witness for his belief"), and goes to heaven immediately irrespective of former sins.

Notes

1 Cf. Asger Christensen, Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society, Kopenhagen 1995; Antonio Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Occasional Papers 22, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown 1996; B. Glatzer, Kabul ist nicht Afghanistan, Akzente: Aus der Arbeit der GTZ (1997) 1, p. 12-15.

2 M. Ibrahim Atayee (transl. M. Shinwari), A Dictionary of the Terminology of Pashtun's ribal Customary Law and Usages, Kabul 1979; Fredrik Barth, Pathan Identity and its Maintenance. In: F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, Bergen etc. 1969; Alfred Janata/Reihanodin Hassas Ghairatman, Der gute Paschtune: Exkurs hber die Grundlagen des Pashtunwali. In: Afghanistan Journal 2 (1975) 3, p. 83-97; Qiyam al-Din Khadem, Pashtunwali [Pashtu], Kabul 1952 (1331); J.G. Lorimer, Customary Law of the Main Tribes in the Peshawar District (revised by J.G. Acheson), Peshawar 1934; Christian Sigrist, Pashtunwali - Das Stammesrecht der Paschtunen. In: Revolution in Iran und Afghanistan - Mardom Nameh: Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Mittleren Orients, Frankfurt/M. 1980, p. 264-279. Willi Steul, Paschtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, 54), Wiesbaden 1981.

3 The size of the "armies" of the various Afghan war lords are relatively small in numbers (some ten thousands) compared to the male population engaged in agriculture (millions). The atrocities of this civil war are due to modern weapons not to the umbers of fighters.

4 Theodor Fontane quoted from Peter Snoy, Die Bevölkerung. In: M.R. Nicod (ed.), Afghanistan, Innsbruck 1985, p. 73.

5 Bernt Glatzer, Nomaden von Gharjistan: Aspekte der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Organisation nomadischer Durrani-Paschtunen in Nordwestafghanistan, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 164.

6 More on ghairatman see Janata/Hassas, Der gute Paschtune..., loc. cit.

7 Cf. ibid.

8 Cf. Steul, Paschtunwali, loc. cit.

9 For more on male-female relations among Pashtuns see: Nany Tapper, Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender, and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society, Cambridge 1991; Audrey C. Shalinsky, Women's Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad.In: International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25 (1993), p. 661-675.

10 Cf. N. Tapper, op. cit.

11 For more on the story see James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, The Hague 1963, p. 154ff.

12 Pierre Centlivres/Micheline Centlivres-Demont, The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1988) 2, p. 141-152.

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