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editor

Anti-Americanism in
the Islamic World

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PAKISTAN

Dietrich Reetz

Background

In view of the war on terror waged by the U.S.-led international coalition in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relations of Pakistan with the U.S. are of immediate, everyday consequence. At the same time the relations between the two countries are strongly influenced by the political cleavages within the country. After the military regime had been in power for three years Pakistan elected a new parliament on October 10, 2002¹, but when the pro-regime coalition government under Prime Minister Mir Zafarulla Khan Jamali (ML-QA) took office on 23 November it had yet to chart its political course. The instability of its majority indicated that it was vulnerable to pressure from numerous sides. Also, the military had not given up its hold on politics. The military regime's leader, General Musharraf, had named himself President in June 2001 and had his time in office confirmed for another five years in a referendum on April 30, 2002 that was seen as partly manipulated.² By means of Legal Framework Order 2002 Musharraf modified the constitution and reinforced the President's authority. He is now again empowered to remove the government from office.³

At the same time Musharraf refused to surrender his military post as chief of the army staff. Observers expressed surprise when he pledged continuity even before the new government was elected – intending this as a signal to the West that he was determined to continue cooperation with the anti-terror coalition despite all domestic political pressures. At the same time he pointed out that he was unwilling to accept an independent course by the civil government, and it remains to be seen if he can prevent a future change in the political alignment of the government. As

for Pakistan's relationship with the United States, stronger anti-American feelings than ever before surfaced during the electoral campaign and the long process of parliament and government formation. Whenever Pakistan was confronted with criticisms from Western institutions such as European Union representatives monitoring the election, the IMF and human rights organizations, anti-American attitudes turned against the West as a whole. Such developments are in stark contrast to the basic pro-American trend in Pakistan's short history since Partition in 1947. Unlike India, Pakistan can look back on a long period of alliances or alliance-like relations with the United States and other Western countries.⁴ In 1954 it concluded a joint defense treaty and in 1959 a bilateral security treaty with the United States; between 1954 and 1972 it was a member of SEATO, and from 1955 to 1979 a member of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO.

In 1981 the Islamist military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq agreed a broad five-year agreement for military and economic aid totaling \$3.2 billion, with a subsequent agreement in 1986 worth \$4 billion (though the latter came with high-interest loans that severely burdened Pakistan's balance of payments).

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1978, Pakistan was to be strengthened as a new frontline state against communism; the United States sensed the opportunity of handing the Soviet forces a costly and decisive defeat. During the 1991 Gulf war to liberate Kuwait, Pakistan contributed its own forces to the anti-Iraq coalition.

General Musharraf also led his country into the 2001 anti-terror coalition, allowing its territory to be used for the war aimed at toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan and pursuing Al Qaeda members in its border region. In return he received pledges of U.S. military and economic aid totaling \$1.1 billion as well as bilateral debt remission of \$1 billion.⁵ Pakistan and Musharraf personally received a major boost in their efforts to strengthen the country's international clout from President Bush designating Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" in June 2004.⁶ Its major practical significance is the easing of conditions for the delivery of military hardware and economic assistance to Pakistan under U.S. law.

Country-specific causes of anti-Americanism

Pakistan's long-standing formal relations with the United States and the Western world were probably among the main reasons for the emergence

of anti-American resentment among parts of Pakistan's political elite and the population as a whole. Pakistan's motives for close ties to the United States and the West were primarily its unsettled and often tense relations with its neighbor India and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan. Most important, they were part of the heritage of Britain's rule in South Asia. The independent states of Pakistan and India had emerged from a religion-based partition of British India and its principalities, with Pakistan made up of two widely separated Muslim majority areas in the North West and North East. Pakistan's leadership believed that close relations with the United States and the West would help solve its conflicts with India, most notably over the principality of Jammu and Kashmir, whose Hindu ruler had formally joined India, thereby acting against the Muslim majority in the territory.

The status of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan is another unsettled question. Various political factions in both countries believe the border dividing the home areas of the Pakhtun tribes on either side was only provisional. Pakistan hoped that the United States would support it in a possible war with India, but since the United States and other Western states were focused on global-strategic interests, especially containment of the Soviet Union and its Asian allies, these hopes were illusory. Many nationalist politicians in Pakistan have not forgiven the United States for standing on the sidelines during the three wars with India, particularly the 1971 war resulting in the formation of Bangladesh, allegedly with massive involvement by India.

The disappointment continued and heightened after the Cold War ended. When the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989 and the Islamist *mujahidin* groups toppled the Najibullah regime, Pakistan became superfluous for the U.S. strategy in the region. The shift in U.S. foreign policy under Democratic President Bill Clinton was to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and especially nuclear capacity. But India's accelerated arming, the suspension of relations with the West and its own nationalist ambitions motivated Pakistan to step up its own nuclear program. The subsequent U.S. sanctions hit Pakistan not only materially but also morally as it felt unjustly punished in spite of its former allied status. The nuclear race in the subcontinent culminated in test explosions, conducted first by India and immediately afterwards by Pakistan, in May and June 1998. The United States understood that harsh sanctions would hit Pakistan much harder than India, and it therefore imposed much lighter sanctions on Pakistan. Still, Pakistan

felt that India was at an advantage; whenever the United States moved against India, it could fall back on its close military ties with the Soviet Union, while Pakistan – as a former ally of the United States – remained crucially dependent on deliveries and services from that source.⁷ U.S. policies on Afghanistan also evoked considerable bitterness in Pakistan. In Pakistan's view the United States had promoted and financed elaborate structures for the support of Islamic guerrilla warfare, while leaving Pakistan “on its own” to face the consequences of American involvement there. A prospering black market in weapons from the war in Afghanistan, Stinger missiles and drugs, along with the proliferation of Islamist militancy among groups of former fighters there, fostered a violent “Kalashnikov culture” in the country.⁸ Pakistan's politicians reacted weakly, in a disorganized and also helpless fashion. The United States' push to obtain access to air bases in Pakistan and in neighboring countries⁹ and, even more important, the direct actions of FBI, CIA and CENTCOM representatives on Pakistan's territory in pursuit of scattered Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters have triggered broad resistance, especially in the Pakhtun and Baluchi regions bordering on Afghanistan. Their tribal populations viewed these actions as an intrusion into their traditional independence, especially considering the fact that they typically do not subordinate themselves to the Pakistani state and its federal authorities.

At the same time Pakistan's re-Islamization initiated during the rule of President Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) strengthened structures, players, and concepts that have come increasingly and decidedly to target the United States. This development was pushed by the 1979 Iranian revolution and became even more pronounced after the end of the Cold War. The puritan movements of Sunni radicalism,¹⁰ which spread in connection with the civil war in Afghanistan, adopted many anti-American arguments from the international discourses of Islamists, especially with reference to U.S. support for Israel. These arguments were reinforced by a sense of helplessness and inferiority in the wake of the United States' often unceremonious treatment of Pakistan, its citizens, and its interests. Nationalist arguments often merged here with an Islamist interpretation.

The reign of the populist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972-7) and his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1988-90 and 1993-7) showed a relatively strong influence of liberal left-leaning ideologies among large parts of the younger middle-class political and societal elite. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto used polemics against the United States to boost his left-

wing nationalist credentials, while also persecuting communists and trade union representatives. To this day left-leaning anti-American arguments play a central role in the public debate, especially in the largely independent print media. Western lines of argumentation are adopted to attack the U.S.-led globalization and cultural dominance.¹¹ Similar criticism is mounting in regard to the supposedly hegemonic role of the U.S. in global politics, with Iraq being cited a prime current example. Another standard argument typical of Pakistani politicians and intellectuals blames the United States for Pakistan's political and institutional deformation as a result of close U.S. ties with military rulers and its corrupting effect.

Specific reasons for anti-Americanism in Pakistan include the conflicts of interests and misunderstandings with the United States regarding the character and scope of the alliance and the partnership. Pakistan always seeks to employ these ties in its dispute with India and, to a lesser degree, in the tensions with Afghanistan. However, the United States strictly subjects its relations with Pakistan to a global strategic perspective. When Pakistan violated U.S. interests (nuclear policy), it was repeatedly hit with sanctions. The country's leadership is often driven here by the "Pakistan ideology" based on nationalism and religion, aiming at dissociation and emancipation from India, and pushing for a leadership role among Muslims and Muslim states in the region. Other specific reasons are rooted in Pakistan's history and the dynamics of its re-Islamization in the 1970s and 1980s, in the fallout from Afghanistan's civil war (which was never overcome), the subsequent anti-terror war, and the mounting criticism of its marginalization in the global economy for which the U.S. is also held responsible.

The main forces of anti-Americanism

Depending on the causes, the forces of anti-Americanism can be roughly broken down in terms of nationalist and anti-Indian camps, Islamist groups, and militia with a more left-wing, local or ethnic background.

The nationalist, anti-Indian forces can be found among the influential military and civil-bureaucratic elite. They are aware that their country is dependent on the United States' goodwill, especially over economic issues but also in matters of military strategy. At the same time, the cornerstones of the "Pakistan ideology" are a priority for them. This ideology implicitly suggests that Pakistan can claim leadership and representation for South Asian Muslims, and for the Muslim minority

living in India which has nearly as many members as Pakistan's own Muslim population. The Pakistan ideology is based on the assumption that the partition of British India along communal lines is incomplete and that its objectives remain unfulfilled as long as the issue of Kashmir is not resolved in favor of Pakistan. Within the large political parties there are voices in the different Muslim League factions advocating this stance; the same applies to the Pakistan People's Party. When they are in power they usually advocate stable relations with the United States for pragmatic reasons; if they criticize the U.S., it is often over specific policy issues where they suspect unequal treatment compared to India.

Regardless of their political stand, the military elite and the large landholding family clans give priority to promoting their own advantage. Even the conservative and pro-American President General Zia-ul-Haq knowingly allowed the U.S. embassy to be attacked and set on fire in 1979 in order to send a warning, and induce the United States to offer additional material and political aid to Pakistan in return for its role in the war in Afghanistan. The military and intelligence leadership of Pakistan has apparently allowed planned strikes against middle-level Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be leaked, thereby directly endangering U.S. military personnel. The Pakistani military secret service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is viewed as a state within the state that is largely outside political and even military control. At the behest of the Americans it has for decades been organically connected to the Islamist resistance in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and even though it is currently undergoing a sort of "cleansing" in the aftermath of the anti-terror operations, many former employees and parts of its structures have to be seen as potential agents of anti-Americanism.

Traditionally, Pakistan's nationalist elite suffers serious difficulty in grasping political reality, for example the fact that massive attacks against the United States (or allowing certain radical and militant activities against U.S. interests) can hardly be reconciled with a push for increased U.S. financial, economic, political, and military support. Those who maintain nationalist and anti-Indian positions in public rarely resort to radical measures themselves, but are willing to condone and even promote such measures if undertaken by others. Where anti-Americanism in Pakistan is concerned, Islamist groups are the second major player. These include the religious *mujahidin* militia who originally fought in Afghanistan and then went on to fight in Kashmir and got involved in sectarian Sunni-Shia violence.¹² Rejection, even hatred, of the United

States unites these groups. They view attacks against the United States and other Western countries and corresponding targets as legitimate and as symbolic acts of war. Other Islamic groups which have dedicated themselves to religious revival and dissemination of the religious way of life (such as different Deobandi groups)¹³ and the inner missionary movement Tablighi Jama'at often criticize the United States in the broader context of rejecting Western lifestyles in general. Yet the same individuals from the nationalist, anti-Indian circles and from Islamist groups who assume an anti-American and America-critical position often see to it that their children are educated in the West, preferably in the United States and Britain. Many politicians who are highly critical of America have themselves studied and lived there.

It was revealing that in 2002 – despite all public criticism of U.S. actions against Islamist extremists – Pakistan's new government made a priority of pressing for concessions for Pakistanis living in the United States. As a group they were hit by the increased security, control, and registration measures affecting a broad range of middle-class and Islamist elite families. They again argued that Pakistan was being discriminated against while Indians living in the United States were not facing heightened controls; and furthermore that such discrimination was incompatible with the assistance Pakistan was providing to the U.S. in the war on terror.

Militia of left-wing, local or ethnic origin reject (or act against) the United States for reasons and arguments unrelated to religion or nationalism. This is true of certain individuals who are active in different radical student organizations but also wings of the major parties (especially the People's Party). Other examples include radical groups in Baluchistan or Sindh that occasionally fight for the autonomy or even independence of their provinces in ethnic and linguistic terms. In the early 2000s these staged attacks against gas and oil facilities targeting Pakistan state interests rather than Western facilities but they could also hit Western actors active in the economic sectors and regions controlled by these groups. Potentially the relatively militant party of the Urdu-speaking immigrants, the Muttahida Qomi Mahaz (MQM), could be counted among such groups. In Karachi the MQM has for many years fought a gang war with rival factions, some of which were supported by Pakistan's military intelligence. All these groups oppose of the dominance of the United States and U.S. companies in

the global economy.

Nationalist members and groups within the military and civil bureaucracy and the mainstream bourgeois parties are among the main bearers of Pakistani anti-Americanism, feeding on a perceived clash of interest between the conflict-laden relationship with India and the hesitant, ambivalent, and "unreliable" partnership with the United States. They tolerate anti-American acts and positions because they believe that Pakistan is badly treated by the United States despite its contributions to the alliance. They specifically resent the lack of U.S. support against India. Islamist groups of the radical and militant or religious-puritan variety have emerged as active anti-American players, especially since the end of the Cold War. Still, within the Islamic sector as a whole support for radical positions probably does not exceed 10-15%. In addition, local ethnic and regional militia with a more left-wing and non-religious focus can also evolve as a threat.

Expression forms of anti-Americanism

In Pakistan all conceivable forms of anti-Americanism are represented. There is a pronounced anti-American and America-critical public debate, and the lines between the different forms are often blurred. Direct political activity by government targeting U.S. and other Western interests is usually the result of nationalist and anti-Indian policies. This is exemplified by voting behavior at the UN, the stance regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Test Ban Treaty, issues of human rights and religious freedom, environmental protection, and liberal global trade. Political differences between Pakistan and the U.S. also exist over fighting the drugs trade and terrorism, although more recently Pakistan has sought to accommodate U.S. positions in these areas.

Previous Pakistan governments also cultivated close ties with states that the United States views as radical, hostile, and anti-American, such as Iran and North Korea, and from North Korea Pakistan also looked for military supplies. Its military had few scruples about accepting offers that would give it new and better weapons for low prices, thus enabling Pakistan to strengthen its position in the dispute with India. After the secret network of nuclear collaboration between its leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan and countries like Libya and North Korea was exposed by the U.S., Pakistan's government has reviewed its position and accepted international curbs, but without formal controls. Political street action with an anti-American thrust is organized particularly by

the Islamist parties. Glaring examples include the mass demonstrations against the anti-terror war in Afghanistan in October 2001, in which stark political symbols were used, with demonstrators carrying coffins intended for any American setting foot on Pakistani soil in the course of the war. The Islamist parties also organized blockades against military facilities where Americans would be stationed, including the airports of Dalbandin (in Baluchistan) and Pasni (in Sindh).¹⁴

Terrorist attacks against American institutions and U.S. representatives can almost exclusively be attributed to the Islamist militia. Repeatedly they have attacked U.S. facilities, at times with heavy military equipment. Also several diplomats have been killed. A well-publicized case was the kidnapping and decapitation of Daniel Pearl, a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent, in January 2002. Following heightened security measures at foreign facilities, terrorists increasingly targeted “substitute” targets such as Christian institutions seen as being close to the West. The increased security measures imposed by the Musharraf military government hardly limited the freedom of action of militants who increasingly spun out of political control, forming “renegade” militias that operated like gangs.¹⁵

Anti-American and anti-Western actions within Pakistan can even have military dimensions. Examples included an Islamist conspiracy in the country’s officer corps in 1995, which was uncovered in time.¹⁶ Two unsuccessful terrorist attacks on General Musharraf in December 2003 and one on the Karachi Corps Commander Lieut.-General Ahsan Saleem Hayat in June 2004 were also said to have been facilitated by inside informants from the military and police. This suggested a much deeper penetration of the security forces by Islamic militants than had been previously assumed.¹⁷

Another indication was the reshuffling of the top military positions with a bearing on military intelligence and nuclear security following September 11, 2001, a move demanded directly by the United States. Two hours before U.S. forces began bombing Afghanistan, generals with known pro-Islamist tendencies were removed from their positions, even though they had helped Musharraf’s rise to power. This move caused discontent within the army.¹⁸

The capability of militant anti-American forces inside Pakistan to gain access to heavy and modern weapons (such as Stinger missiles and smuggled nuclear material from the ex-Soviet republics, and perhaps even biological and chemical weapons) should not be underestimated.

The war on terror opened a crucial front line running across Pakistan’s tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan. Scattered Taliban followers and Al Qaeda fighters withdrew to that region regrouping and scheming new attacks against American and Western interests, especially in Afghanistan but possibly also in Pakistan. The ongoing smaller and larger attacks against U.S. troops and the UN peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan are obviously inconceivable without the logistical hinterland in the Pakistani border region. Under intense pressure from the U.S., Pakistan moved into pockets of resistance, notably in South Waziristan where its efforts to establish the writ of the federal government among the fiercely independent and traditionally autonomous tribes meet strong resistance.¹⁹ Another fundamental issue for the United States – but also for every neighboring state and the entire world community – is the possibility of radical Islamists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. Pakistan’s Islamist right-wing politicians like to portray themselves as staunch defenders of the country’s nuclear program, praising it as an “Islamic bomb.” It warns the military of possible U.S. intentions to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear potential, something that indeed cannot be ruled out. This also signifies a possible congruence of interests between the Islamist right and the military.

In Pakistan one can find the entire range of anti-American action, spanning public debate, peaceful political acts and street action, but also acts of terror and planned military activities. The prevalence of particularly radical and militant forms of anti-Americanism is subject to fluctuations due to the domestic political climate. Anti-Americanism is often tied to the rejection of the dominant role of the military in internal politics.

Mobilization potential for anti-Americanism after September 11, 2001

After the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, the potential for mobilizing anti-American positions and actions in Pakistan increased, largely because the government abruptly joined the anti-terror coalition. The Islamist as well as secular political opposition argues that the military government had no legitimate mandate to do so. Like the civil government that it controls, the military regime avoided engaging in public debate on this issue. As a result the regime is trapped in a defensive position domestically regarding its intensified cooperation with the United States and the anti-terror measures. Anti-American positions have garnered such broad support mainly because they are intertwined with criticism of the

Musharraf regime's manipulative and anti-democratic approach.

The parliamentary elections showed clearly on what a shaky and narrow foundation that regime is based. Even if Musharraf's post-9/11 assessment – that he did not see a militant Islamist protest potential of more than 10-15% emerging among the public – has been confirmed, his regime failed to garner convincing political support in the new parliament for his policy, specifically that of close cooperation with the United States. At the same time his confrontational attitude to the two large established parties, the Muslim League and the People's Party, and the creation of a "King's Party" loyal to the regime and a spin-off of the Muslim League have strengthened the Islamist party alliance, the MMA²⁰, which has built a considerable representation in the federal parliament and the provincial assemblies.²¹ This marks a historic landmark for them, since in the past they were only represented in parliament by a few members. The MMA has formed the provincial government on its own in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is significant since that territory and the neighboring autonomous FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) are the focus of much of the recent anti-terror action. The MMA provincial government intends to curtail and if possible end these measures, but it has only limited chances to do so since it has no administrative control over the FATA region on the border with Afghanistan. At the same time the MMA promotes itself as the lone consistent democratic force, which has refused to accept Musharraf's constitutional changes brought about by the Legal Framework Order 2002. It also demands that Musharraf, as the civil president, should give up his military functions and his uniform.²² After striking a deal with the MMA on his confirmation in office, Musharraf indeed agreed in 2003 to do so by December 31, 2004, but not without strengthening his hold on power through his "guided" democracy. He engineered an amalgamation of the various Muslim League factions, intending to lead it as party president from 2005 on. He replaced Prime Minister Jamali at will, first with Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and in August 2004 with Shaukat Aziz, then finance minister, a long-time executive of the American Citibank group. Thus strengthened, Musharraf announced in his address to the nation on December 30, 2004 his intention to stay on as army chief.

While this approach has further alienated the public, it has also heightened anti-American feelings²³, as an incident in the newly-elected parliament revealed. All delegates rose for a demonstrative prayer in honor of the Pakistani terrorist Aimal Kanshi when his body was turned

over to his relatives in December 2002; Kanshi, who had confessed to his deeds, was sentenced to death in the United States, where he was executed.²⁴ The Pakistan public was particularly incensed that the former government, with the help of American FBI agents, had seized Kanshi in a cloak-and-dagger action in Pakistan and whisked him out of the country without any consideration of legal formalities. Thus the Kanshi case fueled criticism of the blatant way in which the current regime assists the United States. Several similar incidents have since stirred public emotions. "Innocent citizens" were being picked up and interrogated for days on end by Pakistani and U.S. security personnel without any regard for procedural rules. One such case involved a medical doctor who had treated Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders (including Osama Bin Laden) and had to undergo such interrogation. The public saw him as an unselfish, dedicated doctor and human rights activist. His arrest, essentially a kidnapping, triggered a strike of doctors across Pakistan, with a strong anti-American thrust.²⁵

But even inside Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus anti-American feeling lingers on. The middle level, which for years engaged in close logistical military cooperation with the Islamist guerrillas in Afghanistan and Kashmir, remains intact and is not inclined to "betray" its former comrades. The U.S. administration does not rule out the possibility of a coup against President Musharraf with an anti-American and pro-Islamist thrust.²⁶ The tense situation among Pakistan's security forces was also reflected in an incident at the turn of 2002/3. During an anti-terror operation by the army in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region there was a clash with Pakistani paramilitary units, claiming the lives of one U.S. soldier and one Pakistani border guard – in response the U.S. Air Force bombed a Pakistani village.²⁷ Because a significant portion of the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders are supposedly on Pakistani-Afghani territory, cooperation with Pakistan is a must for the United States. In some ways the partnership has been very successful, as the arrest of several high-ranking figures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan has demonstrated.²⁸

By promoting economic, educational and political reforms Musharraf believes he can consolidate the current situation in Pakistan without addressing the underlying tension and polarization, and so establish true political legitimacy for his policies. The United States tolerates this approach, maintaining that all alternatives would lead to a further deterioration of the current conditions. Most important, it fears that the

Islamists could gain more direct access to the military and especially to the country's nuclear potential. The MMA could do so legally, perhaps by cooperating with other opposition parties in the new parliament or in the upper house whose chairman is eligible to represent the state president.

While the situation in Iraq remains unresolved, militant activities targeting U.S. and Western interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan could intensify. As the Americans have conferred upon Pakistan the status of a major non-NATO ally, they expect it to take a much clearer stance on fighting terrorism. Many U.S. politicians are weary of Pakistan's prevarications and repeatedly ask whether it should be a valid target for military intervention²⁹ instead of a dependable ally. However, the risks of such intervention would be enormous. With its population of 150 million and a vast array of conventional and nuclear weapons, resistance could be formidable.

The exceptional mobilization potential following September 11, 2001 primarily derives from the unresolved domestic political contradictions in Pakistan, reflected in the weak political legitimacy of the regime while it opted to join the United States in the anti-terror coalition. This situation significantly weakened moderate political actors, allowing more radical elements, especially in the Islamist parties, to gain momentum. Pakistan's change of course regarding Islamic militancy in Afghanistan also created confusion and resistance in parts of the military and the intelligence apparatus, occasionally hampering the government in pursuing its anti-terrorist policies. The military's determination to maintain control in the political arena through President Musharraf also contributes to a weakening of the pro-Western anti-terror course.

Anti-Americanism as a form of political articulation is deeply rooted in Pakistan. For long periods the country has been a U.S. ally, reflecting the hope of its elite that this partnership would help resolve the conflict with India and, in part, with Afghanistan. Because these alliances were largely driven by military regimes pursuing their own domestic agenda, the partnership with the United States largely lacked political legitimacy. As a result the opposition politics of democratic as well as Islamist groups directed against the military regime became intertwined with anti-American positions. This did not affect the elite's considerable admiration (and that of many Pakistanis) for the American way of life and culture, for American economic and technological power, and for the opportunities for social advancement to be found in the United

States. Anti-American positions and acts range from the leadership level, fed by nationalist disappointments and perceived lack of U.S. solidarity over relations with India, to street protests and violent acts, the latter especially by militant Islamists. The possibility that radical Islamists may gain access to Pakistan's nuclear capacity clearly poses a great potential danger.

The different groups usually draw a clear line between the United States and European countries. Pakistan's political elite considers Europe too weak and uncoordinated to counter U.S. unilateralism. Consequently it believes that it must seek compromises in order to secure its own interests. At a time when politics, the economy, and education are in considerable disarray in Pakistan, the elite views resistance against the United States as not only pointless but also unwise. By contrast, the Islamists differentiate more strongly, and during discussions often stress the special role Germany is due to play. Also, the insensitive and uninformed U.S. approach generates culturally motivated protest. European states are viewed more positively than the United States, but if they participate in more open and offensive anti-terror action, attacks against their interests and representatives cannot be ruled out and may happen suddenly.

In the medium term it is not to be expected that anti-Americanism will ebb – on the contrary, depending on the government's success or failure in implementing its domestic political consolidation course, the situation could grow more tense. Improved coordination and cooperation inside Pakistan between the United States and other Western states may be needed to counter such tendencies. Of particular importance is the degree to which the U.S. and other Western countries accept the military's intervention in and manipulation of domestic politics at the expense of political consolidation and democratic institutions. Pakistani public opinion perceives the United States and to a lesser extent the other Western states as guarantors of the military's influence as personified in the regime of Pervez Musharraf.

Pakistan seems unlikely to achieve stability for as long as the current pro-American policy fails to build a stronger legitimacy by integrating the political forces (including the Islamist camp) into the process of opinion-forming and decision-making. That way anti-American discourses could be channeled and separated more clearly from the social and domestic political factors. Likewise, as long as Operation "Enduring Freedom" with its military dimension continues in and around Afghanistan, no

decrease in anti-American positions and acts can be expected. Public anti-terror action by U.S. forces or local security authorities is seen as a triggering factor in mobilizing resistance among opponents of the pro-American government policies. The Pakistan government and the United States have therefore tried to ensure that open security-related activities are conducted under Pakistani leadership.

In the regime's view, the ongoing confrontation with India could justify attempts to achieve increased legitimacy for its partnership with the United States, which it tries to exploit as a security factor guarding against a possible attack from India. In the past India repeatedly threatened preventive strikes against the Kashmiri guerrilla training camps on Pakistan's territory. Citing the safety of its forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States has so far prevented this from happening by putting pressure on India. At the same time a relaxation in the confrontation with India would weaken anti-American attitudes, especially in the militant Islamist camp. This could be achieved by reaching an agreement on the issue of Kashmir, which is not very likely, but also not out of the question. This issue is pivotal to the agenda of the same militant Islamist groups that launched anti-American acts and terrorist strikes, at times in the name of Al Qaeda. Thus strengthened and concerted activities by Western states to settle the regional conflicts involving India, Afghanistan and Iran would directly contribute to weakening anti-American potential.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Rüdiger Seesemann

Anti-Americanism in Africa: a historical overview

Because of the low Gross National Product in its more than fifty countries, the African continent plays only a marginal role in the global economy. The same goes for the realm of politics, where Africa's influence bears no relation to its share of the world's overall area or total population. Economic data indicate that Africa is largely detached from globalization. Because they border the Mediterranean, the North African states are connected to European markets and are at least heard on global political issues as Europe's immediate neighbors (and partly as Israel's neighbors).

Meanwhile, the sub-Saharan countries play only a minor role in the global context, both politically and economically. The national economies in Africa south of the Sahara usually depend on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and the dealings of the wealthy industrialized nations of the North with Africa are in the form of development and disaster aid.

In other words, the sub-Saharan African states have with few exceptions been considered as strictly peripheral to U.S. strategic interests since the end of the Cold War.

These circumstances explain why three of the four different types of anti-Americanism distinguished by Rubinstein and Smith¹ have not surfaced or have only done so in rudimentary form in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the 1980s. With no direct U.S. political self-interest in Africa, neither "issue-oriented" nor "instrumental" anti-Americanism is relevant.² "Revolutionary" anti-Americanism is also not widespread. In the past, revolutionary movements targeted the colonial powers or internal adversaries. Because the United States did not get directly involved in