

Asian hotspots and their crisis impact on the European Union

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Abstract:

The intense efforts of the EU to implement internal structural reform and carry out eastward expansion bring into sharper focus its relationship with countries and regions lying outside its borders. While European politicians may occasionally be slow to realize the impact of hotspots in Asia on the fortunes of the European Union, the latter has for long pursued a coordinated policy towards many countries and regions of Asia, which is gradually becoming more coherent. The potentially negative outfall of crisis developments is carefully being studied in areas such as security destabilization, migration, cross border trafficking in drugs, labour and cross border organised crime. At the same time the EU chose to engage positively with many regions in anticipation of crisis developments, notably with countries undergoing deep transformation after the end of the cold war, as in Central Asia and the Caucasus, for which it has formulated a Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood policy. Also for East, South and Central Asia it has designed coordinated approaches.

However European initiatives often make little difference on the ground in hot spot areas as they tend to be slow, under-funded and insufficiently coordinated. As EU activities demonstrably lack a military component, local actors in crisis regions tend to pay more attention to US policies. As the expansion of the European Union makes it even more vulnerable to crisis developments in its wider neighbourhood, there are increasing calls from European and local politicians to coordinate crisis policies much more closely with the US, Russia, Japan and China.

It is perhaps only with hindsight that the member states of the European Union as well as observers of European politics are able to properly assess the impact of the end of the cold war. Not only were the political borders of the European Union redefined by the end of the partition of Europe resulting in an expansion process that brought with it the recent enlargement and will probably extend further. But the end of the cold war also brought down a system of international relations and obligations structurally defined by the bipolarity of the mutually assured threat of nuclear extinction. International actors outside the military coalitions of NATO and Warsaw Pact were tied to one or the other side of the barricade in obligations of varying degree. Politicians, governments and random international actors were less likely 'to rock the boat' as everyone was afraid of the ultimate consequence – to trigger the nuclear holocaust which would spare no one.

Much of the volatility that we see today in international relations is still the result of the painful process of readjustment to the realities of a post-cold war world. International actors have to find their centre of gravity. The United States appears to be the sole political and military actor capable and willing to project and assert its power beyond its own borders with few reservations where it appears to be the only super power often more by default than by consent and intent.

In this situation, the European Union went through a process of fundamental restructuring not only of its own body politics but also of its geographic and political environment. Right from the beginning of this readjustment process Europe reaffirmed its historic responsibility for the unification not only of Germany but also of Europe as a cultural and political region. While

the boundaries of such a reconstituted Europe remain contested amongst European actors, this heightened sense of responsibility for its own fate and that of its surrounding had early focused European attention on events to the east and south of its borders. Countries, societies and economies in transformation were seen as being in need of support, encouragement, knowledge and assistance. But they were also seen as a source of potential destabilisation of the west and of the achievements of European integration so far.

Pressure of legal and illegal migration from the transformation countries which included the former eastern bloc nations and the whole of the ex-Soviet Union was intensely felt on the eastern and southern border of the EU.¹ Local conflict and civil war where it broke out in these regions, the Balkans, Chechnya, the Trans-Caucasus, and Central Asia², threatened to undermine stability and development not only in those countries but also in the European Union.

It is against this background that the 'forward engagement' of the European Union has to be seen. To give this approach more coherence and perspective the EU designed a New Neighbourhood policy³ that is meant to revamp and combine all programmes directed at countries in proximity to its borders. A large number of new strategy papers for countries and regions have formulated a mid-term perspective for relations until 2006. The New Neighbourhood instrument is seen as the new coordination and financing tool for this purpose after 2007.

Many political and security concerns were addressed through the efforts of the OSCE⁴ which puts a stronger emphasis on such issues due to its historical evolution. There is growing coordination of activity between the OSCE and the EU. OSCE representatives such as heads of field offices in Central Asian republics report to the EU Council. They thus create broader awareness of the issues they are pursuing. In some cases the EU nominated a special representative as for the South Caucasus region which it regards as potentially volatile. Monitoring of elections, facilitation of talks between opposing sides in local conflicts, support for civil society institutions – those were some forms of engagement which were designed to extend the politically institutionalised and democratic European space to its neighbours. Creating conditions for a more prosperous, stable and democratic life on its borders in the widest possible sense was and still is seen as the best counter to potential threats from volatile conditions there. (Cf. Table 1)

¹ As the more popular entry points of illegal migrants Europol identified Russia (Moscow), Ukraine (Kiev) and Turkey (Istanbul) in addition to the Balkans (Sarajevo and Belgrade), cf. Illegal immigration report 2004, p. 3, at <http://www.europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/OverviewIllegalImmigration2004.pdf>.

² *The EU's relations with Eastern Europe & Central Asia*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm, and *Europol: Illegal Immigration 2004*, online <http://www.europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/OverviewIllegalImmigration2004.pdf>.

³ It currently covers 12 post-Soviet republics, excluding the three Caucasian states, plus Mongolia. See *Implementation of the Wider Europe / New Neighbourhood Policy*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/intro/gac.htm; cf.: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/overview_en.htm; *Communication from the Commission: Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf.

⁴ Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, see www.osce.org.

Central Asia: The EU Strategy paper for 2002-06 envisages support on three tracks, reflecting EU concerns: * to promote security and conflict prevention; * to eliminate sources of political and social tension; and * to improve the climate for trade and investment.⁵

Their ordering is indicative of problems and challenges identified by the EU:

Problems: * *democratic transition*; * *terrorism, fundamentalism and security issues*, pointing in particular to Islamic radicalisation and international networks hampering the emergence of pluralistic political structures; * *demographic pressure* expressed through strains on social services such as health and education; * *socio-economic development and poverty* resulting from marked reluctance to proceed with economic reforms.

Challenges: * *border disputes* in the Ferghana Valley region where Uzbekistan has obstructed trade with South Kyrgyzstan and North Tajikistan, and between Tajikistan and Russia where seasonal migrants face ever more obstacles; * *sharing of natural resources*, particularly water and energy; * *access to world markets* in view of limited domestic demands; * *investment*, particularly in the infrastructure and key industries.⁶

Southern Caucasus: The EU stresses the need to help develop and stabilise the region. It emphasises * the requirement to establish a business climate conducive to foreign and domestic investments, removing all obstacles, and first of all widespread corruption; * poverty reduction and development; and * conflict resolution.

Georgia seeks growing integration into Europe where it is a member of the Council of Europe since April 1999. The EU is concerned⁷ over * its two internal conflicts⁸ as impediments to development; * the unregulated state of relations with Russia; * the transportation and trade problems for natural resources (gas, oil, road transport) and * arbitrary police intervention. For **Armenia and Azerbaijan**, the EU emphasises⁹ conflict resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia should live up to its commitment to close the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP).

Europe faced a second group of conflict regions in countries beyond the former Soviet bloc that were undergoing another kind of transformation process. Internally they were seeking political and cultural legitimacy for their governments undergoing economic adaptation to the new rules and pressures of globalisation. Externally they were trying to find their feet in the new international environment.

Conflict and tension in the wider Asian area such as on the Korean peninsula, between China and Taiwan, in South Asia with Kashmir, in Afghanistan¹⁰ and in Iran¹¹ or Turkey can thus be interpreted as sort of a derivative process of transformation. This process of deep-going change proceeding under the impact of economic, financial and political globalisation enforced new modes of operation on local governments and businesses. Hot spots that had sur-

⁵ EU, *Central Asia Regional Strategy Paper 2002-06*, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/rsp2/02_06_en.pdf.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ EU, *Georgia: Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006*, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/georgia_csp_6.pdf.

⁸ Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.

⁹ EU, *Armenia: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006*, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/armenia/csp/02_06_en.pdf; EU, *Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2002-06*, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/azerbaidjan/csp/02_06_en.pdf

¹⁰ For full conclusions on European Union – General Affairs and External Relations Council to Afghanistan see online http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/gac.htm.

¹¹ *The EU's relations with Iran*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm.

vived from the cold war era – and all the Asian hot spots were essentially not of new origin – were no longer capped. The legitimacy of authoritarian governments was demonstrably undermined by the end of the cold war. Protection from the western or the eastern bloc that had been accorded for strategic reasons was suddenly discontinued. Some of the conflict situations were exacerbated by the reckless policies of local elites hoping to take advantage of the end of old international compulsions and controls and jockeying for a new and possibly larger share in regional or international resources, in politics and economic relations.

Korean Peninsula: For South Korea, the EU recognises the * shared political values; * strong economic links reflecting large bilateral trade and investment flows; and * reiterates support for South Korea's "sunshine" policy of engagement with the North. The EU values the strengthening of democratic values and civil society and an increasingly transparent market economy.¹²

The EU Council noted that positive signals made by North Korea in 2003 on the question of a multilateral framework for dialogue should be encouraged.¹³

Taiwan: The EU * pursues a "One China" policy and regards the PRC as the sole legal government; created a 'European Economic and Trade Office' in 2003; and * supports the peaceful resolution of differences with China, on a mutually acceptable basis, with reference also to the wishes of the Taiwanese population.¹⁴

China: The EU emphasises * support to China's economic and social reforms; * measures for the protection of the environment and sustainable development; * good governance and strengthening the rule of law. Projects underway or in preparation include support for China's WTO membership, Information Society support, Social Security Reform and assistance to the fight against Illegal Migration.

EU political priorities seek * to engage China further, both bilaterally and on the world stage, through an upgraded political dialogue; * to support China's transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights; * to encourage the integration of China in the world economy through bringing it fully into the world trading system, and supporting the process of economic and social reform that is continuing in China; * to raise the EU's profile in China.¹⁵

(South and) Southeast Asia: The EU emphasised * supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; * promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance; * mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; * injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; * continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; * and intensifying dialogue and co-operation in specific policy areas.

In addition, the EU Council stresses the importance of fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery in the region.

India: The EU emphasises that India is a natural ally with no differences as to the economic and political system burdening relations with China or post-Soviet transition countries. It pursues wide-ranging political dialogue and economic cooperation, appreciating India's enormous growth potential. The Asia strategy paper highlights the dangers of conflict with Pakistan and nuclear proliferation.¹⁶ The EU views as largest challenge to lift two to three hundred

¹² http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/south_korea/intro/index.htm.

¹³ Cf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/intro/gac.htm.

¹⁴ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/taiwan/intro/index.htm.

¹⁵ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index.htm.

¹⁶ EU, *Country Strategy Paper India 2002-06*, at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/india/csp/02_06en.pdf; EU, *Strategy Paper Asia 2005-06*, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/rsp/rsp_asia.pdf.

millions out of poverty. It supports building its human capital by * making elementary education universal; * improving health services in favour of the hitherto deprived population groups, * restoring and safeguarding a healthy environment. As cross-cutting themes the EC views * improved governance, * the devolution of decision making and management and * the participation of stakeholders, in particular women and segments of the population traditionally disadvantaged in articulating their interests. The EC will * assist communities at risk to be better prepared for natural disasters.

Pakistan: The EU emphasises Pakistan's persistent * structural problems: poverty is increasing, growth is insufficient to deal with the basic social welfare needs of an increasing population, and the investment climate remains subdued.¹⁷ * Human development in the education sector, with emphasis on good governance and accountability in the provision of educational services; and * trade development and promotion of business and institutional links are seen as priorities. Other interventions relate to the * eradication of child labour, * support towards financial sector reform, the * promotion of democracy and human rights, the * fight against drug abuse, * aid to uprooted people, and * measures of conflict prevention. The * special contribution of NGOs is recognised and will receive continued support.

Afghanistan: Support for Bonn Agreement. The EU regards key * to promote stability; * to reduce poverty – in particular through the promotion of rural recovery where over 80% of the population live; * to improve the availability and access to food, countering the chronic food insecurity in the country that has resulted from drought and war, as well as providing alternatives to poppy production; to help tackle key cross-cutting issues that are critical to Afghanistan's future including * de-mining, the * sustainable return of refugees, the * role of women and * reducing opium poppy production.¹⁸

Iran: Trade agreement negotiations are linked to political dialogue and counter-terrorism. An exploratory, direct Human Rights dialogue has also been started. In the limited existing cooperation, EC priorities in assistance to Iran are drugs control and refugee assistance as it supports a refugee population of 2.5 million people largely from Afghanistan. EU Council welcomed Iran's confidence-building measures in the nuclear area.¹⁹

Turkey: Since the EU recognised its candidate status progress reports on adaptation to EU rules have been made regularly emphasising * internal reforms, where progress of implementation is considered uneven (National Security Council, judiciary), as many European Court of Human Rights decisions have not been implemented and * freedom of expression, of association and of religion remain problematic at times. The * resolution of conflict and differences regarding Cyprus and Greece remains a priority. Progress in * economic and market reforms is said to be varied. * Regional policies have to be improved, also financial controls. In external affairs, longstanding obligations are not fulfilled in the Generalised System of Preferences (free trade).²⁰

While European powers had longstanding traditional relations with many of the Asian conflict countries the nature of that relationship was sometimes encumbered with a colonial past. This

¹⁷ EU, *Country Strategy Paper Pakistan 2002-06*, at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/pakistan/csp/02_06_en.pdf.

¹⁸ See EU Afghanistan Country page at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/index.htm and *Country Strategy Paper 2003-06* at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/03_06.pdf.

¹⁹ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm.

²⁰ See EU page on Turkish membership bid at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/index.htm>, and last progress report 2003 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf.

may have been a reason why the European Union has been much slower at times in responding to these crisis areas.

Another reason for delay was the lack of progress in formulating and executing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) first conceived in 1991. Thus consultation and consent among a multitude of actors turned into an often impractical precondition for action.

Also the consequences for Europe of crisis regions lying beyond its immediate neighbourhood have not been evident to all European politicians.

These perceptions are now undergoing fundamental change I would argue. Europe is in the process of more fully awakening to the impact of crisis developments in Asia beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Two factors contributed to that by the end of the nineties. Economically, the acceleration of globalisation, and even more so, its temporary failure and breakdown with the crisis of Asian financial markets (1997) and of the internet-based dot-com economy (2000), brought home to many European politicians and ordinary citizens the ever-growing interconnectedness of their home area with far-away regions. Investment decisions that moved jobs out of Europe to Asian countries raised sensitivity to developments in these regions. Politically the international fight against terrorism proved to be another such watershed. It had come into sharper focus after 1998 when the Bin Laden network bombed the US Embassies in East Africa. Its aftermath directly involved European countries in the unravelling of international networks, of training centre, routes of recruitment, or money trails. It became paramount after September 11, 2001 when European nations joined the US in the international coalition in Afghanistan. The Madrid bombing was the latest more powerful event demonstrating how the upheavals of the war in Iraq reverberate also across Europe. It made clear that Europe does not enjoy a situation of isolated security apart from the heightened vulnerability in which the US finds itself.

The current European approach to crisis regions is still being shaped by the experience of the East European transformation. European goals include the fostering of democratic institutions by monitoring elections, strengthening political and civil society institutions. Europe played a pro-active role in relation to Iran and later Afghanistan. Particularly in connection with Afghanistan, the EU-supported Bonn process helped introduce a negotiated settlement and political compromise that aimed at resurrecting the political process and reviving long-term institutions. Also for the wider Asia region, country strategy papers bind together perspectives of structured economic cooperation with political and security concerns.²¹ In recent years political intervention outside Europe became more targeted through visits of the so-called EU Troika representing the current and incoming EU presidency as well as the EU commission. Talks in South Asia, Iran and China focused on common political and security concerns. (Cf. Table 1)

As the impact of external crisis areas is bound to continue and to aggravate, Europe will be forced to respond by more coordinated policies of EU member countries as well as EU institutions. As far as European threat and crisis perceptions and required action are concerned the focus will remain on areas such as

- national and Europe-wide regulation of migration and refugee status;

²¹ EU, *Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Country Programmes in Asia 2005-2006*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/rsp/rsp_asia.pdf.

- cross-border networks of organised crime,²² trafficking in drugs,²³ migrants,²⁴ prostitutes, engaging in money-laundering and smuggle, including illicit trade in nuclear material and other weapons of mass destruction;
- internal security – revising intelligence, police and general administration, strengthening counterterrorism;²⁵
- external security – restructuring defence forces for rapid deployment in conflict regions;
- civil development and conflict prevention programmes requiring greater pooling of political, cultural and economic resources and expertise.

A separate communication by the EU Commission to the Council of Europe on Conflict prevention of April 2001 spelt out 4 objectives:

- to make more systematic and co-ordinated use of EU instruments to get at the root causes of conflict;
- to improve the efficiency of actions targeting specific causes of conflict (the so-called "cross-cutting issues" such as trafficking in drugs or human beings, illicit trade of diamonds and small arms, competition over scarce water resources etc);
- to improve EU capacity to react quickly to nascent conflicts;
- to promote international co-operation with all EU partners (partner countries, NGOs, international organisations such as UN, G8, OSCE, ICRC as well as other regional organisations).²⁶

These pressures and developments require more tangible progress in implementing a common European foreign and security policy the need and shape of which are still the subject of substantial debate. But the need for more policy coordination arises already from the lack of sufficient resources without which more practical progress and a more proactive European role remain illusory. Another factor forcing more coordination and cohesion on sometimes unwilling European partners are the recent experiences of spectacular failure of security policy in Europe and in its immediate proximity. Initial inactivity in the Balkans and news of atrocities of the civil war there were not popular with European electorates. Also more recent developments in the Middle East and Iraq have the potential of not only threatening security and prosperity in Europe but of undermining public support for European politicians as well.

These pressures have revived a debate over a European model of development and interaction with crisis regions, one that is not primarily based on policing and enforcement but is seen aiming at internal development and stability, extending European values, institutions, economic and social opportunities. Along with the shaping of a European identity through debates such as about a European constitution a strong argument is made for a distinctly European philosophy of security, of economic, social and international relations.²⁷ The projection of Europe as a civil power in contrast to the security capabilities of military coalitions is key

²² See annual Europol reports at: <http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=publications&language>.

²³ See Europol overview at <http://www.europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/OverviewDrugs2004.pdf>; cf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/drugs/index.htm.

²⁴ See Europol site at http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=publ_illegalimmigration.

²⁵ See Europol site at http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=publ_terrorism, and report on terrorism 2004 at <http://www.europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/OverviewTerrorism2004.pdf>.

²⁶ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp.htm.

²⁷ See for example, Delgado-Moreira, Juan M (1997): *Cultural Citizenship and the Creation of European Identity*, online: <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado.html>.

to this philosophy. Prof. Mary Kaldor, heading the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, elaborated this point when addressing a Berlin audience on May 19, 2004 on the preliminary results of their study group on Europe's Security Capabilities.²⁸ According to her a European world view should be based (1) not on defending Europe but on contributing to global security; (2) not on territorial but on human security; (3) on a multilateralist approach as a matter of principle; and (4) on the regional context in which local conflicts are embedded. From there she derives conclusions centring on the need to work with the other side instead of defeating it, enforcing law instead of eliminating the enemy.²⁹

While some political actors in Europe regard such concepts as an expression of inevitable differentiation of identities and approaches *vis-à-vis* the US in the post-cold war era, the opposite may be true. Their chances of realisation hinge on a much higher degree of cooperation with the US and other international actors. The growth of crisis developments and their rising impact on Europe make more intense coordination with the US,³⁰ and powers like Russia,³¹ China and Japan³² wielding political and economic clout in crisis regions in Asia inevitable. Yet if in the current international security environment a 'partition of labour' between the US and other international power centres is emerging or envisaged it will require a much higher degree of legitimacy, as the current forms of cooperation are being questioned by all involved. The present implicit approach by many European partners willingly benefiting from American security-related actions – whether one agrees with their objectives or not – while publicly attacking these US policies will not work for long. Either Europe will have to mobilise more security-related resources to take a larger share of responsibilities in this area or coordination with the US, Russia and major Asian powers will have to be more regular and intense. This also holds true for the US. It is painfully rediscovering the need to go it together with Europe and other partners as it appeared incapable of fostering a climate of lasting security and stability on its own.

It has to be seen whether or not NATO³³ can become a new and more relevant forum of coordination for such action, and also of implementation, as in Afghanistan. But political dialogue among European partners will have to intensify to ensure progress in this direction. A rather curious side effect of recent developments is the change of NATO's image in crisis regions. It has now subtly taken on the appearance of a symbol of multilateralism contrasted with the unilateralism of the current US administration. While during the cold war it was seen as a symbol of the projection of US military and political might it is now perceived as almost a European institution and contrasted with US actions and institutions.

Yet if it comes to the implementation stage on the ground this illusion will easily collapse as the disparity in military capabilities between Europe and the US has grown tremendously. This leads to the conclusion that a larger and more effective European role in crisis management and conflict prevention will require a considerably larger investment in security and

²⁸ See their website at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/StudyGroup/StudyGroup.htm>.

²⁹ From my personal notes at the lecture – DR. Cf. their vision paper on their website as in the foregoing footnote.

³⁰ *The EU's relations with the United States of America*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/index.htm.

³¹ *The EU's relations with Russia*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm.

³² *The EU's relations with Japan*, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/intro/joint_pol_decl.htm.

³³ Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, online at <http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/nato/20031022/nato20031022.htm>.

defence capabilities, an idea, not particularly popular with European politicians and electorates.

The impact of crisis regions on Europe thus lays bare that the uncertainties of the post-cold war era affect western and European institution in a no less dramatic way than in the crisis regions themselves. Europe and the US are grappling with the same issue of redefining their role in international relations from their side no less intensely than transformation countries of the first or second variety mentioned above. Those resisting greater reflection and coordination will be unprepared for the impact of ever new crisis developments. Change will be forced on them instead of being able to implement desired and desirable changes. In the end, such enforced change will always be more cumbersome and expensive than formulating and implementing a vision. European citizens to whom European politicians are ultimately responsible will find such extra cost and burden unbearable. In democratic countries people have to be taken along and get involved. Only in this way policies of development, crisis prevention and resolution will enjoy greater legitimacy than they do now. If no other than this argument should set European politicians to their task.

Table 1 European Union response to crisis developments in Asia (schematic)

Conflict area	EU conflict outfall perception	EU (/OSCE) conflict response	Country/Region	EU country response
Trans-Caucasus (Chechnya, North Caucasus)	Local insurgencies, Islamic militancy, illegal labour and refugee migration, smuggle of drugs, money laundering, organised crime networks, environment, nuclear proliferation, threats to energy transport lines; internal instability due to lack of reforms, democratic deficits	EU special representative to the South Caucasus (1 July 2003); OSCE field offices in Georgia, Armenia, mission to Georgia; Gahrton Report to EU Parliament (26 February 2004), proposal of Stability Pact for Southern Caucasus; Unsuccessful EU efforts for observers or aid field office in North Caucasus (Chechnya), limited human rights monitoring	Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan	TACIS ³⁴ programme for transition support (1991-2007) – New Neighbourhood Instrument (2007); Georgia: CSP ³⁵ 2003-06; PCA ³⁶ 1999; Armenia: CSP 2002-06; PCA 1999; Azerbaijan: CSP 2002-06; PCA 1999; South Caucasus countries may be included in “Wider Europe” policy
			Russia	Russia: PCA EU-Russia (1997-2006); EU Common Strategy on Russia (1999-2004)
Central Asia	Local insurgencies, Islamic militancy, illegal labour and refugee migration, smuggle of drugs, money laundering, organised crime networks, nuclear proliferation, environment, threat to energy supplies and transport lines; internal instability due to lack of reforms, democratic deficits	OSCE centres in all 5 CARs; Joint OSCE-EU initiatives and statements	Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan	TACIS (1991-2007); New Neighbourhood Instrument (2007); Central Asia: SP ³⁷ 2002-2004; PCA EU – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (signed); Tajikistan: PCA (initialled 2003), TCA ³⁸ 1989/2001
Turkey	Illegal labour and refugee migration (Kurdish), Islamic and Kurdish militancy, tension with Greece, Cyprus,	Through progress reports and accession talks, part. on human rights, labour and economic market reforms	Turkey	Customs Union (1996), association agreement (1963), membership candidate (1999); decision on start of negotiations expected by end of

³⁴ Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States

³⁵ Country Strategy Paper

³⁶ Partnership & Cooperation Agreement

³⁷ Strategy Paper

³⁸ Trade and Cooperation Agreement

	blockade of Armenia; internal reforms (judiciary, human rights, economy and market)			2004
Iran	Nuclear proliferation, Islamic militancy, internal reforms, human rights	EU Troika ³⁹ talks about nuclear programme in 2003, human rights in 2002	Iran	No formal agreement; TCA (negotiations started Dec. 2002); EU Commission Communication to EU Council on perspectives and conditions for closer relations (2001)
Afghanistan	Local insurgencies, Islamic militancy, illegal labour and refugee migration, smuggle of drugs, organised crime networks	Support for Bonn Agreement and Process, also EU Troika visit (below).	Afghanistan	Afghanistan High Level Strategic Forum (with World Bank, 2003), CSP 2003-06.
South Asia/Kashmir	Nuclear proliferation, conflict over Kashmir, Afghanistan, Islamic militancy; labour and refugee migration, international crime networks, counter-terrorism, good governance. intellectual property rights	EU Troika visit to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan (last Feb. 2004) ⁴⁰	India, Pakistan	India: CSP 2002-06, EC 3 rd generation cooperation agreement (1994), EC India Joint Commission (last meeting 2003), EU-India summits (2000), agreements on cooperation such as Galileo; Pakistan: CSP 2002-06; 3 rd generation agreement signed (2001);
Korean Peninsula	Nuclear proliferation, conflict between North and South	Support for “Sunshine” policy and engagement of North; encouraging and facilitating multilateral dialogue with neighbours		ROK: Framework Agreement (2001); Sectoral Agreements customs, telecommunication (1997)
Taiwan/China	Labour and refugee migration; human rights situation; intellectual property rights, nuclear conflict potential; conflict over Taiwan straits	EU Troika talks with China on Human Rights in 2002		“One China” policy; China: CSP 2002-2006; EU-China Summits (6 th – 2003), agreements on industrial policy, Galileo, group tourism, science & technology, maritime transport; Taiwan: EC Trade office (2003), annual consultations

³⁹ Current and next EU Presidency, EU Commissioner

⁴⁰ <http://www.europa-web.de/europa/03euinf/01GASP/asiatroi.htm>.