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6. National Consolidation or Fragmentation of Pakistan

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When Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, took over the reins of power in the small hours of 5 July 1977 he returned the country to a mode of authority very familiar within its short history. The military took advantage of the supposedly independent position it enjoyed in the political power house to restore its favoured civil and military bureaucracy to a position of superiority. It was another eruptive flame of Pakistan's continuous crisis of national identity which surfaced time and again since Pakistan was carved out of the South Asian subcontinent as a result of the politico-religious Islam-oriented Pakistan movement. General Zia-ul-Haq promised to bring back normalcy, peace and tranquillity which had allegedly been destroyed by his main adversary, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was Pakistan's first elected civil leader between 1971 and 1977. He decried the political and social "polarisation" which had befallen the country on account of the "socialistic" policies of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) ¹. Zia's motto was "Back to the future" when he reminded his compatriots of the Islamic goals of the Pakistan movement which supposedly had been totally neglected so far. He claimed to be the first who was serious about implementation of the tenets of Islam. ² They were to serve as reliable orientation for the whole of society to reunite it on a political and ideological ground, seemingly acceptable to all.

To heal the wounds of the past he entered a compromise with ethnic political forces and released the Pathan and Baluch leaders sentenced at the Haiderabad trial in 1975 on charges of high treason and conspiracy.³ He, however, soon came to discover that the very divisions which is desperately tried to overcome were becoming more distinct

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during his rule. Eleven years later, in August 1988, General Zia-ul-Haq presumably fell victim to the hands he had put down forcefully so often during his stay at the helm of affairs. The balance sheet resulting from his rule showed a heavy debit. Pakistan was in the grip of political instability, economic insecurity and social injustice. Yet, could all these ills be blamed on military rule alone?

The Inevitabilities of a Multi-Ethnic Society

The repeated military take-over as well as the unending crisis of national identity have inspired many a scholar to suggest structural deficiencies in Pakistan's body politic and in its social fabric. Some put the blame on the exceptional character of Pakistan's creation brought about by a politico-religious instead of a national movement. Asaf Hussain contended "that the integrative power of Islam had failed to overcome ethnic nationalism" to which the creation of Bangladesh, according to him, was ample proof.⁴ Others centered on underdeveloped capitalist class patterns responsible for the weakness of its political institutions. Hamza Alavi pointed to the parallel responsibility of the state alongside the three economically dominant classes of the relatively weak indigenous bourgeoisie, the influential metropolitan (here also American based) bourgeoisie and the landowners for the functioning of "peripheral capitalism", which imposed a "structural imperative" on the actions undertaken by the guardians of the state and the individual capitalists.⁵ As far as ethno-national group formation is concerned neither explanation can exclusively satisfy. Pakistan's national identity crisis raises very complex issues which are partly shared by all multi-ethnic developing countries and partly result from the particularities of politics and class formation in South Asia.

According to Marxist understanding, social and ethnic factors go together in ethno-national group formation. All people simultaneously belong to both social and ethnic structures. Changes in their social and economic life cannot but effect ethnic stability, and vice versa. Marxist thinking traditionally assumed that different ethnic units graduate in integration levels, ascending from tribe over nationality to nation, and become the more stable and coherent the more advanced socio-economic structures tended to be. The nation theory in Marxism as well as in Western political thought, irrespective of its inherent contradictions, was primarily based and developed on the experience of European nation-states where the extension of the nation conformed with state boundaries. It was this example of "classical" nation-building which

served Lenin repeatedly as a reference point when he developed a national policy for the Russian Social-Democrats. He emphasised that the nation-state was best suited to meet the requirements of capitalist development for free and unhindered contacts of people and for extensive and complete circulation of commodities and capital. For this reason he thought the nation-state was the "rule" of capitalist development.⁶ Yet, he also frequently referred to multi-ethnic Switzerland which embodied to him the most democratic solution of ethnic and national problems in a capitalist society.⁷ Austria's nationalities-state was another reference point.⁸ It was clear that, beside the nation-state, Lenin was interested in the capitalist nation model that appeared in both the ethnically homogeneous nation-states of Finland, France, Germany or Britain and the nationalities-states of Switzerland and Austria (up to 1918). In both state forms, ethnic and national group consciousness was based on modern capitalist class structures and advanced market relations, and was not seriously challenged by other traditional loyalties. The nation stage was the culmination point of the capitalist development of ethnic groups which by number, scope and territory possessed the potential required for the process of nation-building.

The experience of those multi-ethnic developing countries which gained independence after 1945 substantially differed from the above models, and widened the variety range of ethnic and national development patterns.⁹ South Asia in general, and Pakistan in particular, are relevant examples. A return to the "classical" nation-mould was barred. Congruence of nation and state became the exception rather than the rule. The young states composed of ethnic groups, substantially differing in consolidation levels and development stages. Mostly, they had not reached the advanced nation typical of Western Europe. They achieved statehood before they completed ethnic and national group formation. On the one hand, in cases like Pakistan and India, consisting of large nationalities that became increasingly vocal, prospects of transformation into single ethnic nations were slight. On the other hand, the multi-ethnic society produced a new level of inter-ethnic integration, superseding the nation stage. This level of inter-ethnic cooperation proved to be comparatively assertive and enduring, irrespective of its incoherent nature. The deviating ethnic consolidation patterns in the Third World were deeply rooted in the particular features of the social and class structure which could hardly be compared to that of the "classical" nation-states. Capitalism in the developing world proved too weak to completely erase traditional social groupings. Capitalist modernity

entered symbiosis with pre-capitalist tradition. Loyalties of language, religion, caste, kinship or locality were reproduced on a capitalist basis, giving rise to countless class sub-divisions like a Muslim, Sikh, or Parsi bourgeoisie, or the Marwari, Gujarati or Pathan merchants. This was the reason why ethno-national group formation in South Asia and in Pakistan did not proceed in a single direction but was multi-polar in character. The group formation process was prone to competing pressures from different poles. At one and the same time people owed allegiance to a variety of occasionally conflicting loyalties.

Two Levels of Group Formation

No matter how dominant tradition was in Pakistan's ethnic and national group formation, it could not be separated from modern socio-economic development trends of emerging capitalism. The growth of market relations at regional and national levels was the driving force behind the increasing articulation of both separate and common national interests. The dual character of ethnic and national group formation in multi-ethnic societies was discovered much earlier.¹⁰ But mostly, preference was given to one or the other level. A. Hussain presupposed that successful national integration would "cut across ethnic structures".¹¹ Paul R. Brass, in contrast, focused on "a process of nationality-formation rather than state-building".¹² It will be argued here that ethnic group formation and national integration do not necessarily preclude each other. In Pakistan, national consolidation proceeded at both levels, creating a "unity in diversity". Both levels, or directions, of group formation are related to each other. They are part and parcel of an overriding, complex ethno-national group formation process with a clearly delineated dual structure. In this context, national consolidation means a course of development in which the socio-economic allegiances of people tend to conform with both their ethnic identity at group level and their national identity at state level. Ethnic movements and ethnic policies are not confined to ethnicity in its strict sense. They also produce and reject specific socio-economic interests. The same is even more true of the state level. National movements in a multi-ethnic society like Pakistan are not confined to the aspect of inter-ethnic cooperation. To a large extent they include common social and economic factors. The consolidation of ethnic groups constitutes the primary level and inter-ethnic cooperation at the level of state population represents the secondary level. Here inter-ethnic cooperation will be called national integration wherein two elements are to be emphasized: the cooperative

aspect where each nationality retains its identity and the group formation aspect, describing the nascent stages of a common identity for all nationalities. The term "ethnic" will either be related to the ethnic group level or describe the particular quality of ethnicity in a given context. In order to clearly distinguish both levels, the word "national" will be reserved for the multi-ethnic state level. This, however, does not presume that Pakistan is expected to grow into a single ethnic nation in the foreseeable future.

In Pakistan and similar multi-ethnic states the dual ethnic pattern is based on the dualism of socio-economic trends. A substantial part of material wealth is produced, redistributed and consumed on a local basis. In Pakistan the local market primarily included agrarian products, related industrial and consumer goods, like spare parts, tools, and home utensils. Further to this, a significant and constantly growing amount of the produce has been entering the national market. Under British colonial rule this trend was reflected in booming cotton-markets and a burgeoning army supplies industry in the Punjab. After independence this tendency continued with export-oriented agrarian commodities like cotton, rice, and wheat, and agrarian-based manufactured goods like cotton textiles, jute, wool and leather products. With the first wave of industrialization in the 1950s, the national market was boosted with industrial goods like cement, chemicals, fertilizers and technical consumer goods. Social policies at the centre and in the provinces have also shown a certain dualism. Provincial governments determined priorities, different from those of the central government. In the first place this concerned the choice of language as a medium of instruction, and of administrative and political communication. The official status of Urdu and English at the centre was complemented with a provincial status of Urdu in the Punjab, Sindhi—and more recently—Urdu in Sindh, Baluchi in Baluchistan and Pashto in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). This disparity of central and provincial policy penetrated all spheres of life. For example, the army, being a central subject of legislation and policy, largely composed of Punjabis, plus a strong group of Pathans. This contrasted with the Police which, being a provincial force, mainly consisted of locals.

Ethnic Groups

With regard to the ethnic groups, only the four big nationalities are considered here: the 50.5 million Punjabis (1981), the 11 million Pathans, the 9.9 million Sindhis, and the 2.5 million Baluch, leaving

aside smaller groups like the tribes from the Northern areas. Mention must also be made of the approximately 6.4 million Urdu speakers who are mainly descendants of the *mohajirs*—Muslim refugees from India, mostly from Rajasthan, U.P., Delhi, Bihar and Gujarat (although they predominantly speak Gujarati)—who are becoming increasingly active and organised. After a marked movement towards agrarian capitalism and businesses on a local ethnic level in the 60s, the 70s were distinguished by the growing claims of Pakistan's nationalities to a larger share in political power and economic wealth. There are several particularities about the nationality-formation in Pakistan. First, the nationalities differ in terms of population numbers, territorial size, economic growth potential and traditions of their ethnic movements. Punjabis dominate the ethnic pattern with a share of 60% of the population. Pathans and Sindhis follow behind with 13% and 12% respectively, Baluch people constitute 3% only.¹³ Secondly, neither of these nationalities joined Pakistan in their entirety. They were all subject to division between different states. Forty eight per cent of all Pathans live in Afghanistan, 28% of the Baluch people inhabit Iran and Afghanistan, roughly 30% of the Punjab is are domiciled in India and 20% of the Sindhis migrated to India where they live dispersed.¹⁴ Thirdly, Pakistan's provinces, though meant to reflect ethnic group identity, do not fully correspond to the delimitations of ethnic home areas. Thus, it happens that for instance, substantial Punjabi minorities live in the North-West Frontier Province and in Sindh, a Pathan minority inhabits the North of Baluchistan and the *mohajir* community is the largest minority in Sindh.¹⁵ This incongruity leads to increasing friction, recreating nationality-problems in the provinces. Each nationality enviously guards its "home province". Nationality-formation is gradually shifting into the premises of the four provinces. Ethnic elites tend to use the devices of provincial autonomy to compete for a maximum share of power and wealth, particularly in the form of jobs in central government institutions and in the army, of state investment, and subsidies. This situation has created a fragile dualism of province and nationality. Ethnic movements continue to exert their influence on their compatriots residing outside their home province or in foreign countries. At the same time assimilation tendencies are growing among provincial minorities like the Baluch and Brahui, living in Sindh, who are mostly bilingual. They are forced to accept ethnic rules in order to gain provincial employment. The *mohajirs* who represent the major community in the Karachi district led a long fight for political and educational emancipation which centered

around the demand for the recognition of Urdu as a provincial language beside Sindhi.

The constitution of Bangladesh as an independent state marked the highpoint of Pakistan's national identity crisis. Since then the ghost of separation loomed large over Pakistan's ethno-national formation. Bhutto tried to infuse a new sense of national self-consciousness after 1971. In the 1973 Constitution he reached a compromise of substantial provincial autonomy combined with intervention powers in the hands of the central government. However, Bhutto's attempt to increasingly monopolise political power to the detriment of smaller nationalities like the Pathans and the Baluch lead to confrontation. In 1973 Bhutto arbitrarily dismissed the Provincial government of Baluchistan, led by the National Awami Party, which in turn brought down the NWFP cabinet to which the NAP was a coalition partner. In Baluchistan armed resistance broke out which was violently suppressed by the army in protracted and exhausting guerilla warfare.

State Level

On the secondary level of state population, group formation also continued, though admittedly at a much slower pace. Against the background of apparent failure of national consensus over the past twenty years the question arises as to whether or not national integration and identity in Pakistan are based on ideology and politics alone—and area subject to cyclical change. If we look at the continuously expanding Pakistani economy we cannot but notice the expansion of an all-Pakistan market, fostering ever closer cooperation of the four major nationalities. The market volume expressed in terms of the Gross National Product steadily increased (1) by 3.1% a year during 1949-58, the formative phase of national consolidation, marked by a quick succession of unstable civilian cabinets; (2) by 5.7 % during 1958-71, a contradictory phase of civil and military-bureaucrat rule, which stretched over the uneven reigns of Ayub and Yahya Khan; (3) by 3.1% during 1971-77, when Bhutto imparted both impulses and impediments upon national consolidation; and (4) by 6-7% during 1977-88 under the equally assertive and authoritarian rule of General Zia.¹⁶ The delimitation of the phases is open to discussion. But this brief overview marks out conflicting trends of national consolidation. The socio-economic basis for national consolidation did expand constantly, but it grew fastest in times of authoritarian rule. The Z.A. Bhutto administration which was more effective in reaching a national consensus did less for boosting

the economy than it did for redistributing economic benefits slightly more evenly. Conservative regimes, blamed for neglect of social factors, deserve a more positive evaluation as far as their role in the national consolidation was concerned as they contributed to it at least economically. Capitalist development which is very instrumental in creating a modern national identity received a strong fillip during Ayub Khan's stay in power. And Zia-ul-Haq, contrary to his original intentions and professed convictions, retained the strong role of the state in the economy which slightly rebalanced the disruptive effects of extensive private capital mobilization on national consolidation.

The effects of growing national market relations are most convincingly manifested in the formation of a compact economic congestion area in the Indus basin from Karachi up to Peshawar valley, constituting the material base of an all-Pakistan national consolidation. Here live 80% of Pakistan's population on 30% of the country's territory. Inner migration mainly followed these patterns. It flowed from North to South and from villages to towns.¹⁷

The inter-ethnic cooperation complements the socio-economic factor. The group formation of Pakistan's population gravitates around particular group centres which dominate this process. Against other groups Punjabis stand out most strikingly. Within the economic congestion area it is the Punjabis who play the dominant role. By their number and economic strength they objectively constitute a focal point of national consolidation. The strength of the Punjab contributed the weakness of an ethnic Punjabi movement which is mainly restricted to urban intellectual strata. The Punjabi bourgeoisie is strong enough to pursue specific interests on its own and does not urgently require an ethnic movement. The *mohajir* community forms another focal point of national integration. There were about 11 million Muslim refugees who came to Pakistan, and roughly the same number of Hindus that left for India after the two states had been founded in 1947. Eighty one per cent of Muslim refugees came from the Indian side of Punjab and settled in the Pakistani Punjab. Muslim repatriates of Indian origin occupied prominent positions in the civil and military hierarchy. Part of their influence also derived from the fact that they mostly speak Urdu, Pakistan's official language which has no traditional home territory of its own on Pakistan's soil. It is still the coalition of Punjabi and *mohajir* civil and military bureaucrats that, intact since Pakistan's inception, pulled the strings of political and economic power unabated throughout its history. But the effects of their rule were not only negative. Their

part in the all-Pakistan national consolidation could best be described as one of inter-ethnic mediation.

Pakistan's Muslim community (approximately 97% of the population), although quite diverse in its composition, served as another focal point of national consolidation. Despite strong sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia, between Bareilvi and Deobandi, Pakistan's Muslims not only form a religious community but they are also connected by social ties, determining their daily conduct of life in personal, family, judicial, and at times even political affairs. As such, Islam represents not only a loose set of beliefs, values and practices but an organising factor of social relations. This particularly applies to religious communities, living together on a common territory like in Pakistan. These ties may be less intense than ethnic bonds. They, however, provide a social frame for inter-ethnic cooperation and as such occupy a definite place in the national consolidation.

The Zia Divide in Nation-Building

When Zia took over in 1977 he could not start with a clean state. In Zia's concept nationalities did not even exist. In his opinion the primary and only level of national consolidation was the state, not the ethnic group. However, there was no conscious concept of national integration at state level. Economically, he reaped the fruits planted by the PPP government when he completed and inaugurated major investment projects like the Tarbela power station and the Karachi steel mill, although he originally pleaded against the continuation of costly state projects. The requirements of capitalist development forced a more liberal approach upon him than he at first envisaged. Ultimately, only a few smaller projects were de-nationalised like the rice, flour and cotton ginning mills in 1977-78. Public sector development expenditure continued to grow at a fast rate. During the Bhutto years (here: the non-plan period of 1970-78) it superseded the preceding Five Year Plan expenditure (1965-70) by 3.6 times, Zia pushed it up by another 4.9 times (1978-88).¹⁸ Zia further benefited from the rising level of home remittances by overseas Pakistanis which since 1980 continuously exceeded 2 billion dollars per year.¹⁹ Unexpected capital mobilization ensued from the blooming drug sales which in 1984 alone were estimated at 10 billion dollars.²⁰ Similarly, Pakistan's market was boosted by contracts resulting from the U.S. military and economic aid package that amounts to 7.22 billion dollars, stretching over a 10 years period from 1982 onwards. Mention must also be made of the grant assistance

extended to Pakistan for the maintenance of Afghan refugees. For the period of 1979-80 up to 1986-87 the official statistics figure totalled 1.4 billion dollars.²¹ This review makes obvious that Zia remained in power largely due to strong external support which was also instrumental sustaining the development process.

But this could not prevent aggravation of structural problems of the economy. The dependence on international capital markets was quickly growing. Pakistan's external debt stood at 11 billion dollars (1986-87).²² The external debt service, including short term borrowing and IMF charges, increased from 1977-78 to 1986-87 from 374 to 1183 million dollars and reached a ratio of 33% of export earnings which is among the highest in the Third World. Net transfers of credits slumped down from 56% (1977-78) to 12% (1986-87).²³ The economic and social weight of bureaucracy increased substantially. Zia handed out favours left and right to the huge stratum of civil and military bureaucrats. The proportion of non-productive current expenditure to the amount of development finance rose from 57% (1976-77) to 70% (1986-87)²⁴. Though state expenditure on social services like education, on transport etc. is bound to improve national standards and to foster national consolidation, it is first and foremost the bureaucratic apparatus that appropriates the largest amount of it. As such, this increase strengthened Zia's constituency, the civil and military bureaucracy, and cut at the roots of development.

Politically, Zia's main concern was with legitimacy of his Martial Law regime. He tried different ways to create a civil umbrella for his military regime. But he needed more than eight years from July 1977 to December 1985 before he could take the risk of allowing political parties to function again. That was twice as long as the time required by Ayub Khan to reestablish a linkage between his Martial Law regime and the political forces between 1958 and 1962. In 1978-79 Zia wanted to install a civil cabinet under his leadership composed of politicians who belonged to the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), provided the alliance member groups would merge into a single party. The PNA was composed of divergent parties both Islamic and secular ethnic. As a whole it steered a conservative course opposing Bhutto. It had questioned the results of the March 1977 parliamentary elections that supposedly were rigged to produce an ever larger majority of seats for the PPP. According to Zia, the campaign that overthrew the PPP government demonstrated that the PNA enjoyed majority support of the people.²⁵ This attempt ended in failure, saw the PNA ministers engaged

in mutual recriminations and left them in utter disarray. The PNA parties could not agree on a merger or even on a unified strategy.

Then Zia singled out the Islamic-minded parties (*Islam passand*) to make a bid for civil power. This would have ideally suited his Islamisation concept which he had pronounced soon after he took power. But the talks which Zia engineered in 1978 between the Pagara Muslim League, the Jamiyat-e-Ulma-e-Pakistan (JUP), the Jamiyat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) remained inconclusive. Rival ambitions to power and leadership prevented them from sinking their differences in the name of Islam and implementing the concept Zia had propounded.²⁶ The recreation of the old Muslim League was the third, more successful venture for political legitimacy. After the Muslim League was granted an official status, along with the revival of political parties, in January 1986, the party president Pir of Pagara who had assembled around him some of the left-over Muslim Leaguers of old times handed the party over to Mohammad Khan Junejo who was elected Prime Minister by the deputies of Parliament in 1985. The February 1985 parliamentary elections were subject to certain conditions. Candidates were only allowed to contest elections on an individual basis. They were not to show party affiliations, and had to accept separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Zia's nation-concept of Pakistan fell back on the two-nation theory that called Muslims and Hindus two separate nations. This concept was formulated long before independence. Pakistan's national concept had always revolved around the superficial choice between Islam and nationalism. In the Islamic nation-concept as propounded by Pakistan's leaders, only a Muslim was a good Pakistani. It presumed a congruence of an all-Pakistan nation and the Muslim community. Though Pakistan's constitutions expressly defended the rights of minorities, the status of minority did not increase the chances for non-Muslims to make full use of their civic rights. He rejected the nationalistic approach that gained acceptance under Bhutto. The latter had tried to integrate all Pakistanis into the national group formation, irrespective of "race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth"²⁷ Bhutto called on "the worker, the enlightened industrialist and businessman, the peasant and the fair-minded land-owner": "All can contribute to the challenging process of national reconstruction and national reconciliation".²⁸

Zia no longer strove for the national consolidation of Pakistan but instead for the consolidation of "Muslim nationhood".²⁹ He made clear

that this choice would inevitably lead to practical consequences. In 1978 Zia reintroduced separate electorates for Muslims and the "minorities". He elevated the constitutional status of the March 1949 "Objectives resolution" of the Constituent Assembly. The resolution referred to the sovereignty of Pakistan as delegated by God.³⁰ It formed part of the non-committal preamble to the 1973 constitution. To give it binding legal force, the 1985 constitution amendment law moulded it into a separate annex.³¹ In October 1979 another election exercise failed, when Zia cancelled the voting and made Martial Law more stringent, he used the occasion to probe the ground for an Islamic political system by which he wanted to exchange secret ballot and universal suffrage for nomination. He suggested that the right to vote and to get elected should be made conditional on a person's Islamic character. He should be a "practising Muslim". Candidates for the Assemblies had to prove their "honesty, ability and competence".³² It was not before 1985 that Zia conceded defeat in this endeavour to win the ruling classes of Pakistan over to accept Islamic political system: "When we approached the upper and influential sections of our populace and delineated the Islamic order before them they treated it as a rigmarole. They said it would create more problems than solve them. We therefore reached the conclusion that may be the time for enforcement of an Islamic government in Pakistan is not yet ripe."³³ With regard to national consolidation, Zia's Islamic revivalism did nothing to strengthen political and ideological cohesion. First, he hoped for a new majority or political forces, right of the PPP, adhering to "Muslim nationalism". A few weeks after Zia came to power he emphasised on 1 September 1977 that "the basic idea of Pakistan was Muslim nationhood, which distinguishes this country from other countries".³⁴ He believed Bhutto to be isolated as a result of the opposition's campaign against the Bhutto government. Yet, the volatile consensus reached between the military and the PNA soon broke down. National political divisions during Zia's rule almost split the country into two political nations, as the Islamabad-based newspaper, *The Muslim* observed.³⁵ In 1981 the major political parties who favoured a national identity of Pakistan beyond its religious commitment aligned with the PPP and founded the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). When Martial Law was lifted in December 1985, the MRD comprised of 11 parties. By 1988 it included 9 member parties. The Zia administration and the political opposition arrived at a precarious balance where neither side could win without a substantial realignment of forces. The upper echelon of civil

and military bureaucrats, and Zia's hand-picked politicians of the Muslim League forcefully defended the Islamic-oriented, centralist nation-concept. This was reflected in resolutions like that of the Lahore High Court Bar Association in 1979 which called upon the Government "to punish foreign-backed regionalists".³⁶ Also, right-wing politicians like Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, at that time Vice-President of the PNA, deplored those who were making "anti-national demands" on Pakistan.³⁷ It was the creation of the Baluch-dominated Pakistan National Party (PNP) in 1977 that evoked such a strong response. The PNP expressly vowed to defend the nationalities rights. In the opposition camp, the assertion of a nationalistic and ultimately secular identity of the country, inclusive of all Pakistanis, as well as the advocacy of the nationalities' rights was a strong rallying point of the otherwise divergent parties and groups. On 2 August 1986 the MRD parties unanimously adopted a Declaration on provincial autonomy which left four subjects, foreign policy, currency, communications and defence to the central government and gave all other matters to the provinces.³⁸

Secondly, the Islamic orientation in nation-building reopened differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the case of the Qadiani community (named after its traditional stronghold Qadian, India, also called Ahmadiyya) they assumed an outright militancy. The reformist Islamic community of the Qadianis goes back to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who in 1891 declared himself to be the prophet. As this claim contradicted the dogma of Mohammad being the "Seal of Prophets" it caused unending criticism from orthodox Muslims. In Mecca in 1974 their belief was declared incompatible with Islam following which Bhutto amended the constitution accordingly. He hoped this concession would reduce the pressure on his administration from orthodox Islamic parties. Under Zia an ordinance was promulgated in 1984 which established that the Qadianis' continued use of Islamic symbol constituted a punishable legal offence. This decision rekindled inter-sectarian religious tension. For instance, between January and August 1985, seven Qadianis, mostly well-to-do people like doctors, lawyers etc, were assassinated.³⁹ Thirdly, it aggravated tensions within the Muslim community. Between October 1984 and July 1985 there was a Shia protest movement which demanded a return to the agreement of 6 July 1980 where the government promised not to enforce Sunni Shariat law upon the Shias. In September 1986 at the end of "moharram", the Islamic month of mourning, violent clashes occurred between Sunnis and Shias in the Punjab province.⁴⁰ The two Sunni sects of Deobandi

(named after the Deoband seminary, founded in British-India in 1867) and Barelvi (named after Bareilly in U.P., India, the seat of the Muslim leader Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi, 1856-1921) engaged in street fighting with each other for control of the Badshahi mosque in Lahore in 1983-4.⁴¹

Fourthly, combined with ethnic factors, Islamic sectarian differences contributed to the ghastly violence between Pathans and *mohajirs* in Karachi in December 1986 and January 1987.⁴² The *mohajirs'* party Mohajir Qomi Mahaz (MM), founded in 1984, had fallen out with the Jama' at-i-Islami that previously patronised the *mohajirs*. The Jama'at still wielded strong influence among the Pathans and the Afghan refugees settled in Karachi. Although the clashes originally started with problems connected with the drug business of the Pathans, the Jama'at was widely suspected that it also had a hand in it.⁴³

By the end of Zia's decennium in power, political and religious tension raged higher than ever. The orientation towards Islam as the sole reference point of national identity introduced a hierarchy among the people which divided them into citizens of differing status. It was all but inevitable that this hierarchy also spread within the Muslim community itself and reduced the national identity mark to the Sunnite, Hanafi rite of Islam which Zia followed and to which most approximately 80%, but by no means all, Pakistanis belonged.

The "Sin" of Nationality

At the first glance, Zia's stand on the nationalities question seemed not to deviate from established conservative thinking. Answering a question on the issue of nationalities, he declared emphatically that "we are all one Muslim Pakistani nation".⁴⁴ Reviving Islam as the reference point of national group formation, Zia hoped to lay his hands on the ethnic movements which he believed were threatening the integrity of the country. In 1978 Zia confessed to Selig S. Harrison that he would "ideally" like to break up the existing provinces and replace them with fifty-three small units, erasing ethnic identities from the map of Pakistan altogether. He considered President Ayub Khan's One Unit concept a valid one and called it "unfortunate for the country" that Yahya Khan had "surrendered to pressures" and created the existing provinces.⁴⁵ Zia's stand reflected the strong conviction of Islamic-oriented forces in Pakistan that the nationalities notion was a concept alien to Pakistan's Islamic state and was spread by "the militant Indians, the

elusive British, the vague West, and discontent elements at home."⁴⁶ Yet, he introduced a significant pragmatic innovation in so far as he paid unwilling tribute to the fact of the existence of the nationalities and the provinces. He compared the provinces to "the four wheels of a chariot which must pull together with full force".⁴⁷

He emphasised "what is done is done" and, for the sake of national unity he was prepared to adhere to the 1973 constitution, as far as provincial autonomy was concerned. Zia believed that the autonomy formula embodied a "very liberal" type of federation.⁴⁸ For this reason he resolutely rejected proposals by Baluch leaders for amendments to the 1973 constitution that would rule out dismissal of an elected provincial cabinet by central intervention as "totally undesirable".⁴⁹ Economically, the development gap between the provinces did not narrow. In 1968-69 the per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) in Sindh and Punjab stood at 854 and 614 rupees which was almost twice the amount of that in Baluchistan (445) and the NWFP 360.⁵⁰ Although later figures of the GRP were not available, analysts like K.B. Sayeed, W.P. Zingel and Shaheed Kardar agree that the position did not change much. Sindh and Punjab kept the leading positions. Forty-three per cent of Pakistan's industry was located in the Karachi district in 1981. There are 80.5% of all tractors, 88.3% of all tube wells and 76% of the credits of the Agricultural Development Bank concentrated in the Punjab.⁵¹ The financial dependence of the provinces from the central government did not diminish. Between 1950-1 and 1980-1 the central budget increased by 1.8 times more than the provincial finances. The central government retained the bulk of the tax income. The share of the provinces in the central taxes, called the central tax transfer, formed 14 to 15 % of the current expenditure of the central government. The central tax transfer made up for 50 to 60% of the provincial budget.⁵² In order to pacify the unruly provinces, Zia was looking for ways to enhance financial assistance. The provincial share in the consolidated (current and investment) expenditure of the central government and the provinces went up from 30% during Bhutto's stay in power to 40-50% under the Zia administration.⁵³ This was more of a bribe to the provincial administrative elite than an accelerator of economic development in the provinces. It was primarily current expenditure of the provinces, out of which the government services were financed, that increased. What Zia, however, gave to the provinces with one hand he took with the other. In 1971-2 the provinces' investment expenditure constituted 70.1% of the central government's investment finances. By 1980-81 the

provincial investment proportion decreased to 26.2% of central investment finances.⁵⁴ Differences in economic and social standards were reproduced and reinforced as central budgetary support for the provinces continued to be divided according to the proportion of population numbers. Between 1980-81 and 1983-84 the economically strong and heavily populated provinces like Punjab and Sind received 57.11 % and 22.58 % respectively out of the central tax transfer while the backlog of the NWFP and Baluchistan, to which a proportion of 12.96 % and 7.49 % respectively was assigned, persisted unchanged. The only exception was Baluchistan which received a proportion of development expenditure to the tune of 24.35% of the overall amount for the provinces as against 5.14 % share in the population.⁵⁵ The ruling provincial elite became more affluent as the growth of agrarian capitalism continued unhindered. Agricultural income, accounting for one quarter of the Gross Domestic Product, was exempt from income-tax, a fact repeatedly lamented over by government.⁵⁶ This trend was bound to generate new provincial demands concerned with agrarian interests. Even the Provincial Governments nominated by the Zia administration could not but join hands with ethnic forces on such issues like the Chashma Link Canal, or the Kalabagh dam. Sindhi agrarian interests were afraid that the reopening of the Chashma Link Canal would leave them with less water from the rivers jointly exploited with the Punjab. Frontier and Sindhi politicians demanded not to build the Kalabagh dam which they argued would only benefit Punjab and leave vast areas in the Frontier province flooded and in Sindh dry.⁵⁷ In Punjab, a nascent ethnic movement centred around the use of the Punjabi language as provincial medium of instruction, education and administration. In 1985 the Provincial parliament witnessed vehement mutual attacks of the deputies on this account. The first World Punjabi Congress in April 1986 marked a watershed in the process of building an ethnic group consciousness of Pakistani Punjabis.⁵⁸ There were several thorny issues in Sind. The distribution of irrigated land among non-Sindhis arose much indignation. In 1984 *mohajir* industrialists from Karachi and Punjabi government officers received 38000 acres in the Thatta district. The low rate of Provincial Government employment of educated Sindhi youth from the rural Sindh which stood at 3% of jobs in the service against a proportion of 14% of Sindh's population was another bone of contention. In the rural Sind 70 % of graduates from colleges and high school were estimated to be out of employment.⁵⁹ Sindhi youths felt particularly discriminated against by ensuing tension

with army and police personnel over the PPP protest movement in 1983 and 1986. The incident at the Thori railway crossing of 17 October 1984 is relevant here. Several youths were shot dead when they clashed with the police for illegal possession of fire-arms and explosives.⁶⁰ In Baluchistan, provincial interest focused on preventing central government to give up the Saindak mining project.⁶¹

With the Frontier Province it was a special case. There the negative outfall from Pakistan's involvement in the Afghanistan adventure produced widespread discontent and tension. Leaving aside the benefits of regular allowances and supplies, which the Afghan refugees enjoyed in the camps, it was the growing infiltration of Afghan moneyed interest into the local economy that was particularly resented. Afghan traders and lorry drivers created tough competition for the local population. Their animal herds occupied vast pastures. The generous supply of money and weapons to the armed Afghan resistance fostered the spread of social vices like drug smuggling and the illegal weapons trade. It was estimated that 50,000 fire-arms existed on Frontier territory alone which could be misused in tribal clashes, could be directed against the Pakistan Government as well. There were frequent incidents, including criminal acts, between the camp people and locals in areas where the latter were not Pathans. Money and weapons also meddled in local politics. Afghan refugees were used as agents provocateurs in the service of the right-wing militant Jama'at-i-Islamic. The first time a large number of Afghan refugees took part in a demonstration, organised by the Jama'at, in February 1986. The more the Frontier Province was converted into a concentration area for the resistance movement against Afghanistan the graver were the consequences for the provincial population. From January 1986 onwards bomb explosions became a regular feature of Frontier life. At times the military activities unleashed against the Afghan Government threatened to engulf the whole Frontier Province. Pakistani government troops massively put down resistance by the Afridis and their leader Kuki Khel who refused to let pass armed Afghan opposition through their tribal territory from December 1985 to February 1986. Deterrent military expeditions against poppy cultivation areas more often resembled sheer blackmail to force the local tribals into subservience to Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan than an attempt to root out the drug mafia.⁶² Zia's approach to the provinces and to the ethnic movements was steel in glove. He repeatedly stressed that he was ready to compromise on particular issues concerning one or the other province. Yet, he tried to be firm on general issues raised by

a coalition of parties and groups relying on ethnic or provincial support. This coalition constituted the core of the MRD. It was led by the Pakistan People's Party that had made it a special issue to champion the cause of the Sindh province where its strongest power base lay. The PPP had a similarly close look at developments in Punjab where it used to receive strong electoral support. The Awami National Party under Wali Khan's dominating influence (most of the time during Zia's Martial Law he was not the formal party leader) represented industrial and landed Pathan interests. The Pakistan National Party stood for Baluchistan. Zia's confrontationalist attitude had contributed to a marked radicalisation in their programmes.

The 1986 MRD declaration on provincial autonomy rejected the autonomy formula of the 1973 constitution and demanded a redistribution of policy prerogatives in favour of the provinces. The ANP and the PNP also demanded the reconstitution of the provincial borders along ethnic lines. On social issues concerning the provinces all four parties demanded substantial support for small and medium land-holders and tenants. As far as foreign policy issues were concerned that touched upon provincial interests they paid special attention to Afghanistan. They all demanded to start a political dialogue with Kabul and strive for a political settlement of the conflict. Later on, however, the PPP tacitly acquiesced to the Government's Afghanistan policy. They considered this concession a prerequisite to get back to power.⁶³

It is difficult to assess the effects of Zia's national policy on the nationalities as there are few facts available about their economic and social development. If we take the provinces instead the picture becomes clearer. Here also like on the state level differences increased. The provincial administrations formed by Zia could not foster greater unity between the provinces and within.

First, inter-provincial rivalry increased with divisive issues like the social tension in Sindh, the Kalabadh dam and the Chashma Link Canal, cutting across social and political lines inside the provinces.

Secondly, the rift between provincial administrations and ethno-nationalistic forces inside the provinces remained as deep as ever. As the nationalistic forces in the provinces like the PPP, the ANP and the PNP boycotted Zia he had to rely on local feudals, civil and military bureaucrats through which he hoped to create a new subordinate provincial elite. A typical example was the nomination of Sajjad Qureshi in Punjab, Ghafoor Hoti in the NWFP, General (Retd.) Musa in Balu-

chistan and General (Retd.) Jehandad in Sindh in December 1985 as the first civil governors after the lifting of Martial Law.⁶⁴

Thirdly, ethnic divisions inside the provinces were substantially aggravated. This was proved not only by the up and coming *mohajir* movement since 1984 but also by the formation of sub-groups like the Punjabis living in Sindh. In April 1987, the Sindhi Punjabi Ittehad (SPI) was launched defending the interests of Punjabi peasants in the rural Sindh who had migrated from Eastern Punjab and until recently called themselves *mohajirs*.⁶⁵ The MQM was prepared to accept only *mohajirs* from the "non-agreed areas" which meant their families had come from all over India and did not receive substantial rehabilitation. In contrast, *mohajirs* who came from Eastern Punjab arrived under agreement and were financially rehabilitated on their arrival.⁶⁶ Other sub-ethnic divisions appeared in Baluchistan between factions of the Baluch Students Organisation⁶⁷ and in Punjab with the creation of a movement for a separate Siraiki province, a dialect spoken in the Punjab divisions of Multan, Bahawalpur, D.G. Khan and D.I. Khan.⁶⁸

Conclusions

The contradictory features of Pakistan's national consolidation seriously aggravated during Zia's military rule. There is not much to add to the conduct and the consequences of Zia's national policy as described above. However, three points should be noted:

First, national consolidation during Zia's regime did not come to a standstill as critics of the military administration might presume. Group building rapidly continued at the economic level. Economic and social bonds multiplied and strengthened integration among different regions into a singular state economy. Simultaneously, the development process furthered the ever clearer demarcation of distinct economic and social interests of the provinces.

Secondly, this positive tendency was inadequately reflected at the level of politics and ideas. Where Zia aimed at greater cohesion he widened the gap. Ethnic and national political divisions persevered. Diversity was growing. Ethnic politics continued to be of national importance. Zia's national policy proved that the concept of Muslim nationhood was not any more viable and effective during this period than at the time of its inception if it is delinked from a nationalistic approach that would embrace all Pakistanis.

Thirdly, the dual structure of national consolidation showed more clearly than ever. Zia's inability to enforce a national consensus diverted attention from national to ethnic politics which were blamed for being disruptive. Yet, dual social and economic trends made clear that ethnic consolidation is not a sin but an objective process that does not impede national integration if politically properly approached. Prospects of national integration do not depend on reducing ethnic movements to size but on integrating them into a large national frame. This would create a positive environment for, both social progress and economic development of all sections of the multi-ethnic society.

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7. Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Perceptions and Policies

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Historical Background

Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union may be traced to the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution and the founding of the Communist International. These two events led to the introduction of Marxist-Leninist ideology and party organization into French Indochina. It was in 1919, for example, that Ho Chi Minh began to read Marx and Lenin in a systematic way.

Vietnam's first contacts with the Comintern date back to mid-1923 when Ho journeyed to Moscow to study Marxism-Leninism. After his arrival, Ho was appointed a member of the presidium of the Krestintern (Peasant International) and a delegate to the 5th Congress of the Comintern (held in July 1924). In 1925 Ho was assigned to the Comintern's Far East Department in Canton, China. There he successfully established contacts inside French Indochina and recruited cadres for the anti-colonial cause. That same year, as a result of his organizational efforts, the Revolutionary Youth League (RYL) was founded. In February 1930, acting in the name of the Comintern, Ho presided over a conference in Hong Kong that formally established the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP)¹.

While Ho's role was pivotal, the role of their Vietnamese revolutionaries during this early period should not be underestimated. Between 1932 and 1935 some forty Vietnamese cadres, who had been trained in the USSR, were sent back to Vietnam to undertake clandestine

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