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UNIVERSITY PRESS

YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001

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Oxford New York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

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Published in India
by Oxford University Press, New Delhi

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First published 2008

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ISBN 13: 978-0-19-569214-3
ISBN 10: 0-19-569214-4

Typeset in Agaramond 10.5/12.5
by Sai Graphic Design, New Delhi 110 055
Printed at Ram Printograph, Delhi 110 051
Published by Oxford University Press
YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001

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Preface

This volume is the third collection of essays largely based on the work of the panel on 'Religious Reform Movements in South Asia from the Nineteenth Century to the Present' which has met regularly at the biennial European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies. Comprising papers originally presented at the conference hosted by the University of Heidelberg in 2002, the volume contains contributions from members of this panel and cognate panels.

Certain themes and topics, which have been central to the ongoing work of the 'Religious Reform Movements' panel, ensure a measure of continuity between this volume and its predecessors. Such concerns include patterns of political interaction and, more particularly, the changing relationship between religion and the socio-political context, the roles of specific religious movements, and the lives and contributions of individuals. As colonialism has shaped in various ways all the movements and historical personalities covered in this volume, a number of authors continue the panel's exploration, at its previous meetings, of the experience of South Asian religious groups and movements during the period of British rule. Other authors have centred their attention upon more recent developments, drawing in one case upon substantial fieldwork. The issue of gender in religion, which similarly has provided a recurrent topic for the panel's attention, is here addressed through studies of both Hinduism and Islam. Other topics in this volume include the interpretation of religious texts, proselytism, the apologetic use of art, and Hindu constructions of East and West. The 'Introduction' initiates a wider consideration of the study of South Asian religious reform movements. Acknowledging novel aspects in the redefinition of South Asian religious identities during the nineteenth century and subsequently, it discusses the relationship between the past and modernity implied by religious reform. The uses of functionalism, orientalism, and syncretism

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The 'Faith Bureaucracy' of the Tablighi Jama'at

An Insight into their System of Self-organization (*Intizam*)

DIETRICH REETZ

Ham ne is kam ke liye ko'i anjuman nahin bana'i, na is ka ko'i daftar hai, na rajistar (register) *hai, na fand* (fund) *hai, yeh sare hi musalmanon ka kam hai, ham ne murawwaja tariqa par ko'i 'alahida jama'at bhi nahin bana'i hai.*[1]

Muhammad Yusuf, second *Amir* of the Tablighi Jama'at

The Tablighi Jama'at, a movement of Muslim lay preachers, has recently attracted increasing attention, as the ranks of its followers seem to be increasing continuously. The term 'tablighi jama'at' is derived from Urdu and means 'preaching movement' or group, where *tabligh* denotes the activity of propagation, applied here to the theology and practice of Islam. It is considered to be part of the more general task of *da'wa*, marking the obligation of all Muslims to propagate the faith. The movement came into existence in India in 1926 and has since spread all over the world where Muslims live. While its creed and basic structure have been discussed in a number of recent research works, its internal functioning has so far been largely obscured from public view. The Tablighis forcefully assert, notably at the leadership level, that there is no special organization or administration involved, emphasizing the lay character of the movement. A closer look at their manner of operation reveals that this is far from true. This can hardly be surprising as by now they are directing a movement which by many standards is considered the largest living Islamic

movement in the world, drawing into its fold Muslims in their millions, and especially so in South Asia. Its internal administration has become strong and robust. The movement is highly hierarchical and in many instances appears to be rather rigid. The movement is judged here not by its religious agenda but as a sociological phenomenon. From the latter perspective it is understood as a sociologically relevant group with clear in- and out-group distinctions. It forms a social group inasmuch as its members are marked by 'relatively stable patterns of interaction' (Marshall 1994: 207) through shared group norms and institutions where the density of the interaction varies (Fuchs-Heinritz *et al.* 1994: 255). Its members share not only common religious goals, but also many social views and cultural practices. While the movement knows no formal membership it is marked by a distinct internal culture, which influences all members and their mutual relations.[2] The group ethos is even more relevant for the regulars who dominate decision-making and set the rules. They form a minority of 10–25 per cent of the followers, fulfilling the requirement of spending at least three days per month in preaching tours (cf. p. 115).

Derived from the travelling practice as its main form of activity, arrangements are kept deliberately provisional and temporary. Yet there is an unwritten constitution of the movement that determines in great detail what issues are confronted in what way and how the work, such as organizing the preaching tours, is to be conducted, how new members should be attracted, and how issues of leadership and guidance are to be resolved. Comparing their conduct of business to a bureaucracy is an analogy that highlights its rules and procedures, structure, and decision-making. The analogy of the group's functioning with a bureaucracy is also sought here because of the association of this term with modernity. The German sociologist Max Weber argued that the formation of a bureaucracy conducting the affairs of society became a feature of its modernity, moving away from arbitrary and personalized decisions to impersonal and law-based rule, developing specialization and differentiation (Weber 1972: 551ff.).

After briefly introducing the movement the argument will be made that many of its features resemble the functioning of a bureaucracy and de facto contradict the claim by Muhammad Yusuf that the movement is not a group or party in the established sense. Many references are based on field research in India and Pakistan in 2001–2, where informal structured interviews were conducted with respondents in two selected

context situations: the universities of Aligarh and Lahore and the annual congregations of the movement (*ijtima'*) at Bhopal and Raiwind in India and Pakistan. Several of the respondents were involved in decision-making at the local and national levels and could provide unique insights into the functioning of the movement. Most of them requested anonymity for purposes of publication as they felt that discussing such issues openly would undermine their standing in the movement.[3] The practical dimensions of the tabligh work have so far been rarely documented in academic publications. Previous analysis was mostly based on the hagiographic and propagandist literature of the movement (Anwarul Haq 1972; Masud 2000). Though the movement has for long successfully deflected investigative attempts by non-Muslim scholars, lately however, the number of case studies has increased (Faust 2001; Zainuddin 2001; Sikand Yoginder 2002).

The philosophy of the movement is summarized in the famous six points, demanding to focus attention on (i) the confession of faith by reciting the *kalima*, (ii) praying regularly and correctly (*salat*), (iii) acquiring religious knowledge and remembering God (*'ilm, zikr*), (iv) respecting fellow-Muslims (*ikram*), (v) reforming one's inner self through pure intentions (*niyyat*), and (vi) spending time on the propagation of Islam through tabligh work, making oneself a servant of God (*nafr*) (Faridi 1997: 114–16). The movement's self-declared objective is the so-called internal mission, to make Muslims better Muslims, as the Tablighis say. It strongly denies any political ambitions. Yet its efforts to 're-islamize' large numbers of Muslims cannot but have political consequences if only by providing a fertile ground for the activities of Islamic political parties and radical or militant groupings. The movement is predominantly male-oriented, although it does organize women's activities on a limited scale in ways strictly conforming to prescriptions of dress and modesty as derived from Islamic law. Women's activities may partly be regarded as emancipatory, if compared with traditional gender roles in South Asia or in other Islamist movements (see Metcalf 1999; Masud 2000).

TRAVELLING PREACHERS

The Tablighi movement came into being in 1926 when Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) started preaching correct religious practices and observance of rituals to Muslim tribes in the region of Mewat around Delhi (cf. Mayaram 1997). In doing so, Ilyas joined other Muslim activists and groups who confronted the preachers of the reformist Hindu

movement Arya Samaj since the beginning of the century. The area had become a battle ground for the souls of the local tribal population whose ancestors had converted from Hinduism to Islam. Since then the tribesmen had retained a number of earlier non-Islamic customs. The Arya Samaj aimed at reclaiming these tribes for the Hindu faith into which they would be readmitted after ritual 'purification'—*shuddhi*—the name by which the campaign became known. Contacting local elders, Ilyas aimed at reorganizing the religious and social life of the tribes, creating new facilities for religious education, and improving social communication through regular council meetings in villages. His main innovation, however, pertained to the introduction of travelling lay preachers who were being dispatched to other Muslim regions in India. Their objective was twofold: the participants should reform themselves on these tours and they should carry the faith to other fellow-Muslims who so far had remained passive or disinterested in the observance of religious practices. Those preaching tours became the hallmark of the Tablighi movement. Today Tablighi lay preachers practically traverse the entire world.

The groups are formed at the local Tablighi centre, which is usually attached to a Deobandi mosque or *madrasa*. Starting with Ilyas' personal association with the *Dar al-'Ulum*' of Deoband, the movement has been supported by its religious scholars, *'ulama'*, propagating the purist teachings of this seminary located in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) (Metcalf 1982). The Tablighi movement also kept close contact with the Nadwa seminary from Lucknow, the capital of UP (Malik 1997). The association of followers with the movement is mostly a temporary one, lasting for the duration of the particular preaching tour.

At its destination the travelling groups would usually head for a local, mostly Deobandi, mosque. There they would stay for two to three days and sleep inside the mosque—which is a practice not fully accepted by all 'ulama'. The Tablighis try to give it legitimacy by presenting it as some form of *i'tekaf*, the ritual seclusion for prayer in the mosque during the fasting month of Ramadan. They are always self-sufficient with their bedding and cooking utensils, which they carry with them. After prayer they go out and tour the local Muslim community. They knock on doors of most houses to invite people to attend the next prayer at the mosque. While responses vary, between 2 and 10 per cent of those approached may turn up, of which some might have come anyway to say their regular prayer there.[4] After a joint prayer they are given an inspirational religious

talk (*bayan*), narrating religious principles, events discussed in the Qur'an, and the Prophetic traditions (hadith). Its prime objective is motivation (*targhib*). Usually a session of religious education follows (*t'alim*). This consists of reading from a book written by one of its founding fathers, Maulana Muhammad Zakariya (1898–1982), 'The Virtues of Good Deeds' (*Faza'il-e A'mal*), which the movement has adopted as standard educational reference material (Zakariya 1994). It represents a compilation of religious texts, mainly drawn from Prophetic traditions. Then those present are called upon to volunteer for future preaching tours (*tashkil*). People stand up and give their name and local association, which are noted down in a special register or book kept at the mosque. Later the new volunteers will be taken up on those pledges and reminded to live up to them. As pointed out by Yusuf, the target is to get out one person per house for three *chilla*s (Hasani 1982: 772)—a demanding task indeed. When the groups return to their home base they will report to the local Tablighi centre either in oral or written form (*karguzari*) about the progress achieved.

CONGREGATIONS

Next to the preaching tours, its congregations (ijtima') constitute the most well-known feature of the Tablighi movement. They are of various scopes: local, regional, national, or international/global. On one side, they take up the tradition of the weekly Friday prayer congregation at the local mosque, on the other they represent a kind of community 'orientation' meeting, which perhaps has grown out of the initial local community meetings in Mewat with religious scholars and tribal elders. Their programme closely follows the itinerary of the preaching tours, consisting of joint prayers, inspirational talks, readings from the Zakariya volumes, and calls for volunteers to register for future preaching tours. A concluding prayer of supplication (*dua*) is added here. The ijtima' is held regularly on fixed days at the local tabligh centre, usually once a week. It convenes around prayer times to induce the faithful of the area who come to the mosque for prayers to participate in the tabligh meeting as well. The ijtima' also facilitates social communication and networking among followers.

The grand national meetings stand out in a category of their own. The annual congregations of the Tablighis in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are remarkable for the huge numbers they attract and the amount of publicity they generate among the local population, but also on a

wider scale in national newspapers and the international media. Tablighis used to stress that these meetings represent the second-largest congregation of Muslims after the Hajj. Reports assume that up to two million people participate in the Bangladesh meeting in Tongi, and between one and one-and-a-half million in India and Pakistan each. In Pakistan, the meeting usually takes place at Raiwind, the location of the Pakistani centre of the movement near Lahore. In India, major annual congregations were held at different places, although now they seem to have settled on the longstanding Bhopal ijtima'. For about fifty years the congregation was held at its huge mosque *Taj-ul-Masajid* (crown of the mosques) but has shifted recently to open fields outside the city for want of space. The congregations seem to be important venues for mobilizing support not only among Muslims, but also among non-Muslims and secular elites, notably politicians. The Presidents and Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan have repeatedly used the occasion to rub shoulders with the praying millions on occasions that are bound to attract mass media attention.[5] The former head of the Afghan Taliban regime, Mullah 'Omar, was also reported to have attended the Pakistan congregation. In India, cooperation with state authorities is smooth and traditional, although less publicity-oriented. Tablighi leaders seem divided over the merits of such huge meetings. Muhammad Yusuf (1917–65), second Amir of the Indian Tablighi Jama'at, had already emphasized that the regular work in propagating Islam was more important than the meetings (Hasani 1982: 756). There are attempts made in India nowadays to scale back the national congregations in favour of the regular work.

At the national congregation, local Tablighi centres (*markaz*) are represented by formal delegations squatting on the prayer ground behind signboards indicating their place of origin. Also attendance from other countries is a regular feature now as the movement has become truly global. The increasing social function of the movement is displayed in staging mass marriages (*nikkah*), celebrated by prominent elders of the movement. The concluding act, the prayer of supplication (dua), apparently holds an enormous social importance. It is this prayer, which attracts huge additional crowds from among the local population seeking blessings (*barakat*). It is they who swell the participating numbers to the millions; the actual number of participating Tablighis is significantly less than generally assumed. The congregation winds up with sending off all participants on their respective tours, having recharged their motivation and energy.

DEMANDS ON FOLLOWERS

Travelling in preaching groups is the core activity of the movement. It generated a demanding roster of regular commitments differing mainly in the amount of time spent by the Tablighis:

- Three days per month on a full preaching tour to another locality in their home region;
- Forty days per year, called by the Sufi term chilla, generally a longer period of withdrawal or seclusion for contemplation and prayer, which could be a tour to other states or provinces of their country, but also to other countries;
- The 'grand chilla,' consisting of three consecutive chillas, once during their lifetime, which equals four months (120 days);
- For the ardent there are even longer chillas, mostly when going abroad, for a period like seven months or one year, or on foot across the country for a whole year (*paidal* jama'at) (cf. Hasani 1982: 772).

Since the 1980s Tablighi activists have devoted growing attention to a scheme that has slowly but steadily evolved over the past decades, the formation and operation of a local 'mosque group' (*masjidwar* jama'at) in addition to the travelling preaching group, the Tablighi Jama'at. It considers the local mosque as the basic unit of operation. It is meant to keep the work of tabligh alive after returning from the preaching tours. The details of this scheme have been fixed in a rigid grid of demands that are made on its participants on a daily basis. It rests on the understanding that every potential follower of the movement is always and first a member of his local mosque group. This makes the scheme somewhat akin to ideological structures of mobilization, such as the basic units of the Communist movement. In reality, it is only the regulars who are involved in it. It requires doing five 'good deeds' (*a'mal*) every day:

- Attending all five prayer sessions at your local mosque which are also used to fulfil specific functions for the movement;
- Forming a council (*shura*), which meets daily, and to attend its sessions at one of the prayer times;
- Spending two-and-a-half hours daily of dedicated tabligh activities in meeting fellow-Muslims ~nd inviting them on to the path of Allah in a one-to-one meeting (*mulaqat*);

- Conducting two educational sessions (*t'alim*) daily by reading from the Zakariya volumes for about 30–45 minutes, one at the mosque and one at home;
- Making two rounds of preaching walks (*gasht*) per week, around the immediate neighbourhood on one day—which is fixed for every local mosque—and around the adjacent mosque area on their fixed day.

The three-day preaching tour (*seh-roza*) promises to earn the performer thirty days of reward (*thawab*) on the path of Allah. If it is observed every month for a whole year, the individual's lifetime account for paradise will be credited with a reward of one year. The reward system works like collecting rebate points. Different actions promise different amounts of time earned for the afterlife. The idea of specific amounts of time as reward is derived from Prophetic traditions. However the Tablighi Jama'at has uniquely adapted it to its own requirements based on point six of its mission goals, calling upon followers to spend time on the path of Allah. The rewards of varying sizes are mentioned in the Zakariya volumes *Faza'il-e A'mal*. Various Amirs kept developing the system. Detailed time rewards for specific preaching activities of the movement are frequently mentioned in Yusuf's writings. They constitute an arithmetic challenge for individuals to keep track of their faith record, but Yusuf had a rule of thumb for this as well. Calculated on a 24-hour basis, individuals should aim at spending not less than one-third of their time on tabligh. Only then could they be reasonably sure to break with old habits and defeat the devil, really to change in the way required for a pious life. It means that the above-mentioned obligations would not be sufficient. The task for the more advanced regulars or 'old comrades' (*purane sathi*, cf. p. 115 1982: 772) would, therefore, be to make arrangements for spending four months on the path of Allah every year in addition to all the other obligations. Otherwise the ways of humankind on the social level could not really be mended and falsehood (*batil*) rooted out. If the regulars do not undertake at least one proper grand chilla without coming home in between, the spirit of their lives cannot really be changed (Hasani 1982: 772).

Committing to these activities—travel, mosque, and congregation—puts a heavy burden on the shoulders of every regular, especially as these tasks do not present alternatives but are cumulative and have to be followed one in addition to the other. It is not uncommon that those doing so tend to neglect their worldly engagements. At the same time, the

mobilizing efforts can also have affirmative results. A survey made at Aligarh Muslim University in India was said to have shown that the academic achievements of Muslims students who were Tablighi regulars significantly surpassed those of their co-students.[6]

Yet a regular can hardly pursue his predilection for tabligh work, if he does not make it his lifetime occupation and does not count the hours. This also entails social consequences with regard to Tablighi family life. Several informants suggested during interviews that those families where both partners were actively involved in tabligh work tended to have fewer children. They would have more simple marriage ceremonies—because they shun ostentatious expenditure—and easier divorces—because they do not ask for bride money, both under the influence of reformist teachings.[7] Occasionally, young Tablighi activists seek out the advice of their elders for finding suitable marriage partners tolerant of the demanding tabligh work.[8]

LEADERSHIP AND COUNCILS

In its self-representation, the movement stresses its egalitarian character. Outgoing preaching groups (jama'at) elect a leader (*amir*) from among themselves whose orders would be obeyed unquestioningly. Obedience (*ita'at*) to the amir is a cornerstone of the movement. Yet he could be any of them, and more important, he is expected to lead through his personal example in his devotion to preaching, praying, religious education, but also in his humble demeanour towards other members of the group, in his readiness to take over ordinary daily chores of cooking or cleaning. Beside this leader of the basic preaching group, the only other leader who is well-known in public is the national leader of the Tablighis in India or Pakistan (or any other country). The middle rung of leadership is hardly visible to outside observers and not even to irregular participants. Yet the movement is ruled by a clearly defined command structure at every level, being both flexible and rigid in turns. It is based on the principle of consultation as gleaned from the Qur'an and the Hadith (shura, *mashwara*), led by an amir or a responsible person of varying designation. It is assumed that the Prophet's practice of consultation with his companions is the example. Council is held in the open, accessible to all members or interested people, at least in theory. In practice though, there is a selection of those attending and not all business of the movement is conducted in public. While most of its business is limited to its own followers, there definitely is a closed or secret part of business of the movement, which is deliberately kept away from the public eye.

These councils were originally meant to serve as temporary and flexible arrangements, allowing the leaders of groups, local and national centres to take the right decisions. Yet the swelling numbers of followers led to growing requirements for decision-making. Councils over time became more permanent and a regular leadership feature. The shura derives some of its prestige from the amir as and when he presides over the council. It is interesting to note that the councils have some autonomy and permanence, cementing the strong hierarchical order of the 'faith bureaucracy'. While in the lower ranks their composition is shifting and rotating in fairly short intervals to involve as large a number of volunteers as possible, the councils appear fairly stable from the level of the local markaz upwards. Members of these councils are generally endorsed, if not appointed, by higher-standing councils. They often enjoy a life membership. They are mostly not religious scholars, but often academics and professionals who belong to the group of the 'old comrades'. Treated with great reverence and respect, they are next to the amir in enjoying a more or less privileged position. Serving on a council is demanding with sessions held every day and a seemingly endless amount of business to be enacted. The endorsement of outgoing, and the reports of incoming, groups are done on fixed days. Other days are devoted to the congregations, local and national, to settling differences among followers or lower-standing council members where they act as an internal court of appeal on discipline, mission goals, methods, and conflicts.

Maulana Yusuf laid down detailed principles for mashwara in a letter to departing preachers.[9] He specifically warned that in council, participants should not insist on their opinion and push through its implementation, as this would cancel out Allah's support for the movement. If an opinion is required it should be expressed from one's heart and put forward gently (*narmi*), not in competition (*taqabil*) with others (Hasani 1982: 777). One should remember that one's opinion is coloured by evil (*shurur*). If a decision is taken in favour of some other opinion one should be glad to have been saved from this evil, and if one's opinion is accepted one should be filled with fear and pray to God. 'Majority opinion is not our basis of decision and it is not necessary to ask everybody's opinion on every issue' (ibid.) Everyone should have the desire to be kind to the others. After taking opinion there will be discussion in a manner that different temperaments are considered and weighed, after which the amir will then decide. These instructions are obviously meant to take care that council sessions do not give rise to leadership ambitions and power struggle. These are general principles of consensual

management, adapted for a religious movement but by no means specific to it.

Taking India as an example, where the movement started and its global headquarters are located, the leadership structure comprises the following levels:

- The lowest level is the travelling preaching group, the Tablighi Jama'at. Leadership here is a temporary assignment for the duration of the tour. As the size of the groups rarely exceeds 10–15 people, there is no shura formed here. At this level, an amir is always selected, or sometimes appointed.
- Next comes the mosque group where a shura is formed and in operation. But its composition varies. The regulars of the locality take turns in sharing responsibilities. Its leader would be the 'decider'—*faisal.* While his appointment may be confirmed by higher-standing authorities in the movement, the assignment rotates, even at short intervals such as two to three months.
- The next higher-up level would be the locality where one or more local shuras are in operation. In Aligarh, there are two Tablighi centres, one in the university area at the Sir Sayyid Hall Mosque and the other at the old town mosque. The shura has four to five members. Its composition and more so the function of faisal is usually confirmed by the higher up Tablighi leaders, either at the state/provincial level or even at the national level. In the case of Aligarh's university shura, due to its eminent status in the Tablighi movement as a centre of learning and the seat of the most prominent Muslim university it was confirmed by the very leaders of the Tablighi movement in India, the Nizamuddin shura at Delhi. The shura members often keep their post until they die. Age in the Tablighi understanding only adds to authority. This shura would also meet every day, but hold council on the more important affairs of the movement in the locality on the day of the ijtima', which for the university area was Sundays.[10]
- There are also shuras in operation at the level of the Indian states. Some of their leaders were formally designated amir. They conduct the affairs of the movement in their state or province fairly independently. Nowadays the new heads of the councils are preferred to be called by the less formal and presumptuous title faisal (decider).
- Then there is the central Tablighi shura at Nizamuddin. This name is applied to the current collective leadership and also to a larger ruling council. Ilyas was succeeded as amir first by his son Muhammad Yusuf and then by his grandnephew In'am al-Hasan (1918–95). After the latter's death, a collective leadership took over, as the movement could not decide on a single successor. It consisted of the Maulanas Sa'd al-Hasan (b. 1965, grandson of Yusuf and great-grandson of Ilyas), Zubair al-Hasan (b. 1950, son of In'am), and Izhar al-Hasan (related to Ilyas). In'am al-Hasan himself was reported to have contributed to the 'democratization' of the movement as he moved to strengthen the role of the shura against the amir and the role of the daily work (within the mosque group) against ostentatious congregations. After Izhar died, this collective leadership or small shura now only consists of two persons. Among those it is Maulana Sa'd who seems to have moved to the centre. He is seen as the new theoretical, spiritual, and symbolic head of the movement. He seems to be immensely popular with followers as could be judged from reactions to his appearance at the 2002 Bhopal congregation. Maulana Zubair apparently concentrates more on the internal structure and organization of the movement.[11]

Beside the small circle of collective leadership there is a larger shura in operation at Nizamuddin which consists of elders (*buzurg* or *bare*) from all over India and counts approximately fifteen members. While it meets daily it holds open council on Thursdays on the occasion of their version of the weekly ijtima'. Not all its members attend all its sessions. There is a rotation and sharing of responsibilities at work, guaranteeing that issues concerning the reception of incoming or preparation of outgoing preaching groups are not left undecided.

PRINCIPLES AND RULES

The approach of the Tablighi Jama'at to the administration of its movement has remained contradictory. As indicated, in the beginning Yusuf and his successors as Amirs asserted that the movement did not keep an office (daftar), or any kind of administration. He strongly urged not to rely on 'customary' (*riwayati*) means used by other Islamic groups, as they would only strengthen the grip of 'custom'. By this he understood newspapers, other media, established offices and branches, or the collection of donations (*chanda*). He was quoted as having angrily intervened when a tabligh group intended to build a local centre or house of Tabligh. The group wanted to finance it by selling printed tracts and collecting contributions. This would go against the spirit of the movement, he

thundered (Hasani 1982: 750–51). At the same time it was Yusuf who more than anyone else contributed to setting up a strong internal administrative system. It made sure that new entrants would quickly and reliably learn the ways of the movement. Thus uniformity and coherence of purpose and practice was to be kept. It worked like a modern franchise system running on a strong motivational basis. In fact he was quite conscious of the innovative character of his approach, as he predicted that scholars would come one day to study its principles.

Formulating sets of rules for guiding behaviour in all situations became a key leadership instrument. Yusuf was reported to have given detailed instructions to departing preaching groups at congregations (ijtima').[12] They were aimed at spelling out how to fill the time while on tour. Since he regarded the devil and personal inertia to be the biggest enemies of good missionary work, he insisted on not leaving time for them to catch up with the preachers. He, therefore, considered it essential to keep them busy 24 hours for which a detailed plan was laid out. He formulated several sets of four points, covering the basic tasks, things to do, not to do, etc. These were broadly based on the philosophy of the six mission principles. As the four basic tasks he highlighted preaching (da'wa); [religious] education (ta'lim), based on the Zakariya volume Faza'il-e A'mal, and reading other religious literature, in particular the Qur'an; remembering God through prayer (*namaz*, zikr); and making oneself his servant by serving others (*khidmat*) (Hasani 1982: 788–90).

Other sets of principles for guiding behaviour while on tour included the four things to do only as much as absolutely necessary, such as eating and drinking; following your needs (going to the toilet); sleeping; and mutual conversation (Hasani 1982: 790). There were four things to stop doing at all, such as asking questions or making personal demands; asking these questions in the heart; making unnecessary expenses; and taking things from others without express permission (Hasani 1982: 791). Six hours of sleep was considered sufficient by Yusuf, more was excess. Tablighi activists were to observe four things to avoid in relation to fellow preachers: rejection (*tardid*); criticism (*tanqid*); competition (*taqabil*); and pride (*tanqis*) (Hasani 1982: 13). Respondents reported that there were more sets of rules in circulation.[13]

These rule sets had several advantages. They were easy to memorize. Sometimes they even rhymed on alliteration, that is on the first letter, as mentioned above (tardid, tanqid, taqabil, tanqis). They ensured that behaviour was guided uniformly, maintaining the coherence of its

practices. This approach apparently resulted from the deliberate and rapid expansion of the movement started under Yusuf. When a part of the movement relocated to Pakistan as a result of partition the need for strategic thinking on how to expand and secure the movement was born. Decisions were formulated as to where to put new centres, who was going to aid in their formation, and what were the geographic areas most in need of attention (Hasani 1982). Respondents confirmed that this thinking prevails until today. Policy for internal and external (international) expansion of preaching is formulated on the basis of the evaluation regarding whether a particular area or region is in need of religious renewal. Such need is expressed through demands from local religious scholars and leaders who send in requisitioning letters for preaching groups (*taqaza*). It can also result from reports of preaching groups (karguzari) dissatisfied with the state of religion in particular areas or countries. The same approach is also taken for evaluating the internal soundness and viability of the movement. With reference to the five a'mal (see above) the question is asked as to how many of them are alive in that area or centre (markaz) or local mosque. Thus a huge map of religious activity and performance is imagined of the country and the whole world. It is not unlike the target map of a huge global corporate enterprise, setting course on expansion.

The traditional form of letter-writing became an important form of relaying messages, orders, and reports within the movement. Yusuf's famous letter to a departing group of preachers became a sort of rulebook for the movement (cf. fn. 9). Letters written by the leaders to lower-standing leaders, preaching groups, or important elders became a regular form of administration. The new Amir introduced himself to the local centres through such a letter. Nowadays, in Pakistan for instance, regular meetings of the national shura are summarized in letters, sent out to all markaz where they are read out on fixed days in the ijtima' of the local centre. Letters are used to request the dispatch of preaching groups to certain areas (taqaza), and also to report about the progress of some preaching tours, particularly to foreign countries. Letters are written to request the endorsement of expenditure from higher-standing centres, where the conformity of material changes or expenditure with the mission goals of the movement is carefully evaluated. For instance, it was related to the author that the extension of ablution facilities at the Raiwind Pakistan Ijtima'gah had to be sanctioned by the Nizamuddin Centre in Delhi, which in such cases acts as a regional and even global centre of

reference and authority.[14] Such an approach invariably led to a growing bureaucratization of decision-making.

The letter-writing in turn creates the need for offices to write and file the letters. It is the tradition that letters from close or trusted comrades have to be faithfully answered. Thus a need for a chancellery is created, at least at the national centre of the movement, called *sho'ba-e khutut* in Raiwind. The ever-increasing size of the movement demanded further specialization in bureaucratic functions of its centres. Respondents narrated to the author that there were thirty-eight specialized departments in operation at the Raiwind centre.[15] Beside general departments it is primarily the offices for the formation, dispatch, and return or arrival of preaching groups that have become increasingly important. Huge offices of *tartib-o-tashkil* are maintained at the Bhopal and Raiwind congregations and also at the national centres at Nizamuddin and Raiwind. The role of *Chhote Sayyid Bhai* ('the younger Sayyid'), a Maulana from Nizamuddin who was in charge of coordinating travel routes for outgoing preaching groups, may serve as an example. He also was a member of the preparation team for the Bhopal ijtima' 2002, attended by the author. While he explicitly denied any role of regular administrative work in running the movement, he was reported to have his own permanent office at Nizamuddin where he kept a huge oversize chart of all possible destinations of preaching tours in the world, complete with names and addresses for the mosques of destination, and bus and train connections.[16] With the national centres functioning like mini 'holy cities' recreating a religious social utopia, a common kitchen (*matbakh*), facilities for electricity (*bijli*), a post office, and even a mortuary (*murda khana*) came into existence there.

Other administrative business relates to tracking outgoing and incoming preaching groups (jama'ats). Long lists of its members are kept at national but also regional centres under the names of the amirs designated for those groups. This practice has apparently been necessitated by incidents of families searching for relatives who had gone missing but had in fact joined a preaching group.[17] The preaching groups themselves are reported to keep detailed written accounts of their expenditure so that nobody should feel cheated. As the author was told, these are usually destroyed after reporting back to the centre and accounting for the funds and expenses. It is not uncommon that some Tablighis take notes during council sessions or at congregations, which they then share with others or which are used to instruct lower-standing councils or groups. Tablighi

elders try to discourage this practice, deemed to go against the 'spirit' of the movement, although the habit seems to be resilient and popular.[18] Another type of business relates to the requirement of making reports (karguzari). There exist separate departments at the larger centres such as Raiwind to process those reports. They discuss the experience of the groups when preaching to local Muslims, whether they met with a good response or not, what arguments were most effective, or whether the observance of Islamic rituals was good or lacking. The more sophisticated ones would also discuss the programmatic targets of the movement, such as how many of the five prescribed 'good deeds' were alive in the local mosque communities.

ELITE GROUPS

A closer look at the functioning of the movement reveals that its egalitarian pretensions did not prevent the emergence of specific elites in it. Over time, groups have emerged enjoying a special status. They enjoy certain privileges in terms of their impact on the movement. Ilyas had called on followers—and Yusuf had confirmed this—that members should give due respect to religious scholars and mystics—'ulama' and *masha'ikh*. By spreading religious education and revival some followers felt apparently sufficiently empowered to look down on clerics outside the movement, some of whom did not seem to be as well versed in Prophetic traditions or as articulate as Tablighi activists. Both Ilyas and Yusuf repeatedly warned against this folly, particularly as several 'ulama' had—and still have—some reservations about the movement and its alleged externalism. Yusuf pointed out that because of their inherent connection with religious knowledge and devotion ('ilm, zikr)—two of the main principles of the movement—the 'ulama' and masha'ikh should occupy a special place in the movement. Yet they seem to be less then ever before involved with the executive side of the movement. Four 'career' paths suggest themselves to gain a special status in the movement: an ancestral connection with the roots of the movement; a 'career' of tabligh; service in the faith 'bureaucracy'; and becoming a pious and erudite 'foot soldier'.

The ancestral connection seems to have benefited the offspring of the two family branches from Kandhala that were related to Muhammad Ilyas and Zakariya. They have fashioned themselves in the Sufi tradition as members of the Kandhalawi family order or *silsila*. The amirs of the Tablighi Jama'at in India and key shura members have since been selected from their fold. Another such root connection relates to the early com-

panions of Ilyas, particularly to those from Mewat. They are still seen by many as representing a particularly genuine and authentic tradition in the movement.[19] At annual congregations both in India and Pakistan the Tablighi activists from Mewat hold special meetings always attended by the elders of the movement.[20] Maulana Saad is today seen as the worthy successor of the Shaykhs of the Mewatis, as the Tablighi Amirs have sometimes been called.

The Tablighi Jama'at has also succeeded in establishing a rather modern career path in its 'bureaucracy'. Its various levels are measured in preaching time spent in the service of the movement. As indicated, the regulars stand out from the chance followers by at least spending three days in preaching per month, the seh-roza. Several respondents agreed that this is the first significant threshold to take. This is also borne out by the instructions from Maulana Yusuf. The next level seems to be the grand chilla or four months. It tallies with the desired pious one-third of the year level of tabligh time that Yusuf suggested as a necessary minimum for rectifying the ways of society. Those who accomplish it are called the 'old comrades'—purane sathi. Their privileges and obligations are significant. Separate congregations are held for them as a sort of elite gathering (*puranon ka jor*). The author learnt from respondents that being counted as an 'old comrade' is also a qualification required to become eligible for certain leadership positions such as being selected for specialized leadership jama'ats or particular councils (see below). From respondents in Lahore we know that comrades who give time to the movement every day form yet another higher level, the 'daily comrades'—*rozana ke sathi*. They would typically have done a 'grand chilla', thus belonging to the 'old comrades'. In a city such as Lahore they man most of the zonal committees (*halqa* jama'at).[21] The next higher-up level is that of a resident preacher (*muqim*), residing permanently or repeatedly for extended periods of time at one of the centres, mostly at the national level but also at various other centres. In Pakistan, respondents related that the decision had been taken at the leadership level that those giving more than four months to the movement every year would be considered eligible for being called a muqim. They lead a life marked by asceticism and full-time devotion to the movement in prayer, preaching and organizational work, not unlike Hindu *sanyasins* at a temple or Christian monks in a monastery. Officially they are supposed to support themselves financially, which some do through family resourses or by running their businesses on part-time basis when they go home on leave from the centre for a limited number of days per month, like once per week. Others have taken full residence there and

are kept up by community resources where personal donations are pooled. Assumptions also persist that outside donors from Arabic countries may contribute.

Service in the 'faith bureaucracy' partly overlaps in terms of status with advancement on the Tablighi 'faith career path', the second category. It includes those who serve on the various councils, run the specialized departments, and support the functioning of the markaz, particularly at the centre. Council members, particularly from the local, more formal centres (markaz) upwards, will most likely be from among the 'old comrades'. Evidently also many of the *muqimin* holding trusted positions in running the affairs of the centre gain greater importance by running a particular department (*sho'ba*). A prominent example of those would be Masih-uz-Zaman, a former civil bureaucrat who has long been responsible for foreign connections at the Pakistan centre. His two sons, Arif and Iftikhar, have followed in his footsteps and also occupy prominent positions at different levels.[22] A number of religious scholars ('ulama') are also involved in directing the affairs of the movement on a permanent basis. They are attached to the *madaris* of the Tablighi centre at the national level or at the local level. In Pakistan, for example, the Maulanas Muhammad Ahmad Bahawalpuri, Muhammad Ahsan Sahib, Nazirur Rahman, and Muhammad Jamshed have gained much prominence on this count.[23]

The administration also employs a number of full-time volunteers who could be called religious interns, who have decided to give service (khidmat) to the movement for weeks, months, or sometimes a year and longer. The author talked to some who had graduated from universities and now took time out from their civic life supporting themselves on contributions from family members or sharing meagre resources with other Tablighis to be able to devote their full time to the movement.[24] The less sophisticated among them work as ushers at the centres, ensuring that every incoming or outgoing Tablighi or visitor finds his group or stays in touch with his programme. They also shield the centre's core activities from stray visitors, particularly non-Tablighis and non-Muslims, foreigners, and journalists. Those going on longer preaching tours of four months and above would typically also spend part of that time, either at the beginning or at the end giving service (khidmat) to the movement at one of its centres.[25]

Rank and file Tablighis who seem to embody a particularly pious and God-fearing lifestyle represent a fourth, more informal option to acquire an elite status. They gain respect and recognition by their attitude,

learnedness, and personal conduct. An example was Amin M. Farooqi, whom the author met during field research in Pakistan in 2002. He was a chartered accountant and had been living in Australia and New Zealand before he decided to spend the rest of his life back in Pakistan, his place of birth, in the service of the movement.[26] While he did not seem to hold a particular position he visibly commanded respect for his learnedness and piety, but obviously also because of his brush with the western world.

SPECIALIZATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

Any bureaucracy tends to develop features of specialization and differentiation. The Tablighi movement is no exception to this rule. Its administration has developed several specialized functions and approaches. This specialization can also be seen as an expression of its modernity. While the Tablighis regard themselves as egalitarian they have devised distinct methods to deal with elite groups in society. The latter are still considered very important for the success of the movement, especially in South Asia where local elites wield considerable command over the masses. The Tablighi Jama'at distinguishes between general and special preaching (*'umumi gasht* and *khususi gasht*). While the first is directed at local neighbourhoods in general, the second aims at particular elite groups. For the latter purpose special preaching groups are formed. They are sometimes called *tabqati* jama'ats directed at different 'classes' of society. They specifically target groups such as medical doctors, university professors, landowners (zamindars), industrialists, even prominent professional sportsmen and actors, and also the 'ulama'.[27]

While Ilyas already mentioned the need for special jama'ats this feature seems to have become more pronounced with time passing. As one respondent narrated to the author on his own experience, specialized jama'ats preaching among landowners may even dispense with some of the otherwise essential ascetic attributes. As it would be important to be accepted on an equal level, members of the zamindari jama'at would be allowed to travel in their own car and they would even carry their own, special food. The group would consist of highly qualified and educated members; otherwise, the doors of the landed estates would remain closed to them.[28]

The same specialization is reflected in convening smaller congregations for select audiences beside the general ijtima'. As mentioned above, regular meetings are held for the 'trusted comrades' (puranon ka jor) attended by those who have done the four-month 'grand chilla'. A ten-day camp

for them is a regular feature of the Raiwind congregation schedule in Pakistan. It consists of a three-day ijtima', a five-day preaching tour out in groups, and a concluding two-day ijtima'.[29] Such select congregations are also convened for special 'classes' of society, such as the industrialists, the educationists, medical doctors, or students.[30]

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

Mission conformity and uniformity is established through a variety of ways, as the Tablighi Jama'at has spawned an elaborate system of guidance and control. Specialized task groups or jama'ats act in this capacity at the congregations (ijtima'). Some are on organizational duty (khidmat), helping with preparations such as installing a sound system; others ushering people in and out. Performing various kinds of service duties in the shape of khidmat is a central obligation of all followers, as it is part of the six mission goals and will meet with a reward (thawab) in the hereafter. A special kind of khidmat is offered by the guards patrolling the campus of the larger Tablighi centres such as in Raiwind and the congregation grounds. They can be easily recognized by the long sticks they are carrying, usually a cane. At the national centre in Raiwind a more formal department performing security duty is to be found. Known as the *sho'ba-e paihra*, control is more detailed in it and extends also to enforcing religious duties, especially prayer attendance in congregation. As the Raiwind centre is populated at any time by 5–7 thousand Tablighis, laxity and indulgence are feared. Special guards see to it that nobody misses the congregational prayer sessions. They apply the cane occasionally so that the lines of the praying are drawn straight.[31]

Another group, *ikhtilat* (communication, interaction), performs some sort of 'agitational' duties within the movement. Its members are usually well-trained and alert to engage other Tablighis in meaningful discussions so that nobody remains idle. Yusuf had pointed out how important it was to keep members busy at all times. The ikhtilat people are particularly active at congregations where they give information or motivational talks to individuals and groups when they seem lost or disinterested. They also ensure that people listen during the long hours of bayan and do not talk among themselves of private matters.

The formation of special leadership jama'ats guiding other, mainly travelling, jama'ats is an interesting and hitherto little-known feature. Two different types have been reported from Pakistan: the support or assistance group (*nusrat ki* jama'at) and the centre group (*markaz ki*

jama'at). Assistance is provided 'on the job' by doing tabligh work together with those being supervised. The support group gives guidance to those who prepare for a seven or twelve month foreign preaching tour while they are still in the country performing a first round of preaching travel to familiarize themselves with the task and with each other. They are also formed and sent for some weeks to aid and motivate the twelve-month groups walking on foot across the country (*paidal ki* jama'at). The centre groups are formed to assist local and regional units, also councils, by dividing time between preaching and holding council with local preachers. Their task is to sort out local leadership problems or issues of orientation or mission consistency. They are not formed through public calls for volunteers but by invitation on behalf of the Tablighi elders. Eligible candidates would be usually drawn from the 'old comrades'.

FINANCES AND DONATIONS

Such a huge movement with a multi-tier decision-making apparatus can obviously not run without expenses. As the basic work of tabligh where it is carried out by the travelling preaching groups within the vicinity and even within the confines of one country can apparently run on nominal resources, it should not be surprising that it is largely self-financed by intending preachers. The cost for transport in India and Pakistan is still low if travel is undertaken by bus and even by rail. Expenses for food are deliberately kept down, as the Tablighis strive not to exceed the means of the poorest participant. Those giving more time to the movement by sitting on the councils, forming part of leadership groups, or living as resident full-timers at one of the centres tend to be from a middle-class or self-employed background where family connections and private businesses are mobilized to finance their living in whole or part.

Yet still the congregations as well as the centres, particularly the national headquarters, seem to require resources beyond the means of member self-financing. Here the movement has to rely on donations, the collection and utilization of which is largely withheld from the public eye and from most Tablighis. From the various interviews it can be deducted that a large part of these donations comes in kind. Congregations primarily rely on the voluntary offerings by local businesses and administrations sympathetic to their cause. They provide food at nominal prices, sound systems, tents, and transport; local governments arrange for security, health, and fire and emergency services. The same holds true for the national headquarters, where items such as food and also the land, which they utilize, seem to be donated, notably by local landowners in the tradition of landed Muslim patronage of religious institutions.

A certain need for cash transactions still exists if only to repair or extend facilities and buildings, or pay for some of the foreign preaching groups travel cost. Respondents argue that these cash donations are made as *hadiya*, or pious gifts.[32] To establish consistency with mission goals, gifts are accepted only from those who have contributed to the cause of the movement or are doing so. This rule also applies to travelling preachers regarding whether or not to accept food offerings on the road. Donors may either have spent time on preaching, which is the most preferred contribution, or as mothers and fathers, may have provided the movement with several actively serving members from their offspring. Reportedly there is a long waiting list of willing donors to be accepted as few are considered worthy doing so. Since the movement pretends it has no offices, it does not seek legal registration or tax-exemption and its accounts are neither made public nor scrutinized, at least in South Asia as far as is known.

FOREIGN TOURS

A review of the bureaucratic features of the movement would be incomplete without looking at the ways in which foreign preaching tours are organized and conducted, giving the movement the global reach that has attracted so much attention. The foreign tours are initiated on much the same basis as the local ones, either by receiving a formal demand or request from local Muslims (taqaza) or by attracting the attention of Tablighi elders that Muslims of this region are in serious need of religious reformation. However, the financial demands generated by a foreign trip or *berun* jama'at make participation selective where faraway destinations require at least a costly air ticket.[33] In any case, participation in this foreign travel has become an attractive and coveted 'career goal'. Its mobilizing effect is obviously used also by the leadership. Particularly for long trips lasting more than seven months a careful and drawn-out selection process has to be navigated where intending travellers have to qualify. Respondents related that candidates have to meet a minimum of conditions before being eligible for foreign travel. They have to first complete a grand chilla, two year-long preaching tours (*salana*), and they have to be married. Strict rules stipulating that a minimum time has to elapse before becoming eligible again for a foreign trip also apply.[34] Also preachers of little means may participate if they succeed in getting the money, for which they

sometimes even borrow money, sanctioned in this case as serving a religious cause provided no interest is charged. Occasionally, this may get followers into deep debts against which the councils carefully caution. Donations may also be forthcoming from wealthy members to sponsor deserving poor followers. But permission has to be granted by a higher-standing council, often at the national level, where the donor's moral, religious, and financial credentials are reviewed. Another condition is that first-grade dependent relatives must give their formal consent so that no ailing parents or hungry children are left behind. As mentioned above, a preaching group heading abroad will undergo formal training and coaching at home for a couple of weeks. Where ten to fifteen men have to spend twenty-four hours together daily, characters may not match, creating problems, as has happened in the past. After their return they will also go together on local missions before the trip is considered complete. The groups going on foreign tours also report in-between through letters (karguzari), some of which have been published. They appear to be a naïve reflection of the cultural conflict into which Muslims from a thoroughly Islamized background in Pakistan or India are thrust when meeting with secularized and largely adapted Muslims in the West. Britain is a notable exception where islands of strong religious commitment by local Muslims can be found and Deobandi institutions flourish.

It is unclear to what extent the prospect of going out with a berun jama'at may have a corrupting influence on the movement as it becomes the subject of favouritism, which could be derived from some hints by respondents. Conversely, foreign preachers from the West coming to the subcontinent are often driven by romantic notions to find the true religious spirit in the homelands of the movement. An increasing number of visiting preachers from Asian, African, and Arabic countries, among which Malaysia and Indonesia seem to stand out, are anxious to learn and emulate the mobilizing effects of the movement for their own Muslim societies, where reformism increasingly targets the diversity of religious practices and Muslim lifestyles. Many visiting preachers learn some Urdu, in the process contributing to its spread as a global lingua franca of the movement. While translations of the main works exist in all major languages, their style is often arcane, formulaic, and marked by migrant speaking habits. Yet the deliberate usage of local languages for Islamic discourse and preaching marks the movement out and explains some of its success in spreading out.[35]

The social and cultural barriers between various segments of the global movement are exemplified in the special treatment which arriving foreign Tablighis receive in the subcontinent. Their accommodation at congregations and at the big centres is usually privileged. At Pakistan's Raiwind a special berun kamra or foreign guest hall exists, which is partially air-conditioned. Also hygienic conditions are better, with separate washing and toilette arrangements. At the national congregations, foreign participants appear to be virtually segregated from local followers as their separate tents are closed to locals. Foreign groups and visitors are assigned separate levels at the huge concrete centre at Nizamuddin, Delhi. They are usually always accompanied, getting all the speeches translated at their place, and almost never join the main auditorium in front of the speakers.

Examining the movement at close range, it seems that its bureaucratic features threaten to take on a life of their own. The movement appears to be more strictly regulated in Pakistan than in India, an assessment also shared by some respondents. To some extent, the bureaucratic transformation seems to be a product of the enormous growth of the movement, which generated considerable demands on leadership, guidance, uniformity, conformity, motivation, and control. The Tablighis have apparently moved from a fringe phenomenon to the mainstream of Muslim society in South Asia. Through this, they have attracted a more heterogeneous following. The growing representation of wider sections of Muslim society in its ranks has brought many middle-class concerns into the movement. Social networking has apparently intensified, aimed at opportunities in business, education, or arranged marriages. Political opportunities are tested with the implicit association of the Tablighi Jama'at and its stalwarts. None of this, however, has been proven to be the deliberate policy of the leadership of the movement. On the contrary, it tries to stem the tide of social and political opportunism by more elaborate and rigid regulation. The dynamics of growth may, therefore, be the major explanation for the emergence of a 'faith bureaucracy'. At the same time, its rules and procedures provide a 'steel frame' for the movement, allowing it to maintain its consistency and coherence when spreading across countries, cultures, and continents. They attest to its 'modernity', even though it deliberately relies on pre-modern forms of communication such as walking and personal oral talk. This 'skeleton modernity', however, remains ambiguous. It does not allow assumptions about the political and social values or activities of its members. Those

can be progressive or conservative, active or passive, radical or moderate. Viewing the Tablighi Jama'at as a 'faith bureaucracy' allows insight into its functioning hitherto unavailable. It does not allow making an assessment about the forms and directions of its contributions to society and politics, which primarily are informed by the multitude of—sometimes conflicting—concerns of its rank and file members.

NOTES

1. 'We have not formed a new organization for this work, nor is there any office for it, nor register, nor fund; this is the work of all Muslims, we have also not created a separate group (party) in any traditional way' (Hasani 1982: 750).
2. Culture is understood here as a unique profile and combination of universal aspects of human behaviour and not as reflecting eternal or permanent essential features.
3. Details can be provided on request by the author.
4. In very conservative and traditional Muslim majority areas such as the tribal belt bordering the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, the turnout will reach much higher figures though. This observation is owed to Albrecht Kraft who regularly travels in the area.
5. For the 2000 congregation, see *Dawn*, 5–7 November 2000; for Bangladesh, see Agence France-Presse (AFP), 'Muslims stream into Bangladesh for the 34th Biswa Ijtema', dateline 29 January 2000.
6. Interview at Aligarh Muslim University, 13 December 2001.
7. This refers to the Puritanism of the concept of *islah*, a movement for Qur'an-based reform of behaviour that emerged in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century and spread to the whole Islamic world.
8. Respondents at Aligarh on 12 December 2001, and Lahore on 9 and 15 November 2002.
9. The letter was written by Maulana Yusuf for a jama'at departing to the Hijaz for performing *'umra* (Hasani 1982: 765–82).
10. In Pakistan, zonal (halqa) councils are also formed, combining several local centres for extra leadership and guidance.
11. My interviews at the Bhopal congregation, 5–7 January 2002. The Amir of Pakistan's Tablighi Jama'at is Hajji Abdul Wahhab (b. 1928).
12. Cf. his farewell message and instructions at a congregation near Calcutta as printed in Hasani (1982: 783–91).
13. Interview at Lahore, 13 November 2002.
14. Interview at Lahore, 4 November 2002.
15. Interviews at Raiwind Markaz, 12 December 2002.
16. Respondent at Bhopal Ijtima', 4 January 2002.
17. Interview with Hamid Khan, Lahore, 31 October 2002, speaking about his own experience with his son.

18. Interview at Lahore, 22 October 2002. Cf. the memoirs of an old Mewati comrade of Muhammad Ilyas from the founding days of the movement, Rahim Bakhsh (1995).
19. Cf. the memoirs of an old Mewati comrade of Muhammad Ilyas from the founding days of the movement, Rahim Bakhsh (1995).
20. A significant number of Mewatis migrated to Kasur District in Pakistan at partition and their Tablighi representatives attend the congregations in force.
21. Interview at Lahore, 22 October 2002.
22. My interviews at Lahore in October–November 2002.
23. Interview at Lahore, 19 November 2002.
24. Interview at Nizamuddin, Delhi, 20 November 2001.
25. Interview with Jamshed Khan, long-time participant, although not a regular, at Lahore on 30 October 2002.
26. Interview at Lahore, 5 November 2002.
27. Interview at Lahore, 22 October 2002.
28. Interview at Lahore, 4 November 2002.
29. Interview at Lahore, 30 October 2002.
30. While annual student ijtima' are a regular feature of the Indian Tablighi Jama'at, the same could not be verified for Pakistan.
31. As observed during a visit to the Raiwind Markaz, 12 December 2002.
32. 'Hadiya—a donation made from piety or out of thanks-giving, rather than need (not maintenance, repair etc.). Usually a carpet, plaque or KISWA KIDMA-LI-LLAH service for Allah.' *http://members.tripod.com/~wim_canada/glossaryh.html*, accessed 7 November 2002.
33. One respondent from Pakistan estimated the cost of participation in a berun jama'at to be around Rs 100,000 and of a paidal jama'at around Rs 10,000. Interview at Lahore, 22 October 2002.
34. According to one respondent from Pakistan, you have to do 3 + 1 + 1 chillas before you can go on berun jama'at, and again before you go on the next one. Lahore, 22 October 2002.
35. Prominent examples are the state of Gujarat in India and Indonesia where the local language dominates the Tablighi discourse and literature of the movement.

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5

Bengal in Karnataka's Religious Reform Movement

A Case Study of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, 1890–1947

MARUTI T. KAMBLE

VIVEKANANDA IN KARNATAKA

Religion as a social variable occupied a significant place in the regeneration of modern South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nineteenth century was the century of the Indian Renaissance. Bengal was the heart of this renaissance and the religious movements that emerged out of it were the life-blood. There was a saying that if Bengal caught cold, India sneezed. Calcutta was the metropolis of the British Empire in India. Hence, Bengal was much closer to the western impact than any other region in India. The religious movements that began in Bengal in the nineteenth century gradually spread to interior parts of India and became national in character. Karnataka too did not escape the influence of the religious movements of Bengal. At the receiving end as far as Indian Renaissance was concerned, Karnataka's religious renaissance became the product of Bengali influence. Bengali literature, religion, and other aspects of culture acted as a role model to Karnataka in the nineteenth century. This chapter examines the impact in Karnataka of the religious movement of Swami Vivekananda, acting in the name of his guru, Ramakrishna Paramahamsa.

Popularly known in Europe and America as the 'cyclonic monk of India and patriot saint of India', Vivekananda (1863–1902) was intellectually well-equipped at the time of his contacts with Karnataka between