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# Changing Values Among Youth Examples from the Arab World and Germany 

International Conference, Cairo 20-21 June 2005

■ edited by
Sonja Hegasy and Elke Kaschl

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## Foreword

## Ali E. Hillal Dessouki

There are two ways of approaching youth issues. The first perceives youth as an object to be shaped, influenced, and molded. From this perspective, socialization is essentially a process of social control through which societies reproduce themselves, maintain the status quo, and resist change. The second perspective views youth as autonomous actors or subjects. They have their own aspirations and problems, hopes and fears, and their own visions for the future.

The social and political implications of these two perspectives are numerous. The first, a one way street, is an authoritarian approach and usually leads to generational conflict. Its wisdom is for the old to indoctrinate and youth to obey. The second is more dynamic and democratic, and implies that socialization is a process whereby society transfers its basic values to the young, giving them the opportunity to redefine these values.

In this context, the present book represents a valuable contribution to youth research. It contains useful insights and draws conclusions on youth views of society and politics in five Arab countries (Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, Syria and Palestine) and in Germany. In terms of methodology, it brings together various qualitative and quantitative approaches. It is most enlightening to identify and compare elements of similarity, difference, and specificity among the views of the young in different contexts.

Unemployment, for instance, is perceived as a major challenge in many cases. We also find patterns of commonality with regard to family life and meaningful jobs. In diverse situations one notices a sense of dissent, rebellion, retreat and anger, embraced by a general milieu of ambivalence. In the German case, these feelings are related to unemployment or to not having a rewarding job. In the Arab situation, it is a function of deep anxiety and uncertainty associated with rapid social change (Egypt and Morocco) or implication of a tense political context (Iraq and Palestine).

Discrepancies in the attitudes and behavior of youth were observed in some cases. This can best be understood not in ethical terms, but rather in the light of the contradictory situations youth encounter. Dealing with day to day challenges forces youth to bargain and compromise. In Morocco, ambivalence became a cultural system and negotiations a fundamental way of coping and
adapting (El-Harras). In Egypt, the same phenomenon manifests itself in the development of a youth subculture, complete with symbols and vocabulary. It reflects withdrawal, lack of confidence in adults, and the absence of a vision for the future (Elkamel).

In a world characterized by instability and uncertainty, an increasing number of youth take refuge in religion and family. For German youth, fathers are no longer seen as symbols of authority but rather as 'confidants'. Given the specificity of Palestinian youth, family became the primary agent for the transmission of values. The cohesiveness of Palestinian families is seen as an important factor in maintaining Palestinian identity.

As the studies in this volume reveal in many places, youth are ambivalent, confused, and ill-adjusted. They should certainly not be blamed, since they are dealing with a situation not of their own making and for which they are not prepared. Thus planning for a better future should involve empowering youth and providing them with basic life skills. The paper on Iraq demonstrates that energetic, self-determined, and goal-oriented young people willing to shoulder social responsibility under difficult conditions do exist (Wollenberg). The real challenge is to find out how we can contribute to assisting youth to take control of their own destiny and create their own future.

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2006

## Introduction

## Sonja Hegasy and Elke Kaschl ${ }^{1}$

What do we really know about young people in the Arab world? Too often they are perceived as passive, subdued and law-abiding individuals. When describing what happens in their societies, we like to refer to texts - whether legal or religious: The sharia says..., the koran demands..., family law stipulates..., satellite dishes are banned..., the Internet is censored..., premarital sex is not allowed etc. But what do young people really think and do? And how do we study them? This was the starting question of a conference by the Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in Berlin and the Goethe-Institut Cairo/Alexandria (GI) in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Cairo in June 2005. The conference aimed at promoting exchange among German, Egyptian and other Arab researchers on the study of youth values and attitudes. The study of young adults is an underdeveloped area of research and despite growing awareness of its vital significance since September 11th, there exists no single comprehensive youth study of any Arab country. Existing research is often scattered, partly inaccessible, and to a great extent focused on specialized topics. Yet almost $70 \%$ of the Arab population is under the age of 35 . To know more about this 'silent majority' on social as well as political issues is crucial, not only for Arab societies. The conference and this volume which resulted from it were therefore designed at presenting the potential and limitations of youth research in the Arab world and beyond, using examples from Morocco, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Germany. The focus is less on data analysis than on survey processes and methodology.

The ZMO, headed by Prof. Ulrike Freitag, is the only German research institute devoted to an interdisciplinary and comparative study of the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia. The study of youth has been a key research interest at the centre in recent years. In October 2003, the ZMO initiated a round table in Berlin on 'Empirical Youth Studies in the Arab World' ${ }^{2}$ to reflect on a comparative survey of political attitudes of young adults in North Africa. Furthermore, the feasibility of using a format comparable to the German Shell Youth Studies for Arab countries was discussed here for the first time. Johannes Ebert, Regional Director of the Goethe-Institut Cairo/Alexandria, and Enzio Wetzel, Head of Cultural Programmes, were also concerned with
gaining more knowledge on the situation of young Arabs. For the last few years they have been involved in initiating dialogue programs in the region, going beyond representatives of intellectual elites to focus on young people. In particular, the GI Cairo/Alexandria has begun cooperation with youth organizations in the field of art and culture for development. It has launched a project competition to facilitate networking and to set up a German-Arab Internet Online Youth Forum. In dealing with youth issues, Ebert and Wetzel were struck by the dearth of reliable background information and sensed that knowing more would be a welcome asset in designing projects to effectively reach their target group and address the issues that matter.

Against this backdrop, the joint ZMO-GI conference in Cairo was set up as a platform aimed at reviewing the state-of-the-art in youth research in the Arab world. It provided room for an exchange of experience and lessons learned, testing the ground for the possibility of conducting a national youth study in Egypt. In order to move beyond a purely theoretical debate, the conference not only hosted youth research specialists, but invited representatives of Egyptian youth organizations as well as the Egyptian Ministry of Youth to join in the discussion on how to make practical use of these insights. Students of anthropology from the FU Berlin also presented their fieldwork in Egypt.

The point of departure was the German Shell Youth Study, a national survey carried out at regular intervals over the last 50 years. Up to now 14 Shell Youth Studies have been published, and have gained international recognition as a unique example of longitudinal research on youth values. The Shell Studies were initiated in 1952 as part of the reconstruction of Germany after World War II. From the very beginning they have been used by a wide range of people in the area of politics, economics, society and culture as a means of understanding where generations of young Germans are heading and what their preoccupations are. Its findings are omnipresent in both the German public debate and the media, taking up and reproducing the specific terms or 'brand names' used to characterize each generation of adolescents and young adults. Hence the eighties, for example, brought forth the infamous and widely debated so-called 'Null-Bock-Kids', referring to a generation of young Germans with apparent indifference to anything except entertainment and fun. But are young Germans really no longer interested in getting involved in voluntary work, in political parties or in the church? In his contribution to this publication, Richard Münchmeier, professor at the FU Berlin and supervisor of the 13th Shell Study, portrays the present generation of young Germans as
'down-to-earth' and having a clear perception of the challenges that lie ahead of them. They also possess a strong readiness to tackle these challenges and make the best of them.

While Münchmeier's research presents a model study of youth research in the German context, the contributions of Bernard Sabella from the University of Bethlehem and Hans Oswald from the University of Potsdam bridge the geographical gap between Germany and the Arab world. Their papers are based on a rare comparative study of changing attitudes towards democracy among young adults in former East Germany, Palestine and Israel, which was published by Hilke Rebenstorf in 2004. ${ }^{3}$ In his paper, Bernard Sabella explores the intergenerational transmission of attitudes towards democracy in Palestinian families, based on family cohesion and the frequency of communication about politics and gender. At a time in which 'democracy' has become one of the over-used buzz words, Sabella's study makes an important contribution to our understanding of how Palestinian youth perceive of democratic participation in a context characterized by occupation, political turmoil and repeated attempts on the Palestinian side of making democracy happen despite the dire circumstances.

Hans Oswald from the University of Potsdam took part in the same crosscultural longitudinal study. He elaborates in this volume on gender differences in the political interest of adolescents from both Brandenburg and the West Bank. Based on a number of empirical studies that have shown the significance of political interest for a democratic political identity, Oswald examines the behavior of first-time voters from Brandenburg, one of the former EastGerman states, in the parliamentary election of 1998. Reacting to feminist critique of how the term 'political interest', was conceptualized Oswald and his colleagues not only included the customary single-item indicator but also a question on political interest in twenty different fields of politics. Women were shown to have less interest in so-called 'front page politics' but to be more concerned with societal politics (health, gender, peace). Instead of highlighting the 'unbridgeable difference' between Europe and the Middle East so often evoked in public discourse, the findings of the two papers by Sabella and Oswald bring to light various ways in which young people in the two locations of Brandenburg and Bethlehem in fact share similar concerns and perceptions towards democracy.

Four additional papers present results of studies from around the Arab world. Since the summer of 2004, psychologist Anja Wollenberg has had the
rare opportunity of talking to young Iraqis she came across during a joint radio project called Telephone FM. Together with Klaas Glenewinkel, Wollenberg directed an Iraqi-German team of young radio journalists, who produced and broadcasted shows in Iraq covering cultural and political issues. The target group of these programmes consisted of young adults in Iraq aged between 18 and 35 . Addressing the question of changing values, motives, and attitudes of young adults in Iraq, she undertook an analysis of 28 interviews with young men, in an attempt to identify influences and constraints that have shaped individual biographical narratives since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Given the difficult circumstances in Iraq, the analysis contained in her contribution to this volume had to rely purely on qualitative methods and does not claim to be representative. Wollenberg uses a content analysis approach in order to identify subjective patterns of action and motivations. Her findings with regard to patchwork biographies and non-institutional learning in Iraq are particularly interesting, albeit limited at this point in time. In contrast to widespread assumptions about education in authoritarian states, the biographies she presents are characterized by ardent self-determination and the readiness to take radical decisions.

Mokhtar El-Harras from the University of Rabat is one of the most renowned sociologists on the subject of youth in Morocco. His contribution dealing with students, their families, and the process of individuation concludes that "norms and ideas of previous generations have lost their effectiveness and validity for the current generation." El-Harras stresses that youth in both rural and urban areas increasingly make their own decisions, thereby reducing parental intervention. He attributes this partly to the knowledge gap between children and their parents, as parents are no longer the main knowledge transmitter. Parents furthermore had to relinquish some of their moral and religious authority. El-Harras points out that " $[\mathrm{t}]$ he transfer of youth socialization to extra-familial educational institutions undoubtedly contributes to the autonomy of youth." The author gives a number of important examples to illustrate the processes of individuation taking place in Moroccan society and the kind of identity bricolage to which youth is reverting.

Between May 2003 and January 2004, Sonja Hegasy carried out a quantitative survey on concepts of legitimacy under Mohammed VI, positioning them in the context of changing state-society relations. Hegasy presents her methodological approach and experiences in the survey process, during which she encountered a number of restrictions. The survey itself is based on a ran-
dom sample taken from urban and rural Morocco with the participation of 622 young adults between 18 and 35 . Politically the most relevant section of society today, this generation will decide on the stability and continuity of the Moroccan monarchy. Hegasy considered it insightful to comprehend their attitudes towards a young king in a society said to be based on the authority of a mystical father figure - be it head of the family or father of the nation. Inspired by what Clifford Geertz called "warrior saints"" - or homme fétiche following Alfred Bel (1938) - she explores how the king goes about securing his reign in the 21st century despite a diminishing of the spiritual, religious, patriarchal, divine, and holy dimensions of his authority and the growing importance of worldly, profane, merit-based and individual qualities for the legitimation of this authority.

The results of the studies on Morocco, Iraq and Palestine confirm that parental authority is losing ground in the Middle East. In the case of Palestine, where the intifada is driven by young people, this development is not as surprising as it is in the authoritarian states of Iraq and Morocco.

The papers presenting research projects from Egypt are evidence of the high level of both quantitative and qualitative methodological expertise available in the country. Diaa Rashwan from the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies gave an overview at the conference of the current socio-political conditions of young adults in Egypt and the perceived shift in their political values. ${ }^{5}$ Sahar El-Tawila, Professor for Statistics at the Faculty of Political and Economic Studies of Cairo University, presented lessons learned from the design and implementation of two national quantitative studies that were conducted in the mid- and late 1990s on youth and adolescents in Egypt in relation to health issues, marital patterns, and family formation. These studies are still considered pioneering in the Egyptian socio-political context. El-Tawila gives a highly interesting account of the survey process and its difficulties. Since international literature on adolescence "often misses crucial aspects" of adolescent life in developing countries, as El-Tawila points out, they are particularly insightful.

Farag Elkamel, Dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication at the Ahram Canadian University, summarizes the results of a qualitative study he conducted for UNICEF in Upper Egypt, the Delta and Metropolitan Cairo in 2001, focusing on different aspects of human interaction between adolescents and 'significant others', such as peers, siblings, friends, parents, and teachers. Elkamel used focus group discussions to study attitudes on gender equality within the family,
about relationships between boys and girls, as well as attitudes towards smoking and drug use. His most important finding was that youth has developed its own subculture and are withdrawing from the communication process with adults.

Rania Salem's contribution presents the findings of an action-based research project on gender attitudes of rural adolescents in the governorate of Minya, which was implemented by the Cairo office of the Population Council, an international non-governmental organization, thereby bringing the practitioner perspective into the discussion. The starting point was the fact that the educational system has failed to erode patriarchal attitudes towards gender roles as no significant difference could be found in the attitudes of those who have primary schooling only and those with a university degree.

We are very pleased to be able to include another paper which was not presented at the conference but rounds up this volume very well. Katharina Lange from the ZMO writes about income generating activities of youth in a Northern Syrian village. She looks into the effects of economic change on the situation of rural youth, pointing to the complex interrelationships between external economic transformations, changing labour-related values, and intergenerational relations as well as social norms.

The conference was financed by special funds from the Federal Foreign Office for "Dialogue with the Islamic World", the Goethe-Institut and the Kon-rad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Cairo headed by Dr. Michael Lange, whom we thank very much. In addition, our thanks go to the Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften in Wiesbaden for their permission to reprint and translate Bernard Sabella's contribution into Arabic. It was another important aim of this volume, to make all papers available for the Arabic speaking readership. We are also very honoured that the former Egyptian Minister of Youth and wellknown political scientist, Prof. Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki, agreed to write the foreword.

As a result of our conference in June 2005, we were able to assemble a number of sociological studies on youth in the Middle East carried out by people who have not heard of each other before. A list of contributors is given in the appendix and we hope that this will serve as a nucleus for a network of researchers on youth in the future.

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Notes

1 The editors would like to thank Firdaous Fatfouta and Gamal Abdelnasser very much for proof reading the publication and Tobias Goldschmidt for compiling the bibliography.
2 Hegasy (2004)
3 Rebenstorf (2004)
4 Geertz (1971 [1968]: 46)
5 For organisational reasons his paper is unfortunately not included in this volume.

# After the Fall of the Regime: Orientation and Motivation of Young Adults in Baghdad 

Anja Wollenberg

## Introduction

From April 2004, on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the streamminister company has been conducting cooperative media projects with local partners in Iraq. So far three projects have been run where German-Iraqi teams have produced and broadcasted a radio shows covering cultural and political issues. The partners and target group of the programmes are young adults in Iraq aged between 18 and 35 . The long-term goal of the cooperation is to establish and maintain participative, impartial media services in Iraq and to foster qualification and networking among Iraqi journalists. All projects were funded by the German Foreign Office.

In order to go beyond the scope of these projects and address the question of values, motives, and attitudes of young adults in Iraq, streamminister undertook an analysis of 28 interviews from the first radio project, TELEPHONE $F M$, trying to identify influences and constraints that shape individual biographical narratives after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

## Empirical Material and Research Object

The Radio Show
TELEPHONE FM was an Arabic language radio show. It was produced partly in Berlin and partly in Baghdad by an Arab/German team and was broadcasted on a Baghdad youth radio station over a period of three-and-a-halfmonth in the summer and autumn of 2004.

The 70 broadcasts in total focused on concerns such as how people conceived their lives in present and future, what aims they had, both personally and career-wise, and what projects young people had in Baghdad eighteen months after the Saddam Hussein regime fell. One of the project's goals was to elaborate a comprehensive picture of the attitudes, interests, and activities as well as the fears and hopes of the listeners; in fact, what emerged was a public platform for presentation, inspiration, and critical debate.

Streamminister started the project in early 2004, initially intending to produce and broadcast a radio show in Baghdad. However, as the security situation deteriorated, one was forced to give up plans of moving there. Instead, Iraqi journalists and radio presenters were invited to Berlin to produce the show here. A total of four Iraqis came to Berlin for two production phases where, together with German and Arab colleagues, they developed, designed and produced the show; a 90 -minutes programme was then delivered on a daily basis to a FM-radio station in Baghdad where it was included in the daily broadcasting schedule. Since then a number of follow-up projects have been initiated, such as:

- a radio show monitoring the political process in Iraq, respectively the elections in January and the ongoing constitutional process (running from December 2004 to December 2005)
- a show on cultural issues planned for autumn 2005 including reports about the state of contemporary art and culture in Iraq's neighbouring countries (named: Iraq $360^{\circ}$ )
- a website providing a civil society discussion forum on the political process in Iraq and the drafting of the new Iraqi constitution (www. niqash.org)

The Interviews and the Interviewees
During the production of the TELEPHONE FM broadcasts, the editorial team conducted over 100 interviews on a variety of subjects, primarily with young Iraqi adults living in Iraq. These interviews were conducted either by correspondents in Baghdad or via phone by the Iraqi journalists in the Berlin studio (hence the name - TELEPHONE FM). The process of finding interviewees was taken up by the entire team and by project partners supporting the research. They were specifically looking for interviewees drawn from two groups of people: experts on a specific topic - for example, media, education, culture, etc. -, and young people working on interesting projects or topics who were willing to talk about themselves and their work.

In order to attain well-founded and meaningful statements in the project evaluation about the interviewees' attitudes and opinions, a series of interviews were translated and evaluated and an additional number of in-depth interviews were carried out with Iraqi project partners in Berlin. In the following, some of the findings from this extended evaluation is presented, based on interviews with 28 Iraqi men ${ }^{1}$ aged 18-35 living in Baghdad. The material comprises:

- 13 short ten-minute interviews
- 12 long interviews (of around 20 minutes each)
- 3 discussions lasting approximately 2 hours each

The research focused on the issue of how biographies are constructed and the factors that influence this process, looking specifically for answers to the following questions:

- What are our interviewees' jobs and how do they do them?
- What motives and interests play a role in their work?
- How important is the world outside Iraq in their work?
- How do they evaluate the future of Iraq as playing a part in their own plans for their personal future?


## Procedure

In terms of methodology, the analysis has been conducted as a backwardsmoving process: in contrast to standard research where one begins with the research question to generate the according data, we found ourselves first confronting the data before specific issues could be identified. To clarify the concerns, all interview passages were divided up into the categories of 'description', 'explanation', and 'evaluation', which then allowed the team, in a second step, to identify issues - what was being described, explained, or evaluated? This, in turn, led to the key questions listed above.

On the basis of these key questions, a structured collection of answers could be generated that were then analysed in regard to similarities, differences, and patterns among the statements. As a result of these procedures, tentative theses and interpretations were formulated, which are presented and illustrated by excerpts from the interviews shown in section "Presentation of the Findings."

In adopting this method, we are following Mayring's content analysis (1990), a qualitative approach aimed at identifying subjective patterns of action and reasoning to make action understandable. This phase of the research was not striving to ensure the findings were generalisable or representative for the group as a whole. (On the validity of the findings, see "Conclusion").

## Social Background

Just prior to the Gulf War, the U.N. described Iraq as a high middle-income country with a modern social infrastructure. In comparison to other Arab states, religion played a minor role in public life and was seen as a private mat-
ter. Gender equality was relatively advanced in the training and job sectors, while the level of general education, enjoyed an excellent reputation in the Arab world. The Iraqi self-image, even today, is coined by the notion of belonging to the vanguard of modernity in the Arab world. In fact, however, Saddam Hussein's aggressive and authoritarian domestic and foreign policy and the embargo in place since 1990 has reversed the successful start to modernization and the formerly high level of cultural development. The 1990s were a step backwards into pre-modern times and a return to pre-modern values: tribes and shuyukh have gained influence, religion has gained in importance, and everyday life has become dominated by the quest for provisions, with the society marked by social injustice (Al-Ali 2003).

## Political Conditions

Roughly speaking, our interviewees were born in the 1970s, at a time when the Socialist Baath Party was already in power. In 1979, Saddam Hussein took over from al-Bakr as President. The political environment this generation grew up in can be characterized as authoritarian: despite the modernization in the 1970s mentioned above, civil society neither had chances to engage in political participation nor was there a freedom of opinion, press, or information. Violence was an omnipresent instrument of asserting political power, the regime persecuted and killed large numbers of Kurds, Shiites and communists. The general population was under surveillance from a number of secret service organisations and was systematically brainwashed by the regime's propaganda machine (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett 1990). In this spirit, Iraqi media production was controlled by Saddam Hussein's son Uday, who also was the head of the Iraqi Journalist Union. Satellite television and the Internet were banned. Contrary to their intended goals, the sanctions imposed on Iraq under UNSC Resolution 661 in 1990 did not lead to changing power relations within Iraq but instead further buttressed Saddam Hussein's regime. As the principal distributor of foodstuffs and medicine, the government was not only provided with further control mechanisms over the population, but also regained legitimacy within Iraq.

## Economic Development

In this period, economic development is marked by extreme contrasts and a progressive downward spiral. During the 1970s, the centralized economy found itself in the middle of an upswing. Oil production had been nationa-
lised and benefited from output nearly tripling between 1965-1979, with a parallel rise in oil prices. Between 1973 and 1979 alone, the revenues from oil rose tenfold (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett 2003). The economic decline began in the mid-1980s as the spiralling costs for the war with Iran and the war damage began to bite. In the medium term, the UN imposed embargo resulted in the majority of Iraqis living below the poverty line - causing significant damage to the integrity of the society in the health, social, and cultural spheres. Since 1990, infant mortality rates (4,000-5,000 per month), and cases of malnutrition, leukaemia and cancer have all been steadily rising (Al-Ali 2003).

## Education and Professional Life

Since the economic crisis began, salaries paid in state-run institutions and factories have increasingly taken on a symbolic character. For example, by the mid-1990s a teacher's monthly salary amounted to somewhere between $\$ 5-10$ - one reason why a person's education and training and the job they were doing frequently bore very little relation to earning a living. The average family made ends meet through food stamps and trading on the unofficial markets. Although compulsory school attendance was introduced in Iraq in 1976, a Ministry of Planning survey in the summer of 2004 found that $20 \%$ of young Iraqis under the age of 24 had not received any schooling at all, $15 \%$ had not even finished primary school, and only $11 \%$ had completed a secondary school education. ${ }^{2}$ After the initial successes scored in the fight against illiteracy when compulsory schooling was introduced, by 2003 the illiteracy rate had again risen to $30 \%$ among men and $55 \%$ among women (UNESCO 2003).

## The Gulf Wars

Our interviewees witnessed three wars fought under Saddam Hussein's regime: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Second Gulf War 1990/91, and now the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the allied forces led by the U.S. Everyone who has lived through these years can recount their own traumatic experiences of war and list friends or family who were among the casualties. From their 16th birthday on, all young men were constantly accompanied by the fear of being drafted into the military at anytime and without any warning.

The interviews providing the material for this analysis were conducted in the summer and autumn of 2004, one-and-a-half year after the invasion of the American-led Coalition Forces. In the following section a brief overview is provided of the central features of the situation in Baghdad at that time.

## Iraq in Summer 2004

Dissolution of Structures
Under the occupation, state structures were dissolved and replaced by improvised interim institutions with an authority and jurisdiction that initially remained opaque. In a parallel movement, triggered by this power shift, the entire society became gripped by a heated debate on personal and collective identities, where religious, political, ethnic, and regional affiliations were taken as points of departure for new identity constructs. In this situation, radical preachers (like Muqtada al-Sadr), proved able to attract a following, especially among young adults, by pitting the clarity of religious dogma against growing social chaos. On 28 June an interim government was appointed under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a leader regarded as having authoritarian leanings. This move was connected with a hope for a quick clarification of the situation.

The sudden loss of any semblance of security in the public sphere may well be the feature that most characterised the situation in 2004. Iraqi citizens faced a variety of threats from different areas. Firstly, the occupying forces represented a constant source of potential violence and a possible provocation to violence; secondly, the number of criminals ready to plunder property, kidnap children, or work as hired contract killers steadily grew; thirdly, the summer of 2004 saw a significant increase in religiously and politically motivated assassins, that became a constant source of worry and concern as such attacks occurred with increasing frequency and began not only targeting the occupation forces but also those collaborating with them. At that time, the battles in Fallujah became a symbol of the occupation forces' inability to curb resistance.

The freedom generated by the fall of the regime is extensive and radical. Innumerable new radio stations and newspapers, freed from state control, have begun disseminating their own - usually politically bound - positions. Numerous Internet cafes have sprung up providing uncensored access to information on the Internet. Satellite TV is also freely available, providing one can afford to buy a satellite dish. Political parties have been founded and political views can be freely expressed in public. Since the fall of the regime more than 700 NGOs have been founded in Iraq, frequently with the support of exile Iraqis who have now returned to their home country (in June 2005, there were around 6,000 NGOs).

The supply situation in Iraq was already serious before the invasion and the war had only made it more severe. Recurrent power cuts at temperatures of
around 55 degrees fuelled the general population's anger and desperation; the hygienic conditions in hospitals, the state of the roads and provision of water were all noticeably worsening. The massive army lay-offs and dismals in the wake of the peace settlement and in the process of 'de-Baathification' resulted in an already high unemployment rate rocketing to approximately $50 \%$. Figures from late 2004 revealed $43 \%$ of all families living below the poverty line, with a further $44 \%$ of families barely above it, and only $2 \%$ able to enjoy a reasonable or even prosperous standard of living. ${ }^{3}$

The roadmap imposed by US politicians not only held out the promise of elections in January 2005 but also that of Iraq's democratisation. The roadmap provides for elections and a provisional government, a constitution designed by 15 August 2005, a referendum on the constitution and, finally, at the end of 2005, parliamentary elections held on the basis of the new constitution. The public debate in Iraq on the project's chances of success showed a certain ambivalence, with the question of whether democracy can be created through war and outside coercion constituting a main element in the debate. In real terms, from the perspective of the civilian population, although the elections in January 2005 remain an abstract plan, the term 'democracy' is filled with hope.

## Presentation of the Findings

As mentioned at the beginning, the interview analysis focused on the question of how biographies get shaped. Beyond this core concern, the aim was to gain a greater understanding of the values, motives and attitudes of the project partners and target groups. The concrete questions detailed in the section on the interviews and the interviewees are used here to structure the presentation.

What are our Interviewees' Jobs and how do they do them?
The majority of the interviewees are self-employed, freelancers, or develop their own projects; only 6 out of 28 are salaried employees while 12 work in the cultural sector, e.g., film makers, writers, sculptors, dancers, or musicians. A further six own shops or workshops, in jobs ranging from lute-builder to antiques dealer, Internet Café owner or tattoo shop proprietor. Six interviewees are mainly working as full-time journalists, with the remainder of the group made up of software programmers and sportsmen, and people working for NGOs or at universities.

## Patchwork Biographies and Non-Institutional Learning

Since many interviewees follow more than one career path, either consecutively or simultaneously, this initial categorization into occupational groups is only roughly applicable. For example, the poet and writer was previously trained as an electrician but is now working as a journalist; the dpa correspondent also owns an Internet Café; another journalist is not only a businessman and farmer, but also busy writing his doctorate; the NGO founder is also an author, and so on. Most of the biographies we came to know are marked by frequent changes of work areas and multiple jobs in different occupations.

Undoubtedly, such non-linear biographies are more likely to occur given a centralised distribution of university places in line with school grades, as was the case in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein regime. Here, a training path was not selected on the basis of interest and talent but imposed by a state-defined mechanism where specific grades inevitably led to specific educational paths. In the case of our interviewees, this had often resulted in a situation where they had both completed the prescribed training but also pursued their own interests and talents, combining both of these strands into a career patchwork.

This kind of non-linear career-pathing is also associated with self-taught acquisition of the competencies needed in one's work. The expertise and skills required are often learned outside the state's educational institutions, most commonly with the help of friends and books and, since 2000, also with the help of the Internet as an information resource. The following two examples illustrate this way of learning.

Not only did the owner of a tattoo parlour teach himself how to tattoo but he also built his own tools when he was first starting out: "I started in 1996 and since I could already draw rather well, the two things were an optimal fit. In the beginning, I had to build the tattoo equipment myself but after a while things started to develop further [...] Of course, it's mainly a question of talent. I learnt the basic skills and created a foundation on which I could then build. I've kept on working on those skills - and kept on learning, for example, from western specialist magazines and catalogues."

The film maker O. left film school after one year and learnt how to make films on his own: "Every student had to submit a short film as a part of their final exams. Most of them weren't capable of making a film. They simply hadn't learnt how to do it. One day a student asked me to make a film he could submit for his finals. He offered to pay me for it. I shot the film and suddenly I was snowed under by similar requests. From then on, I shot one
film after another for these students. It was a great way to learn about the art of filmmaking - I could try everything out."

## Confident Decision-Making, Quick Realization

What emerges in trying to identify factors, institutions, and persons influencing the interviewees' biographies is, first and foremost, their impressive readiness to aplomb. Without giving any great consideration to risks or potential disadvantages, or taking steps to establish long-term safeguards, most of our interviewees quickly put projects and plans into action. And they take these decisions themselves, almost entirely alone without making any noticeable allowances for intervention or support from state institutions, family members, or others. A few examples will illustrate this approach in more detail:

Journalist and doctoral student $S$. is working for a number of agencies and newspapers, writing his thesis at the university and, in addition, running a smallholding outside Baghdad. When he talks about his attitude to life, he says: "My advice to anyone striving to be successful is to set yourself a goal and forget about everything else. Don't think of anything else but your goal and how you can achieve it. In my view, you only have to keep that goal right in front of your eyes and never let yourself be distracted by the problems and difficulties there are in Iraq at present. [...] If you want to be successful, then you'll also enjoy the risk contained in any challenge [...] I can risk everything and challenge any power in this world."
R. runs a successful Internet Café in Baghdad: "I opened my Internet café after the war, helped by friends who lent me computers. Before the war, I was studying in Baghdad in a college for mass media. I've got the only Internet café in this part of the town. [...] In my life up until now, I've only ever done the right things. I trust myself and my intuition. Lots of people think they can do great things but they never do. That doesn't happen to me."
O. is a filmmaker from Baghdad who shot a feature film there shortly after the war ended. For his film, he used old looted film material that he bought on the black market: "None of the people putting up the money for the film knew whether they'd ever actually get to see anything on the screen. None of them knew if it would ever really result in anything at all. But still we sold our cars, my brother and I, to make our work possible."

In the course of a conversation, J. had taken the decision to make a career in journalism: "One or two days after the fall of the regime an American journalist visited me at home. At that time I was working as a baker and earning
about $\$ 2$ a day. After first having described my home as a place where not even mice would want to live, the journalist then asked me some questions. I spontaneously replied that now after the system had changed, my situation would also change and, at that very moment, I decided to become a journalist."

Many of these narratives are marked by the readiness to take radical decisions and imbued by a feeling of self-confidence and courage. The interviewees present themselves as sovereign actors who react to the shift in the overall situation not with helplessness but with activism. They do not ask for institutional support; however they do rely on the help of friends and relatives.

Naturally, though, there were also other approaches to life where, for example, the interviewee pursuing a sports career with his potential actions limited by the official sports organisation. Other cases, for instance the lute-builder and antiques trader, revealed a continuation of family traditions, where sons had taken over the jobs and businesses of their fathers. However, in our series of interviews, this mode of a determined life adapting to external restraints was lower-ranking compared to the autonomous, action-directed, and self-determined approach related to the tendency to acquire self-taught skills and realise patchwork biographies.

## Comment

If these observations are now placed in relation to the societal structures and conditions in summer 2004 it would seem that acting confident, quick and self-determined might well be an appropriate response to the dissolution of structures, state, and order that characterised the situation so strongly. Apparently our interviewees are handling the sudden disappearance of structures, security, and order in a rather competent and self-assured way, which raises the question of when and how they acquired the according skills. All our interviewees grew up during the Baath regime and, hence, under societal structures oriented along and towards regulation, supervision, and control. But how can young people in an authoritarian and repressive society develop competencies that turn them into experts in dealing with chaos and disorientation?

One thesis, though needing to be verified, relates to the state's inability to maintain supply in the education and work sectors under the conditions created by the embargo. The inability to provide the civilian with institutional promotion and institutionalized securities leads at the same time to the loss of institutionalized supervision and control over this civilian. As a result, the poli-
tical culture obviously no longer penetrates and structures the space of individual professional activities, which are (or have to be) organised outside institutional structures. Paradoxically this disintegration can be combined with an increased legitimacy of the regime as pointed out in chapter 3. Within society autonomous cultural spaces may develop with their own values and maxims of action. To put it somewhat pointedly - within the context of this structural aspect, the transition from dictatorship to anarchy may not be that much of a change. This is a point I will return to in the conclusion.

## Family and Gender

The assumption that the interviewees in Iraq also act in a sphere outside family influence is not suggested here. For every individual, the family plays a large role in self-image, future plans, and everyday life and, moreover, is more important than loyalty to the state. In Iraqi society, the extended family is the fundamental social unit. Nonetheless, in assessing family influence, one needs to differentiate between plans in the work and private sphere and between men and women. Although certain decisions in the private sphere, for example, place of residence and choice of spouse - which are not part of this research are definitely regarded as a family concern and under family control, this does not apply to such an extent to work-related decisions taken by young men. While our interviewees and colleagues reported family support and encouragement in their professional lives, they described the attitude of their families towards private or possible love relationships as restrictive and controlling. The question of whether this approach is similarly differentiated in the lives of young women, though, goes beyond the scope of this research. It is known, however, that women in general are subject to more stringent familial and societal controls than men and that, since the mid-1990s, the restrictions on, and social marginalisation of, women have been steadily increasing.

What Motives and Interests Play a Role in Their Work?
In the second step of the analysis, motives for work-related decisions and the interests underlying them were investigated. The following motives are prominent in the narratives.

## Market and Customers

In explaining work-related decisions, many of our interviewees refer to the needs and interests of customers and the market. Just as everywhere else in the
world, when making products available, business people orientate themselves towards customer demand. Also artists align their production with their audience's anticipated or real interests, whereby one specific feature of such 'customer orientation' shall be addressed here in more detail:

Many of the artists interviewed are passionately involved in rehabilitating art in society. They deplore the collaboration between art and the previous regime as well as the misuse of art for propaganda purposes which has culminated in the destruction of art and its function in society. The artists view the loss of culture's credibility among the general population as the loss of their means of existence. The people have turned away from art so much so that even art that is oppositional in character and non-regime affiliated has lost both its audience and its legitimacy. Our interviewees rejected the artists-inexile, removed from the people, and similarly rejected regime-affiliated artists who worked against the people. Instead, they are striving to recover an audience by addressing the issues that directly affect the people.

For example, the poet A. commented: "I grew up at a time when poets enjoyed hardly any widespread public acceptance and, at that time, it really hurt me. This was because poets wrote poems of praise to the people in power, and took their money too. Only a very small group of poets avoided that route, going down a different road, working out of the public eye. But because this went on for decades, people learnt to treat poets with contempt since they were writing things about Saddam and events in Iraq that had little or nothing to do with ordinary people's reality. These poets inhabited a different world from the world of truth and the world of the Iraqi people. [...] Now we need poets in Iraq who show that what was disseminated as poetry in those days was simply a lie and not poetry at all. We have to offer the broad mass of people poems bound to their own joy and suffering, and far removed from the government and the rulers."

## Presentation Abroad

We find here a second motif, closely related to the notion of revitalising art by turning to the audience: the motif of rehabilitating the Iraqi people in the way it is perceived through the media by the rest of the world. Many interviewees justify their actions with the desire to correct the sensationalist media image of the underdeveloped, violence-loving Arab and replace it with the reality of the educated, confident and cosmopolitan Iraqi, an image vanished from the media since the fall of the regime.

This desire plays a key role among Iraqi bloggers, as the blogger F. explains: "We drew our motivation for writing from the vast discrepancy between international media reports and commentaries and what we were experiencing ourselves everyday. In many of their reports, the international media seemed to have little idea of what was happening - and I can't say whether that was deliberate or not. But it simply created a false picture of what was happening. And that's why we are following all the everyday events."
H., a sculptor, puts it even more directly: "My friends' help enabled us to disseminate a different picture from the one usually seen in the media or broadcast via satellite TV as news, no matter whether it was couched in black or white terms. Actually, you know yourself the news in those days only ever portrayed a dark likeness of the city, the shadowy side, the robberies and murders. We just wanted to make Iraqi voices a part of this change too, so we could say: We are there, we are thinking, we are dreaming, and we are doing our work, and this reveals more of our civilized state than just the degeneration that's taking place in front of the cameras, all too keen to capture it on film to fill the satellite TV stations' programmes." Another variation of this concern is found among some journalists who are calling for the reintroduction of truth in the Iraqi media as a key journalistic standard and goal. From this standpoint, journalism is less a professional skill than, first and foremost, a moral task: "The thing I really hope for in my job [as a journalist] is that I can portray the truth, precisely and without bias, regardless of whether it is about oppressing some ordinary person, describing rights previously withheld or exposing the things politicians want to hide from the people."

## Passion

We found that together with, and complementary to, the externally directed drive of customer/market/image, career decisions are taken on an emotional basis. Passion is an essential source of motivation in work activities - despite, and perhaps because of, the hostile conditions in which these activities take place. This was most clearly expressed by S., the lute-builder, who has been making ouds since he was 18: "Making an Oud is not particularly lucrative since the details involved in the work are very time-consuming and complex [...] No-one can really make an Oud if they don't love the instrument too. It also takes a while before you master the skills you need but then you're really proud of your work. [Question: What kind of skills do you need to become a lute maker?] First of all, you have to love the instrument."

The journalist O. too is driven by the enjoyment of his job: "Afterwards I started as an announcer at a local radio station. I also enjoyed that more and more, my media competency increased and my best times where when I was in the studio."

## Comment

In comparing the motives and interests outlined here with the living conditions at the time of the interviews, one is confronted by an apparent contradiction: the interviewees do not act defensively or out of despair, as might be suggested by the hostile conditions in occupied Baghdad; instead, they are pursuing motives one could describe as idealistic. Rather then underscoring their powerlessness and despair, the interviewees emphasize the scope and impact of their possibilities. In their narratives, the ideal of freedom takes precedence over material shortages and existential problems, which rarely appear as reasons for their actions.

How Important is the World Outside Iraq in Their Work?
Since the fall of the regime, contacts abroad have significantly increased although, looked at objectively, trade conditions have actually worsened due to the risks on the ground (bringing visits from abroad to a near total standstill), the severe damage caused to the infrastructure, with the related difficulty of reaching anyone by phone, and the invalidity of travel documents previously authorized. Nevertheless, contacts have not only multiplied vastly but have also become more interactive, i.e., rather than just a consumption of Western culture, commercial and cultural exchanges are taking place.

## Cooperation

Most of our interviewees are successfully looking for contacts to Western institutions to utilize their production and distribution capacities to enter international markets, communities, and discourses:

- a guitarist we interviewed told us the band he was in had found a producer in London who was going to produce their new album there and launch it on the international market
- one of the film makers had worked together with a German film production company to produce and distribute his movie shot on location in Baghdad. In the course of realising this project, he had travelled to Germany with some of his Iraqi colleagues to spend several months there. The film is currently being shown at international film festivals
- many Iraqi journalists have applied for IWPR, CNN, or BBC training and, in this way, have become correspondents working for international agencies. Streamminister is in touch with at least 30 Iraqis - of course, apart from those mentioned here - who have participated in the streammi-nister-media-projects mentioned earlier.
- one programmer is a member of the international Linux community, viewing himself as a bridge-head for that community in Iraq. He hopes that he can help Iraq become a place with more Linux than Microsoft users.
- Iraqi track and field athletes held their pre-Olympic training in Cologne, since the conditions there were better and also prepared there for the Arab Games in Algeria.
- both (!) antiques dealers buy their goods in Italy, Austria, Russia, and from all of the Arab countries.
At the time of the interviews, the vast majority of interviewees had active work-related contacts abroad - a surprising finding when one takes into account how extremely difficult conditions were then to establish and maintain contacts. The main criticism of the West was directed to its media coverage. As one can see in some of the quotes above, Iraqis primarily criticise the choice of images broadcast by a violence-loving media focusing, as the core of their coverage, on shots of armed Iraqi perpetrators and injured Iraqi victims. They fear - and rightly so - that the media will damage the image of Iraq abroad and they attempt to use their own activities and work to counter such developments. In particular, the Iraqi blogger community is active here and has managed to attain worldwide popularity (e.g., www.riverbend.blogspot.com).


## Emigration

As has been illustrated (section "Cooperation") contacts abroad are being sought generally and, in particular, to the West and the inspiration from abroad is being welcomed; the increased exchange with the world abroad is viewed positively and the opportunities to make money through cooperation are being utilized. In contrast, however, the decision to leave Iraq to live abroad is viewed unfavourably. Many of our interviewees disparage and reject emigration, or at least deny it as a possibility in their own lives. In this sense, the pop group we interviewed is an exception, since they have collectively decided to emigrate to England. The others who commented on this issue all view emigration - frequently not explicitly but between the lines - as a betrayal or an act of weakness. As the following quote from the writer O. illustrates,
emigrants are seen as turning their back on the people, just as the regimeaffiliated artists are considered to have turned from the people towards Iraq's despotic ruler:
"Two types of Iraqi lyrical poetry are no longer readable at all - and mostly for psychological reasons. I'm talking about those types, those ideological contradictions, whose shadows still lie across Iraqi culture, and one of them comprises the chauvinists - and the other their counterpart, the emigrants. Neither of these types is seen as representing Iraqi culture any longer and they are no longer read. [...] And now lots of people are asking themselves why isn't Muzaffar al-Nauuab here - in Iraq? [...] He is presently living in Syria - and accepts a system there that in a certain sense is also a dictatorship. So why isn't he here? Or Saadi Youssef, who's living in London - and at the cost of the people there, since he's receiving financial support from their government. So he's living in a country occupying his own homeland. These are contradictions I simply can't understand!"

Emigration is rejected as a biographical option, as is illustrated in the following quote from the film maker R:
"My second film was about the end of the hippie culture in Iraq. The film was nine minutes long and rather good. It was shown at a film festival in Amsterdam. I didn't go there even though I would have had the chance. It wasn't forbidden to visit Europe and I could have got a visa. For example, my uncle lives in California. He was always inviting me to visit him but I didn't want to go. I had the feeling that some major changes would be taking place in Iraq and I wanted to witness these events first-hand. It was a decision that wasn't easy to make and meant I had to give up a mass of chances I would have had. But I think it was the right thing to do. I've experienced the events of the last year and I've made this film and received a lot of recognition from people who are important to me. I only left Iraq for the first time this year to visit the Berlin Film Festival."

## Comment

Many interviewees have successfully set up cooperations with foreign institutions, ending the painful isolation imposed during the embargo era. In doing so, the Iraqis have positioned themselves in these evolving relationships as, on the one hand, recipients of benefits and support - for example, in the case of the athletes invited to Cologne by the Olympic Committee to provide them with better training facilities or the many journalists invited to training courses
run by Western media such as the BBC, CNN and Deutsche Welle. A significantly larger number of contacts, however, are of a business nature, where the actors from 'the West' are not perceived primarily as helpers but as business partners.

As it becomes clear from the examples (see "Cooperation") many relationships evolving here are relationships of partners who pursue transparent interests. This entry into cross-border cooperative relationships may also help effectively establish a middle class and develop civil society into a self-confident and modern partner for the state - especially since, as the quotes on the issue of emigration show, the interest of young Iraqis in staying in their country appears to be greater than any desire to leave it.

The passionate rejection of emigration by those staunchly determined to stay is more easily understood when one bears in mind the intellectual and financial resources lost in each wave of emigration - since the occupation of Iraq in April 2003 more than 600,000 Iraqis have left the country, including many physicians, academics, and experts. In this sense, emigration is not just an act of betrayal, of turning one's back, but also something that increases the desolation in one's home country.

How are Iraq's Present and Future Evaluated as Part of One's Own Life Plans?

The characteristic features of the situation in Baghdad in summer/autumn 2004 can be summarized as, on the one hand, the increased freedoms in the wake of the fall of the regime and, one the other, the loss of security and the worsening supply of material goods (for details see section "Iraq in Summer 2004"). Unsurprisingly, then, our interviewees all referred to the severe shortages and poor security situation in Baghdad as 'tough', 'hard', 'difficult', and 'painful'. In the interviews, they did not go into detail about the generally poor situation and their comments remained brief and general; similarly, American policies were also not discussed in depth.

But rather than there being no evaluation offered at all, it was transposed and transmitted via the issue of Iraq's future and democratisation. In contrast to the anticipated negative assessment of the present situation in normal life, Iraq's future perspectives were largely viewed positively - even if the majority of interviewees admitted an indefinite period of learning, effort, and change lay between the unappealing present and a future seen in glowing colours. As the following quotes show, the basis for such an optimistic assessment proved
to be an unfaltering faith in the Iraqi people, its power and intelligence, and its capacity to overcome crises and find solutions for the problems it is facing: "I expect I will see many beautiful things in future - and even if it's only because I'm one of those working towards creating them. Our city is now in our own hands and we have to make most of the effort ourselves. I'm absolutely convinced this generation will experience more work than joy but, on the other hand, the effort we have to make is itself a reason for joy - and a very honourable one too. I sincerely hope we'll be successful. And even if we aren't able to enjoy that success ourselves, there will certainly be someone coming after us who can. Nowadays, it's enough to plant a flower - after all, only thorn bushes were planted in the past..."
K. takes a far more critical stance but believes in a similar end result: "I'm not optimistic in the short term but I believe, given time, things will get better. Young people in Iraq are open and ready for new ideas. The reason why there are still problems in educating the youth politically is largely down to a tense and troubled situation, poor economic development and lack of security. But this will change too in the medium term and the political education of young people will then bear more fruit. Then we will find young Iraqi people actively involved in building their own country and participating in the process of creating political will. I can well imagine that, perhaps in 10 years time, young people may be demonstrating here, out on the streets, demonstrating about issues in other, far distant countries!"

In this case, rather than being sceptical, the blogger $S$. is full of enthusiasm: "And despite the terrible situation here and the awful picture the world is given of Iraq - even if much of it is true - we are totally convinced that the Iraq of the future will provide a model, and very likely even an international model. After all, all the necessary conditions are there: people want changes, they want fundamental reforms in all areas of life; what's more, the country has lots of resources and opportunities, it has intellectuals and talented and capable people. And the mistakes we made in the past ought to prevent us from repeating them in the future. Above all, that's why we are predestined to change and evolve and offer a successful model for the entire region. For that reason, I believe Iraq will be the key to these changes and reforms. And, in saying that, I mean those Iraqi people who are motivated and interested in change and development."

The journalist R. goes even further: "I am very optimistic about Iraq's future. It will prove to the whole world that it is the cradle of civilization and
culture. [...] My people will live in democracy and peace, and we will fight against terrorism to the death."

I would like to follow up on S.'s quote by pointing out the following context: the overall positive assessment of the future is extensively deduced from a very positive evaluation of the problem-solving abilities of the 'Iraqi people', into whose hands the fate of Iraq is now placed, i.e., the country's fate will not be decided by God or any leader, but only by the people themselves. Fortunately, they appear to be the source of hope and self-confidence and yet, at the same time, they are, in my view, unrealistic idealised as the country's saviour.

For example, when Z. says: "These people [the terrorists] mostly take other ethnic groups or faiths as their targets - but, in reality, I think they aren't bothered with that. Instead, they just want to be provocative and cause further conflicts. Thank God our people are clever enough not to let themselves be draw into something like that..." He is voicing an idealized splitting of 'evil' from the Iraqi people, which also makes them immune to criticism. This ignores the fact that those involved in conflicts, violence and negative developments do not only come from external groups but also from the Iraqi people themselves. ${ }^{4}$ A similar misconception underlies the frequently cited Iraqi argument that the conflicts between Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis are actually Western media constructs and projections.

## Conclusion

The theses presented here on the shaping of biographies of young adults in Iraq cannot simply be generalized. If we had set ourselves the goal of generalisability, for instance, for 'the group of Iraqis in Baghdad aged between 18-35 years', we would have selected the interviewees differently, had to interview substantially larger numbers and, above all, formalise the procedures. ${ }^{5}$ Given the framework of a qualitative procedure, the validity of the findings can be measured by the plausibility and reasonableness of the arguments presented, whereby the recipient has to decide whether to endorse them or not. Furthermore, validity is also measured by the usefulness of the recommendations that the findings generate.

This research project set out to gain a deeper understanding of the patterns of action, evaluation, and motivation among young adults in Baghdad and, in this way, grasp the processes by which they subjectively construct meaning and plan their lives. Generalisability could only be established in further verification of the theses through application of quantitative methods.

The conversations were held as public interviews, which undoubtedly led to a stronger expression of idealized images of the self, the people, the culture, etc. The tendency to give answers that are not unconditionally truthful but instead reflect a certain 'social desirability' is not a concern specific to this present investigation but a general methodological problem in social research where one has to rely on interviewing people as a means of gathering data. In interpreting the data presented here, one should assume though that, as a result of the public broadcast of the interviews, this tendency is present in an extended form. In the interviews, we encountered, on the one hand, an energetic, goaloriented and emancipated group of young people who, as individual bearers of the civil society, clearly give grounds for hope since they do not only have or develop interests, but also follow up on them confidently and passionately (Section "What motivates and interests play a role in their work?"). Moreover, one also perceives a distinct willingness to shoulder social responsibility as an individual and, in the same breath, assign the responsibility for the country's future development to 'the people'. Civil society commitment and participation would not be realizable without these capabilities and attitudes.

The approach to arranging one's life that was characterized as "confident, quick and self-determined", facilitating swift responses and courageous deci-sion-taking, simultaneously suggests an egotism that seems to exclude any binding and long-term interaction with state institutions. The explicit 'turning towards' the people - as the addressee of professional activities and bearer of political hopes - also contains in itself a 'turning away' from the state, and continuing a way of life removed from state institutions. ${ }^{6}$ From the perspective of political science research, this disintegration of state structures and individual life designs, represents a development problem since "the level of development of a society is to be gauged by the degree to which intermediary units are capable of channelling the interaction between individual/company and the state" (Fein, Matzke 1997: 41). Obviously, the dynamic in Iraq will depend on both: the development of the civil society and the question if the interaction between state and civil society/civilian can be revitalised by implementing institutions that operate as a mutual and reciprocal axis of communication.

Notes

1 In Iraq, men and women have different conditions, motives, and goals shaping their lives. To ensure the findings were meaningful, the interviews with women were analyzed separately from those with men. In this paper I intend only to present an analysis of the interviews with men.
2 Figures given by Abd al-Zahar al-Hindawi, then spokesperson of the Ministry of Planning, in a radio-interview, summer 2004.
3 Ibid.
4 Uncritically idealising the 'people' might also put at risk any efforts to confront the past and the necessary processes of reconciliation.
5 The research presented here was conducted during the standard project evaluation and not as an independent research project with its own funding. Hence, the extent of the project had be correspondingly limited
6 The family here is thought of as an extended self, although it seems likely that the family bonds too become eroded under the pressure of economic crises, and the individual then acts as an independent unit.

# Gender Differences in the Political Interest of German and Palestinian Adolescents - Results of a Cross-Cultural Longitudinal Study 

Hans Oswald, Bernard Sabella, Hilke Rebenstorf and Hans Peter Kuhn

This paper deals with young people between sixteen and eighteen in East Germany and in the Palestinian Autonomous Region in the West Bank and how they develop an interest in politics. It focuses on gender differences with regard to a general interest in politics as well as to an interest in specific areas thereof.

## Theoretical Introduction

A general interest in politics could be considered the basis for a democratic political belief system, as well as for identity achievement as the outcome of a process of identity development.

In terms of political sociology, political interest is the main component of political motivation, a variable indicating an ability for the ideological conceptualization essential to participation in the democratic process (Klingemann 1979). Thus political interest is an indispensable precondition for the desired characteristics of a responsible and democratic citizen: critical loyalty, and the ability and readiness for political participation. Empirical studies have coherently shown the relevant impact political interest has on the strength of these features (e.g., Kaase 1984). The significance of political interest for the existence of a democratic political identity is therefore evident.

Political interest, however, is not only crucial to the existence of a democratic political identity but also to its emergence. Identity achievement requires exploration as well as commitment (Erikson 1968; Marcia/Archer 1993). Political interest serves as the underlying force for exploration, without which there is no identity achievement. Interest raises questions about the political process, the political system, and the incumbents of political positions. Political interest leads people to weigh ideological positions, to assess their pros and cons, and finally to make a commitment and achieve political identity. Without political interest, political identity remains diffuse: not knowing what to think, not knowing what to believe, and not knowing where one's own commitments are. ${ }^{1}$

Political interest is expected to grow with general development. Thus, a common interest in politics should increase during the critical stage of adolescence, indicating the crises and exploration typical of this life span according to Erikson's developmental theory (Erikson 1968). But socialization theory also depicts adolescence as a critical phase during which political opinions crystallize from primary, affective to mature, reasoned commitments (Dawson/Prewitt 1969; Niemi/Hepburn 1995).

For more than four decades, empirical studies of political socialization and political culture in the Western industrial world have continuously shown that girls and women are less interested in politics than boys and men (e.g., Hayes/Bean 1993; Verba, Schlozman/Brady 1995; Owen/Dennis 1988 and 1992; Inglehart 1981; van Deth 1990). Although these studies testified to a steady increase of political interest by age, gender differences are enduring. In an international comparison, Hayes and Bean (1993) concluded that despite the disappearance of gender differences in conventional political participation for adult women, an enduring gender gap in political interest can still be found, regardless of country of origin or social background. Could this be due to a socialization deficit in adolescent girls?

Feminist scholars focus their critique on the male-defined concept of politics, which forms the basis of mainstream research on political attitudes and political participation. According to this position, political participation is instrumental behavior aimed at wielding influence within the framework of given political institutions. The feminist position holds that females have a different understanding of and a different access to politics than males (e.g., Jacobi 1995). Female political thinking revolves around terms of compassion and cooperation, not contest and competition. Females are interested in solving concrete problems and are driven by social empathy, egalitarian values, and engagement on behalf of other people. Female access to politics seems to be closely linked to high social empathy, the need to protect, and concern for living conditions, whereas males tend to look for opportunities to satisfy a need for self-efficacy, self-assertion, self-affirmation, and self-presentation (Fend 1991). Feminist scholars point out that a male-biased definition of politics neglects the political problem areas that females are particularly interested in. Lack of female political interest thus refers to the area of conventional and institution-related politics only. Females prefer unconventional forms of political participation (e.g., Hayes/Bean 1993; Jacobi 1995; Meyer 1994; Westle 2001). In sum, feminist scholars proclaim that girls and women are not gener-
ally less interested in politics; on the contrary, they are even more interested than males, albeit in different political areas.

## The Study

The longitudinal study on political socialization was directed by the first author of this paper at the University of Potsdam. The original plan was to predict the behavior of first-time voters from Brandenburg, one of the new German states, in the general election (Bundestagswabl) of 1998. To this end, the study was to begin with 10 th grade students at a Gymnasium (college-preptrack school), continue with two more waves of data collection in 11th and 12th grade, and end with a fourth and final wave in 13th grade after election day. The research plan stipulated questioning all parallel classes in a representative selection of schools, so as to include as many friends as possible and thus make their mutual influence accessible to analysis. Additionally, both parents of each pupil were to be questioned, in order that their influence could be seen in proportion to that of their friends.

Prof. Karin Weiss from the University of Applied Science, Potsdam, carried out a parallel study with students at 'Real-' and 'Gesamtschulen' (non-college-prep-track schools and mixed comprehensive schools), the majority of whom leave school after 10th grade and join the labor force, partly as apprentices. This second study introduced conditions in vocational training and on-the-job training as additional socialization factors. The combination of the two sets of data allowed us to cover the entire group of first-time voters in Brandenburg and to compare first-time voting behavior of students at Gymnasien with that of young people already integrated in the working world. The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG - German Research Council) supported both longitudinal studies, which we conducted in four waves of questioning, beginning with the 10th grade in the year 1996, to inquire into the development of political interest, political attitudes, identification with parties, willingness to vote, and - after September 1998 - actual voting behavior. A book has meanwhile been published on the Brandenburg first-time voters (Kuhn/Weiss/Oswald 2001). In the first wave of data collection we interviewed 2,633 students ( $41 \%$ males and $59 \%$ females), in the last wave 682 first-voters. For comparative reasons we will only use data from wave one to three in this paper $\left(\mathrm{t}_{2}: \mathrm{N}=1,166 ; \mathrm{t}_{3}: \mathrm{N}=1159\right.$; for details of the data collection method, the sample, data sets, and instruments used, see Kuhn/Weiss/Oswald 2001; Rebenstorf 2004).

Within the framework of the cross-cultural study, a parallel study was conducted by the second author of this paper, who is based at the University of Bethlehem in the Palestinian Autonomy Region in the West Bank. This study used a similar sample design for three waves of data collection. Between $1998\left(t_{1}\right)$ and $2000\left(\mathrm{t}_{3}\right)$, a list of all public and private schools was drawn up and a random sample of twenty schools selected in seven different localities, covering cities, villages, and refugee camps. Because the Ministry of Education refused to grant permission, it was not possible to ask public school students to complete the questionnaire in class - as we did in Brandenburg. Home visits and informal student gatherings were availed of to fill out questionnaires. The students completed the questionnaires in the presence of the interviewer. Parents were also contacted at home and did likewise in the interviewer's presence. Here, in contrast to Brandenburg, either the father or the mother was interviewed. It was not possible to repeat the survey each year with the same students, so that we have three different cross-sectional samples for the West Bank. This enables us to perform a trend analysis. In the first wave of data collection we interviewed 804 students ( $57 \%$ males and $43 \%$ females), in wave three 573 ( $40 \%$ males and $60 \%$ females). Data was collected in both rural and urban areas of the West Bank: Jericho ( $3 \%$ in the first wave), Hebron and South Hebron (32\%), Bethlehem (27\%) Nablus and North (21\%), JerusalemEast (14\%) and Ramallah (3\%). The sample for the first wave of data collection contains $89 \%$ Moslems and $9 \%$ Christians. Christians are over-represented for two reasons. First of all, the large proportion of Christians results from including three private schools in the sample. Christians are more likely to attend this type of school than Moslems. Secondly, the over-representation is intentional; we want to be able to analyse how religious affiliation and the degree of religiosity affect political attitudes.

For reasons of access, the random selection of respondents in the West Bank had to be restricted to school pupils. This means that there is an over-representation of youth from families with higher educational levels ${ }^{2}$ in the Pa lestinian selection compared with the samples from Brandenburg. As a privileged group, however, these adolescents are probably more sensitive to the specific living conditions experienced by youth in the West Bank: a short supply of opportunities for employment and career advancement despite good education, and limited freedom of expression and movement. The more educated a person is, the stronger they feel the lack of opportunities for self-development - as confirmed by research on deprivation and on the status of imbalance in
general (e.g., Winkler 1996). The education of these students enables them to make cognitive evaluations of their environment and to question traditions. Our sample can therefore be seen as the future avant-garde, future elite, and probable opinion leaders. Consequently, the focus on this privileged minority is very much in keeping with our research question.

Furthermore, questions related to influence among peers had to be abandoned completely in the West Bank, since the anonymity of the questioning would not have been preserved had we asked for names and addresses of the respondents' friends.

## Results

The first section of the findings indicates the political interest of boys and girls ( $15-17$ years) as developed over a period of three years. Using a single-item indicator, we have attempted to replicate the results of (1) a steady increase of political interest and (2) the gender difference, with girls showing less political interest than boys both in Brandenburg (Germans) and in the West Bank (Palestinians).

In the second section, we follow the feminist critique and try to show that girls are not generally disinterested in politics but are interested in other areas of politics than those that interest boys.

The Development of General Political Interest (Single Item) Over Time

As in many other studies in different countries we asked a single question:
How interested are you in politics? Very much (5), a lot (4), average (3), a little (2) or not at all (1)?

Measured with this single-item indicator, we found a steady and significant increase of political interest in Brandenburg from a mean of 2.85 in $\mathrm{t}_{1}(15$ years of age) to a mean of 2.98 in $\mathrm{t}_{3}(17$ years of age) on the five-point scale. In all three measuring time frames girls were less interested than boys, but there was a steady increase and it was significant for both sexes. This corresponds to the hypothesized expectations of other studies.

Contrary to expectation was the development in the West Bank. The mean of 3.13 in $\mathrm{t}_{1}$ decreased significantly to a mean of 2.95 in $\mathrm{t}_{2}$ and 2.90 in $\mathrm{t}_{3}$. As in Brandenburg and in other countries, girls' interest in politics was lower than that of boys (significant in $t_{1}$ and $t_{3}$, but not in $t_{2}$ ). This decrease could be ex-
plained by the historical development of the second intifada and the historical failure of the peace process between 1998 and 2000.

The different results in Germany and in the West Bank show that an increase of political interest is not only a question of identity development, as stated by Erikson (1968), but also a result of political circumstances. Thus, the increase in Brandenburg from $t_{2}$ to $t_{3}$ may partly have been due to the impending general election in 1998, when the subjects of the study had the right to vote for the first time in their lives. This type of situation forces the decision of how to behave and fosters political interest. In contrast, the failure to achieve a state and democratic rights and duties in the occupied territories of the West Bank may have foiled the 'normal' development of an increased political interest during adolescence.

Table 1: Political interest by sex and region

|  | Brandenburg <br> longitudinal sample |  | West Bank <br> cross-sectional samples |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Male | Female | p | Male | Female | p |
| Mean $\mathrm{t}_{1}$ | 3.09 | 2.72 | .000 | 3.22 | 3.02 | .030 |
| ${\text { Mean } \mathrm{t}_{2}}^{\text {Mean } \mathrm{t}_{3}}$ | 3.12 | 2.75 | .000 | 3.05 | 2.86 | .$n .5$. |
| N | 3.25 | 2.85 | .000 | 3.08 | 2.79 | .011 |

The Domain-Specific Political Interest: Gender Differences
To examine political interest in different areas, the adolescents were asked about their interest in 20 different areas of politics. Exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to identify different factors of political interest. The following analyses are based on data from the third wave, when the German and Palestinian adolescents were approximately 17 years of age.

## Germans in Brandenburg

The factor analysis of the German sample revealed four factors: Factor I, 'front page politics', is associated with core political issues (NATO, UNO, Foreign Affairs, Europe, Federal Government, Parties, Defense, Economy), the traditional, male-defined side of politics, as feminist scholars claim. Factor II, 'social policy', contains socio-political issues (Labor Market, Pensions, Public Health and Social Welfare). Factor III, 'new politics', contains political issues linked to the so-called new social movements (Ecology, Peace, and Third

World/Development Aid. Factor IV, 'foreign immigrant policy', focuses on foreigners and refugees (two items).

As a result of the factor analysis, four scales - front page politics, social policy, new politics, and foreign immigrant policy - were constructed by computing the means of the item scores. The internal reliabilities of the scales are satisfyingly high; Cronbach's alphas range between .74 and .88 .

Table 2: Gender differences in measures of interest in politics - Brandenburg adolescents (t-tests)

| Measures | Mean (scale 1-5) |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Male | Female | $\mathrm{p}(\mathrm{t})$ |
| Front Page Politics |  | 2.90 | 2.51 | ${ }^{* * *}$ |
| Social Policy |  | 3.26 | 3.31 | n.s. |
| Foreign Immigrant Policy |  | 3.10 | 2.99 | n.s. |
| New Politics |  |  | 3.09 | 3.49 |
| n.s. not significant | ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<.05$ | ${ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<.01$ | ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<.001$ | $* * *$ |

Males were more interested than females in the political area we called "Front Page Politics". This factor correlates strongly ( $\mathrm{r}=.56$ ) with the single item. Females, however, were more interested than males in the political field of "New Politics", that is Peace, Ecology, and Third World/Development Aid. These gender differences turned out to be highly significant. No gender differences were found either in Social Policy or Immigration Policy. Boys and girls were interested in both areas to a parallel degree.

## Palestinians in the West Bank

The factor analysis revealed 3 factors (see table 3). As a result, three scales were constructed by computing the means of the item scores. The internal reliabilities are satisfyingly high, with Cronbach's alphas ranging between .78 and .90 .

As in Germany, boys were more interested in the items of the first factor, which we called "Front Page Politics", with the exception of "Governmental Policy" where girls were found to be as interested as boys. With respect to the second factor, "Societal Politics", we found no overall gender difference. In three areas girls were more interested than boys: "Gender Politics" (significant), "Health Politics" (significant) and "Peace" (not significant). No gender difference was found in the average interest in "Environment" (ecology), "La-
bor Market" and "Social Welfare Politics". With respect to all items of a third ("mixed") factor, "Foreigners", "Third World", "Pensions" and "Energy", boys again were clearly more interested than girls.

As expected, girls were more interested than boys in areas important to them, such as "Gender Politics" and "Health Politics", but both girls and boys showed matching interest in "Social Welfare", "Ecology", and "Peace". This result greatly resembles the German result. In contrast to Germany, however, Palestinian girls and boys are similarly interested in the politics of "Government" and in "Labor Market Politics".

Table 3: Gender differences in measures of interest in politics - Palestinian adolescents (t-test)

| Factor composition | Mean Girls | Mean Boys | Mean Total | p |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Factor I: Front Page Politics | 2,4 | 2,9 | 2,6 | .000 |
| UNO | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | .000 |
| USA | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.6 | .000 |
| Parties | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.6 | .000 |
| European Policy | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.2 | .000 |
| Foreign Affairs | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.4 | .000 |
| Defense | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.6 | .000 |
| Government | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.2 | n.s. |
| Economy | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.9 | .000 |
| Factor II: Societal Politics | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | n.s. |
| Environment | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | n.s. |
| Gender | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | .000 |
| Health | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.5 | .051 |
| Peace | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | n.s. |
| Labor Market | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | n.s. |
| Local Politics | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.5 | .048 |
| Social Welfare | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.0 | n.s. |
| Factor III: Foreigners, Third | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.7 | .000 |
| World, Pension, Energy | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.3 | .000 |
| Foreigners | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.7 | .027 |
| Asylum | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.7 | .000 |
| Third World | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.9 | .000 |
| Pension | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.8 | .000 |
| Energy |  |  |  |  |

## Summary and Conclusion

In Brandenburg, average political interest - measured with the single-item indicator customary in many studies - rose continuously, as expected, over the three-year period of the research project. This could be a result of age. But it is also possible that the election campaign conducted in the third measuring time frame had a mobilizing effect. The Palestinian region clearly shows that particular conditions and events can lead to a growth or reduction of general political interest.

In the West Bank, in contrast and contrary to expectations, the average political interest of girls declined continuously over the three-year period of the study; boys' interest dropped in the first year, to remain constant at a substantially lower level than in Brandenburg. We suspect that the Palestinian Autonomy Region's absence of an independent state and of democratic traditions, along with the hesitant progress and numerous setbacks of the peace process, prevented the growth of young people's interest in politics with increasing age in this region. As mentioned earlier, the results of the West Bank may be somewhat biased (over-representation of higher educated people and Christians) because of the sampling procedure.

On average, young women in numerous countries are less interested in politics than young men (Torney-Purta et al. 2001). Confirming this result and measured with the customary single-item indicator, boys in Brandenburg proved to be more interested in politics than girls in all three measuring time frames. Interest rose similarly for both sexes with age, so that the gap between them remained the same over the three years. In the West Bank, too, girls showed less interest in politics than boys over the entire three-year period.

Feminist authors have occasionally criticized that studies confirming less political interest on the part of women do not encompass women's specific interest in politics (e.g., Jacobi 1991). They claim that women have a different understanding of politics than men and that this is not captured by the customary measuring methods. To test this assertion in our investigation, we not only posed the customary single-item question concerning general political interest, but included specific questions referring to interest in twenty different fields of politics. In Brandenburg and the West Bank, we tested whether the low interest of girls compared with boys applied in the same way to all fields of politics, or whether there were certain areas of politics where the interest of girls was greater than or equal to that of boys.

The results in both regions confirmed the feminist criticism. The single-item question is clearly associated with general party politics and government policies as presented primarily on the front page of the newspaper. We therefore speak of "front page politics", where despite differential questions girls showed less interest than boys. In Brandenburg, however, the study revealed that girls' interest was markedly greater than boys' interest when it came to policies related to the Third World, maintaining peace, and the preservation of a healthy environment. There were no differences between the sexes in Brandenburg on such issues as social and immigration policies, i.e., girls were as interested in these topics as boys. In the West Bank, girls were more interested than boys in health and gender policies, since women are more affected by these problems there than men. Both girls and boys in the West Bank were interested in environmental, social, labor market, and peace policies to a similar degree. Girls in Brandenburg and in the West Bank are primarily interested in problems immediately related to their daily lives or that speak to an aspect of politicalmoral judgment that Carol Gilligan calls "caring" (1982).

Conclusion to a survey on youth and politics in the Arab world: We strongly recommend the single-item question on political interest be included for comparative reasons. As in numerous other countries, this indicator will produce a marked gender difference, showing males to be more interested in politics than females. However, this indicator conceals specific female interests. We therefore recommend asking additional questions referring to specific domains that in all probability interest women more than men. The following items should be included as a minimum: Gender Politics (equal rights and opportunities for men and women), Peace, Ecology, Public Health, and the Labor Market.

## Notes

1 Needless to say, that political interest can also stimulate a movement away from democracy. However, this is not one of the questions asked in this paper.
2 The Palestinian Bureau of Central Statistics reports for 1997 that $13 \%$ of 15year olds had no formal school education, $20 \%$ finished grade 6 , and only $15 \%$ finished grade 13.

# Palestinian Democracy: Attitudes of Parents and Adolescents ${ }^{1}$ 

Bernard Sabella

## Introduction

The attitudes of Palestinian adolescents to democracy are of special interest here, in particular the correlation of parent attitudes to those of the young. In the relevant literature it was found that, among other factors, family and community influenced the development of political identity among Palestinian youth. Specifically, Sayigh (1977) discovered in a pilot study on a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon that there was a predictably close link between the activism of the fathers and the sons. Farah (1980) concluded that the family seems to be the most important agent of political socialization among children. This role is maintained even when the "political indoctrination" variable, i.e., membership of parents in a formal PLO faction, is controlled. When the sex variable is taken into account, there is no sign of a noticeable difference between the answers of boys and girls.

These findings agree with conclusions in recent literature elsewhere, which see the intergenerational transmission of attitudes from parents to their children as important in the socialization process. But as Weiss and Mibs point out " $[\mathrm{M}]$ ostly the father is seen as the main agent for the transmission, while less research is done so far regarding the influence of the mother." (Weiss/Mibs 2002)

The data on Palestinian youth and their parents allows for a comparison with either fathers or mothers but not with both parents in the same family. Using structural equation models, it also allows for verification of how parent attitudes influence those of their adolescent children. The two moderating variables applied in examining attitudes of parents and adolescents are family cohesiveness and the frequency of communication about politics. How close family members are to one another and adolescent children to their parents is assumed to be vital in latent political socialization, since identification with parents and consequently with their political attitudes is deemed to be higher in close-knit families (Geissler 1996). The moderating effect of frequency of communication within the family is related to higher transparency and visibility of political attitudes and hence transmission. The expectation is therefore "We therefore expect that, in highly cohesive families and in families with much
communication about politics, intergenerational transmission should be stronger than in other families." (Weiss/Mibs 2004: 191)

The Palestinian family is a defining parameter not simply of identity but also of social demeanor and appearance for its individual members. As an organizing social principle, the family compares itself with other families of its own stature and hence becomes restrictive towards its members in terms of personal marriage choices, friendship, education, employment, and other pursuits, all of which are normally associated with the rights of the individual as such in an individually inclined culture. With the changes taking place in society, the Palestinian family today has lost some of its traditional hold on its members, particularly in terms of intergenerational signs of respect. The younger family members, male and female, enjoy a considerable degree of freedom now that transportation is more available, and television and the computer have become common commodities in many Palestinian homes. The fact that almost all Palestinian girls now receive a general education, however, may be a significant contributory factor to weakening the strong family hold that used to be the norm three or four decades ago, even in very personal matters. But the family has not lost its centrality altogether in the lives of its individual members, and given the turbulent social, cultural and political environment, the family has gained added importance as the protecting institution and as the last refuge for its members. ${ }^{2}$

The gender combination is a third influencing factor. Of interest here is the hypothesis presented by Weiss and Mibs that "Intergenerational transmission should be greater in same-sex combinations than in opposite-sex combinations." (Weiss/Mibs 2004: 192) The Palestinian data allows for a testing of this hypothesis.

## Specifics of the Palestinian Case

Palestinian society is one that continues to emphasize the role of the family as a socializing institution, particularly in upholding values related to religious observance, culture, and interpersonal and intergenerational relations. Precisely because of this traditional prominence of the family and its socializing role, family cohesiveness in the Palestinian case cannot refer to the same set of value relationships as in Western countries, such as Germany. In addition, consideration should be given to the overall situation of conflict in the Palestinian case, an overarching factor that influences attitudes of both parents and adolescents, and consequently mute the impact of family cohesiveness on the interge-
nerational transmission of attitudes and the development of the political identity of the young.

That the overall political situation can impact in this way was illustrated by Mansour (1990), who administered "Ideal Self" questionnaires to 100 Palestinian children aged between 13 and 17. Among her findings was the rather unexpected piece of information that only one boy and one girl chose their own father or mother as their immediate environment model for the Ideal Self. As to the personalized Ideal Self, 10 out of 22 boys selected a fidai (guerilla), while only one girl for a similar number of respondents chose a fidai (guerilla) and one a soldier. Boys seem to be more swayed by the political environment than girls.

In conflict situations such as those experienced in the Palestinian Territories in the first Intifada from 1988 to 1993 or in the current political instability, questions of identity and relations between children and parents have different implications than those in societies with 'normal' conditions. In the first Intifada, the issue of intergenerational relations in the Palestinian family became paramount. This was because politically active youth saw their movement against continued Israeli occupation in sharp contrast to the inactivity and failure of their parents and their generation to end occupation. Thus, youth activity against occupation was also seen as a challenge to parents and their authority. A similar inter-generational issue seems to have arisen in the present conflict situation, known as the second Intifada. Based on his interpretations of Palestinian children's dreams, Massalha argues that "their identity is not individual, but collective [...] the children feel that their parents are not competent to protect them. A paternalist society has lost its anchor [...] a generation of Palestinian children is growing up with no one to trust." (Silver 2001) This conclusion sounds dramatic but it highlights the impact of a conflict environment and its effect on family relationships, especially those between children and their parents.

Despite these findings, however, which point to a serious challenge to the traditional role of parents in a society undergoing intense conflict, the role of the Palestinian family as a key institution of political socialization is still significant. The conclusions of both Sayigh (1977) and Khamis (2000) on the importance of the Palestinian family as a political socializing agent and as a coping institution in a situation of violence and political instability cannot be discarded. The findings of both authors tend to confirm that the dynamics of Palestinian family relationships continues to be relevant to the process of political
socialization and to the question of intergenerational transmission of attitudes. Besides, we cannot minimize the effect of the family support and protection extended towards children and other members of the family adversely affected by a conflict environment.

Nevertheless, apart from the specific family dynamics in the Palestinian case and its potential effect on the intergenerational transmission of attitudes, attention should also be given to the fact that democracy and its practice is not an institutionalized experience in Palestinian society. The Palestinians had never had a government and the experience since the Oslo accords, including the free elections for President and Legislative Council (Parliament) in January 1996 did not allow for a fully-functioning democratic government for a variety of both internal and external reasons.

Yet, youth and many of the parent generation have been through the experience of activism and grass-roots organizing, especially in the period leading up to the first Intifada (1988-1993). This experience was based on mass participation and empowerment, a situation that gave shape to the initially high expectations of any incoming governing authority and its performance. These expectations may have influenced attitudes of both parents and children towards the idea of democracy and, accordingly, their satisfaction with actual democracy in Palestine.

A public opinion poll carried out in April 2000 showed that only $22 \%$ of the Palestinians polled judged Palestinian democracy positively in comparison with over $50 \%$ in $1997 .{ }^{3}$

Yet, although expectations of the incoming governing authority and the modest "democratic" tradition were high, Palestinians have never experienced "a fully-fledged democratic tradition...that implies a long and profound experience with the rule of law, political participation and public accountability, respect for human rights, and most importantly, alternation in power, typically through free and fair elections." (Abu Amr 1996: 84)

## Hypotheses

Regardless of the above-mentioned arguments on Palestinian democracy, conflict environment, and the role of the Palestinian family in unstable conditions, the aim of this presentation is to explore the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes in Palestinian families. We seek to find out what role family cohesiveness, the frequency of communication about politics, and gender have on the transmission of attitudes?

Not unlike the Palestinian section of the Brandenburg study, the relevant question here also deals with "whether parents and adolescents in a country undergoing severe social (and political) change have similar attitudes." Similar attitudes, however, do not necessarily reflect intergenerational influences or their directions. Aware of the overarching political instability of the environment and its possible effects on attitudes and their formation and transmission in the Palestinian case, we intend to explore two questions:
a) Are there comparisons or correspondences between the political attitudes of parents, fathers and mothers, and those of adolescents, boys and girls?
b) Are correspondences in political attitudes of parents and adolescents affected by family cohesiveness, frequency of communication about politics, and gender combination?
We also seek through the application of correlation and regression analysis to:
c) Test the contribution of parent attitudes to those of adolescents and
d) Check the additional effect of internal and external political efficacy.

A sense of internal political efficacy is the perceived power not just to influence politicians but to influence politics in general. Its effect on support for the idea of democracy is hard to predict. If someone believes in their own power, they will soundly support the idea of democracy, since this political regime encourages people to make use of their power. It can, however, be interpreted the other way round. If people experience a feeling of powerlessness, their sense of internal political efficacy will be low. Nevertheless, if they believe that their powerlessness will come to an end once democracy has been established, they could become strong supporters of the idea of democracy. The link between a sense of internal political efficacy and satisfaction with the democracy experienced can also be twofold. It can be assumed that if someone feels powerless they will be dissatisfied with the existing political regime, so that a sense of internal political efficacy could be expected to have a positive influence on satisfaction with the democracy experienced. In other words, the higher the sense of internal political efficacy, the greater the satisfaction with the regime. It is also possible for people to feel powerful on the whole but dissatisfied with how their influence is handled. In this case the correlation of internal political efficacy and satisfaction with the political regime experienced will be negative. The higher the internal political efficacy - in this case trust in oneself - the lower the satisfaction with the regime experienced. For the West Bank this is a truly explorative study. Since the political system in the West Bank has less knowledge than established democracies of the many democratic
participation channels - it is still not certain whether elections originally promised for January 2003 as part of the Palestinian Authority reforms will take place, it is very likely that someone with a high sense of internal efficacy will be dissatisfied with the regime experienced.

A sense of external political efficacy refers to the perceived attitude of politicians towards the people, and reflects both trust in politicians as well as trust in the responsiveness of the political system. In what way can external political efficacy affect support for the idea of democracy and satisfaction with the democracy experienced? There is a clear answer to the latter. The more people trust their politicians, the more satisfied they will be with their political regime. A similar connection is very likely to be found for the first case. If people trust their political representatives, who have in turn been democratically elected, they will have every reason to support the idea of democracy. However, the connection is not thought to be very strong.

## Method

Table 1: Sample indicators (wave 3)

| Age of adolescents | $15-20$ years, mean age 17.6 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | $43 \%$ |  |
| - male | $57 \%$ |  |
| - female | $72 \%$ |  |
| Expected school leaving Tawjihi certificate | fathers | mothers |
|  | $18 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| Less than 9 years | $24 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| $9-12$ years | $30 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| 12 years, Tawjihi | $28 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| 13 years or more |  |  |

N of adolescents $=573 \quad \mathrm{~N}$ of fathers $=348 \quad \mathrm{~N}$ of mothers $=215$

The data generated from the third wave of the Palestinian sample is used to shed light on the correspondence of attitudes towards democracy and political efficacy in Palestinian society in the West Bank. The data set includes 573 adolescents and a corresponding number of fathers or mothers. Consequently it does not comprise entire families or triads but merely dyads. 348 fathers were interviewed but only 215 mothers. We use specifics from the data collec-
tion (wave 3) in the year 2000. The mean age of adolescents covered by the data collection is $15-20$ years, with a mean age of 17.6 years. The gender distribution of the sample is $43 \%$ male and $57 \%$ female, with $72 \%$ expecting to receive the Tawjibi school leaving certificate.
The measures used in the analyses are: Support for the Idea of Democracy; Satisfaction with Actual Democracy; External Political Efficacy and Internal Political Efficacy as described in the introductory chapter to this section on democratic attitudes. The Cronbach's Alphas show the validity of these scales. External political efficacy for adolescents $\mathrm{a}=.815$; for parents $\mathrm{a}=.847$; internal political efficacy for adolescents $a=.534$; for parents $a=.635$. To measure the effect of family cohesiveness and political communication we used two additional scales: "Communication with Parents about Politics" and "Family Cohesiveness". Talks with Parents about Politics are measured by four questions:

- How often do you talk to your mother (or your father) about politics?
- How often do you argue with your mother (or your father) about politics? Possible answers range from one 'never' to five 'very often'. All four items are added to form the indicator "communication about politics". (Cronbach's Alpha for this indicator is .842 .) Family Cohesiveness is measured by way of three items:
- Our family will stay together no matter what happens.
- In our family we can rely on each other.
- We certainly would stick together if things got really tough.

Possible answers range from one 'does not apply at all' to five 'applies totally' (Cronbach's Alpha for family cohesiveness is .759.)

## Findings and Discussion

Table 2: Means of the variables used - adolescents and parents

|  | Adolescents |  |  | Parents |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Boys | Girls | Total | Fathers | Mothers |
| Idea of democracy | 3.84 | 3.74 | 3.79 | 3.82 | 3.86 |
| Satisfaction with actual democracy | 2.93 | 2.41 | 2.63 | 2.63 | 2.64 |
| External political efficacy | 2.60 | 2.47 | 2.53 | 2.55 | 2.45 |
| Internal political efficacy | 2.68 | 2.76 | 2.73 | 2.90 | 2.74 |
| Political communication with parents | 2.66 | 2.47 | 2.55 | - | - |
| Family cohesiveness | 4.05 | 4.05 | 4.5 | - | - |

Support for the idea of democracy is quite high with a mean close to 4 on a five-point scale. Satisfaction with actual democracy is low in comparison, even below the scale mean of 3 . The sense of both internal and external efficacy is lower still; political communication with parents is also below the scale mean of 3 . Overall family cohesiveness is extremely high.

Table 3: Significance of mean differences according to gender (ANOVA)

|  | Boys - Girls | Fathers - Mothers |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Idea of democracy | n.s. | n.s. |
| Satisfaction with actual democracy | .000 | n.s. |
| External political efficacy | n.s. | n.s. |
| Internal political efficacy | n.s. | .037 |

There are hardly any gender differences in political attitudes. Girls are significantly less satisfied with democracy in the West Bank than boys, and mothers show a significantly lower degree of internal political efficacy than fathers.

Table 4: Significance of mean differences: parent-child comparison (T-Test)

|  | Father - <br> Son | Father - <br> Daughter | Mother - <br> Son | Mother - <br> Daughter |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Idea of democracy | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| Satisfaction with actual democracy | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| External political efficacy | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |
| Internal political efficacy | .004 | n.s. | n.s. | n.s. |

A significant difference between parents and their children was found in one case only: the sense of internal efficacy of sons is significantly lower than that of their fathers. This is a first hint that there is no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex transmission.

Table 5: Bivariate correlations (Pearson's r) between parent and adolescent political attitudes ${ }^{1}$ - according to family cohesiveness, frequency of communication about politics and sex

|  | Support for the <br> idea of democracy |  | Satisfaction with <br> democracy in Palestine |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | r | n | R | n |
| All adolescents | .43 | 528 | $.37^{* *}$ | 530 |
| Girls | $.38^{* *}$ | 296 | $.26^{* *}$ | 307 |
| Boys | $.49^{* *}$ | 224 | $.44^{* *}$ | 227 |
| In families with high cohesiveness ${ }^{2}$ | $.37^{* *}$ | 266 | $.34^{* *}$ | 273 |
| In families with low cohesiveness ${ }^{2}$ | $.50^{* *}$ | 258 | $.30^{* *}$ | 265 |
| In families with high political com- $.48^{* *}$ <br> munication ${ }^{2}$  | 241 | $.44^{* *}$ | 241 |  |
| In families with low political com- | $.37^{* *}$ | 272 | $.29^{* *}$ | 285 |
| munication $^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |

${ }^{1}$ separate correlation performed for correspondence of fathers and mothers with their adolescent children did not show any significant differences between fathers' and mothers' correspondences with their offspring - according to Fisher-Z-Test.
${ }^{2}$ families with high/low cohesiveness and frequency of communication respectively, divided according to the median ${ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0,001$ bold letters: difference in correlation coefficients (referring to vertical order) is significant at least at the $5 \%$ level - tested with Fisher-Z-Transformation.

Family cohesiveness affects the correspondence of parent and adolescent attitudes concerning support for the idea of democracy. Accordingly, the high/low cohesion family types differ in correspondence of parents and children on the idea of democracy.

The intensity of political communication within the family also makes for a significant difference in the correspondence of parent and adolescent attitudes towards satisfaction with democracy in Palestine. Accordingly, the high/low intensity family types differ in correspondence of parents and children on satisfaction with actual democracy.

There is a significant difference in correspondence of parent and adolescent attitudes independent of the adolescents' sex in the case of satisfaction with democracy in Palestine. Accordingly, tests for differences according to sex with respect not only to satisfaction with democracy but also with support for the idea of democracy are suggested.

Tested but not illustrated in the table: there were no significant differences between the sexes within the two communication groups or between the two family types (high cohesion/low cohesion). Thus, we do not distinguish between boys and girls when we differentiate according to intensity of political communication or according to family cohesiveness.

Tables 6 and 7 show results of the regression analysis of parent attitudes, sense of internal and external efficacy on "support for the idea of democracy" (Table 6), and on "satisfaction with democracy in the West Bank" (Table 7). The regression analysis was performed to assess the contribution of parent attitudes to those of their adolescent children.

Table 6: Regression of parent attitude, and sense of internal and external efficacy on support for the idea of democracy (Beta-Coefficients)

|  | All <br> Adolescents | Boys | Girls | High Family <br> Cohesiveness | Low Family <br> Cohesiveness |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Parent attitude | $.42^{* *}$ | $.48^{* *}$ | $.37^{* *}$ | $.36^{* *}$ | $.50^{* *}$ |
| Internal efficacy | $-.15^{* *}$ | $-.25^{* *}$ | -.09 | $-.21^{* *}$ | -.05 |
| External efficacy | .03 | $.18^{*}$ | -.06 | .09 | -.02 |
| Sex | .00 |  |  | .02 | -.02 |
| adj. R2 | .19 | .25 | .15 | .15 | .25 |
| F | $30.19^{* *}$ | $25.40^{* *}$ | $17.88^{* *}$ | $10.79^{* *}$ | $21.54^{* *}$ |
| N | 501 | 218 | 283 | 246 | 251 |

Although sex does not contribute to explaining "Support for the Idea of Democracy", we can see that predictors for this variable differ according to sex. The parent attitude contribution is much stronger for boys than it is for girls, the internal efficacy contribution can only be observed for boys, but not for girls. The total explanation of variation in support for the idea of democracy is $25 \%$ for boys and can only be accounted for by parent attitude and internal efficacy. For girls the total explanation is still $15 \%$. Since efficacy has no effect at all, however, the $15 \%$ is accounted for by parent attitude. In families with high cohesion, internal efficacy contributes to explaining adolescent attitudes towards the idea of democracy. Parent attitude and internal efficacy together explain the $15 \%$ variance in adolescent support for the idea of democracy.

Surprisingly, families with low cohesion show a much higher explanation for the adolescent attitude towards the idea of democracy than families with high cohesion. This explanation stems entirely from parent attitudes, with efficacy showing no impact whatsoever.

Table 7: Regression of parent attitude, and sense of internal and external efficacy on satisfaction with democracy in Palestine (Beta-Coefficients)

|  | All Ado- <br> lescents | Boys | Girls | Political Com- <br> munication High | Political Com- <br> munication Low |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Parent attitude | $.32^{* *}$ | $.40^{* *}$ | $.26^{* *}$ | $.37^{* *}$ | $.27^{* *}$ |
| Internal efficacy | $-.15^{* *}$ | $-.18^{*}$ | $-.14^{*}$ | -.12 | $-.16^{*}$ |
| External efficacy | $.14^{* *}$ | .14 | $.15^{*}$ | $.21^{* *}$ | .07 |
| Sex | $-.14^{* *}$ |  |  | $-.15^{*}$ | -.11 |
| adj. R2 | .17 | .20 | .08 | .24 | .11 |
| F | $27.82^{* *}$ | $18.95^{* *}$ | $9.51^{* *}$ | $18.80^{* *}$ | $8.98^{* *}$ |
| N | 515 | 221 | 294 | 228 | 271 |

All independent variables contribute to the prediction of adolescent satisfaction with the democracy they experience.

The explanation is higher for boys than for girls and is accounted for by both parent attitude and internal efficacy. The lower the sense of internal efficacy, the higher the satisfaction, and the higher the parent satisfaction, the higher the satisfaction of their adolescent sons. With $8 \%$ the explained variance is much lower for girls than for boys. External efficacy is also a contributing factor in their case; the higher the trust in politicians the more satisfied they are - or vice versa, the lower the trust in politicians the less satisfied they are. The latter expresses exactly the same as the former. However, the wording of the latter is probably closer to the truth, since the satisfaction of girls with democracy in Palestine is significantly lower than that of boys (see Table 2 and 3).

The same pattern can be found in families with little communication about politics. Where political communication is greater in families, our model explains a quarter of adolescent satisfaction with the democracy they experience.

Having reviewed the findings of both tables 6 and 7 , the question arises as to whether we can do more.

If adolescent efficacy contributes to explaining their support for the idea of democracy, the parental sense of efficacy could also do so - at least indirectly
by affecting their children's sense of efficacy. This was tested with structural equation models. In doing so we can even explain the adolescent attitude as emanating from the family context more clearly than with a simple regression analysis that cannot adequately account for co-variations.

Since the sense of both internal and external efficacy obviously contributes to the attitude toward democracy and we assume that the adolescent sense of efficacy is additionally influenced by that of the parents, we undertook path analysis - which included the parental sense of efficacy (Figure 1) - to get a picture of transmission patterns and the pattern of attitude formation within the context of the family.

Figure 1: Structural equation model for male adolescent support for the idea of democracy

$\mathrm{N}=208, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=7,2, \mathrm{df}=7, \mathrm{p}=.408$
GFI =.988, AGFI $=.965$, RMSEA $=$.

The interpretation of figure 1 shows that in comparison with the regression analysis in table 6 we have only a minor increase in the explanation of support for the idea of democracy (from $25 \%$ to $26 \%$ ). The pattern of attitude formation, however, can be seen more clearly. The main contributor is the parent attitude, followed by a sense of internal efficacy and a sense of external efficacy. The adolescent sense of efficacy, however, is also influenced by that of the parents, and the two show co-variation.

Figure 2: Structural equation model for female adolescent support for the idea of democracy


[^0]The interpretation of figure 2 confirms that in a more complex model we find that the female sense of internal efficacy contributes to explaining their support for the idea of democracy when the sense of external efficacy is not taken into account. The explanation rises from $15 \%$ in the regression model to $19 \%$ in the structural equation model. However, the overall pattern of attitude formation seems to differ between boys and girls.

Figure 3: Structural equation model for all adolescent support for the idea of democracy in families showing a high cohesion

$\mathrm{N}=237, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=0,765, \mathrm{df}=3, \mathrm{p}=.858$
GFI $=.998$, AGFI $=.995$, RMSEA $=.000$

Figure 3 gives us no additional information to the regression analysis in table 6 - except the finding from the two previous figures that the parent sense of internal efficacy shows an effect on the adolescent sense of internal efficacy.

None of the structural equation models were suited to families displaying low cohesion. We found nothing other than what had already been revealed in the regression analysis.

When structural equation models were applied to satisfaction with the democracy in Palestine, nothing new was discovered. We found identical expla-
nations to those found in the structural equation models on support for the idea of democracy. There are interconnections of efficacy of parents and children and of political attitudes.

## Conclusion

It can be concluded that the family context in the West Bank contributes significantly to the adolescent attitude towards democracy in general and to the evaluation of the democracy adolescents experience. However, the contribution of the family differs in some cases according to the sex of their children and in others to the density of political communication or the extent of family cohesiveness.

This conclusion confirms the argument that the Palestinian family is still a major factor in the political socialization of its children, notwithstanding the differences shown in certain cases.

Accordingly, a vital question that emerges here is not simply whether Palestinians, parents and children in our case, exhibit clearly democratic tendencies (Hanf/Sabella 1996), but what factors contribute to these tendencies and their development. Another relevant question that has not been answered here concerns the impact of an unstable and violent political environment on the change in attitude of both parents and children towards support for the idea of democracy.

Undoubtedly the questions and issues raised here are not simply theoretical but have practical implications as well. In the Palestinian case and with the absence of a 'fully-fledged democratic tradition', these findings could be a yardstick for the direction in which Palestinian society needs to move and what is to be done to eventually increase the feeling of satisfaction among Palestinians, both parents and children, with the practice of democracy.

## Notes

1 This presentation is a modified version of a chapter written in collaboration with Hilke Rebenstorf under the same title (see Rebenstorf, Hilke (ed.), 2004: Democratic Development? East German, Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents. Wiesbaden.)
2 For the status of Palestinian women and the implications of economic, political, and social change in the role of women in the Palestinian family and society, see: Haj 1992; Wing 1994; Ovensen 1994; Sabbagh 1998.
3 CPRS Polls April 1999 and April 2000.

# Economic Change and Income-Generating Practices of Rural Youth in Northern Syria 

Katharina Lange

## Introduction

As the studies collected in the volumes edited by Meijer (2000), Mahdi (2003), and Simonsen (2005) document, the interest in youth in the Arabicspeaking Middle East has increased noticeably in the last decade. Many of these studies give similar reasons for the importance of studying youth in Arab countries. Apart from the numerical significance of the younger generation in Arab societies, the authors emphasize the rapid transformations these societies have undergone over the past fifty years and their profound effect on the younger generation in particular. Political and socio-economic aspects are often at the centre of such analyses, with authors pointing out the social, economic, and symbolic tensions and contradictions that define the situation of Arab youth today. The majority of them concentrate on urban youth. This is not surprising considering that large-scale and extremely rapid urbanisation processes are among the most noticeable of the transformations mentioned above. Studies focusing on rural youth have - up to now - been less frequent. ${ }^{2}$

This article looks at the economic practices of youth in a rural context. It is based on data collected in qualitative research in a village in northern Syria, which I will call Rasm Hammoud. Fieldwork was carried out in the course of altogether thirteen months between September 2002 and January 2004. This was followed by a number of subsequent visits to the village, the last of which took place in February 2006.

The original purpose of the fieldwork was to research oral narratives about the history of the area and the ancestors of today's inhabitants. ${ }^{3}$ As I got to know the villagers better, however, I noticed that the past and the present are not only brought together in the different historical narratives; they also meet in intergenerational relations and interactions. The large-scale economic transformations that took place in the region in recent decades, affecting the lives of all the villagers, have led to noticeable differences between the older and younger generation in the experience of everyday life. These can be observed at various levels. In this article, the changing economic practices of youth are at the centre of the discussion. The aim is twofold: firstly, to contribute to the des-
cription of the economic situation of rural youth; secondly, to suggest some implications of the economic transformations for the complex field of practices, values and intergenerational relations in rural northern Syria, which could be explored further in future analysis.

During my visits to the village, I spent most of my free time with girls and young women. The five unmarried daughters of my host family and their large circle of friends generously allowed me to accompany them during their daily occupations and to their social gatherings. Observing them throughout the year and listening to their conversations brought home to me the significance of economic activities for their daily lives. As I became more interested in this topic, I began to conduct interviews with villagers of different generations on the subject of changing economic practices, wages, and labor-related attitudes. ${ }^{4}$ The information presented in this article is thus based on my own observations, as well as narrative interviews ranging from informal to semi-structured ones. Notes were usually taken during and occasionally after the interviews. My interlocutors were both male and female, but most of the more informal and spontaneous conversations took place with females.

## Transformations in Rasm Hammoud

The village of Rasm Hammoud is located in northern Syria, close to Lake Asad. In the terminology of agricultural geography in Syria it is a "zone 4 village", indicating that annual rainfall in the area averages $150-200 \mathrm{~mm}$. As elsewhere in the Arab world, large-scale transformations have been taking place in this area since the early 1970s. Up to about thirty years ago, the population of this region lived off a multi-resource economy that included income from semi-nomadic sheepherding and seasonal agriculture. Since then, seasonally mobile livestock raising, which has been decreasing since the beginning of the twentieth century, has declined notably, while the area under cultivation expanded as a result of the intensification and mechanisation of agriculture that began in the 1950s and has continued up to the present day. The land reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s have changed property relations in the region, entailing a depropriation of large land-owners and the distribution of smaller-sized land holdings to farmers.

The construction of the Euphrates Dam at Tabqa in 1973 and the ensuing flooding of what is now Lake Asad with the resultant economic, geographical and social transformations mark the biggest rupture in recent decades.' When the newly-emerging lake flooded the houses of the original village of Rasm

Hammoud, as well as the fields that had been cultivated seasonally in the fertile river valley (zor), the villagers moved a few kilometres further up to the higher river bank, where the new village of Rasm Hammoud was built. ${ }^{6}$ Water from the lake made it possible to expand the cultivated zone several kilometres beyond the original river bed, and even allowed the extensive cultivation of water-intensive crops, of which cotton was the most profitable. (More recently, government measures have been introduced to curb the extensive cultivation of cotton in an effort to use water more efficiently for other crops, especially olive and other fruit trees). At the same time, livestock raising has gradually lost its significance as a principal source of income. Although this process set in as early as the first half of the twentieth century and has accelerated notably since the $1950 \mathrm{~s},{ }^{7}$ in the narratives of the villagers the decline in large-scale livestock raising is primarily associated with the flooding of the lake as a temporal marker of fundamental social and economic change.

Irrigated agriculture has extended beyond the river valley into the steppe, with areas formerly used for pasture now being transformed into cultivated lands. Electricity was brought to the villages around the lake, enabling access to mass media, notably TV; the plant that was erected to purify water from the Euphrates and supply the city of Aleppo and large stretches of northern Syria with drinking water has caused an influx of urban professionals as water department employees. Apart from these developments, labor migration to the large Syrian cities and abroad, which began sporadically in the late 1960s/early 1970s, shows a marked increase. Similar to other regions in rural Syria, at least one member of every household now works in Damascus, Aleppo or abroad; their contributions are vital to household livelihoods.

## Village Youth

What does "youth" mean in the local context of Rasm Hammoud? In this article youth is understood as a social category associated with, but not defined by, biological age. Looking at local terminology in Rasm Hammoud, there seems to be no clear-cut equivalent to "youth" as a social category. The ages of those at the centre of this article are between fourteen (give or take a year) and mid- to late twenties. Locally, this age group is referred to as ash shabab (for males) or al b'nayyat lal banawit (for "girls"). While the term referring to young men, shabb/shabab, gives no indication of marital status, the term b'nayye, girl, signifies a young unmarried female and can be applied to children as well as adolescents. In contrast, a married woman - regardless of her age - is
referred to as mar'a. ${ }^{8}$ A man who has reached a specific age and has a certain social status (usually including marriage and fatherhood) is referred to as belonging to the social category of rijal or zilm (men).

In this sense, "youth" in Rasm Hammoud is closely related to adolescence; it is characterized as a phase in the lifecycle of each individual associated with a young age, and as the period between childhood and full, social maturity that is reached with marriage and, especially, parenthood.

## Young Men

For young men, neither the beginning nor the end of the phase described as youth are clearly marked. Their childhood ends roughly when their formal education is over. Although the number of secondary school graduates of both genders who continue their studies in a vocational college or at university is steadily growing, many village boys still leave school as early as in seventh or eighth grade, frequently citing a "dislike" or "lack of talent" for formal schooling as reasons. Consequently they are obliged to look at income opportunities that do not require a high level of formal education or even a high standard of literacy.

An important step for young male villagers on the way to social maturity is the obligatory military service, which lasted two and a half years in 2002/2003 (since then, it has been reduced to two years). A celebration in the young man's home marks the end of this liminal phase and the young man's return to his home community; quite often, it is followed by his engagement and marriage within a year. Only rarely does a young man get married before he has concluded his military service; in addition, he and his family are obliged to accumulate a certain capital to be able to meet the relatively high expenses associated with marriage. The groom must be prepared to pay bride wealth (siyag or mabr) to the bride's father (between 100,000 LS and 250,000 LS, with an average of 150,000 LS in 2002/2003). ${ }^{9}$ Besides, he must provide housing - at least one room in his parents' household - for his future family. A young man with insufficient property of his own must either save up enough money to meet the necessary expenses, or - in the still comparatively rare case of studying for a degree - complete his studies and wait for employment with a regular, albeit inadequate, salary. In the majority of cases, however, these sources of income are not sufficient to meet the cost of marriage, and most young men are forced to depend on financial support from their family for this occasion.

Age and generational precedence is generally regarded as one of the key factors apart from gender in determining social status and regulating interaction in the Middle East. Rasm Hammoud is no exception to this. If asked, most villagers would say that the older commands the "respect" of the younger generation, and that this is particularly true of relations within a kin group. Children not only owe their parents "respect" but must also show obedience, deferring to the parents' experience and superior judgement. However, despite the unequivocal articulation of this social norm, there are numerous examples of intergenerational conflict in practice, where sons and fathers disagree over such issues as the choice of spouse for a daughter/sister, or for the son himself, as well as economic questions such as decisions on household spending or farm management.

Land is usually registered in the name of the male head of the family and is inherited in equal parts by his sons when he dies. This means that as long as the father is alive, the children hold no legal title to this property. ${ }^{10}$ But even before the legal transfer of property rights from father to son(s), which occurs upon the death of the father, marriage is a step in the life cycle that customarily marks the transfer of rights of use over at least some of the family property, most commonly by informally assigning part of the family house or another property to the young couple to live in.

Due to persistent economic dependency as well as normative prescriptions on intergenerational relations, it is extremely difficult for a young man to marry a girl against the wishes of his parents. Although social norms and customs, underlined by references to religious obligations, can be invoked to underscore a young man's right to the financial support of his family when he wants to marry for the first time, they do not include his right to choose a spouse freely without considering his family's preferences.

During my stay in the village, young men's families raised money to cover marriage expenses by using either the bride wealth they received when one of their own daughters got married, by selling some of their land, or - in rare cases - their livestock. If the family's economic situation allows it or if circumstances make it unnecessary to accumulate the large sum required as bride wealth, young men may get married in their teens, but this is exceptional. ${ }^{11}$ In effect, most young men marry in their early to mid-twenties.

Income-Generating Activities of Male Village Youth
Herding sheep and goats used to be - and sometimes still is - a job for boys or young men. ${ }^{12}$ Frequently, the livestock a shepherd (rai $)$ tends are not his own; sometimes, he is employed by several different households to take their livestock out to graze in a joint herd. In the increasingly rare case where a household owns a larger herd of fifty or more heads of livestock, a shepherd could be charged exclusively with their care. Until about thirty years ago, shepherds used to be remunerated in kind. In early spring of each year they were given one lamb for every ten sheep herded throughout the year, as well as a certain amount of wheat, and perhaps some clothes. Today, payment is in cash, with a shepherd receiving about 30 LS per head and month. Working as a shepherd is considered a menial job with low social prestige. It is therefore not surprising that young men and even boys now rarely work as shepherds (villagers told me that the shortage of shepherds was an additional contributing factor to the disappearance of large herds). The situation is slightly different when the herd belongs to the shepherd's own family. Although his work may still be considered "dirty" or "backward", at least the undesirable position of "working for other people" is avoided.

Village households require fairly large sums of cash each month to cover their daily needs. My host family in the village, for example, whose household consisted of six adults and two children needed a minimum of 15,000 LS per month to cover their day-to-day expenses. As research in neighbouring areas of Northern Syria shows, land sizes per farmer have become so small that most households cannot subsist on farming alone due to the rapid population growth and subdivision of land through inheritance. A young man's decision to work in agriculture is therefore linked to the amount of land his family owns. If the family's land holdings are small, male household members, notably young men are more likely to turn to labor migration to supplement the meagre household income. ${ }^{13}$

Only a minority of young male villagers rely on agricultural work for income. The connection between the size of the family's land holdings and the decision to seek work elsewhere became apparent in the statements of my interlocutors in Rasm Hammoud, as well. I was told that most villagers consider working "for others" (ind an-nas) in agriculture embarrassing. Young men, who are conscious of their status in the village, are of the opinion that menial agricultural labor, such as weeding, cleaning the fields, and cotton-picking, is
beneath their dignity. This is slightly different if the labor involves "heavy" or "responsible" work "that females cannot do", such as driving a tractor or a combine, ploughing and digging ditches, attending to irrigation, etc. Generally speaking, however, labor in agriculture is not acceptable to young men unless they work their own (or their family's) fields - which is economically sensible only when the family's land holding is of a certain size.

Since there are only very few other local sources of income open to young, unskilled men (a few find work as drivers of local microbuses, for instance), seasonal or year-round labor migration has become the most significant in-come-generating activity for the male youth of the village. ${ }^{14}$ The difference between wages paid to male laborers in agriculture (100-250 LS per day) and in construction ( 500 LS daily for an unskilled laborer, 1,000 LS or more for a worker with special skills) cited by Abdelali-Martini et al. ${ }^{15}$ shows the economic logic of seeking work abroad, despite that fact that migration causes additional expense for paperwork, transport, housing, etc. As a rule, visible signs of relative prosperity (a modern type of house made of concrete with a columned portico, a car, a motorbike, household appliances such as a refrigerator, satellite TV, a video disc- or videoplayer, a camera, new furniture and accessories etc.) indicate that at least one family member is working abroad and provides the household with the necessary cash to supplement the income from declining traditional activities such as livestock raising and agriculture. Apart from occasionally being a source of "luxury" items, however, income from migrant wage labor is indispensable to most household livelihoods.

In 2002/2003, most male migrants from the village sought work in construction, preferably in Lebanon or Jordan. ${ }^{16}$ Those who were able to find a patron and obtain a work permit in Saudi Arabia were among the most prosperous of the labor migrants; however, their absence from the village was comparatively longer. Other migrants moved to the Syrian cities, especially Damascus and Aleppo, where they found work as unskilled laborers on building sites, in factories, etc.; some of the male villagers worked seasonally in archaeological digs, others as carriers in Aleppo's main vegetable market. Although the majority of migrant workers is male, more and more wives and daughters of male labor migrants are joining their relatives abroad, where they work as domestic servants or caretakers in Saudi Arabia, as factory workers in Damascus, or as agricultural laborers in the fields of the Damascene Ghouta. All labor migrants depend on a network of relatives, friends or fellow villagers to find work and accommodation at their destinations.

Female Village Youth
Where childhood ends and youth begins is more clearly marked for females than for males. The interstitial phase between childhood and marriage begins with the girl's first period. Consequently, her style of dress changes from that of a child (uncovered head, sweater or blouse with a long skirt or trousers) to that of a young girl who wears a long, loose gallabiya, and a headscarf whenever she is in public. The next status change occurs with marriage, which transforms the "girl" into a "woman". This step is elaborately marked by the wedding and the associated preparations, ceremonies and celebrations.

In contrast to male villagers, girls in Rasm Hammoud may get married as young as fourteen years of age. ${ }^{17}$ Girls who reach their mid-twenties without getting married have less chance of making a "good match." Since it is unthinkable for them to remain unmarried, they may be obliged to accept a proposal from a man who is already married and thus become a second or third wife, or marry a divorced or widowed man who may be fifty or more years of age. Marriage - and, consequently, motherhood - is considered an inevitable step in every young girl's life. Villagers gave a number of reasons why they considered it necessary for a girl to marry: "life without children is empty. And who will take care of you when you are old?" or "marriage provides emotional and mental stability, despite all the problems you may have with your husband". I was also told frequently that "unmarried girls are a burden on their fathers. It costs money to feed and clothe them, and they do not earn any money themselves."

This statement, however, cannot be taken literally. Although income opportunities are limited for village girls and wages paid to them are extremely low, they engage in a number of economic activities in the village. It is also true, though, that a great deal of the work done by girls is not remunerated. A large part of female working hours are taken up with household management and maintenance. Besides daily activities such as cleaning, preparation of meals and bread-baking, child care, doing the laundry etc., work in this sector includes the maintenance of clay roofs and walls (tali) carried out once or twice a year, preparation and maintenance of mattresses and blankets (nadhida) which are the traditional status symbol of a prosperous household, or the preparation of the household staples (vegetable and/or fruit conserves, cheese, etc.).

In families that still own sheep or goats, it is the girls' and women's task to milk the livestock and process the milk into yoghurt and cheese. As a result of
the transition from semi-sedentary livestock raising, involving seasonal migration and milk processing, to a completely sedentary lifestyle with hardly any livestock raising that has taken place over the last thirty to forty years, the change is generational. Almost all women of forty and older have experienced seasonal mobility and command the necessary skills (setting up the tent, looking after sheep and processing milk). Only very few girls and women under forty years of age still possess these skills.

Of the few households in the village that still keep sheep, most of them merely have a small herd of five to ten sheep (known as mneeha) to produce yoghurt and butter for home consumption. The surplus is sold to the village shop or, less frequently, in Aleppo. Like young men, female youth do not appreciate working with livestock because they see it as tiring, "smelly", and "dirty". This perception also translates into marriage preferences. Most girls I spoke to said they would not like to marry into a family that kept sheep and goats because "they would not be able to do the work."

Most of the unskilled labor required in agriculture but disregarded by the male youth in the village is carried out by girls, who work seasonally either as wage laborers or, if a girl's family have their own fields, as unpaid workers on the family property. ${ }^{18}$ When a girl gets married, she usually stops working "for others" in agriculture, since it is considered incompatible with the dignity of her married status, and impractical because of her responsibilities as a housewife and mother. Wage labor in agriculture is a crucial and for many village girls the only source of income. Girls spoke of two major problems in this sector. First of all, they were paid a very low wage of 100 LS per day (a working day in the fields lasts from approx. 7 a.m. to 2 p.m.), while male laborers received an average of 200 to 300 LS per day. However, girls perceived that there was nothing they could do to increase this wage. Secondly, wage labor in agriculture does not provide a steady, annual source of income but is dependent on seasonal fluctuations. The busiest time for girls is the cotton-picking season between August and October, cotton picking being the only task that is not paid with a daily wage but according to the quantity picked. (In Rasm Hammoud, girls were paid 3,000 LS per ton in the cotton harvest of 2003, with each girl harvesting daily between $50-90 \mathrm{~kg}$. In other villages, I was told, girls pick even more. Generally speaking, a girl can expect to earn between 3,000 and 10,000 LS per season.)

Other activities include cleaning cotton fields of the stubble residue in January and February as preparation for new crops, and springtime weeding and
cleaning of wheat and barley fields as well as olive tree plantations which have only recently been introduced into the village. During the rest of the year, there are no regular income opportunities for girls in agriculture.

The girls I spoke to complained that their opportunities to work in agriculture had decreased in the last three to five years. They explained this with the steadily growing mechanisation of agriculture that has taken over the work traditionally done by girls, on the one hand, and legal measures such as the new legislation limiting the cultivation of cotton along the Euphrates, and the introduction of government-established environmental protection zones, on the other.

In principle, girls have the right to spend their wages as they please. When the harvest is over and wages are distributed, girls typically buy themselves new clothes, make-up and other cosmetic products, as well as costume jewellery, sandals, headscarves, clothes and underwear for everyday use. When the household income is in short supply, however, girls give part or all of the money they have earned to their family as a contribution to day-to-day household expenses. Labor migration occasionally has consequences for household finances that are in stark contrast to the positive effects described above. A few households where the male household head worked abroad were among those with the lowest income in the village (indicated, for example, by lack of heating fuel in the winter, an unbalanced diet, refraining from medical treatment except in the direst emergency). The livelihood situation of these households depended partly on the migrant's work situation abroad, on the duration of his absence, and his financial provisions during this period, as well as on personal relations within the family; the financial situation of the family members "left behind" can become precarious especially when the household head marries more than one wife and there are no sons of a suitable age to contribute to the household income. In this case, income contributions from girls are of vital importance. However, the temporary participation of women and girls in household deci-sion-making and income contribution was countered by a - sometimes difficult - readjustment to former roles once the male head of household had returned home.

Formal education for girls plays a rather insignificant role in the village, although now the first girls from the village have completed their university education and work as teachers in the village school. ${ }^{19}$ However, most of the girls I met during my fieldwork had left school in fifth or sixth grade. The main reasons given for leaving school were personal dislike either of school work or
the teachers; in other instances, the parents had decided to take their daughters out of school for reasons of "propriety", so that they would not be exposed to the gaze of men and boys on the way to and from school. Equally, many people argued that it is more essential for a girl to gain knowledge in household work than to learn English, French, or mathematics. As a result, the general level of education in the village is low, with a surprisingly large number of girls barely literate.

As a result of the shortage of income opportunities for girls, new activities have entered the village. These are based on skills that girls acquire through informal learning. Up to thirty years ago, handicrafts (mainly weaving of rugs and blankets) were engaged in for household consumption only. More recently (from the mid- to late 1990s), handicrafts on commission for Aleppian merchants such as the finishing of cloth for sale with embroidery, seams and other needlework, are carried out by some girls and young women. They are paid per piece completed at an estimated hourly wage of 20 to 60 LS , depending on the nature of the work and the skill of the seamstress. Other income opportunities are opened by cosmetic skills, especially bridal make-up and hairdressing, which can bring up to 500 LS or more for an evening's work. Another activity practised by girls and women is the sewing of simple dresses (gallabiya) for the women of the village. The seamstress earns between 75 to 100 LS per finished gallabiya. However, there are some obstacles to entering this trade. Firstly, not many households own a sewing machine, which means that an investment is a prerequisite for earning money by sewing; and secondly, several girls told me that they could not work as seamstresses because "they did not know how to do it". While this simple skill could be acquired from other women who were more accomplished, I was informed that the village seamstresses guarded their trade secrets closely for fear of competition, and did not want to teach other girls and women how to sew. Sewing courses are also offered by the women's union in the nearest market town, which is about five kilometres away and easily accessible with local transport. However, none of the unmarried girls I knew were allowed to attend - again, I was told, for reasons of "propriety". ${ }^{20}$

## Conclusion: Economic Practice, Changing Values, and Social Norms

Income-generating strategies of youth in Rasm Hammoud respond to external constraints, pressures, and the new opportunities that have emerged as a result of the large-scale transformations of everyday life in the Syrian Euphrates val-
ley in recent decades. The decline in livestock herding, lack of income opportunities in local agriculture, and the new infrastructure that has enhanced villagers' mobility have in particular led to increased labor migration, especially among male rural youth. In addition to these external conditions, the economic practices pursued by individual actors are influenced by other factors, such as their respective social and economic background, educational situation, or social networks.

However, young villagers' decisions about income-generating practices do not follow a purely economic rationale. Their choices are also motivated by other considerations, namely references to both explicit and implicit work-related values, which should not be overlooked in the attempt to gain a more complete understanding of young villagers' economic choices.

A closer look at some of these work-related values and attitudes in the village reveals that they have changed at least partly over the last twenty to thirty years. Villagers' views on working with livestock are one example of this. Members of the older generation speak with nostalgia of the semi-nomadic lifestyle associated with large-scale sheepherding. They describe livestock raising as a rewarding occupation, frequently portraying it as a "clean life" where people relied on "unpolluted", homemade products such as yoghurt and ghee as the mainstay of their diet. Health, longevity, and economic self-sufficiency are associated with this "clean" lifestyle.

Members of the younger generation, on the other hand, emphasize that technological progress and growing sedentarisation have made villagers' lives easier over the last twenty to thirty years. Their attitudes toward livestock raising are a striking contrast to those articulated by their parents or grandparents. Village youths refer to work associated with livestock as "dirty" and look down on the daily chores connected with it as tiring and "backward". Underlying this attitude is a specific understanding of modernity, which can be linked to the rhetoric of "development", progress and modernisation that characterizes much of official Syrian representations about the country's past, present and future. In official discourse propagated via media as diverse as political speeches and TV soap operas, the future of the country is associated with technological progress, increased urbanisation, industrialisation, and education. Nomadic or semi-nomadic sheepherding is, at best, accorded a folkloristic value as the "authentic Arab way of life" - an image that is located irrevocably in the past.

## Gendered Perceptions and the Division of Labor

Other value-related considerations with regard to income-generating practices emerge when gender-specific divisions of labor are examined. As outlined above, the conception of "youth" as a phase of preparation for marriage and full social adulthood makes it necessary for young men to accumulate capital and prove themselves capable of providing income to support their future family. "Earning a living" is thus an integral part of the normative concepts of male village youth. For young girls, other normative ideals, such as being modest, well-behaved, etc., but also proving oneself proficient in the tasks required of a future wife, such as cleaning, cooking, baking, and childcare, are more predominant, although economic realities may in fact oblige girls to contribute to the household income with wage labor, as well. It can be assumed that these normative ideals influence local perceptions of work, at least in part. The view that "girls do not earn any money" as expressed by the villagers would then not only be explained by the observation that girls receive lower wages than male workers, but would also be an expression of normative perceptions linked to gender and generational roles.

It is conspicuous that activities with low prestige, such as menial agricultural tasks, are practised by the village girls, i.e., by laborers whose youth and gender imply that they will not lose face by working "for others" in the fields. Male villagers, on the other hand, are under constant pressure to preserve their dignity among their peers. This applies all the more to young men, whose social standing and reputation has yet to be proved and asserted. Carrying out menial tasks for somebody else would show up a young man as subordinate to another villager, at least in the economic sphere, and could therefore detract from his social standing.

However, the stigma of "working for others" associated with wage labor in local agriculture does not apply to migrant wage labor. This indicates that it is not working for others as such that is perceived as demeaning. Rather, the problem seems to lie in working for members of one's home community, i.e., for peers, relatives, friends, or neighbours, to whom one's dignity and reputation is vulnerable. In contrast, working as a wage laborer abroad means working for an outsider, for someone who is not part of the constant struggle for predominance and face-saving that takes place among the villagers. Furthermore, work on construction sites in Beirut or elsewhere is beyond the village gaze. Although the nature of migrant labor is well known in the village, wor-
king for others is not visible there, since it takes place in an environment far from home - unlike the wage labor practised by village girls. ${ }^{21}$

## Intergenerational Relations

Changing economic practices play a part in subtly transforming intergenerational relations. ${ }^{22}$ "Traditional" economic activities of youth have always taken place within the framework of the family as a unit of production. Income and labor related to family property was and still is shared by family members of both genders and all ages. Meat, wool, milk products, and agricultural produce are all understood as family property; but decisions about land use and disposition of the income derived from it rest with the patriarchal head of the household.

Income from wage labor, however, is a different matter. Other than the natural produce obtained through working in agriculture or with livestock, the cash a young man earns during labor migration is his own property. Although he is expected to contribute a considerable amount of this income to covering his family's day-to-day expenses, he has far more influence on and can even veto decisions about how the money should ultimately be spent. ${ }^{23}$ A changed balance of income may thus lead to a shift in the balance of authority within the household. It can be assumed that this will gradually strengthen the position of the young generation in Rasm Hammoud by increasing their authority and, possibly, even autonomy vis-à-vis their parents' generation.

At the same time, the economic transformations described above create new dependencies that may lead to the preservation and even strengthening of family ties. As parents and younger siblings depend on income contributions from sons, especially when a family has very few economic assets, such as livestock or property in land, a son's responsibility for the parents' material wellbeing can set in even earlier than before, i.e., even before he gets married and has a family of his own.

## Outlook

Of course the field of economic practice, notably the income-generating activities that were the subject of this article, represents only one aspect of the multi-faceted everyday life of youth in Rasm Hammoud. But although the discussion of these activities is just a starting point on the way to a greater understanding of what characterizes the situation of the young generation in rural northern Syria, I would argue that looking through the lens of youth-specific
economic practices makes the complex interrelationships between external economic transformations, changing work-related values, and intergenerational relations and social norms more tangible.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that social and cultural change in the village goes beyond the work-related aspects discussed within the scope of this article. Increased labor migration, electrification and access to mass media and communication technologies, as well as contact to urban professionals who come to the village in various capacities, are of course not only indicators of economic transformations. They also transport new and potentially conflicting images, values, and norms to the countryside, which first and foremost affect the younger generation.

Changing practices and representations of marriage, religious norms, political attitudes and constructions of rural as opposed to urban identity and belonging, in addition to gender and generational roles, are thus among the issues that could be included in future studies of the situation of youth in rural northern Syria.

## Notes

1 See, for instance, Muñoz (2000: 19).
2 For a recent example, see Ibrahim/Wasef (2000).
3 The research was part of a project entitled "Life worlds of a nomadic tribe from 1900 to 2000", directed by Dr. Annegret Nippa, in the framework of the comparative research centre "Integration and Difference" at the Universities of Leipzig and Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. It was funded by the German Research Association. During my stay in Syria I was hosted by the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), Aleppo, as a visiting researcher.
4 I would like to thank Dr. Aden Aw Hassan, who supported my research throughout my stay at ICARDA, for his encouragement to take a closer look at the significance of livelihood security and income generation for villagers' everyday lives.
5 Detailed descriptions of the changes in the Euphrates valley since the early 1970s can be found, for example, in the studies of Annika Rabo (1986), Sulaiman Khalaf (1981; 1993), Günter Meyer (1984; 1990) and Myriam Ababsa (2004).
6 For more details of villagers' displacement and the different state-directed relocation measures, see Meyer (1984: 25ff).

7 See Daker (1973) for a more detailed description of the sedentarisation process in this area.
8 Terms such as sabiyye or fatat, designating a young girl, which are heard in urban contexts, are understood, but rarely used in the village.
9 Unless marked otherwise, information on wages, fees, etc. in this chapter relies on oral information from the villagers in 2002/2003. During my stay in Syria, 50 LS (Syrian Pounds) was approximately equivalent to 1 US Dollar.
10 Of course, the property relations and inheritance laws in this region that involve custom, state law and religious prescriptions as multiple reference systems are much more complex than can be described here and merit a far more detailed discussion.
11 In one tragic case, for example, the parents of a young girl were killed in a car accident, leaving herself and her brother, who supported both of them as a laborer on construction sites in Lebanon. Shortly afterwards, her brother was also killed in an accident. Consequently, she was married to her young patrilateral parallel-cousin (i.e., her father's brother's son) who was only seventeen years of age when they married. The marriage, which gave the girl a place in her patrilineal uncle's home, was facilitated by the fact that no bride wealth was demanded.
12 In some cases, when a household has very few animals and the grazing ground is close to home, older women or young girls can also be seen accompanying the small herd.
13 Abdelali-Martini et al. (2003: 72f).
14 Although this process has accelerated in recent years, it should be noted that labor migration from the Euphrates valley began several decades ago. Meyer (1984: 87), for instance, gives a description of this phenomenon in the early 1980s.
15 Abdelali-Martini et al. (2003: 88).
16 Lebanon was the preferred destination because Syrian citizens only need their identity card for entry; however, since the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al Hariri in February 2005, and the ensuing tensions between Syria and Lebanon, there has been a noticeable decrease in labor migration to Lebanon.
17 As Annika Rabo notes, this early age of marriage for girls - which contradicts legal prescriptions in Syria - can also be found in the conservative merchant milieu of Aleppo (Rabo 2005: 88).

18 See also Abdelali-Martini et al. (2003).
19 The example of a girl from a neighbouring village, who had completed her secondary education with such excellent grades that she was accepted at the college of medicine in Aleppo university, was sometimes cited with admiration and - at the same time - considered as an exceptional and rare case by girls in Rasm Hammoud.
20 This changed for one of my friends when she got married. Her husband supported her wish and consented to her attending training classes.
21 The difference between working "for others" at home and abroad was made clear to me by the mother of one young man. Her son, a teacher and the grandson of a famous tribal sheikh, used to work in Beirut in construction for additional income to alleviate the family financial situation. His mother told me that this was only possible away from the Euphrates valley, since it would be too embarrassing to work "for others" so obviously in an area where everyone knew his family background.
22 See also the contribution by El-Harras in this volume.
23 For instance, I was told that a father might marry a second or third wife with the money derived from his land, even against the will of the children from his first marriage, who had contributed to this very income with their own labor. He would, however, not be able to remarry with the money received from a grown-up son's migration labor if his son did not agree.

# Methodological Considerations Related to Studies on Youth and Adolescents in Egypt 

Sahar El-Tawila

This paper summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of two pioneer studies on youth and adolescents in Egypt and the overall experience acquired from their design and implementation. The first study, Transition to Adulthood: A National Survey of Egyptian Adolescents, was conducted in 1997 and focused on adolescents aged 10-19 years. The second study, Patterns of Marriage and Family Formation among Youth in Egypt, was conducted in 2000 and targeted young Egyptians in the 18-30 age group. Although they combined several methodologies for data collection, both studies relied heavily on structured instruments administered in the context of a national survey. The sample design and related biases are detailed and response rates are presented and discussed. The material presented and discussed in this paper is extracted mainly from the annexes of the published reports of the two studies.

## Transition to Adulthood: National Survey on Egyptian Adolescents ${ }^{1}$

As societies began to extend the years of education and skill-training necessary for participation in adult life, adolescence came to be recognized as a unique and important period in the life cycle. The working definition of this prolonged period of transition from childhood to adulthood is the second decade of life, spanning the ages of 10 to 19 . Much of the international literature on adolescence focuses on sexual behavior, deviance, or rebellion against adults. However, this literature often misses crucial aspects of adolescent life in developing countries, which either lead to deprivation or to enhanced opportunities in the future, such as the transition from school to work roles, and marital unions.

Now that Egypt has expanded basic education to reach nearly all children and the requirements of entering into adult roles such as work and parenting have become more complex, adolescence emerges as a crucial phase in the life cycle of young people. In the Egyptian context, girls and boys experience adolescence differently, which translates into different opportunities as young people progress toward adulthood. Also, adolescence in Egypt is a period when many gender-specific distinctions become more concrete and revolve around
appropriate dress, mobility, leisure activities, and aspirations for the future. In addition, health and nutrition are major components during adolescence and puberty, as is reproductive health. Hence, the main objective of the study was to compile, a comprehensive profile of Egyptian adolescents for the first time.

Collaborating institutions on this study were the High Institute for Public Health (HIPH) of the Alexandria University, the Faculty of Medicine of Assiut University, and the Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo. The whole exercise was led and coordinated by the Population Council Regional Office for West Asia and North Africa.

## Sample Design

The survey sample is a national representative, multi-stage, stratified, probability cluster sample of adolescents. In the first stage, 101 primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected proportional to population size, using the census frame compiled by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). The five frontier governorates were excluded from the study, as only about $1.5 \%$ of the total population of Egypt lives in these five governorates. In urban areas, PSUs are the smallest administrative units for which census results are published, and are known as shiakhas. In the rural areas, PSUs are made up of villages and the corresponding hamlets and satellites administratively linked to them.

The PSUs were stratified by 21 governorates and by urban/rural type of residence within each governorate. Based on population estimates from 1996, selected PSUs were partitioned on the maps. In the rural PSUs each partition had an approximate population of 5,000 , while urban PSUs had an approximate population of 10,000 to allow for the greater heterogeneity in urban areas. One partition was randomly selected from each of the 101 PSUs. A quick count process of housing units in the selected partition was carried out. The selected partition was then divided into smaller well-defined segments, each with an approximately equal number of housing units. In the second stage, two segments were randomly selected from each of the 101 primary sampling units. The segment size varied among the different PSUs so as to yield a self-weighted sample of households at the end. Using a household roster sheet, all households within the well-defined boundaries of the selected segments were screened.

A total of 13,271 households were successfully screened during this phase of the survey. Households were defined as eligible when they contained at least
one member in the 10-19 age group. The number of eligible households amounted to 7,256 (the eligibility rate was 0.547 ). Using the Kish-grid, one adolescent (by gender) was randomly selected from each eligible household. This resulted in one boy and one girl being selected from households that contained at least one adolescent of each gender. A total of 9,128 adolescents were successfully interviewed (4,354 boys and 4,774 girls). All adolescents selected at random were eligible for an individual interview using a core instrument. The sample of adolescents is not self-weighted.

All randomly selected adolescents enrolled at school between 5th grade and 9th grade and those who dropped out between these two grades were eligible for two achievement tests in Arabic and mathematics. A total of 3,713 eligible adolescents completed the Arabic test and 3,792 completed the mathematics test. A total of 3,682 adolescents completed both tests.

A quarter of the total sample of adolescents selected at random was systematically sub-sampled: half the sample (by gender) in 50 primary sampling units. Subjects in this sub-sample were eligible for a second interview focusing mainly on health issues. The total size of the sub-sample successfully interviewed was 2,323 ( 1,070 boys and 1,253 girls). The adolescents selected in this sub-sample were also eligible for a complete health examination including urine, stool and blood tests. Similar to the original sample of adolescents, the sub-sample is not self-weighted.

Since the principal investigators had an interest in the phenomenon of adolescent marriage among females, both the individual core instrument and the health instrument were administered to all ever-married adolescents identified in eligible households. This process was applied regardless of whether or not the adolescent was selected at random. The total number of ever-married adolescents successfully interviewed was 317.

This design resulted in national representative samples of adolescents for which all reports remain generalizable and can be disaggregated by region of residence (urban governorates/Lower Egypt/Upper Egypt), type of place of residence (urban/rural) and by gender.

## Study Instruments and Methodology

## The Roster

The roster collected basic demographic information from all 13,271 sampled households on all regular members of the household, such as age, sex, marital
status, educational attainment, literacy among the group who never attended school, and work status.

## The Individual Adolescent Core in Five Parts

Section I. Education: information was collected on exact birth date, school ever-attendance, highest stage reached if ever attended, current enrolment status, age at drop out of school and reasons for drop out, school entry age, reasons for never attendance, and attitudes towards literacy classes among ne-ver-attendants. For those in pre-university education at the time of the survey and for the group who had ever attended preparatory schools, a battery of questions on different aspects of the school experience was administered. Attitudes toward school, distance to school, school conditions and facilities, interaction with teachers and among students, and some indicators of the quality of education were also addressed.

Section II. Economic roles: this section included questions concerning ever as well as current participation in the labor market, type of current employment, working hours per day and work days per week. Special questions were asked of adolescents working for pay in regard to working conditions, work hazards, satisfaction with current job, level of earnings, and management of earnings. Reasons for and age at starting work were asked of all who ever worked.

Section III. Health status: focused on health-service-seeking behavior, medications taken regularly, exercise, and smoking behaviors. For girls, questions about menstruation and its management were addressed.

Section IV. Social relations and personal traits: focused on the adolescent's communication and exchange of support with family members and peers. Questions addressing important aspects of the psychological profile of individuals in this transitional phase of their lives were also included. These were not psychological tests but rather an exploratory tool to investigate some positive personal traits such as self-worth and leadership, as well as the prevalence of negative emotions (loneliness, anxiety, fear, guilt). In addition, venues to express anger and the extent of satisfaction with life, future expectations, and role models were examined.

Section V. Time Use: twenty-four hour recall of studying, work, help in household chores, exposure to the media, and activities during leisure time.

## The Health Status and Health-Related Attitudes Questionnaire

Section I. Health-service-seeking behavior: this section focused on the frequency of laboratory testing of urine, stool and blood in the 12 months preceding the interview. General information on the type of service provided, reason for utilization, and level of satisfaction during a recent illness was also collected.

Section II. Health-related practices: this included regular intake of vitamins and iron tablets as well as personal and peer experience in regard to tobacco and drug use.

Section III. Dietary habits: the number of meals per day, snacks between meals, eating outside the home, consumption of tea and coffee, vegetables, fruit, bread, salt, etc.

Section IV. Reproductive health and gender roles: appropriate age at marriage for boys and girls and justification for it, the incidence of circumcision and the related social context, knowledge of perception of maturational changes, sources of information on these changes, and for girls, management of menstruation. Adolescents between 16 and19 years of age were asked a battery of knowledge and attitudinal questions on reproductive health issues, including sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and family planning, gender roles in the house, sharing tasks and decision-making, divorce, and the marriage contract. Some of the questions concerned with circumcision, gender roles, decision-making and divorce were extracted from Egypt Demographic and Health Survey modules that were administered to ever-married women in reproductive age.

Section V. Marriage: all 16-19 year old adolescents were asked about the qualities they sought in a future spouse, the ideal age difference between spouses, and the difference in educational attainment between spouses. Evermarried female adolescents were asked about their age and that of their husbands at the time of marriage, marriage arrangements, living arrangements after marriage, ideal number of children, communication between spouses, and a complete account of pregnancy outcomes.

## Assessment of General Health Status

Laboratory investigations incorporated 'Hemoglobin Determination' and a 'Parasitologic Study' (El-Tawila/Ibrahim et al. 1999). Measurement of weight and height was carried out on 1,999 adolescents according to procedures recommended by Jelliffe (1966). The anthropometric indices height-for-age and
body mass index (BMI)-for-age, as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee (1995), were used to evaluate the nutritional status of the adolescents. The United States National Center for Health Statistics/World Health Organization (NCHS/WHO) reference data (1983) was used for the height-for-age index. The latter provides an indication of linear growth retardation and is therefore an indicator of stunting. BMI-forage [weight $(\mathrm{kg}) /$ height $^{2}(\mathrm{~cm})$ ] is recommended as the best indicator of thinness and overweight in adolescence. Tanner's scale was also adopted for the assessment of sexual maturation.

## The Unique Features of the Study

The experience from the pre-test and later the implementation of the survey emphasized the feasibility of interviewing very young adolescents, as long as the phrasing of the questions was sensitive to age and regional colloquial differentials.

Obtaining parental consent to interview an adolescent in private was occasionally problematic. While the majority of the adolescents interviewed were positive about this process, took it seriously, and felt a sense of pride about participating, parents were often sceptical. The interviewers were instructed to carry out the interviews in total privacy. When parents insisted on attending, the interviewers used one or more strategies to maintain the privacy of the interview. They reiterated the objectives of the study gave parents a blank questionnaire to read or offered to read the questions to them prior to the interview. Alternatively, interviewers suggested that parents sit where the interview could be seen but not heard, and began with the achievement tests if the adolescent was eligible. Otherwise more than one interviewer carried out interviews with several eligible respondents from the same household simultaneously. At worst, the interviewers had to accept parents' listening to the first few questions and answers, after which they either recognized the legitimacy of the survey or grew bored and left the room.

One problem unique to surveys on adolescents is the relatively high mobility of this segment of the population within the area of residence. In-school adolescents are either in class or at private lessons after school. When they finish their scholastic commitments, they visit or go out with friends, or are off buying things (particularly food) for the household. In rural areas and in urban Lower and Upper Egypt, they are very likely to be employed either in workshops for pay or helping their parents in the fields without pay. The interview-
ers were instructed to make three attempts on different days and hours to meet the selected adolescent. After the third unsuccessful attempt, the adolescent in question was considered a non-response.

Administering multiple instruments to the same respondent translated into the practical need to make more than one visit to the same respondent. Adolescents in the health sub-sample who were also eligible for the achievement tests represent an extreme case. This group was interviewed for the core individual adolescent questionnaire, the health questionnaire, and the achievement tests in Arabic and in mathematics. Collectively, two and a half hours were needed to implement this set of instruments. Allocating such a long period to the interview was difficult for some adolescents due to exhaustion or other commitments. The successful implementation of the complex health component of the survey is the outcome of a high level of coordination between four research institutions, on the one hand, and the sincere support of high level executives at the Ministry of Health and Population, on the other. Furthermore, the seriousness and commitment of the physicians who were recruited to implement this component and their sensitivity to the respondents were infinitely vital assets. Nonetheless, implementation of the health component faced four main problems.

Parental skepticism (and occasional indifference) was a major obstacle interviewers had to face. Convincing parents and the adolescents themselves to undergo the clinical examination and to give urine and stool specimens was indeed a very difficult task. Accompanying the respondents to the health center, emphasizing the safety of the procedure, and the presence of a female physician (for girls) were all positive factors in raising the response rate to this particular component of the survey. Later on, returning the results of the laboratory tests to the respondents reinforced the benefits of participation and a sense of the researchers' commitment to them.

In some urban and rural PSUs, the health center designated by the Ministry of Health as the nearest to the area was still not close enough to the particular sampled segment. Having to walk a long distance or use a means of transportation were real obstacles to implementing the health component. Furthermore, no paramedics were recruited. The presence of paramedics might possibly have speeded up the process, facilitated the work of the team, and minimized waiting time for the respondents.
In addition, the implementation of the health component coincided in some PSUs with school examinations during the month of May. Both parents and
adolescents were reluctant to participate in this component during this period because of the time consumed in the process, while the survey team could not postpone it due to the potential cost incurred by this delay.

Characteristics of the Sample and Quality of the Data
Due to the innovative nature of the study and the complexity of the sampling design, it was important to assess the quality of the data collected and the extent to which the sample of adolescents was representative of the original population. Three main concerns were: accuracy of reporting the age of the adolescent, level and pattern of response rates, and impact of non-response on the overall quality and representation of the sample.

Figure 1: Age distribution of 9-20 year old individuals in screened households


Figure 1 displays the age distribution of individuals from 9-20 years in all sampled households screened for the purposes of the survey. The results indicate that some of the eligible adolescents, aged either 10 or 18-19, were probably shifted to the ages of 9 and 20 respectively, putting them outside the range of the eligibility criterion for selection and interview.

The process of smoothing the age-curve results in an increase by about 700 in the number of eligible adolescents in screened households. Assuming the same response rate, the size of the core sample of adolescents successfully interviewed should have been higher by 400-500 cases, comprising less than 5\% of those actually interviewed. The sub-sample subjected to the second interview,
using the health instrument followed by the clinical examination, and the collection of urine and stool specimens, lost about 100-125 cases due to inaccurate age reporting. The loss is divided almost equally between the ages of 10 and 18-19. As a result, the number of 16-19 year old adolescents in the health sub-sample is reduced by $8 \%$. For all reported ages above 20 , age heaping at figures ending with zero or five is evident.

Table 1 provides the response rate, the number of adolescents successfully interviewed, and the number originally selected by type of instrument, sex of respondent, and urban/rural type of residence.

Table 1: Response rate, the number of adolescents successfully interviewed and the number originally selected by type of instrument, sex of respondent and urban/rural type of residence

|  | Males | Females | Urban | Rural | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Core adolescent questionnaire | 82.1 | 89.7 | 82.7 | 88.2 | 86.0 |
|  | 4,354 | 4,774 | 3,659 | 5,469 | 9,128 |
|  | 5,303 | 5,323 | 4,423 | 6,203 | 10,626 |
| Health sub-sample questionnaire | 80.7 | 94.2 | 84.8 | 89.3 | 87.5 |
|  | 1,070 | 1,253 | 938 | 1,385 | 2,323 |
|  | 1,326 | 1,330 | 1,105 | 1,550 | 2,656 |
| Achievement test in Arabic | 73.3 | 80.3 | 71.4 | 80.8 | 76.6 |
|  | 1,858 | 1,855 | 1,534 | 2,179 | 3,713 |
|  | 2,536 | 2,310 | 2,149 | 2,697 | 4,846 |
| Achievement test in mathematics | 75.2 | 81.6 | 72.0 | 83.2 | 78.3 |
|  | 1,908 | 1,884 | 1,548 | 2,244 | 3,792 |
|  | 2,536 | 2,310 | 2,149 | 2,697 | 4,846 |
| Responsible adults questionnaire | 82.6 | 93.1 | 83.5 | 90.0 | 87.2 |
|  | 3,274 | 2,939 | 2,552 | 3,661 | 6,213 |
| Clinical examination* | 3,965 | 3,157 | 3,056 | 4,066 | 7,122 |
| Test for anemia* | 88.7 | 82.7 | 71.0 | 95.2 | 85.4 |
|  | 949 | 1,036 | 666 | 1,319 | 1,985 |
|  | 1,070 | 1,253 | 938 | 1,385 | 2,323 |


| Urine specimen* | 86.2 | 79.6 | 67.9 | 92.6 | 82.7 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 922 | 998 | 637 | 1,283 | 1,920 |
|  | 1,070 | 1,253 | 938 | 1,385 | 2,323 |
| Stool specimen* | 81.4 | 74.8 | 59.2 | 90.5 | 77.8 |
|  | 871 | 937 | 555 | 1,253 | 1,808 |
|  | 1,070 | 1,253 | 938 | 1,385 | 2,323 |

* The response rates are calculated as a percentage of the sample that successfully completed the health interview.

The overall response rate for structured questionnaires administered to adolescents was $87 \%$. Response rates were systematically higher in rural than in urban areas and higher among girls than boys. Three out of every four eligible adolescents completed the achievement tests in Arabic and mathematics. Among adolescents who successfully completed the health questionnaire, the response rate to the clinical examination was $85 \%$, and was higher among boys than girls and higher in rural than in urban areas.

Table 2 shows the differentials in response rates among adolescents randomly selected for the core individual interview by sex, age, school enrolment, and work status.

Table 2: The differentials in response rates among adolescents randomly selected for the core individual interview by selected background variables

|  | Boys | Girls | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Age |  |  |  |
| 10 | 91.8 | 91.9 | 91.9 |
| 11 | 89.2 | 94.2 | 91.5 |
| 12 | 85.0 | 94.3 | 89.6 |
| 13 | 86.3 | 90.7 | 88.5 |
| 14 | 85.2 | 93.9 | 89.8 |
| 15 | 81.8 | 90.5 | 86.1 |
| 16 | 76.9 | 85.9 | 81.7 |
| 17 | 78.8 | 87.3 | 83.1 |
| 18 | 70.5 | 83.2 | 76.8 |
| 19 | 68.1 | 80.0 | 74.0 |


| School enrolment |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| In school | 85.9 | 91.6 | 88.6 |
| Out of school | 71.5 | 86.0 | 80.5 |
| Work for pay | 79.3 | 86.2 | 80.5 |
| Yes | 82.9 | 89.8 | 86.7 |
| No |  |  |  |
| Unpaid employment | 90.4 | 95.3 | 92.0 |
| Yes | 79.4 | 89.0 | 84.6 |
| No |  |  |  |

Table 3 displays the distribution of individuals in all sampled households by sex, age, and type and region of residence, and compares this distribution to data results of the 1996 census in Egypt. Only minor differences are observed in the distribution of sampled households by urban/rural type of residence. The proportion of urban households in the sample is slightly lower than in the census, apparently outside of the urban governorates. This is a result of two main factors. Firstly, response rates for the preliminary screening process was lower in urban than in rural areas. In addition, non-sampling non-response was also higher in urban than in rural areas due to the higher incidence of unoccupied housing units in urban than in rural areas.

Table 3: The distribution of the population from the 1996 census data and the distribution of individuals in all sampled households by background variables

|  | Results of the 1996 census |  |  | Individuals in all sampled <br> households |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Males | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total | N |
| Sex |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Males | - | - | 51.2 | - | - | 50.3 | 34,241 |
| Females | - | - | 48.8 | - | - | 49.7 | 33,894 |
| Age <br> \% 10-14* | - | - | 10.7 | - | - | 12.8 | 8,772 |
| to total <br> population |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Type of residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Urban | 43.1 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 41.5 | 41.4 | 41.4 | 28,241 |
| Rural | 56.9 | 57.1 | 57.1 | 58.5 | 58.6 | 58.6 | 39,894 |
| Region of |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban Gov. | 18.8 | 18.7 | 18.8 | 21.6 | 21.2 | 21.4 | 14,590 |
| Lower Egypt | 44.1 | 44.2 | 44.1 | 43.2 | 43.0 | 43.1 | 29,373 |
| Upper Egypt | 37.0 | 37.0 | 37.0 | 35.2 | 35.8 | 35.5 | 24,172 |

## Patterns of Marriage and Family Formation Among Youth in Egypt

Within the changing demographic and socio-economic context surrounding 'youth' in Egypt, patterns of marriage and family formation require realistic assessment. Understanding marriage is important for the appreciation of future social change. Marriage behaviors such as the choice of partner, the timing of marriage, and the forms of marriage and consequent living arrangements are relevant to questions of population, fertility, and child rearing. The research aimed at investigating the knowledge, attitudes and practices of official marriages among young adults vis-à-vis secretive $u r f i$ marriages. The ultimate goal of the study was to provide all stakeholders with the necessary information to help them improve the social, cultural and economic environment in the interests of a healthier pattern of 'youth' marriage and family formation by seeking answers to the following questions:

- How do young people choose their prospective marriage partners?
- What are the financial implications and impediments to the formation of new families?
- What is the attitude of young people toward the pre-nuptial medical examination?
- Is early marriage a persistent problem?
- Does late marriage affect all young people in Egypt?
- Is there still a preference for consanguineous marriage?
- What do young couples appreciate in married life, and what are the disadvantages of marriage envisaged by young couples?
- How do young people evaluate secretive Urfi marriage: its consequences, advantages and disadvantages?
- What factors are correlated with entering into a relationship that may or may not lead to an official marriage?
- What is the extent of involvement and role of the family in the marriage process?

Study Design and sampling Scheme
The study integrated quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an attempt to understand the context and content of relationships that may or may not lead to marriage, and to describe these relationships and the deliberations and considerations that structure them.

The research had three phases:
Phase I: was a qualitative assessment of a wide spectrum of issues that needed to be considered from the perspective of young people themselves. Several techniques were utilized in this phase, such as free-listings ( 33 respondents), Focus Group Discussions ( 17 FGDs involving 87 Egyptian youth) and one in-depth interview with a key informant who had close daily contact with a population of about 900 youth of both sexes. Participants in the FGDs were not selected with probability-sampling techniques, but rather on the basis of certain individual characteristics related to age, sex, marital status, education attainment, place of residence, religion, and socio-economic background.

Phase II: was a household survey using structured instruments developed on the basis of the qualitative assessment results in phase I. These instruments were administered to a national probability sample of young males and females in the 18-30 age group. Based on our previous experience (collecting data from 10-19 year old adolescents) and given the sensitive nature of the data collected, we realized that if we raised the lower age limit from 15 to 18 years, the gain in terms of interview privacy and data quality would outweigh the loss of information on adolescents of younger ages (15-17). In addition, extending the upper age limit of the target population to 30 years proved essential to providing a comprehensive profile of the marriage process and the significant long-term influences exerted by contextual factors on the formation of new families.

Phase III: was a social in-depth qualitative component. In this phase, indepth interviews were conducted with young males and females who had experienced secretive $u r f i$ marriages. Interviews were carried out using a semi-structured questionnaire. The aim of these interviews was to give interviewees the latitude to present and evaluate their own experiences, discuss their concerns and share their thoughts. Non-probability sampling methods, such as the use of informants and snowballing, were used in this phase. A total of 18 in-depth interviews were conducted.

Sampling Scheme for the Household Survey
The target population for the study was defined as young men and women in the 18-30 age group. Existing listings from the adolescent survey were re-utilized to identify eligible households for the study in two-thirds of the original Primary Sampling Units ( 66 Primary Sampling Units in 21 governorates). The eligibility criterion for inclusion was based solely on the ages of individual members of the screened households. The time lag between the two surveys was taken into consideration. A total of 5,743 eligible households was identified. We anticipated that this procedure would yield a fairly representative sample of young respondents - males/females, married/unmarried, at university/otherwise - who would be in the 18-30 age group at the time of the interviews for this study.

## Sources of Bias in the Sample

The study aimed at profiling marriage-related attitudes and practices among a representative sample of young males and females in Egypt. Ideally, a stratified probability sample of households, where all eligible respondents identified are interviewed, should be sufficient to fulfil the objectives of the study. However, four main sources of bias are intrinsic to its design.

First of all, ensuring literally a representative sample of Egyptian 'youth' requires all socio-economic groups be represented in this sample. The 'elite' in any society - Egypt being no exception - is a relatively small group and tends to be clustered in geographic terms. Probability cluster sampling could never yield the desired level of representation for this group unless a sufficiently large number of Primary Sampling Units and socio-economic criteria were incorporated in the stratification of the original frame before the selection process is carried out. Both conditions were beyond the resources available to this study.

Secondly, the target population for this study was 'Egyptian youth' in the 18-30 age group. It encompasses several sub-groups, including young males in the course of fulfilling mandatory military service and unemployed males who travel abroad for short periods (less than six months) in search of work. These two sub-groups meet the de jure criterion for identifying members of a sampled household, which emphasizes not having another residence during the preceding six months. Hence, they are listed along with other household members in the roster sheet although they are not actually present. The two subgroups remain grossly under-represented in the sample.

Thirdly, two further sub-groups of young men and women pose a real challenge to gaining full coverage of the target population in sampled households, as they are hardly ever at home and therefore very difficult to interview, i.e., those who leave their main residence and reside temporarily in other governorates for the purposes of work or study, and those who work very long hours outside the home and are highly mobile when they are not at work. Our only strategy in this respect was to intensify the data collection effort at weekends and during the holidays.

A final source of bias relates to the utilization of existing rather than updated listings of households residing within well-defined segments. As a result, young men and women from originally screened households who had changed residence in the preceding two or three years (moved to another non-sampled PSU altogether) due to marriage or other reasons were excluded by definition. The absence of this group was only partially compensated for by the inclusion of newly-formed couples in the households already listed. In western societies this would have been a very serious source of bias to the sample, since 'youth' usually move out of the parents' residence as they approach the age of 18 and become young adults themselves, regardless of their marital status. The situation in Egypt is somewhat different. Young adults of both sexes tend to continue living with their parents until they get married and the majority begin their married life residing with one of the families of orientation. In the current study, we attempted to at least count the cases of eligible respondents within listed households who had changed residence in the interim period between the two surveys.

Table 4 provides information on the size of the youth groups not represented in the survey sample, as well as the total number of those listed and those actually interviewed.

Table 4: Total number of listed eligible households and individuals (youth), the number of households and youth included in the study, and the number of households and youth not included by reason

| Households |  | Individuals (youth) |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Total eligible households from <br> existing listings in 66 PSUs | 5,743 | \# of youth who changed residence- <br> between the two surveys due to <br> marriage | 409 |


| \# of households that moved out of <br> sampled PSUs | 242 | \# of youth who changed residence- <br> between the two surveys for other <br> reasons | 126 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| \# of households that could not be <br> identified in the field in all 66 <br> PSUs | 127 | Total number of youth in the up- <br> dated listings of designated eligible <br> household | 7,907 |
| \# of households included in this <br> study | 5,374 | Total number not available for <br> interview | 1,138 |
| Total number available for inter- <br> view | 6,769 |  |  |

Response Rates and Reasons for Non-Response
Response rates reported for national surveys in Egypt are known to be high for two main reasons: the high share of the rural population and the nature of the target population, basically middle-aged married women who are at home most of the time. Generally, it has been documented that adolescent and youth response rates are much lower than among the adult or elderly population. Adolescents are known to be a mobile group. In Egyptian society, rules and boundaries that restrict the movements of this group - in terms of the time they are allowed to stay outside the home as well as the places they can go to - still exist to some extent for boys and much more so for girls. However, it seemed that these rules did not exist at all for young males in the 20-30 age group. At this stage of their lives, they can exercise the utmost freedom of movement, since the majority has completed education/military service, started to explore the labor market, and have little or no responsibilities.

As indicated in Table 5, the overall response rate of sampled youth in this study was $68 \%, 59 \%$ among young males and $77 \%$ among young females. The highest response rates were recorded for young females who were either married or resided in Upper Egypt (85-87\%). On the other hand, young married men and young men in the urban governorates recorded the lowest response rates ( $53 \%$ ). These two sub-groups of young men were the most likely to be working extremely long hours and to be at home only at times inappropriate for interviewing. Moreover, it is not surprising that the highest rate of non-response was encountered in the urban governorates.

Among young females, non-response was mainly due to refusal (10\%) or because the respondent was running errands or visiting someone (9\%). Straight refusals comprised $11 \%$ of total eligible cases among males, while 'at
work' and 'not at home' had a higher magnitude - $12 \%$ and $17 \%$ respectively (Table 6). Weights were computed on the basis of response rates by sex, region of residence and marital status.

Table 5: Response rates by sex, region of residence, type of region of residence and marital status

| Background Variables | Response Rate |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Males | Females |
| Urban Governorates | 52.7 | 62.5 |
| Urban Lower Egypt | 55.6 | 78.9 |
| Rural Lower Egypt | 56.0 | 80.7 |
| Urban Upper Egypt | 80.2 | 87.5 |
| Rural Upper Egypt | 76.3 | 87.1 |
| Urban | 55.3 | 68.6 |
| Rural | 62.7 | 83.3 |
| Single | 63.8 | 72.3 |
| Married | 55.2 | 84.9 |
| Widowed | - | 81.8 |
| Divorced | - | 72.2 |
| Total | 59.3 | 76.7 |

* Sampled PSUs in Giza governorate are included in the category of urban governorates

Table 6: The distribution of screened youth in eligible households by sex, the result of interview (completed/not completed) and reasons for non-response

| Reason for non-response | Male | Female | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Refused | 11.2 | 10.7 | 10.9 |


| Not at home | 16.6 | 8.6 | 12.5 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| At work | 11.8 | 2.8 | 7.2 |
| Health reasons | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| In jail | 0.2 | - | 0.1 |
| Ran away | 0.1 | - | - |
| Total not completed | 40.7 | 23.3 | 31.9 |
| Interview completed | 59.3 | 76.7 | 68.1 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The Study Instruments
The study instruments comprised three sets corresponding to the three main phases of data collection:

The first set: had two instruments: the free-listing tool and the guidelines for Focus Group Discussions. The guidelines covered issues related to the reasons and circumstances underlying youth marriages - how young couples get introduced, the role of the two families, the financial implications of forming a new family etc., perceived marriage assets and liabilities, consequences of divorce and spinsterhood, and emerging unconventional forms of marriage.

The second set: comprised four structured questionnaires corresponding to possible marital statuses of youth - single, engaged, married, or widowed/ divorced. One questionnaire was administered to each sampled youth in the survey, according to their current marital status. The 'youth' instrument was administered to all respondents through face-to-face interviews. No identifying information was collected and each instrument was enclosed in a sealed blank envelope at the end. These interviews were carried out at home after obtaining the informed consent of the young respondent and ensuring privacy during the interview. All four questionnaires had the same sections on official marriage and extra-marital relationships, secretive Urfi marriage, health-risk practices including sexual relationships, and some background information on education attainment and current work experience. Different versions of the questions related to official marriage were developed to reflect either attitudes/perceptions/expectations or otherwise actual behaviors/practices, based on the current marital status of the respondent, i.e., single or ever married.

The third set: consisted of two slightly different, semi-structured questionnaires, which were used in the in-depth interviews conducted with young men and women with current or previous experience of secretive Urfi marriage. The
instrument aimed at collecting some background information on the respondents and their family of orientation, how the couple got involved in Urfi marriages, motivations for avoiding official marriage, the role of other agents such as family or friends in initiating/terminating the marriage, consequences of this marriage, and their overall self-assessment of the experience.

# Dialogue with the Future. ${ }^{1}$ Findings of a Study on Adolescents in Three Egyptian Governorates 

Farag Elkamel

The main objective of this study is to identify problems, opinions, and ambitions of Egyptian adolescents. The study used a qualitative research methodology known as Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), which is suitable for research on sensitive issues such as those under review. The sample consisted of 24 groups (each with 6-8 persons) divided into an equal number of male and female groups. The groups had an equal representation of young adolescents ( $12-15$ years) and older adolescents (16-18 years). The 24 groups were in turn divided into three sub-groups, one of which was researched in Upper Egypt (Menya), another in the Delta (Dakahlia), and the third in the metropolitan Cairo area, including Cairo and Giza. The methodology of the study required female researchers to moderate the female group discussions, and male researchers those of male groups. There was no exception to this rule. All group discussions took place at the homes of selected participants, with the exception of two groups, whose discussions were held in the meeting room of a social club.

## Findings

## Gender Equality

Almost all boys agree that girls are treated differently from boys with respect to at least two issues: freedom to go out and the type of parental punishment. Boys are generally allowed to stay out late and to go out more frequently. Girls are not. Male participants justify this differential treatment as 'protection' for girls from harassment by boys. One boy from Giza explained: "If something happens to a girl, people will say that her father failed to bring her up properly. There is no problem if a boy comes home late. If it was a girl, she would have a problem with her reputation." In fact, this is one of the very few situations where a girl can be physically punished by her parents. On the whole, however, boys are subject to far more physical punishment than girls. Our discussions with boys revealed that most of them are physically punished by their parents.

In addition to the belief that boys are more equipped to withstand physical punishment than girls, one of the boys justified this differential treatment in
terms of what he called the 'higher aspirations' parents have for boys. Boys are treated with physical punishment if they neglect their studies, whereas girls are scolded verbally. One boy from Cairo (16 years) explained: "A girl will eventually marry someone, even if she has no education, but a boy won't." Another boy ( 14 years) added: "Parents always set higher standards for boys. Even if a girl doesn't study she will eventually get an intermediate diploma and stay at home (until she gets married). But a boy has to do better in order to be able to have a home and raise a family."

On the other hand, several boys indicated that parental attitudes and treatment varied according to their social and cultural levels, and that boys and girls were treated equally in families with a higher socio-economic status.

From the girls' perspective, however, parents are much more restrictive with girls than they are with boys. One girl from Menya stated: "There is a saying that if you break one of her ribs, a girl will grow twenty-four more instead. But nobody, for example, would say if you break a boy's leg, he will grow two more." Girls also claimed that parents give boys what they want but do not do the same for girls. "For example, if a boy wants a new pair of trousers and a girl wants a new skirt, the parents will only buy trousers for the boy." Another girl explained: "Parents always say girls will eventually leave home when they get married." Another one added: "When a girl gets married, she becomes a member of someone else's family." Commenting on the above, one girl exclaimed: "Why this backwardness? We want people to be more progressive in their thinking." Her friend(s) continued: "What they are doing is wrong. Why did they have us? To torture us?" A girl from Cairo (H) said: "A girl is scolded and yelled at no matter what she does. Boys aren't." However, (D), also from Cairo, had a different experience: "On the contrary, I believe that boys are treated more roughly so that they will toughen up." Nevertheless, $(\mathrm{M})$ insisted that boys enjoy more rights than girls: "This happened to me, for example. My mother told me that my brother was to get double the daily allowance I get. She shouldn't have said that to me. She shouldn't have hurt my feelings, especially considering he's my younger brother." In conclusion (S) added: "Some boys are very spoiled by their parents. Any extras in food, money, or clothes, for instance, are automatically given to them."

This differential treatment is more intense when the family has only one son, particularly if he is the oldest child. One 13-year old girl from Cairo said: "In the case of two girls and a boy, the two sisters will be close to each other. As a result, parents will spoil the boy and give him more things as compensa-
tion. My mother doesn't understand when I tell her she treats my brother better than me."

One troubling phenomenon is, however, that a large number of girls have come to accept this differential treatment as normal, to the extent that they themselves intend to follow the same pattern with their own children. A 12year old girl from Menya said: "My brother beats me to teach me what's right and wrong. I never get angry or hit him back." Her friend (M) added: "Parents don't mind if a younger brother beats his older sister, but they would scold her if she did the same to him." A girl from Mansoura (K) stated: "If I had a son I would try to make him feel he's a man, but a girl is different. A boy should be treated more firmly, and a girl more kindly. Boys and girls shouldn't be treated equally."

It is undeniable that many girls have developed an inferiority complex as a result of years of this differential treatment. They do not even aspire to equality of girls and boys. In fact, their sole wish is that their families grant them 'some' of the rights boys are given. The girls from Menya had the following opinions: "They should be strict with us because we're girls, but not too strict"; "We can go out, but not stay out late, otherwise we wouldn't be allowed to go out at all"; "We should have some freedom." Media programmes targeting youth evidently need to tackle this complex.

Many of the girls in the sample accuse their brothers of treating them badly, and of controlling their behavior or how they dress. Brothers sometimes exercise more control than parents. Most girls obey their brothers' orders, unless they are expressed rudely, in which case a girl can refuse to obey.

This sense of inequality increases as a girl gets older and sees that her brother is given more rights, while she herself is deprived of them. One example is using the telephone. (A) from Cairo explained: "Parents let a boy talk on the phone for as long as he wants. They don't even ask him who he was talking to. But with girls it's different. They always want to know who is calling or who I called, and usually ask before they allow me to use the phone." Another girl (D) added: "A boy is free to talk to girls on the phone, but girls aren't. It's no big deal if a girl talks to a boy on the phone, but parents don't understand this."

The preceding analysis has shown that girls enjoy fewer rights than boys. In addition to what has been mentioned above, focus groups also spoke of other rights, such as choosing the faculty they join. Parents can interfere and prevent their daughters from joining a particular faculty if it is too far from home or in
another governorate, although the daughters themselves may prefer it. Furthermore, girls are not permitted to join the police or military faculties. The girls in the sample also discussed the right to work, and concluded that society did not encourage women to join certain professions, such as law. "Anyone with a legal problem goes to a male not a female lawyer." In Mansoura, focus group discussions mentioned that some parents stop sending their daughters to school after third grade. Others said that girls are often obliged to marry a man chosen by their family, on the basis of his wealth or other material possessions. They stated that boys, on the other hand, are not forced to marry a person of their parents' choosing.

Relationships Between Boys and Girls
Relationships between boys and girls tend to be mostly innocent during the early adolescent phase (12-14). Friendships between the two sexes exist in the context of collaboration in school activities. It seems, however, that relationships outside school are strongly discouraged. As illustrated by (K) from Giza: "It is possible for a boy and a girl to be friends, but it's not welcomed because the girl's father looks on the relationship differently." His colleague (A) added: "If you were to walk in public with a girl who's just a friend, people in the street would shout 'don't you have a sister?' at you. They see it quite differently."

Indeed, both boys and girls agreed that there cannot be mere friendship between boys and girls. Boys were of the opinion that girls cannot keep a secret the way a male friend can, and girls said it is impossible to talk about certain subjects to a male friend as they do with their girlfriends. Girls also agreed that it is not possible to walk down the street with a male friend or visit him as a friend at home. Some girls stated that they tend to be more rational and more mature than boys of their age.

Half-way through adolescence, peer group pressure encourages both boys and girls to develop relationships with the opposite sex, ranging from friendships to romantic love. One boy from Mansoura expressed it as follows: "Friendship between a boy and a girl is a normal thing nowadays. A girl who doesn't want to have a male friend is called 'old-fashioned'. However, in my opinion a girl shouldn't have such relations with boys or even talk to them on the phone."

On the whole, boys believe that girls hold the reins in a relationship. They stress that it is basically the girl who decides how far it should go. Boys also agree that a girl who allows a boy to have a 'physical' relationship with her is
not really 'respected' by him. The boy would eventually leave the girl because he was convinced she had had similar relationships with other boys. He would never think of marrying her.

Relationships between boys and girls begin in various ways. Sometimes a boy sends a letter to a girl through one of her friends, or he might even drop it into her briefcase or her drawer. Some boys use the telephone to develop a relationship with a girl. With a few exceptions, however, most girls are closely monitored with respect to their use of the phone. One girl from Mansoura mentioned that her mother allows her only a ten-minute telephone conversation once a week with a boy who 'admires' her.

In addition, boys and girls meet each other in the context of family relatives, neighbours, social clubs or private tutoring. When boys and girls reach a later stage of adolescence (15-17), it is more likely that they will meet in clubs or even on the street or other public places. The girls from Mansoura said that there was a particular street in the city where a girl and a boy could meet, and that boys and girls respect existing relationships between couples. Boys would not bother a girl if it was common knowledge that she was attached to another boy.

Most girls, however, do not tell their parents about these relationships. They are afraid that their mothers might ask for more details, or pressure them into turning the relationship into an official engagement. Girls prefer to wait for the right moment. The definition of the right moment is when the boy himself is ready to propose to her and come with his family to meet hers. Some girls in the group stated that they were well able to distinguish between boys who were serious and those who just wanted to fool around. One of the tests a girl puts a boy through is to claim that one of her neighbours had seen them walking down the street together. If this does not bother the boy, the girl knows he is not seriously interested in her. If he is, he may even suggest avoiding the streets in future in order not to expose her to a similarly embarrassing situation.

The girls in Menya said they knew of other girls who had relationships with boys, and that some of them had developed into 'consensual marriages'. Many of the boys waited outside the school to meet their girlfriends and, as they said, everyone could see them walking down the street. They also said that some of these girls were veiled. However, the Menya girls did indicate that it was not easy for a boy and girl to meet in public because of what their fathers or brothers might do if they found out.

Adolescent Problems, Ambitions, and Opinions
The status of a boy among his peers is determined by several factors. A boy from lower-class background is considered a leader if he is physically strong and can beat others up. Other boys come under his protection and treat him as their leader. Leaders can also be determined on the basis of how they are dressed or their ability to treat other boys to food and drink. A boy who beats up another boy for daring to harass his girlfriend could also become a leader.

Boys who are top of the class or have particularly good manners are usually admired, albeit such traits do not qualify them to become leaders among their peers. Nonetheless, features of this kind give boys preferential status with girls, as the latter tend to admire boys with a sense of humor, a sense of responsibility, good manners, and a high performance at school.

Decisive factors for female leadership are the ability to give good advice, a strong personality, rational thinking, and high achievements at school. Some girls particularly emphasized keeping a secret as an essential trait.

## Relationship to Teachers

According to the statements of the boys and girls in the focus group discussions, their relationship with teachers is generally negative. Both boys and girls believe that teachers are only interested in money and private tutoring. During class, teachers talk about everything except the lessons themselves. On the other hand, the relationship with a teacher improves when a boy or girl pays for private tutoring. Teachers are friendlier in these cases, and might even exchange cigarettes with some of the boys.

The study reveals quite clearly that many of the teachers beat their students and insult them with obscenities. This is more likely to be the case with boys than girls.

Some boys believe that their relationship with the teachers deteriorated when the system of 'continuous assessment' was abolished, and performance based solely on final examination marks. This situation has led to a couldn't-care-less attitude towards teachers among students, which, in turn, seems to make the teachers so aggressive that they insult their students and beat them. One boy, however, expressed a different opinion: "But not all of them. We have a maths teacher who always talks to us about the importance of having good manners, only nobody listens to him." Sometimes it is the students themselves who cause tension in the relationship with teachers. One boy ex-
plained: "We had a good teacher once, but the students wouldn't give him a chance. They used to bang on their desks every time he tried to speak."

The girls' experience with teachers is similarly harsh. They too are the subject of physical abuse and verbal insults by teachers, who are also considered by these girls to be unfair. "If, for instance, two girls had a fight, the teacher would punish both of them, regardless of who is at fault." Furthermore, girls who have relatives in the school or those who take private lessons with teachers are not punished to the same extent as others. One girl from Menya got very emotional when the subject of teachers was brought up during the focus group discussion. She stood up and addressed the other participants in the group: "Just wait. Nobody has mentioned the teachers; let me talk on your behalf." She then looked at the moderator saying: "Frankly speaking, I don't know how to put it. They should be buried alive! They look at us and treat us like dirt." Another girl added: "They should be more respectful." A third one said: "It's the language they use. They say we're just a pile of garbage." A fourth one claimed: "Some teachers use words a girl shouldn't have to listen to. I can't even repeat them." A girl from Cairo (M) stated: "We have a teacher who treats us like married women. May God get rid of him." Her friend (H) added: "He stares at us in a horrible way. We even avoid class participation because we're afraid he might use bad words or tell dirty jokes that make us cry." A girl from Mansoura said: "Teachers just sit there drinking tea and coffee all day long. They either talk to each other or about each other." Another girl from Mansoura commented: "During private lessons, the teacher explains everything in great detail. But in the classroom he only talks about himself. He keeps telling us that he was in Saudi Arabia, where he had an air-conditioned car. We all failed the first monthly exam because we had not yet taken private lessons with him. Once we started taking private lessons, we all passed."

The accumulation of all these problems and negative experiences has led to a total absence of trust in teachers. When a female teacher encourages students to discuss their problems with her, no one tells her anything. One girl from Cairo put it this way: "I don't trust her enough to discuss my personal problems with her. How do I know that she won't discuss what I tell her with her husband and her kids?" One of her colleagues in the group added: "Teachers shouldn't be told anything of a private nature. It's better to talk to a friend or an older sister. They wouldn't go around telling everyone else what I told them."

The study found no real presence of counselling in schools. Even if qualified counsellors were available, the atmosphere is not conducive to productive
counselling. It is quite obvious that social workers do not play a major role. Not a single boy or girl in the sample mentioned a situation where a social worker had intervened to solve a problem encountered by boys or girls at school.

## Relationship with Parents

The early adolescent phase (12-14) is characterized by mild tension in the relationship between boys and their parents. The boys in this age group were divided into three categories: those who cannot communicate with their fathers, those who have a problem communicating with their mothers, and those who are unable to communicate with their parents in general. The older group (1518) is almost unanimously of the opinion that their parents lack the ability to understand their ideas, opinions and behavior. The boys stated that the only thing their parents talk about is studying. However, these young people also want to have fun, to go out, and to hang around. Some of the boys in the study sample describe their parents as still living in the 'stone age'. These youths told us they were forced to develop a dual personality, one that surfaces in the presence of their parents, where they act politely and show responsibility, and the other when they are not at home. One boy from Giza said: "My parents think I am decent and polite. But I know certain words and things, and I'm totally different on the street." Another boy added: "A father wants his son to follow his instructions and obey him, that is, to pray, be polite, and be responsible. The minute that boy leaves home, he becomes someone totally different. He could carry a knife, smoke, or be a member of an irresponsible group."

There is constant tension in the relationship between teenage boys and their fathers and mothers. Some of the immediate causes of friction include constant insistence by the father to study for school, regardless of any obstacles they may be facing. The latter include the absence of a private space to study in, the presence of too many other siblings and the annoyance they cause, especially the younger ones, and the loud sound of television, as their parents watch it nearby. Friction also occurs when boys ask permission to go to their friends in order to study there. Parents usually refuse to let them go, frequently accusing them of making excuses to go and play or smoke.

Another source of tension is the negative attitude of parents towards their children's involvement in sport. Parents often discourage this commitment because it leaves less time for studying than they consider necessary. One of the boys in the sample received an award in Kung Fu, and wanted to hang his cer-
tificate up on the wall. His father was against it and even tried to tear up the certificate, saying: "What is this. You might as well dissolve it in water and drink it." In another case, the father of a boy who had bought a new pair of football boots rebuked his son: "You could have used this money for something more useful. Football is not going to feed you or pay for your wedding." Finally, boys stated that the opinions of parents and their sons differed when it came to what college they should go to, and caused tension every time the subject was brought up.

For girls, the greatest source of tension with their parents is divided between the subject of relationships with boys and the appropriate clothes to wear. Some girls see disagreement over these subjects as a reflection of the generation gap, where parents want to raise their children in precisely the same way they themselves were raised. Similar to boys, girls also complained about the parental obsession with studying. One girl commented: "I don't like being told to study. I prefer to do it off my own bat." Another girl added: "When my mother insists and makes me study, I hide a magazine under the book and pretend I'm studying."

Girls are very upset about how parents make threats and issue ultimatums. One of the girls in the study sample stated: "They live in a different world." Another girl claimed: "They don't understand us. They don't understand our way of thinking. They force us to do things, instead of trying to get close to us." A fourth girl in the group added: "They think we're still children. They never think that we, too, might have an idea of how to solve a problem. They need to understand that we've grown up and can think of easier solutions."

Girls also disagree thoroughly with their parents over the kind of clothes to wear or shoes to buy. Parents often prefer shoe styles that girls dislike, and force their daughters to buy them. Girls rebel at the way their parents 'order' them to do things, and often think up ways to avoid doing something that is forced on them. A 13-year old Cairene girl admitted: "I can't stand vegetable soup. One time I wanted to visit my aunt, but my mother told me that I couldn't go if I didn't eat vegetable soup. I finished it, but then went to the bathroom and threw up."

Many girls complained that their parents had no time for them, and that they didn't seem to care, or want to give them any attention. A 12-year old girl from Menya said: "When I ask my father about something, he is usually too busy to discuss it. He sometimes agrees with my doing something and doesn't even stop to think about whether it's good or bad." Typical answers that girls
hate include "later", "after a while", or "I'm busy now." One girl commented: "This means they'll forget about it."

Girls also complained that parents are always suspicious of their relationships, even with girlfriends. If a mother finds out, for example, that her daughter is friends with a girl who talks to boys, she tells her to discontinue the relationship, although the daughter may be very attached to this particular girlfriend.

It is worth noting that youth has developed its own techniques to adapt to this constant tension and lack of parental understanding. The two sides have an 'agreement to disagree'. Youth are obliged to accept this situation, primarily because they are financially dependent on their parents. However, the significant gap in understanding and effective communication is growing wider every day.

One serious consequence is the fact that this generation is growing up in an unhealthy social environment that gives them no space to think freely. They commonly use a number of tricks to adapt to this environment, including lies, hypocrisy, and deception. The reader is undoubtedly aware of the potentially damaging consequences to the value system of society, and to this generation in particular.

Finally, it is important not to generalize the findings discussed above to include 'all' youth in Egypt. There were teenagers who indicated that they had no problem in communicating with their parents, and that the latter showed a great deal of understanding and emotional support. However, they formed a minority in the sample. Hence, there is a genuine need to include different segments and social strata in follow-up studies, in order to further investigate this sensitive issue of intergenerational communication.

Risky Behavior
Smoking is not a straightforward problem among young people. It is merely the tip of the iceberg - the tip of a mountain of potentially serious problems with regard to the future of youth and the general well-being of society. For youth, smoking is not just a cigarette, as some might think. It is, in fact, the start of something more damaging. A 16-year old boy from Mansoura stated: "A cigarette without 'bango' is like drinking pure water when you really want tea. Bango is for cigarettes what a tea bag does for tea." His colleague (H) added: "A lot of kids our age smoke. If you want to be considered a man, you have to have a packet of cigarettes in your pocket. Smoking cigarettes leads to other things, like bango, drugs, and so on."

Adolescent smoking is not limited to the street or places not in view by adults. It also takes place in schools, sometimes even in the classrooms. As (M) from Giza said: "As soon as the teacher leaves the classroom, two or three kids light cigarettes and smoke until the teacher comes back. They also smoke bango in the classroom, but there are no pills." One boy in the same focus group discussion had a different experience at his school: "Our school has very strict supervision. If a student gets caught, he is expelled." (M), however, responded: "I swear that yesterday I said to the Arabic teacher, 'Isn't it wrong for you to smoke in the classroom in front of the kids?' and he replied, 'It's not my problem'. Then I said, 'What do you mean it's not your problem?' and he said, 'Well, all kids are sons of...." A boy from another school commented: "Some of our teachers smoke in the classroom and some kids exchange cigarettes with them." He added: "Even the janitor sells cigarettes to students. Boys usually say to him, 'I need a cup of tea and a cigarette'. It's all because the janitor needs money and kids want to look cool."

Adolescents start smoking in preparatory school. A 14-year old youth told the moderator: "With my own eyes I saw kids from my school going on to the roof of the school and smoking. The neighbors saw it too and informed the headmaster, but he didn't do a thing." Another preparatory school kid commented: "And during exams, there are students who smoke freely because no one can say anything about it during exams."

It is worth noting here that smoking appears to be confined to a minority of adolescents. However, this minority has a negative influence on others, and encourages non-smokers to join in. One student stated: "They need money to buy cigarettes. They steal or even rob others to buy cigarettes and bango. Then they smoke in a group and invite us to join them." A 13-year old youth from Mansoura said: "One of my friends told me his family grows bango. They put it in cigarettes and sell each one for two pounds." His colleague (S) added: "My friends in class offered me cigarettes." A 15-year old boy from a low-income family in Giza said: "At school we load a cigarette with bango and all share in smoking it. Each kid gets a kiss. Which means everyone takes a drag and passes it on to the next kid."

In addition to cigarettes and bango, they also report the wide use of pills and other 'medicine', which many youths use as drugs. One stated: "They ask their fathers for money for private lessons and then they go out and buy pills." They mentioned various names of tablets and said that one kind was sold in the school for one pound fifty. One boy commented: "It's all a lack of consci-
ence. A packet of these tablets normally costs five pounds but the pharmacist sells it to these kids for thirty. The kids then sell each pill for a pound and because there are 100 tablets in a packet, they make a profit of 70 pounds."

The most widespread pills are known as 'cockroach tablets'. Normally used as cough medicine, an overdose of these pills makes adolescents feel high. One of them stated: "He used to swallow the entire strip of tablets and then say 'Look, the cockroach is moving around in my head'." Another boy added: "Last year a kid in my school took three cockroach tablets and then tried to kill the headmaster in his office." Other youths use liquid cough medicine as a drug, especially the kind containing alcohol.

This precarious behavior is not only harmful to those who engage in it, but to others as well. Sooner or later adolescent drug addicts turn to crime in order to come up with money to buy drugs. A 15 -year old boy explained the procedure: "At first one of them would come up to you and say, 'Take this pill, it'll make you feel great'. After a while you have to buy some. Kids steal money from home or deceive their fathers and spend the money for private lessons on drugs." He added: "There are kids who steal car tires and sell them for whatever they can get, in order to buy bango and tablets." Another boy commented: "They stand in front of my school and force students to empty their pockets or else beat them up quite badly." A third boy stated: "One of my classmates hit one of our group after taking some of these tablets, and caused a wound that needed nine stitches." Another boy in the group claimed: "If someone gets high after having taken these tablets, he could rape a girl if one happened to pass by."

The situation for girls in all three regions of the study sample is fairly similar. Risky behavior spoken of by girls includes smoking and drugs (tablets, bango, and hashish). A 12-year old girl declared: "There are girls around here who smoke." Her 13 -year old colleague added: "They once did a body search at my school and found drugs on girls." In Mansoura, some girls were caught taking intravenous drugs.

Several girls in Cairo and Menya said that they knew of girls who watch Xrated videos and listen to pornographic cassettes. Girls of preparatory school age in Cairo stated that they knew of some schoolchildren who had sexual relations with boys. "This kind of thing is widespread in school, and I know girls in the club, too, who do it."

A secondary school student from Mansoura added: "Another thing that is becoming common in the neighbourhood is consensual marriage. It is particu-
larly prevalent among university students, who walk boldly down the street as couples. If anyone makes a comment, the guy simply says, 'She's my wife'."

Finally, it should be remarked here that the above is not a complete list of risky behavior among youth. More attention should be given in future studies to the issue of AIDS, since there are indications of practices that could cause it to spread more rapidly, especially in the absence of adequate AIDS awareness and information on protection and prevention.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has yielded significant results with regard to the kinds of problems and challenges facing the adolescent segment of the population, who are indeed the future of this country. Most important was the finding that youth has developed its own sub-culture, complete with communication symbols and vocabulary. Adults are not allowed to enter this "world". When parents enter their children's room while they are on the phone to a friend, the son or daughter does not hang up immediately as young people in previous generations used to do if they were 'caught' in the middle of talking about something 'personal'. Nowadays, the adolescent would simply say to the friend on the other end of the line: "It's getting too hot in the room." The friend understands and 'decodes' the message as meaning that they should change the subject.

Of course, many adolescent problems are part of growing up. Many of the problems found in this study, however, go beyond that, and can only be explained by the widespread lack of knowledge and skills among adults, both teachers and parents, in the principles of effective communication with teenagers. As a result of repeated frustration, youth are in effect 'withdrawing' from the communication process with adults. Their experience has been extremely negative. Their opinions are either ridiculed or overheard. Their communication with adults is a one-way street; they are merely at the receiving end of orders, instructions, blame, insults, and abuse. Consequently, youth are 'forced' to develop their own unique sub-culture. Many of the expressions in the 'vocabulary' we identified reflect their apathy and unwillingness to continue dialogue with adults, who view them as children. They consider themselves just as capable of problem-solving as adults, if not better!

The end result of all of this is a considerable lack of essential information and life skills, and worse still, the absence of a clear set of values to equip these young people for life. This is at least partly due to the fact that they have no confidence in the adults who are supposed to convey precisely these basic 'pro-
ducts'. The study, for example, shows that youth are amazed at the hypocrisy of adults, such as teachers who smoke in the classroom, or parents who tell them not to lie but ask them to say they are not at home to an unwelcome caller.

The situation is problematic. Youth are in many ways confused and ill-adjusted. In short, they need help. However, they are not receiving this help from parents, teachers, or even the current media programmes.

In view of the issues raised by youth in this study, it is strongly recommended that a number of priority interventions are undertaken and genuine efforts made by the relevant institutions.

Notes
1 The study was conducted in 2000 with funding from Unicef, Egypt. The detailed findings were published by Unicef both in English and in Arabic (Elkamel 2001).

# Influencing Gender Attitudes of Rural Adolescents: Findings of an Action-Research Project in Egypt 

Rania Salem

## Introduction and Review of the Literature

Egypt is often regarded as a society in which the norms and values of patriarchy are deeply entrenched (Hoodfar 1997). Nowhere is this truer than in rural Upper Egypt, a region where distinctive forms of male domination are ingrained in the local culture. Shifting the ideological parameters underlying gender differences is a challenge which consumes development practitioners, policymakers and social scientists alike in Egypt.

It has been noted elsewhere (El-Tawila/Ibrahim/Wassef 2003) that the gender role attitudes of today's generation of young people in Egypt are no more progressive than those of their parents. Intergenerational differences in gender attitudes are minimal, although overall, girls are more likely to embrace egalitarian gender role attitudes compared to both their parents and their male counterparts.

In another analysis, Mensch et al. (2000) demonstrate that educational attainment is neither strong nor significant as a predictor of egalitarian gender role attitudes among Egyptian adolescents. In other words, the gender role attitudes of those with only some primary schooling do not differ markedly from those with university degrees. Together these findings suggest that the dominant gender ideology in Egypt is indeed quite resilient. However, the fact that the education system has failed to erode patriarchal notions among its students is especially interesting, and poses the question of what sort of intervention, if any, could succeed in doing so.

This paper investigates gender attitudes among rural adolescent girls in Upper Egypt through an analysis of survey data from a sample of approximately 600 girls. The data derives from the assessment of an NGO program carried out by the Population Council in collaboration with a number of Egyptian NGOs. Targeting disadvantaged adolescent girls and members of their communities, this program sought to improve the lives of rural girls by providing non-formal educational opportunities, raising awareness and addressing harmful traditional practices. Although changing gender attitudes among beneficiar-
ies was not articulated as an explicit objective of the intervention, its curriculum was nonetheless pervaded by messages on gender equity.

The present analysis seeks to address a number of research questions related to gender role attitudes among adolescent girls. Firstly, I explore the question: what gender norms are prevalent among adolescent girls residing in rural Upper Egypt? This population sub-group, which stands at the far end of the so-cio-economic distribution, consistently records the lowest rates of school attendance, suffers poor health status, and experiences a host of other forms of social exclusion and disadvantage, will be described in the course of the analysis. Although program and policy efforts addressing this group have intensified in recent years, rural adolescents seldom feature as the subject of focused research in Egypt. I attempt to redress this knowledge gap by constructing a profile of rural adolescent girls' gender attitudes, as well as a number of behaviors that reflect gender norms. Second, I posit the question: can gender norms be altered through program intervention? Despite the recent interest in adolescents and youth in developing countries, little is known about the program approaches and intensity of exposure necessary to produce change. Thirdly, if program interventions can change gender norms, in what ways and to what extent do they change? A final aim of the paper is to highlight some of the methodological and ethical challenges arising from intervention research. These will be explored in the concluding section.

## The Program and the Methodology of its Impact Assessment

Between 2001 and 2004, the Population Council had the opportunity to observe the social changes triggered by a development program called Safe Spaces for Girls or Ishraq. The Minya governorate in which the Ishraq program was implemented performs poorly on a number of human development indicators as compared to Egypt as a whole, with nearly half of all households in the governorate falling into the poorest wealth quintile nationally. Women in Minya also tend to marry earlier and bear more children than Egyptian women overall.

There is also evidence to suggest that in Minya, slightly fewer girls than boys are fully immunized, and girls are less likely to receive medical attention when ill (El-Zanaty/Way 2004). If we take rural Upper Egypt as a whole, we find that the gender gap in school attendance is considerable. According to the 2000 DHS, only $68 \%$ of girls aged 11-15 are currently enrolled in school in rural Upper Egypt (as compared to $89 \%$ of boys) (El-Zanaty/Way 2001).

Targeting the population sub-group that lag furthest behind their male counterparts in both education and health status, namely, adolescent girls in rural Upper Egypt, the program's overarching goal is to redress gender disparities among adolescents. The specific objectives of the Ishraq program were to create safe public spaces for girls and increase their mobility; foster the formation of peer relationships; raise awareness of their rights, bodies, and health; develop functional literacy and numeracy skills; mainstream girls back into formal schooling; and finally to advocate for positive community norms concerning girls. The program did not explicitly aim to change gender attitudes, as stated earlier. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that it might, since the Ishraq curriculum contained a plethora of messages on gender equity.

The program sought to achieve the above-mentioned goals by means of a non-formal education program for girls of 13-15 years of age, who were currently out-of-school at the time Ishraq was launched. The program consisted of three components: literacy, life-skills, and sports. ${ }^{1}$ Beneficiaries were grouped into classes of 25 girls each under the guidance of a promoter, an older girl from the local community with a secondary education degree. Each class met for an average of 12 hours per week over the course of two and a half years.

As the research partner in this project, the Council was tasked with assessing the social impact of the program on its beneficiaries. Although a number of qualitative research methods were employed, this was done primarily through pre- and post- intervention surveys. The impact assessment used an experimental design whereby data was not only gathered in the four villages where the program was offered, but also in two matched villages where no program was offered. Making comparisons between this control group and program participants enables us to determine whether changes over time can be attributed to the intervention. As noted above, questionnaires were administered to the same population of girls at two time points. At baseline, a saturation sample of all out-of-school girls aged 13-15 was taken in each village. The same girls were interviewed approximately 2.5 years later at endline. A total of 582 girls completed questionnaires at both time points. Of these girls, 100 had completed the full Ishraq program. 148 had participated for some time but dropped out before graduating from Ishraq. In addition, 200 respondents had never participated in the program although it was offered in their village. And finally, 134 girls were in the control group, meaning that Ishraq was not offered in their village. These four exposure groups ('control', 'none', 'some', and 'full') will be used in displaying the results of the analyses that follow.

The survey instruments contain a number of variables that are of interest. Here, respondents' attitudes pertaining to the roles and relationships of men and women are supplemented with girls' reports on behaviors that can be considered indicators of gender norms (namely early marriage, female genital cutting, and physical violence) to gauge the extent to which changed attitudes have been accompanied by changed behaviors. Such behaviors are indicative of adolescent girls' own attitudes, but perhaps more importantly those of their parents, who are often the main agents behind such practices.

## Findings

## Gender Role Attitudes

The Ishraq survey instrument contained a battery of statements about appropriate power relations between the sexes and the sexual division of labor within the household. We assumed a set of stereotyped attitudes regarding male-female and intergenerational roles and relationships to be common in this setting, and to constitute important obstacles to gender equity. Respondents were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with each of these statements, as displayed in Table 1.

We find that at baseline, several of these patriarchal stereotypes were opposed by girls. For example, three-fifths disagreed that boys and not girls should be sent to school if a family cannot afford to educate all their children. In addition, $72 \%$ of girls agreed that if a woman works outside the home, her husband should help with house work and child care. However, at the same time, $65 \%$ stated that ideally women should be wives and mothers, and not work outside the home. Also notable is the fact that approximately four-fifths of all respondents agreed at baseline that a girl must obey her brother even if he is younger than her.

Table 1: Percentage agreement with gender role attitude statements over time

| Gender Role Attitudes | Baseline | Endline |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| If the wife works outside the home, the husband must help her in <br> the house work and child care | $72 \%$ | $88 \%$ |
| Women must be wives and mothers only and not work | $65 \%$ | $34 \%$ |
| Boys must help with house work just like girls | $40 \%$ | $63 \%$ |


| When the family cannot afford to educate all their children, boys <br> and not girls should go to school | $41 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| If the husband wants children, the wife must obey him, even if she <br> does not want to have children | $73 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| A girl must obey her brother, even if he is younger | $82 \%$ | $71 \%$ |
| Men should have prior knowledge about pregnancy, delivery and <br> family planning before marriage | $59 \%$ | $82 \%$ |
| A woman who has daughters only must keep trying for a boy | $44 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| A girl should accept a groom chosen by her parents, even if she <br> does not want him | $35 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| The husband is the one who should decide how to spend money <br> at home | $72 \%$ | $54 \%$ |

How did girls' gender role attitudes change over time, and what was the impact of the Ishraq program on those who participated? To address this question, a simple index comprised of the statements that appear above was constructed. Each respondent was assigned a score on this index ranging from 0 to 10 , with 0 as the least equitable gender role attitude and 10 the most equitable. In Table 2, girls' scores are disaggregated according to exposure to Ishraq, with scores at baseline and endline displayed for each group so that we can evaluate the program's impact.


Table 2 suggests important maturation effects in girls' gender role attitudes. That is, girls belonging to each exposure group expressed more equitable gender attitudes as they grew older. However, the greatest absolute increases in the gender equity were witnessed among girls who participated in the full Ishraq program. Girls in the full exposure group had an average score of 4.6 before the program began, and by the time it ended their scores on the gender attitude index had increased to 8.2 - the highest score attained among all the exposure groups.

In examining this table it is also important to note differences among girls' gender role attitudes at baseline. It appears that girls residing in the control sites were less equitable in their gender attitudes than girls in the treatment sites overall. Among respondents from the treatment villages, it appears that girls with more favorable attitudes towards the roles of males and females at baseline may have been more likely to enroll in the Ishraq program. Multivariate analysis allows us to account for these and other influences on girls' gender role attitudes.

Linear regression was used to test the association between exposure to the program and gender role attitudes, net of other factors that might affect gender attitudes such as village of residence, socio-economic status, age, and attitude at baseline. The second column of Table 3 demonstrates that completion of the Ishraq program is strongly associated with improved scores on the gender attitude index, and that this association is highly significant even after controlling for other factors.

Table 3: Coefficients of the multiple linear regression of endline gender index score on level of participation in Ishraq program.

|  | Unstandardized Coefficients (B) |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
| No Participation | .383 | -.302 |
| Some Participation | $.799^{* *}$ | .007 |
| Full Participation | $2.390^{* * *}$ | $1.827^{* * *}$ |
| Baseline Index Score | - | $.339^{* * *}$ |

NOTES: Reference category for the outcome variable Endline Gender Index Score is "Control Group". Model 2 also includes the predictors age, village, and socio-economic status. None of these are significant, and are therefore not displayed in the table. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<.05,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<.001$

Behaviors Related to Gender Ideology
Exposure to program opportunities does have the potential to change gender attitudes significantly among adolescent girls; however, to what extent is this translated into changed behaviors? Behaviors such as early marriage, female genital cutting (FGC), and violence arise in part from cultural assumptions about the role and value of girls and women in society. While we may expect a shift towards gender equity in the attitudes of girls to affect such practices, it must be accompanied by a decline in the support of parents and other community members for these practices. Mothers, fathers, and community leaders were addressed by the program, primarily through public seminars and targeted awareness-raising sessions for smaller groups. Although the surveys fielded did not solicit the views of parents, we can deduce their attitudes indirectly through indicators such as their daughters' experience of early marriage, FGC, and violence. Female genital cutting (FGC) is a formidable health risk that affects approximately nine out of every ten adult women across Egypt (ElGibaly et al. 2002). There was overwhelming support for FGC among each group of adolescent girls at baseline. By endline, girls with exposure to the program were more likely to state that FGC is not necessary, and less likely to express the intention to circumcise their own daughters in the future. Coupled with attitudes that favor higher status for females in the family and society, such opposition to FGC could lead to a decline in the practice if girls themselves had full control over the FGC decision.

Table 4 reveals that to the contrary, the prevalence of FGC increased in each exposure group as girls matured. Early adolescence is, after all, the time when the majority of circumcised girls undergo the operation nationally ${ }^{2}$. As with other indicators, we see in Table 4 that the control sites are distinct from treatment villages regarding the practice of FGC. Rates of FGC were markedly lower in the control sites at both baseline and endline. Although this hinders our ability to draw conclusions about Ishraq's effect on the practice of circumcision, we can still make comparisons between exposure groups within the treatment villages. Clearly, FGC rates at endline are lowest ( $51 \%$ ) among girls who attended the full Ishraq program. However, it appears that initially, a smaller proportion of girls were circumcised among those who enrolled in the program relative to those who did not enrol.

When we use multivariate analysis to control for FGC status at baseline and other background factors, we find that completion of Ishraq is strongly
and significantly associated with being uncircumcised at endline (regression results not displayed here). Despite these encouraging results, the multivariate analysis also reveals that not getting married has an even greater protective effect against FGC than program participation does. Therefore, the program may have operated to prevent, or at least delay, FGC in part by retaining those participants who remained unmarried.


As with FGC, the program sought to raise awareness in the community about the negative consequences of early marriage for girls - survey's an effort that met with great success among beneficiaries, according to the attitudinal indicators. Turning now to actual behavior, we find that program participation is associated with delaying marriage, as noted above. At baseline, only two girls in the entire sample were married. By endline, 92 girls were currently married. Table 5 demonstrates that, excluding control villages, the lowest proportion of those who married before turning 18 is among the graduates of the Ishraq program. Multivariate analysis confirms that completion of the program significantly reduces the odds of marrying before the age of 18 , net of background characteristics (not shown here).

Here again there are notable village effects, with the marriage rate somewhat lower among control village respondents (16\%) than among treatment village respondents with no program exposure (22\%), and even lower than
girls with some program exposure (19\%). It is also important to note that the low proportion of married girls among full-term participants is in part due to the fact that enrolled beneficiaries sometimes dropped out of the program when the time came to get married.


The final behavior of interest is domestic violence against girls. Hitting, pushing, and other forms of violence are often employed within the family as a means of punishment or coercion. Nationally, adolescent girls are far more likely to be subjected to physical aggression within the family than boys (ElTawila et al. 2000). The Ishraq questionnaire did not attempt to gauge the severity of the violence, but rather asked about the frequency with which girls were beaten at the hands of a family member.

Table 6 displays the results by exposure category. With the exception of the control sites, where a distinct pattern of behaviors clearly prevails, various categories of respondents are undifferentiated according to program exposure. The incidence of violence does not appear to be related to the Ishraq program, since it declined for all groups as they grew older. This finding is confirmed by multivariate analysis (not shown here).


## Discussion and Conclusions

To return to the initial research questions posed, it is clear from the findings presented above that gender norms are by no means fixed. The Ishraq experience demonstrates that gender role attitudes can be influenced using specific program approaches at a rather high intensity of exposure during the adolescent stage of the life cycle. I show that the gender role attitudes of rural adolescent girls are in many respects quite conservative and stereotypical, but at the same time, that they favor equality between the sexes on a number of issues. These gender role attitudes shift considerably after exposure to the Ishraq program, with increasing participation in the program resulting in greater egalitarianism in the gender attitudes of adolescent girls. These strong and statistically significant results are impressive, especially given that the Ishraq program has achieved what the formal education system has thus far failed to do. Although the composite index used here showed that gender role attitudes changed in a positive direction overall, it is important to note that positive change was not observed in all items equally. Girls' support for the separation of domestic tasks according to sex is especially inflexible.

Another conclusion that arises from this analysis is that practices pertaining to adolescent girls that stem from the dominant patriarchal norms appear to be more persistent than gender role attitudes. While positive program effects were detected with regard to FGC and early marriage, the program had no effect on
the incidence of domestic violence, which appears to decrease as girls age. Because adolescent girls have limited agency in determining whether or when they are circumcised, married, or beaten, these behaviors are treated as indicators of the feasibility of influencing parents as well as girls. Since messages on these harmful practices were directed at several target groups by the program, it is difficult to discern the actual mechanisms operating to produce the observed change. In other words, did participating girls acquire new skills and attitudes that allowed them to avert FGC and early marriage? If so, what were these skills and attitudes, and which actors were involved in arriving at positive outcomes? Did Ishraq persuade parents directly to abandon FGC and delay their daughters' marriage? Did Ishraq change intermediate factors that are themselves determinants of FGC and early marriage? Further research is required to better understand these processes. However, regardless of the mechanism of change, the program has clearly had some success in this domain.

The analysis of the program's impact on gender norms presented here highlights some of the challenges inherent in the methodology employed in this research. Although the control villages ostensibly shared the same characteristics as treatment villages, upon analysis of the survey data it became evident that the two control villages were quite unique. This hampers our ability to isolate the effects of the Ishraq program. In this paper, I drew comparisons between the girls who were exposed to the program and their peers in the same villages who had no exposure. This approach gives us an imperfect sense of the program's impact because there may have been contamination effects, whereby girls outside of the program learned and absorbed its content through interaction with girls participating in the program in the same village. Another major limitation of this study is that it only provides data on short-term impact that is, indicators of change were measured just a few months after the completion of the program, when program impact is likely to be strongest.

Finally, the discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors found in this analysis poses an ethical dilemma with which development practitioners and researchers must grapple. When a program such as Ishraq fosters equitable gender role attitudes among girls, this may not be compatible with their wider social environment, which continues to harbor contradictory norms. Beneficiaries of such programs may experience frustration if this prevents them from acting on their newly acquired values, or conflict may arise between beneficiaries and other members of their community, and special efforts must be exerted to prevent or alleviate the consequences of these problems.

Notes
1 These components made use of modified versions of the Caritas literacy curriculum "Learn to be Free", the CEDPA life-skills curriculum "New Horizons", and a sports and recreation curriculum designed by Save the Children, Population Council, and members of the Faculty of Physical Education at Minya University. Save the Children was responsible for overall implementation of the program.
2 At the same time, our observation of the research sites revealed that customs vary regarding the timing of FGC in Minya. In some villages the procedure is performed when a girl is very young, others when she enters puberty, and in others the operation is carried out directly before marriage.

# Researching Attitudes Towards Power in Morocco A Methodological Account 

Sonja Hegasy

## Introduction

This contribution presents implementation and method of a quantitative survey on royal authority in Morocco carried out between May 2003 and January 2004. The data was collected in eight different areas in the country from south of Marrakech to the Rif mountains in the north among 622 young adults between 18 and 35 years. Nearly $30 \%$ of the Moroccan population fall into this age category. This group is the politically most relevant part of society that will decide over the stability and continuity of the new monarch. $35 \%$ of the questionnaires were carried out in Arabic and 65\% in French. With 33\%, students were the largest group we polled. ${ }^{1}$ The survey was based on a random sample and cannot claim representativity for a number of obstacles I encountered during the administration. The article will therefore concentrate on the possibilities as well as limitations when doing quantitative youth research in Morocco. ${ }^{2}$

The study started from the hypothesis that under Mohammed VI the relation between subjects/believers/citizens and the king is changing from the patriarchal and authoritarian to more rationally established arguments as a result of a young society that is partaking in processes of modernization and globalization. The study's starting point put into question that Mohammed VI can retain both traditional as well as modern aspects of legitimacy. I wanted to know from young Moroccans from different backgrounds what in their view constituted the new king's authority over them. Was he still the highest religious authority and ultimate arbiter in the country and at the same time an icon of globalized popular youth culture?

In the course of 59 mainly multiple choice questions, interviewees were asked about attitudes towards Hassan II and Mohammed VI. It will be shown that the monarchy's attempts to establish the king as the cultural representative of modern, 'Europe-oriented', globalized Moroccan youth has been successful in terms of securing authority. According to the survey youthfulness (Q 58-4) as well as the king's good relations with Europe (Q 58-6) were regarded as the
most important basis of the new king's authority: 62,7\% (Q 58-4) and 62,5\% (Q 58-6) of the interviewees regarded these two features as very important or important and achieved the highest consent of all possible answers.

Without neglecting the authoritarian character of the Moroccan monarchy, the exertion of manipulation mechanisms or the use of open violence even by the new makhzen ${ }^{3}$, this study explored motives for recognizing the ruler, assuming that citizens are not driven by 'sheer docility'. Reasons for being loyal must be examined as part of changing social praxis and cannot be considered as a static given. During a pre-test in 2002 one woman in retirement expressed her opinion on Mohammed VI to me as follows: "The king is the only person who works in this country." It is not a simple given that the authority of the then 38 -year old Mohammed VI is accepted.

Assuming that these societies did not merely submit passively for centuries to their sovereign, new aspects of the complex processes of legitimization need to be made accessible. Using this approach, I intend to distance myself from theories that regard the 'submissiveness' or 'docility' of Arab societies as the reason for the continuity and legitimacy of power in the Middle East, as well as from interpretations that use notions of 'oriental despotism'.

Secondary literature is divided on the subject of growing or diminishing 'religious authority and legitimacy' among youth in the Maghreb. In his essay "Metamorphosis of the Sacred", Mohammed Arkoun (1994) argues in favour of a reduced role of religious authority, contending that youth have "to a large extent lost interest in such matters, while at the same time the mosque is being used for many other types of activity carried on in the name of religion. The young are more concerned with seeking tangible results in respect of jobs, housing and social welfare, as well as with pressing for participation in political affairs, greater fairness in the distribution of wealth and a reduction in corruption" (1994: 271).

An empirical survey by Rahma Bourquia, Mohammed el-Ayadi, Mokhtar el-Harras and Hassan Rachik on "Youth and Religious Values" in Morocco (published in 2000) suggests the opposite. Although it was not possible at the time (mid-1990s) to include concrete questions regarding the monarchy and its religious authority, the survey confirms that religious values and practices are more important to young people today than they were in the sixties and seventies.

## Finding a Research Team

Opinion polls are extremely rare in Morocco ${ }^{4}$ and the rest of the Arab ${ }^{5}$ world. In contrast to the Arab world, many Latin American countries have administered national youth surveys within the last ten years. In Israel, annual representative youth surveys are also carried out. A study by Bernard Sabella (2004) on the political socialization of Palestinian youth was the first of its kind, using annual investigations from 1998 to 2001. Empirical surveys in the Arab world are generally hampered by the fact that asking questions automatically makes people think of the secret service.

During a visit to Morocco in 2002, I contacted several sociology students with the aim of setting up a team of five or six people to help me carry out the questionnaire. I also carried out a preliminary test containing 43 questions (including eight open questions). Some of the answers of the preliminary test were incorporated in the final questionnaire as an element of multiple choice. With this, I checked on the comprehensibility and usefulness of the questions. ${ }^{6}$ When I returned in 2003 in order to begin with the survey, it became clear that the king's authority was too delicate an issue for students to participate. Moreover, 45 people had been killed in Casablanca in five simultaneous suicide attacks carried out by 12 young men two days after I had arrived on May 14th. It now seemed impossible to find people to go around the country enquiring about attitudes to the king. Left on my own, I was faced with two major problems. How could I reach my goal of interviewing 600-700 young people and what options did I have to go beyond Rabat - the rich administrative capital of Morocco?

Through word of mouth I got in touch with a lawyer from Fez who agreed to interview her colleagues and people from the administration and the courts in Fez.' This would not necessarily counter the urban or elite bias of the questioning in Rabat but at the time I had no choice, especially since freedom of movement in Morocco is non-existent. ${ }^{8}$ Later on, a courageous student who had heard about my study, approached me and suggested that her friend could interview young people in Meknès and Fez. She (Female 3) herself took ten questionnaires and had most of them filled out in the student dormitory in Rabat. I hoped in this way to counter the elite bias and gain access to lower income groups. Indeed the male interviewer (Male 1) went to several working quarters in Fez and made a detailed report about his interview situations. Through him I met the president of a local branch of the National Association
of Unemployed Graduates (ANDCM), a unique lobby organization in Morocco (Male 2). He went further south to an area between Casablanca and Settat. Grand Casablanca is the large economic capital in the west of the country, while Settat is a medium-sized but politically significant town in a mid-western province. As the birthplace of the former long-term Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, the village of Settat developed a reputable infrastructure with high investments. The town also served as one of the main recruitment areas for members of the security apparatus. Male 2 conducted interviews in the Beni Ahmed area (60,000 inhabitants), using taxi stands or kiosks to approach


Figure 1: Locations of the survey people from the younger generation. In my view he balanced the middle- and upper-class bias of Female 2 and myself. Finally, through the political scientist Mohammed Tozy and the development NGO Targa, I met two other trained interviewers (Male 3 and 4). They conducted interviews in so-called douar in the Rif mountains to the east, as well as in Ouneine in the High Atlas of southern Morocco. Both areas are in the countryside and very difficult for foreigners to access.

While designing the survey the Rif region was chosen because of its location in the neglected north of Morocco and its "traditional opposition" to the king. Many people still speak fluent Spanish here, a vestige of the Spanish occupation. George Joffe (1988) explained the violent public revolts in the Rif against Hassan II in the 1970s and 80s as a mass expression of the demand for attention of their king. Mohammed VI's visits to the north of Morocco at the very beginning of his reign demonstrated this attention and prevented such instability.

For the poll we chose the villages of Tanaqob and Tassift, where Targa is active. I was eventually able to go to Tanaqob, where I spoke to the local counterpart of Targa. At the end of the day we met with the local male community in a tiny village coffee shop, where I presented the project and asked for their support and participation. Here it was even more difficult to convince people that there was nothing suspicious about the survey. But thanks to the reliable
contact with the Targa local counterpart, the men finally agreed to answer questions. From Rabat, a twelve-hour car journey to the south leads to the village of Ouneine where Targa is working on electrification. 72 douar are home to about 10,000 people here. Illiteracy is high and there are a large number of people of Berber origin. The interviewer himself (Male 4) also came from Ouneine and therefore spoke the local Berber dialect. ${ }^{\text {. }}$

At the end of my field work a colleague from a university in southern Morocco suggested conducting 50 interviews with her students (Female 4). I cautioned her about possible repercussions but she was adamant. Two days later she informed me that the Dean's office had requested her to stop her activity immediately, probing her about the survey. On her next journey to Europe she was taken aside at the airport. Her luggage was searched and her papers investigated. They found the three remaining questionnaires she had completed. Once again she was asked about the questionnaire but finally allowed to continue her journey without further harassment. But as we had seen before at the universities of Rabat and Salé, it was impossible to do the poll on campus. ${ }^{10}$ Therefore, I had been advised from the beginning not to demand for a research permission.

## A word about Self-Censorship

Such was the context in which we began working; training interviewers in advance as had been planned in the beginning, was out of question. Nevertheless, I discussed the questionnaire with each interviewer individually, pointing out potential difficulties and ambiguous wording. In fact the interviewers avoided overlapping at my house as they were afraid it might look like a conspirative meeting with a Westerner. These circumstances prevented any kind of representativity of the survey. Let me give you an example of the wording I was advised not to ask: "Are you satisfied with the accomplishments of the King since his ascendance? (on a scale from 1 to 5,1 meaning 'very satisfied' and 5 'unsatisfied')". Instead we decided to ask: "Are you satisfied with the accomplishments 'since 1999'?" Everybody knew what had happened in 1999, i.e., the succession of Mohammed VI to the throne, but in this case the monarchy was not directly evoked. Or we asked: "During the last three years, do you think that less authoritarian relations between the state and the citizens have been installed in Morocco?" This type of self-censorship is one of the major obstacles to empirical research in the Arab world. ${ }^{11}$

## The Questionnaire

For obvious reasons the questionnaire had a neutral title: "Jeunesse et changements politiques au Maroc., ${ }^{12}$ It consisted of seven parts. ${ }^{13}$ After noting the interview situation (where and when), questions 1 to 9 dealt with the basic personal data of the interviewee. Questions 10 and 11 concerned the level of education and the profession of mother and father. Following are the answers on changes in the economic status of the household.

Table 1: Did the economic status of your household improve or deteriorate during the last ten years?

| improved | $44.7 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| unchanged | $32.2 \%$ |
| deteriorated | $23.1 \%$ |

Question 13 tried to determine the economic status of the interviewees more precisely. It asked whether these young people possessed a bicycle, motorcycle, car or something similar. It turned out that three quarter had no own means of transport or similar possession which shows that we did not deal with the upper class. ${ }^{14}$ Questions 14 to 17 concerned stays outside Morocco and reasons why. It turned out that $86.9 \%$ had never been outside of Morocco. Question 18 to 21 treated issues of equality between husband and wife. Starting with question 22, attitudes towards political engagement were polled (participation in elections, party membership, expectations of the current government etc.). Questions 29 to 31 asked about the use of media. Following are the answers on leisure activities.

Table 2: How much time do you spend...?

|  | at the <br> mosque | with your <br> family | with <br> friends | doing <br> sports | on the <br> Internet | in an <br> NGO |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a lot | 4.9 | 29.7 | 33.9 | 8.5 | 7.4 | 6.0 |
| quite | 15.5 | 33.3 | 38.6 | 16.3 | 18.3 | 6.5 |
| some | 32.6 | 35.2 | 23.2 | 32.3 | 26.0 | 11.0 |
| little | 47.0 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 42.8 | 48.4 | 76.2 |
| none |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Questions 33 to 37 asked about religious practices. Questions 38 and 39 were reproduced from a survey by André Adam in 1962, dealing with awareness of the generation gap. ${ }^{15}$ Question 40 asked about the degree of trust in a number of national institutions. ${ }^{16}$ Question 41 inquired whether the process of globalization was considered an advantage or disadvantage to them. Half of the respondents saw both, advantages as well as disadvantages. Question 42 was the first to deal directly with youth and state power, and included a choice of perceived characteristics of Mohammed VI. ${ }^{17} 20 \%$ of the interviews were broken off at this point, as people felt they could not continue to answer the questions honestly.

Questions 42 to 58 all dealt with attitudes towards Mohammed VI and Hassan $\mathrm{II}^{18}$, the impact of the monarchy's representation, recent political reforms, expectations of the new king, and finally the chief basis of the young king's authority. The final question left room for criticism of the questionnaire and additional remarks.

## Interviewees Profile

The survey took place in Casablanca, Rabat, Settat, Tanaqob, Fez, Meknès, Immouzer, Agadir, Tassift, Ouneine, Kénitra and other places. $42.8 \%$ of the questionnaires were carried out in Casablanca and Rabat. $22.6 \%$ in smaller towns and $34.6 \%$ in rural areas. $36 \%$ of the participants were women; $64 \%$ men. The largest age group was between 25 and 29 years ( $29 \%$ ). $80 \%$ spoke Arabic as a first language; $19 \%$ grew up with a Berber dialect. $70 \%$ were singles; $28 \%$ were married. ${ }^{19}$ In $67 \%$ of the cases, we carried out the survey in the place where people were born; $33 \%$ had meanwhile moved to the area we met them in. $33.2 \%$ were students, $10.3 \%$ were farmers; $9.4 \%$ were unemployed, another $9 \%$ were civil servants; $6.6 \%$ worked in liberal professions; $6.3 \%$ were housewives; $4.5 \%$ were workers in either industry or agriculture; $5.3 \%$ worked in services and another $5.3 \%$ were small merchants. A majority of $52.4 \%$ had finished their education with a university degree. $11.8 \%$ finished high school; $9.1 \%$ finished O-level; $9.6 \%$ went to Koran school; 8.3\% finished 7th grade, and $6.3 \%$ had no education.

As we dealt with youth it was clear that the vast majority ( $98.3 \%$ ) had not performed the hadj so far (although $65.6 \%$ wished to do so at one point). $91.6 \%$ were not member of a political party. Half of them participated in the 2002 parliamentary elections. A quarter of those voted for the leftist koutla (USFP, PI, PPS), and a quarter did not respond to this question. $8.8 \%$ said
they voted centriste (RNI, MNP, MDS), $12.7 \%$ voted for the wifaq (UC, MP, PND), $11.9 \%$ voted for the Islamist Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD). 11.9 voted for independent candidates and $7.3 \%$ casted a white ballot.

## Reactions

Anonymity was vital to the respondents, and doubted on several occasions. ${ }^{20}$ Some students asked me if I came from the German embassy or if their responses would have an effect on eventual visa applications. I was also asked whether I was sent by the German government or the secret service. If we had given out the forms and collected them the next day, the thrust would not have survived, and we would have had neither large participation nor serious answers. The students at the Goethe-Institute were very hesitant at first. Later on, more and more students asked if we could also come to their class. Particularly in Tanaqub in the countryside I was openly confronted with an attitude of "We cannot answer these questions honestly because we have to be loyal to our king." But again, my counterpart and Targa's practical work (they were vaccinating the cattle that day) prepared the ground for the trust that led to the men agreeing to participate.

On the other hand, the majority of the interviewees expressed delight at being asked to give their opinion on these topics. They were glad that challenging questions of social relevance were asked. This information is not derived from the statistical results but from narrative interviews conducted while carrying out part of the survey. Observing the context of the study was at least as indicative as the survey itself. The latter served as a vehicle for discussion that would otherwise have been arbitrary, and could not have been discussed, for example, in groups. It became clear in the course of the survey that only a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods would give a verifiable picture of youth attitudes and preoccupations.

Male 2 observed that after the attacks people were keen on reporting odd behaviour in their neighbourhood, and that everyone was on the look-out for members of the terrorist group Sirat al-Mustaqim, said to be responsible for the attacks. This phenomenon was exacerbated in Casablanca. Dealing with questions on Mohammed VI, Male 2 estimated that half of the people who answered 'positively' later added orally what they really thought (e.g., just vs. unjust). The fact that he noticed a different attitude in the countryside does not mean that the attacks had no effect there. As Male 2 put it: "The simple equation was that the perpetrators of 16th May were weird people who travel
around and ask strange questions." He also remarked that comprehension of the questions was more difficult in the countryside.

## Results

Approximately $80 \%$ of the interviewees answered the main question, i.e., what they regarded as the primary pillar of the new king's authority. They were asked to rate the importance of ten elements on a scale from one to four ${ }^{21}$ (see table 3).

Table 3: What is, in your opinion, the new king's main basis of authority?

| Reason |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| very <br> important | 42.1 | 45.9 | 44.5 | 47.2 | 40.1 | 37.7 | 22.1 | 18.6 | 30.7 | 36.8 |
| important | 13.4 | 14.9 | 15.7 | 15.5 | 17.9 | 24.8 | 20.2 | 12.2 | 18.8 | 21.6 |
| less <br> important | 12.4 | 14.1 | 13.3 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 15.4 | 20.4 | 16.8 | 15.1 | 13.4 |
| not <br> important | 32.1 | 25.1 | 26.5 | 23.4 | 27.4 | 22.1 | 37.3 | 52.4 | 35.4 | 28.2 |

The question how important it was that the king had a young spirit achieved highest approval. ${ }^{22}$ His capacity to guide the country during the era of globalization was relatively unimportant, whereas his good relations with the European Union were of great importance to $37.7 \%$. Mohammed VI's efforts for democratic reform were given a mixed reception. $40.1 \%$ considered them very important, $17.9 \%$ important, $14.6 \%$ less important and $27.4 \%$ unimportant.

Characteristics with religious connotations, i.e., his descent from the prophet and his status as Commander of the Faithful were with $42.1 \%$ and $45.9 \%$ very important. As important was his closeness to the people. $54 \%$ regarded Hassan II as a father of the nation whereas $46 \%$ did not. For Mohammed VI the result was the opposite: $46 \%$ saw him as a father of the nation whereas the rest did not. Regarding characteristics that were ascribed to both monarchs differences can be identified very clearly: whereas $78 \%$ attributed the characteristic 'severe' to Hassan II, only $22.9 \%$ did this for Mohammed VI. Hassan II is widely esteemed as a "génie politique" (89.1\%) whereas Mohammed VI only convinces $31.1 \%$ in this regard. In comparison to his father, Mohammed VI is regarded as more just ( $39.8 \%$ vs. $30.6 \%$ for Hassan II). $76.4 \%$ attributed "authoritarian" to Hassan II, but only $29.9 \%$ to his son. $83.1 \%$ deemed Hassan II as eloquent whereas only $32.1 \%$ connect this feature with Mohammed VI. $47.3 \%$ looked upon the father as "arbitrary" whereas only $26.6 \%$ associate this feature with Mohammed VI.

The results from questions 42 and 55 show that the "new concept of authority" introduced by Mohammed VI convinces many young adults and is obviously positively connected with him. Mohammed VI is regarded as a much more open, just, benevolent and a less patriarchal ruler than his father. $70.4 \%$ were e.g. in favour of abolishing the royal hand-kiss. In 2000 Remy Leveau wrote that kissing the king's hand has handicapped Moroccan politics. One of Mohammed's VI first acts was to abolish this particular feature of royal etiquette - although it seems to be reappearing 'on stage'. $74.5 \%$ explained this continuation with a strong tradition ( $64.8 \%$ mentioned that it was also still practiced in their family). $62.8 \%$ cited fear as a reason, $63.9 \%$ opportunism $58.5 \%$ respect for the king and $47.2 \%$ respect for the Commander of the believers. ${ }^{23}$

The survey shows that the initial abolishment goes hand in hand with the majority's popular aspirations. I read from the results that the monarchy is not estranged from its populace. That his new style of rule is not merely the result of improved public relations or pure propaganda is immediately evident on asking any Moroccan citizen what has changed since Mohammed VI came to power. People from different backgrounds agree that they can move more freely, that the state of fear (biba) has ended, and that they have more freedom of expression. $51.7 \%$ stated that one could criticize the makhzen today. Asked whether less authoritarian relations had been installed between state and citizens $41.3 \%$ said yes and $32.6 \%$ no. ${ }^{24}$

On a scale from 1 to $4,9.2 \%$ stated they were very satisfied with the reforms introduced during the last three years. $24.9 \%$ were satisfied, $30.2 \%$ not satisfied and $35.8 \%$ were not at all satisfied. Asked about concrete politics, $40.1 \%$ expected the king to democratise the country. $30.6 \%$ awaited that he equals the rights between men and women. The same number anticipated that the king guarantees more civic liberties. Social issues like unemployment (59.4\%), housing, education and health ( $56.9 \%$ ), poverty ( $49.1 \%$ ) gained highest expectations for the king to act, $41.8 \%$ also saw it as his task to control the Islamist movements. Regarding trust into different political institutions like political parties, the government, the judiciary, the trade unions and non-governmental organizations, none of them gained high trust, including the Islamist NGOs.

## Conclusion

Regime durability in the Arab world is not only a function of repression and cooptation. Negotiating reasons for legitimate order is a major contributing factor to stable and legitimate rule which should not be underestimated. Significant political and demographic change impacts on the Moroccan monarchy's pattern of domination as well as its search for legitimacy. Mohammed VI does not simply rely on the legitimization strategies his father used. A mounting gap between rich and poor, popular expectations and global challenges force him to adapt his strategies, and especially his concept of authority. The king and his advisers are obviously aware of this challenge and have reacted to it at the level of royal iconography and discourse, as well as with several major reform initiatives (inclusion of Tamazight in the national education plan, reform of family status law etc.). "The new [family law, SH] draft will play an important role in keeping society together and in confirming the religious authority of Mohammed VI" as Léon Buskens concludes (2003: 124).

Young women in particular favour the opening up of the monarchy and its new political iconography. The new makhzen has successfully managed to create a different image both for itself and for the king.

As far as its relationship to the citizens is concerned, the Moroccan kingdom is in the process of substituting verbal persuasion for coercion. ${ }^{25}$ This in itself is part of the process of modernization. The king's voicing of problems and emphasis on their gravity is not designed to avoid change. A major moral split between talking and acting, between words and deeds might not be tolerated by the citizens. "Political actors, whether individuals or groups, cannot
act by physical force alone - except in the extreme case, where it is questionable that one is still in the realm of what is understood by 'politics'. This function is closely linked to coercion, because it establishes the right to be obeyed, that is, 'legitimacy'. Why do people obey regimes that are very different in their policies? Reasons for being obeyed have to be communicated linguistically, whether by overt statement or by implication." (Chilton/Schäffner 1997: 213)

The "new concept of authority" in Morocco influences king-subject relations: The king is more popular than is widely acknowledged. Young people in particular admire Mohammed VI for his newly-defined role, which has the semblance of being closer to their reality.

## Notes

1 University education is still to a high degree francophone.
2 In 2006 the Journal of North African Studies (vol. 12, no.1, March 2007) discusses the findings of the study.
3 Makhzen, which originally meant ,warehousé, denotes the formal royal institutions and informal networks that constitute the center of power in contrast to the bled as-siba, i.e., the autonomous tribes.
4 About 12 empirical studies addressing youth or young adults have been published in Morocco since André Adam's work in 1962 entitled 'Une enquête auprès de la jeunesse musulmane du Maroc', for which 1,500 high schools students were interviewed.
5 Even an organization like The Pew Global Attitudes Project chaired by Madeleine Albright, which carried out a survey on "Views of a Changing World" in six Arab countries in 2003, did not get a research permit to poll outside the city of Cairo, for example.
6 The pre-test took place in March and April 2002. I would like to thank Dr. Driss Maghraoui for distributing the questionnaire to students at the University of Ifrane in September 2002.
7 Hereafter she will be referred to as Female 2. Due to the political circumstances the interviewers are kept anonymous.
8 When I left some weeks later for the village of Beni Ahmed in the south of Casablanca, I was obliged to carry a travel permit with me. This I was only able to obtain through a local NGO.
9 At one point we discussed translating the questionnaire into Berber. However, the cost alone made it prohibitive.

10 We were seven interviewers altogether including myself. Female 1 (SH) carried out $25.9 \%$ of the interviews. female 2: $13 \%$. female 3: $1.6 \%$. female 4 : $0.5 \%$. male $1: 14.3 \%$. male 2: $13 \%$. male 3: $12 \%$, male $4: 18.3 \%$.
11 My thanks therefore go to the interviewers for their courage and commitment to carry out this study.
12 We began the questionnaire with an introduction: „Je m'intéresse à l'étude des jeunes au Maroc et notamment à la connaissance de leurs attitudes concernant les récents changements politiques et sociaux survenus au Maroc. Il s'agit d'une étude scientifique du Centre du Proche Orient Moderne en Allemagne pour la réalisation de laquelle votre coopération est vivement souhaitée. Votre réponse restera anonyme et ne sera transmise à aucune autre personne ou institution."
13 1) personal data, 2) family background, 3) economic status, 4) male-female relations, 5) attitudes to politics, 6) leisure activities and 7) attitudes to the monarch.
$1410 \%$ owned a car and $7 \%$ a bicycle.
15 In 1962 people replied as follows: $20 \%$ felt very close to the proceeding generation. But nearly three quarter saw a gap. In 2003/04 only $6 \%$ felt very close and $27.8 \%$ replied close. $28.8 \%$ felt distanced and $29.8 \%$ felt very distant.
16 Political parties, the government, the constitutional council, the judiciary, trade unions, the media, human rights NGOs, Islamist NGOs, the major official NGOs.
17 Just, severe, political genius, bel homme, authoritarian, eloquent, arbitrary, charismatic, someone with baraka (someone who is blessed).
18 In question 55 we listed the same characteristics to enquire about Hassan II to see whether the attributes differed.
19 Eight participants were divorced, and four were widows.
20 Sabella encountered similar problems while carrying out his poll in the West Bank. " $[\mathrm{Q}]$ uestions related to influences among peers had to be abandoned completely, because the anonymity of the questioning would have been cast into doubt if we had asked for the names and addresses of the young people's friends." (Oswald 2004: 12)
21 1 = very important, $4=$ unimportant.
$2247.2 \%$ said that youthfulness was a very important basis of the new king's authority.
23 Multiple nominations were possible.
24 26.1\% said they do not know.
25 See also Catusse; Vairel 2003.

# Students, Family and the Individuation Process: The Case of Morocco 

Mokhtar El-Harras

## Introduction

The accelerated social change experienced by Moroccan society in the post-independence period impacted strongly on family values and relationships. Young people have been greatly influenced by globalized cultural values and patterns of behaviour, in most cases against the will of their families and without their approval. More than ever, Moroccan youth now faces economic and social uncertainty of a very persistent kind. Youth unemployment is on the increase, while the indeterminate status of the young is beginning to lose its temporary character.

Youth can no longer simply follow in the footsteps of their parents, or continue to regard the latter as their identification model. In order to adapt to this new life of constraints and challenges, they need to experience new lifestyles and ideas. The age when youth simply had to adopt the path their family environment had prepared for them in advance has vanished irretrievably. The definition of youth as the uncomplicated, natural passage to adulthood is no longer valid. Youth is no longer a time of delightful dreams, but has instead become a period of anxiety, instability and fear vis-à-vis the future.

One of the most tangible results of this new situation is that norms and ideas of previous generations have lost their effectiveness and validity for the current generation. In both rural and urban areas, the relationship between parents and their young children has forfeited a fundamental characteristic, namely, the authority of the old over the young. Young people tend more and more to take their own decisions, reducing parental intervention to officialising what has already become a reality. On the other hand, parents have different power strategies towards their children according to gender considerations.

## Methodology

The study findings we will present in the following were obtained in fieldwork I conducted in Rabat five years ago with three other colleagues (R. Bourqia, H.

Rashiq and M. El Ayyadi). Our main objective was to study how young students deal with religious values and Western culture, and to see if there was any conflict or compromise between traditional, popular and modern culture.

The findings were arrived at with the use of a questionnaire that involved 865 youth, $60 \%$ of whom attended Mohamed V University in Rabat and 40\% were taking their final year at the four Rbati high schools. Individual interviews were carried out to secure more details and obtain further explanations of the quantitative data.

In the sample selection we took several significant variables into consideration, such as the nature of the departments (human and social sciences/'hard' sciences); university students/high school students; males/females. Each member of the team used the collected data according to the problematic they were interested in. In the following, I will present my analysis and interpretation of the data collected on youth and family relations.

## Students and Family: Evidence from the Field

Between 1960 and 1998, the percentage of people with single status in the Moroccan population increased substantially. The proportion of single males in the population rose during this period from $35 \%$ to $55.6 \%$; and of females from $17 \%$ to $44.8 \%$. The number of single males exceeds that of single females. Another significant statistic relates to age at first marriage. In 1998, it had reached 32.5 years for males and 28 years for females in urban areas, and 29.3 years for males and 25 years for females in rural areas. The difference in age at first marriage between urban and rural areas is less than ever before.

This immense increase in the length of the dependence period on the family is due to socio-economic constraints rather than to deliberate choice. There is a growing tendency for young people to study longer, and thus to earn their first income at a later stage than their parents had done.

In spite of a discernible modernization, young people face obstacles to marrying at the appropriate time. When they marry, they do so at a much older age than their parents did; the dowry sum is higher and in addition, they have to be in a position to pay for expensive wedding ceremonies. All these factors constrain young people and force them to extend their single status. Moreover, the socio-demographic changes taking place in Moroccan society prolong the obligations of youth toward their families. As a consequence of increased life expectancy, more young people are looking after their elderly parents and siblings.

This new intergenerational relationship could be explained in part by the fact that parents are less educated than their children. The fieldwork data shows that only $13 \%$ of fathers and $4.4 \%$ of mothers went to university. The knowledge gap between the majority of students and their parents has resulted in the transformation of parent-children relations: parents have not only ceased to act as knowledge transmitters, but have also had to relinquish a significant amount of their moral and religious authority.

However, despite this new youth autonomy in relation to parents and family authority, and the difficulties young people face in having a family of their own, most of the youth consulted continue to attach importance to the family. Of the various institutions, be it the state, the political party, the university, the trade union or the humanitarian association, it is the family that deserves most to be trusted. Such was the attitude of $78 \%$ of the students.

Family and the Individuation Process
The sociological research revealed that manifest processes of individuation are taking place in Moroccan society. From the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, we could also deduce the existence of multiple signs of individuation in the family.

We noticed that children's first names are less and less those of an ancestor. First names are currently being chosen from Egyptian TV series, or from a particular political or religious historical period. Instead of integration into the family lineage, there is a singular characterization of the individual. Family solidarity is contracting more and more to the immediate family environment, namely, the family of orientation, the stepfamily, the grandparents and the nephews. The choice of marriage partner has become largely an individual affair. Parents might still be consulted but the decision is no longer theirs. Finally, knowledge of the family genealogy rarely goes beyond the grandparents. Only families in possession of written genealogies know more.

In spite of our customary tendency to perceive the family as a coherent and harmonious group, the individual element is an essential component of the family structure. Everyone has a unique relationship with their parents, and brothers and sisters. In early childhood we begin to express our attachment to individual ownership and show interest in the private and the intimate. We increasingly push our children into the competitive scene, asking them to be first in the class, an individual distinct from the crowd. Even family power is exerted to impose the will of one individual on that of another. The individual di-
mensions of romantic love and sexuality, which have largely been liberated from former social regulations, are no less significant.

## Signs of Individuation Among Students

Numerous signs of individuation were observed among the students. The fact that $2 / 3$ of their parents live in a big city $(73.87 \%)$ and $1 / 3$ was born there predisposed students to evolve in the direction of an increased process of individuation. The variety of individual paths and trajectories is more visible in a big city than a small one or in a rural area.

With regard to the ideal marriage partner, we noticed that $18.7 \%$ of the students wanted their partner to be a believer; $59 \%$, however, had a preference for a well-educated partner. This statistic expresses a student inclination for a society model with a diversity of ideas and variety of attitudes that allow individuals to express themselves, even against the group, as distinct from a model where individuals with similar beliefs dissolve into the community.

Equally important in the case of marriage is the preference of almost $50 \%$ of the students for two children as an ideal number. They want to be responsible toward their children, and to personalize their relationships with them. In the same vein, $88 \%$ of the interviewees are in favour of contraception, a fact that shows how important it is to them to act responsibly and respect individual choice.

The process of individuation is also evident in how students would prefer to bring up their children. $80 \%$ of them prioritized 'persuasion', as against $4.2 \%$ who preferred severity, and $6.5 \%$ who were more in favor of allowing children to act freely. Contrary to the educational method that obliges everyone to act according to a unique behavioral norm, regardless of differences and individual particularities, the persuasive method recognizes the right to autonomy and difference from the outset and, hence, rejects the unconditional submission to the will of the father.

## Preference for Autonomy in the Case of Personal Difficulties

Young students also incline towards autonomy when they face personal difficulties. Asking a certain family member or someone else for help depends on the nature of the problem to be solved. The following table 1 illustrates the student response.

Table 1: Person called on first in the case of difficulties

| Person called on in the <br> case of difficulties | Material and professional level |  | Personal level |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number | $\%$ | Number | $\%$ |
| No answer | 5 | 0.6 | 14 | 1.6 |
| Anybody | 46 | 5.3 | 148 | 17.1 |
| Father | 312 | 36.1 | 11 | 1.3 |
| Mother | 166 | 19.2 | 123 | 14.2 |
| Brother/sister | 97 | 11.2 | 88 | 10.2 |
| Friend | 57 | 6.6 | 355 | 41.0 |
| Other | 19 | 2.2 | 16 | 1.8 |
| Many | 163 | 18.8 | 110 | 12.7 |
| Total | 865 | 100 | 865 | 100 |

In the case of either material or professional difficulty, $36.1 \%$ of the students have recourse to their fathers as a priority. Only $19.2 \%$ and $11.2 \%$ respectively have recourse to their mothers or brothers/sisters. When students face personal difficulties, however, they prefer to consult their friends ( $41 \%$ ) rather than members of their families. Another significant element is the $17.1 \%$ who have recourse to anybody at all under these circumstances. Whereas their families are to a large extent involved in everything related to their studies and materiel needs, young people allow themselves a substantial margin of autonomy when it comes to dealing with feelings and intimate problems.

## Intermittent and Discontinuous Obedience

Another indicator of this process of individuation among young students relates to their opinions on the degree of obedience youth should show to their parents, a wife to her husband, and the younger to the older (brother/sister). A tendency to autonomy was confirmed at all these levels.

Table 2: Pupil and student opinions on the degree of obedience (according to family relation type)

| Family relation | children/parents |  | wife/husband |  | younger/older |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Obedience degree | Number | $\%$ | Number | $\%$ | Number | $\%$ |
| No answer | 2 | 0.2 | 5 | 0.6 | 18 | 2.1 |
| Yes, often | 438 | 50.6 | 272 | 31.4 | 186 | 21.5 |


| Yes, sometimes | 409 | 47.3 | 538 | 62.2 | 580 | 67.1 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Not at all | 16 | 1.8 | 50 | 5.8 | 81 | 9.4 |
| Total | 865 | 100 | 865 | 100 | 865 | 100 |

Undoubtedly, obedience in the family is largely accepted by most students. Out of 865 students studied, only $9.4 \%$ reject obedience to elders, $5.8 \%$ are against obedience of a wife to her husband, and a very small percentage completely rejects obedience to parents (1.8\%). With regard to internal family relations, student opinions are clearly still impregnated with the traditional obedience model.

However, a distinction should be made between continuous obedience and one that is intermittent; between general obedience in relation to both private and professional life, and partial obedience activated only in the household or when the dignity and reputation of the family is at stake. Although students tend to reject parental 'intrusion' in their personal lives, they accept obedience when it comes to the moral codes and social conventions their parents represent.

Our observations show that students feel obliged most to be constantly obedient to their parents, but notably less so at the level of wife/husband and younger/older relations. What about youth opinions concerning relations between the sexes? How does the question of obedience rate among youth in the case of such relationships?

Table 3: Opinions on the degree of obedience a woman should show towards her husband (according to sex) (\%)

| Obedience degree/sex | Yes, often | Yes, <br> sometimes | Not at all | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | 49.4 | 47.5 | 3.1 | 100 |
| Female | 18.8 | 73.3 | 7.9 | 100 |
| Total | 31.8 | 62.3 | 5.8 | 100 |

We see that while $49.4 \%$ of male students are in favor of continuous female obedience towards the husband, only $18.8 \%$ of female students share this attitude. Whereas more than half of the males would like to maintain their privileges of dominating women, female students prioritize intermittent obedience towards a husband, and tend to alleviate the obedience charge rather than reject it totally.

Opinions on the conditions for sexual practice
Male and female students express divergent opinions on the required conditions for sexual practice. Let us look at their answers.

Table 4: The conditions for sexual relationships (according to sex) (\%)

| Sex conditions | Should be <br> married | Should be <br> love | Enough to know <br> each other | Other | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Males | 39.6 | 31 | 21.4 | 8 | 100 |
| Females | 86.2 | 10.6 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 100 |
| Total | 67 | 19 | 9.7 | 4.3 | 100 |

For 86.2 \% of these young females and $39.6 \%$ of the young males, sexual relationship is linked to marriage. The personal and familial cost of an eventual pregnancy out of marriage is much higher in the case of female students. Such a relationship also entails the risk of damaging the woman's reputation, her matrimonial capital, and the honor of the entire family group. Sex is for women mostly dependent on marriage; women are aware that social sanctions would in no way affect their male partners.

Most of them are in favor of abstinence before marriage because any other behaviour would expose them to lack of respect in the community for a long time, and therefore, the possibility of a successful and durable encounter with men. From their own experience of Moroccan social life, women know that beyond their declared intentions or expressed attitudes, men end up respecting women who did not consent prematurely to their desire.

The conditions for sexual practice in the case of young men, on the other hand, are less complicated. The reason why $60 \%$ of young men state a preference for sexual relationships before marriage is because they know they are less vulnerable to social sanctions in a society that still values male virility highly. For most young men, sexual relationships are determined solely by the quality of the intersubjective relationship (it should be love, knowing each other is enough). They know very well that they suffer far less from social and ideological pressures, and are perceived to a much lesser degree as a channel for the 'social pollution' that could affect their family reputation.

The ambivalence is greatest when these young men aspire, on the one hand, to sexual relations before marriage but consider the ideal woman, on the
other hand, to be one who has had no premarital sexual relations. While male sexuality is seen as 'natural and necessary', female sexuality is perceived from the angle of shame and prohibition. Young men allow themselves to have premarital sexual relations but refuse to marry a girl who has had similar experience. In their mode of thinking, honor carries more weight than religious principles.

Ambivalence is also manifest in the aspirations of young women to have contact with the opposite sex, knowing in advance that society disapproves and men cannot be trusted. Young men are also in two minds about being with a woman who has already had sexual experience with someone else, and could act similarly in the future.

Attitudes Toward Polygamy
Polygamy is the second question where male and female attitudes diverge.
Table 5: Young people's attitudes toward polygamy (according to sex) (\%)

| Attitude | In favor | Against | Indifferent | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Males | 29.4 | 43.3 | 27.3 | 41.7 |
| Females | 16.1 | 70.9 | 13 | 58.3 |
| Total | 21.7 | 59.4 | 18.9 | 100 |

If we compare $59.4 \%$ of students against polygamy with $21.7 \%$ in favor, it can be deduced that for the most part monogamy represents the family ideal in the student milieu. However, while all of the students are generally in favor of the monogamous family, female students are more inclined to reject polygamy than males. $29.4 \%$ of males expressed a favorable attitude toward polygamy, whereas only $16.1 \%$ of females were of this opinion. Even the female students who accepted polygamy would refuse to endorse it in the case of their own marriage, and saw great difficulty in applying it in contemporary Islamic societies.

Attitudes Toward Women Working Outside the Home
As in the previous questions, the attitudes of both sexes differ substantially from one another here, too.

Table 6: Young people's attitudes toward women working outside the home (according to sex) (\%)

| Attitude | In favor | Against | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sex |  |  |  |
| Males | 72.4 | 27.6 | 100 |
| Females | 91 | 9 | 100 |
| Total | 83.3 | 16.7 | 100 |

On the whole, although $83.3 \%$ of students of both sexes are in favor of women working outside the home, a significant divergence between male and female attitudes should be underlined. $91 \%$ of female students are in favor of women working outside the home, but only $72.4 \%$ of male students express a similar attitude. In other words, working women are still a problem for almost a third of the male students under review. Emanating from a young, educated section of the population, this attitude is quite surprising. Female students claim their right to work outside the home almost unanimously. Neither do they seem predisposed to accepting a family where the woman identifies with the private sphere, while the husband is totally integrated in the public sphere. They refuse to be isolated from the work environment in the name of some religious or political ideology, and are supported in this by almost $2 / 3$ of male students. What kind of work and under what conditions is vital in this case. The balance of power between the sexes is not so much determined by the rejection or acceptance of women working outside the home, but by the nature of the jobs taken by or left to women, and the corresponding rights and salaries.

## Conclusion

In the next twenty years, the percentage of Moroccans under the age of 15 will decline. At the same time, the overall number of young people and those over the age of 60 will increase. The young will exert strong pressure on the job market. Will Morocco be able to satisfy such a strong job demand? This is one of the real challenges for the next two decades.

The transfer of youth socialization to extra-familial educational institutions undoubtedly contributes to the autonomy of youth. At the same time, however, these institutions extend their dependence on family resources. In spite of their aspirations to take charge of themselves, the lack of job opportunities for-
ces a large number of youth to live in prolonged dependence on the family. The family, on the other hand, finds itself in charge of an anxious and frustrated category of youth, torn between the desire for greater autonomy and real dependence, but is unable to reintegrate its own members because they have been formed in other institutional moulds.

Despite the process of individuation in the family and the aspirations of young students to keep their private lives to themselves, they still have recourse to family support in matters crucial to their future, such as their studies and professional careers. Although the autonomy of youth is more obvious within a circle of friends or a peer group, it has not been achieved to the detriment of good relations with their families.

On the other hand, the respect of youth for religious principles in family life is accompanied by a growing privatization of their own personal relationships. Faced with pressure derived from what is left of parental power, however, youth opposes individual choice, a spirit of understanding, persuasion, and dialogue.

The abstinence practiced in relations between the sexes, as strongly demanded by the family, indicates a more prominent rejection of modern values and reveals the extent to which youth tendencies towards a certain form of modernity remains eclectic and hesitant.

Although religious values are important in young people's family lives, there is a tendency towards an ideological bricolage, manifested in the many forms of compromise with modern culture. Due to the variety of referents, choices and alternatives that students have to deal with among other factors in their daily lives, ambivalence has become a cultural system, and negotiation a fundamental way of coping and adapting.

# Studying Youth in Germany: The 13th Shell Youth Study 

Richard Münchmeier

## Traditions

The Shell Youth Studies look back on fifty years of tradition in youth research. The first report was published in 1953 and in 2002 the 14th edition of the report was issued. I had the pleasure of being a member of the scientific board of the 12th and 13th reports, published in 1997 and 2000 respectively. The following remarks therefore obviously refer to these two studies.

The Shell Company possesses great merits for initiating and financing the studies without influencing their scientific independence and autonomy. The budgets, made available to the studies, have been relatively substantial until now. In the case of the 13th study, the budget reached the total of US \$ 750,000 . Thus the scientists had rich possibilities for lavish scientific work and costly empirical designs. The Shell Youth Reports are said to be one of the most important youth studies in Europe, due to their methodological and theoretical expenditures. They combine and integrate qualitative and quantitative approaches; the main study is usually a representative questionnaire among a large sample.

Anybody who is interested in the data, tables and findings of our study can get all information through the Central Archive of Social Sciences, University of Cologne. From the start, Shell Studies viewed themselves as a service to the public, i.e. for all who were seeking information with respect to youth. That means the studies intended to provide a database for practical or political orientation for all dealing with youth issues. So it is perhaps understandable that Shell Youth Studies have gained impressive public interest.

The findings are traditionally presented in the Federal Press Conference, and the Federal Minister of Youth Affairs of the day usually comments on the main results. The print and media industry usually review the presentation. And, of course, the studies are published and distributed by the book trade. As an example: the book vendors marketed approximately 85,000 copies of the 13th study.

## Theoretical and Methodological Framework

## Theoretical Starting Points and Development of Concrete

 TopicsOur theoretical starting point has been based on the social situation and structural problems of youth at the beginning oft the 21st century. In almost all wealthy, post-industrialized countries, we observe the emergence of new conditions of growing up, which produce a changed model of juvenile life, what we can refer to as a 'pattern of modern youth'. It is a perspective for development also for those countries developing in this direction.
'Modern youth' is characterized by

- prolongation of the period of education,
- a new biographical phase between youth and adulthood: 'post adolescence',
- a specific youth culture, tending to separate from the mainstream culture towards own rituals, esthetics, and behavioral patterns,
- ambivalence in terms of the social status between economic dependency and socio-cultural autonomy,
- inclusion even of those groups of youth which in the past had less access to education and youth culture (e.g. girls, rural youth, working class youth),
- marginalisation of those who fail to meet the demands of modern youth (above all failing to reach a high level of education),
- delegitimization of the traditional value-structure of youth (especially the value of focussing upon qualification and deferring gratifications) by the consequences of worldwide economic changes (growing unemployment even among the high-qualified).

Methodological Design of the 13th Study
As these theoretical theses are necessarily very abstract ones, it is important to explore

- if and how embedded in concrete constellations they are experienced by the young people, and
- what the meaning is of the mentioned topics within the subjective perspective of youth, respectively of the different groups of youth.

From the 9th study (1981) on, it has been scientific standard to conduct a series of non-directive interviews and group discussions with young people in order to understand their subjective perceptions and valuations, and to select the
topics of the questionnaire according to their point of view. Very often the transcripts of the interviews have been used as an items source for constructing scales via factor-analysis by a pre-study.

This subjective line of vision has been one of the methodological basics of the Shell Youth Studies since 1981 and has had a great influence on the basic orientations of youth research in Germany. In this sense the task of youth research is not to ask whether the value orientations, the goals of life, and the attitudes of the young generation are in harmony with the societal expectations or the norms of the adult society. This way of questioning would risk misunderstandings. Therefore youth research defines its job to outline the subjective viewing points and judgements of youth regarding society, politics, adult expectations and so on.

In the case of the 13th Shell Youth Study we conducted 30 explorative and 32 biographical interviews and ran two group discussions. We used these qualitative approaches to construct the measuring scales.

The representative survey was carried out among 4,546 young people between 15 and 24 years (and an additional survey among 648 youngsters of foreign Turkish and Italian nationality). The sample is representative with regard to five connected characters (age, sex, social status, member states of the Federal Republic of Germany, size of the respondent's residence). We only used so-cio-demographical characters for the quota scheme. We strictly avoided any substantial definition of youth. Even the limitation of the age groups was caused only by the restrictions of our budget. If there had been sufficient money, we would have liked to extend the age groups from 10 to 30 years. Instead of introducing our own definitions and theoretical understandings of youth, we investigated how youth is thinking of itself and how they express their self-awareness.

We employed more than 450 professional interviewers (the questionnaire was filled in during face-to-face interviews) of the ADM (i.e. Association of German Opinion Research Institutes). For the analysis of the data quality we used multiple data-evaluations by intrapersonal consistency-checks.

## Outline of the Main Findings

Perception of the Most Serious Problems of Modern Youth In modern and modernizing societies we observe the emergence of new conditions of growing up, which produce new chances and risks young people have
to cope with. Youth no longer means a psycho-social moratorium, but an open biographical period of burdens, challenges and strains. One of the most serious problems is the delegitimation of the inner sense of the youth period. Viewing the structural crisis of labour society, young people can no longer be sure that their efforts in learning, preparation and qualification will be rewarded in the future by satisfying employment careers.

We asked our sample an open question: "What are in your opinion the most serious problems of young people nowadays?" Almost half of the respondents ( $48 \%$ ) answered: "unemployment". If we look upon the age group between 22 and 24 we find $64 \%$ who point out that unemployment is the most serious challenge. This is no surprise, because it is during the third decade when youth has to solve the problems of transition from the phase of preparation and qualification to the biographical phase of employment and work.

## Future Expectations

One of the most important preconditions for making plans for one's life is the competence to conceive the next steps into the future. If we ask for the clarity of the perception of the next steps towards the future we find differences between German and foreign youths. Italian females appear to be more resolute and lucid in respect to their future plans. But Turkish girls and even more Turkish boys seem to be rather reluctant and uncertain.

This may be due to a variety of reasons. Unlike Italians, who participate in the freedom of movement and labour market of the European Community, Turkish youths who don't hold German citizenship are subject to certain restrictions regarding the right of residence and entitlement to search for employment. In planning their future they have to decide if they want to re-migrate or to remain in Germany, if they want to assimilate into the German culture, or to which extent they want to keep up their Turkish cultural habits. In not few cases their decision signifies conflicts with parents and families or with friends, peers and related persons in Germany. Their characteristic position 'in between' makes it difficult to reach clear anticipations of the future.

The average level of education among Turkish youths is lower than it is among German. So among the Turkish group we find a far weaker self-confidence in relation to being very well prepared for the future. Only $15 \%$ of the Turkish respondents feel "very well, or rather well" prepared to cope with the competitive structure, the achievement principle, the requirements of flexibility and efficiency and other traits of modern society.

For the maintenance of personal autonomy and mental health it is of enormous importance, if one can be convinced that it will be possible to arrange the personal future according to one's own wishes. Of course, this conviction is dependent on social resources and personal competences. In this respect Italian girls are the most confident ones. The very high part of $90 \%$ answered our question ("Are you convinced, that you will be capable of arranging your personal future according to your own ideas?") by "certainly yes" or "probably yes" (instead of "probably not" and "certainly not"). And again we find the Turkish subgroup, especially the Turkish girls, relatively reluctant and uncertain. To understand this we have to remember what already has been said, and, moreover, take into consideration that girls from traditional oriented Turkish families are very highly guarded and supervised and confronted with cultural norms and patterns which don't leave margins for an autonomous arrangement of life-style.

## Goals in Life and Biographical Perspectives

Reluctance as such we can not only find on an abstract and general level, but also in respect to more concrete biographical decisions. If we ask whether the young people are ready to set up one's own business, to try to be successful in the business world as entrepreneurs on a modest level, we encounter again general differences between boys and girls. But in particular we find clear differences between German, Italian and Turkish girls. The patterns of female biography still seem to be dependent on cultural norms which prescribe the norm "family-orientation" for girls and "job-orientation" for boys. This gender-specific pattern is least true for German girls and mostly the case for Turkish ones: $41 \%$ of the German girls stress their readiness for entrepreneurship, in comparison to $28 \%$ of Italian and only $23 \%$ of Turkish girls.

By factor-analyses we constructed different scales in order to measure the importance of different goals in life and biographical orientations among our sample. There are in particular two very important and prominent goals, which jump out very clearly: to have a good job and to live a good family-life.

If we look at the scale "job orientation" (consisting out of 6 items) we find: The weightiest importance have "job - good education and interesting work" for German boys and girls. They reach the very high scale level of 24.5 and 24.4 points respectively (scale-maximum 30 points). The differences between boys and girls in respect of job-orientation, which we found in the past, have completely disappeared. The traditional definitions and gender patterns of the
female role (emphasizing motherhood and housewifely duties) seem no longer to be orientation lines for the girls of today. They claim equal opportunities as males, and therefore rank fairly high self-realization through labour, and autonomy through economical independence.

But, of course, we recognize some differences. The level of importance among Italian and Turkish youths is fairly lower. And especially Turkish girls show less emphasis towards this goal in life: only 22.1 points (scale-minimum 6). Within this group traditional role patterns seem to be a little bit more prevalent.

On the other hand we find different results when we analyse the scale "family orientation". Life of today is experienced as remarkably contradictious, urging permanent struggles, competition, strengthening self-management, coolness, flexibility etc. All that is very boring and burdening. Family seems to be desired as a counterbalance to these challenges. Family is associated with experiences of emotional warmth, acceptance, security and faithfulness.

One aspect differs significantly in comparison with job-orientation. The results show large differences between boys and girls in all ethnic groups. Family seems to be of much higher importance for the female youth.

The difference between boys and girls is the clearest one among the Turkish group. And the scale level of importance is on the part of the Turkish girls almost as high as on the part of the German ones. How can we explain this? More detailed analysis illustrates two main reasons. In the perspective of German girls, job and family are of equal importance; they want to combine job and family and live both components. In contrast to that, Turkish girls give family orientation a higher value; therefore they estimate job orientation less. And what is more: Turkish girls less clearly perceive that they have margins and options to make their own decisions with respect to how they want to live. For them both work and family seem to be more or less objective rules which are not in the range of subjective disposition. Perhaps this can explain their relatively low scale level in respect to family orientation.

The prominent role of family and children within their biographical anticipations can be clearly found in the answers to the question regarding how many children they intend to have. $53 \%$ of the Turkish girls state that they want to have two children, plus $29 \%$ who want three or more - altogether $82 \%$. In comparison: $56 \%$ of the German girls want two and $12 \%$ three or more kids; this amounts to only $68 \%$.

The whole range of differences between the various cultural patterns of marriage and premarital relationship can be found in the answers to the ques-
tion: "Does it match your ideas of your own life to [...] live in close relationship with a partner without being married?" About three quarters of the German respondents state that they agree totally or to a certain amount with this form of life, but only $56 \%$ of Turkish boys and only $36 \%$ of Turkish girls.

Relations to the Parents
The renaissance of traditional family values we can also discover with regard to a surprising new and impressive good harmony between parents and youngsters. Compared to former studies, the German youth of today perceive their parents more often and more clearly as confidants (instead of authorities to whom you have to be obedient). They report less often of a severe style of education and express their intention to educate their own children like they had been educated themselves.

Commonly it was believed and written in the study books that it was typical for the juvenile changes that kids run a combative process of separation from their parents. It was commonplace within the juventology that becoming an independent adult meant detaching oneself from parental authority and care. Perhaps, this is still true in a psychological sense. But it is no longer correct in a sociological sense. The process of becoming independent does not come about through conflict with the parents, but through mutual consent. Most of the juveniles report that their parents are supportive (even sponsoring) of their attempts to become autonomous in both an economical and socio-cultural sense.

In Germany during the period of the late sixties and early seventies of the last century, we experienced the peak of the so-called anti-authoritarian movement among the rebellious 1968 -generation. This generation never would have accepted educating their own children the same way their parents did, and they would have refused to discuss their worries about orientation and decision problems with mother or father. So, as we can see, the situation has almost completely changed. Perhaps the most weighty change factor is: the members of the 1968 -generation are today the parents of the kids, and practise changed educational methods.

## Value Orientations

There is an ongoing discussion about a deep-reaching change of values on the part of the youth. In combination with prominent theorems of the processes of individualization and pluralization, sociologists state even a decay, or erosion
of value orientations. This would mean, that the young generation is not only the representative of a change of values, but - what's more - is suffering from a whatever clear consciousness of values.

In our investigations we could not find any of these statements and postulations. Of course, there are some changes. But such kind of changes we find throughout history. On the other hand - and that was very astonishing and surprising - we found just a 'renaissance' of well known and traditional value orientations.

Investigating the juvenile value orientations we followed new ways. We no longer used the traditional scales which imply a dichotomy of values (e.g. egoism versus altruism, materialism versus post-materialism etc.). Rather we tried to develop out of the qualitative materials and by means of a pre-study (factoranalysis) new scales that place value dimensions in the context of life concepts and biographical goals. We found eight quite different dimensions of value orientation: to have a family, to have meaningful work, humanity, modernity, autonomy, authenticity, attractivity, and self-management.

All these dimensions have in common that they differentiate very strongly according to the level of education. The well educated ones agree more intensely with each of the values. In practical life it is typical to perform a combination or a patchwork of a variety of values which seem to be contradictious (e.g. humanitarian orientations and seeking for personal autonomy). The traditional dichotomic concepts therefore seem to be inadequate and abstract ones beyond the realities of life. This is also shown by relatively high correlations between these values.

Humanity and modernity are important value orientations, especially in the western part of Germany. Attractiveness (and within this: economical success) as well as authenticity and autonomy are rather prevalent in the eastern part. But above all modernity is the most important value among all other dimensions. Modernity (in the sense of participation in technology and commitment in politics) is a deciding factor for one's own chances for the future, like employability, flexibility, and self-performance. But, high interest in technology (computer, handy, internet) does not mean social impoverishment. Quite the reverse: just technology, internet, and electronic media can be part of a particularly active, varied, and committed social life and fundament of an active organization of one's leisure time. Being enthusiastic for technology (in the sense of the value 'modernity') is not at all identical with sitting all the time in front of the television.

## Politics

The interest in politics and political matters is declining further. This is the case for all subgroups of the sample. The most important reason for this distant attitude is that most of the respondents connect with the term 'politics' the panorama of political parties and bodies, ritualized procedures of interest bargaining, rituals of power struggles, or bureaucracy of the political administration. They perceive and experience politics as being far away from their every day life and their concrete problems. And, above all, they experience politics as being disinterested in youth. So they tend to say: it is not we, who are reluctant against politics, but it is the political actors, who are reluctant against the youth.

Having no interest in 'politics' therefore, does not mean not being interested in questions regarding for example social justice, solidarity, participation and equal rights of minorities, globalization and exploitation of the developing countries, human rights etc. Political parties and the organisations of the political system gain a very low confidence from young people. Upon our list of confidence in organisations they take the very last place.

It is very important to remember: all these changes and attitudes are not at all exclusively typical for the young only. They describe not merely a 'youth problem'. On the contrary: as Prof. Butterwegge (University of Cologne) was able to show, in respect to attitudes towards politics or confidence in established organisations of the political system, there are no differences between adults and youth. The reluctancy against the political "business as usual" seems to be a commonly shared contemporary attitude through all generations.

But nevertheless it is typical for the youth: young people prefer to invest their interests and activities rather in small-scale initiatives and basic-democratic organisations such as civil movements, self-help groups, temporary and local projects.

## Perception of the Unifying Europe

The cooling down of enthusiasm for Europe, which we can perceive generally throughout the entire European population, was also refined in our data among the youth. Youth in Germany is rather distant or sceptical towards the consequences of the European unification. Most of them perceive the rhetoric of the European politicians as a façade with nothing behind it. They believe that only the rich will profit from the extending possibilities.

Advantages or opportunities are only for those ahead who have a high level of education and qualifications, as well as strong beliefs in their personal efficacy. Those who have less resources, education and self-confidence fear growing disadvantages.

Nevertheless, the young people remain very calm and cool when the European perspectives are being discussed.

## Gender Differences

Typical differences between male and female youngsters seem to be not as often as stated, and not particularly appear to be as severe as postulated, at least not among the German youth (whereas we actually find gender differences within the subgroups of foreign youngsters, especially young Turks). In respect to values, future expectations, goals and concepts of life, biographical preferences and so on, we find no sharp diversities, but a process of increasing similarity between the sexes. The combination of family- and job-orientation is the commonly shared, undisputed basic value orientation. But this is true only up to a certain age as well on the part of male as of female youth. At an age of 22 or 24 years, resp. at an age, when the decision to have children is a more tangible one and a more relevant one to the biographical situation, girls are still more prepared to change their job orientation and bring it in line with their wish for children, whereas young men show less reasons for such adaptations.

Also a variety of the in former decades gender-specific separated spheres of every day life and activities have been opened and made permeable in both directions. Nevertheless the classically male dominated spheres of technology, politics, computing, internet, sports, club activities are - even if no longer exclusive - clearly male-specific activities. Typical domains of the girls are shopping, strolling, caring for others and for the environment or animals, and chatting with others.

Even in respect to gender differences, the world apparently became more complex and diverse. Insisting upon categorical differences between the sexes seems to be as inadequate to the empirical findings as rashly announcing an upcoming state of equality. These would be merely simplifications of a fairly complex social reality.

## Relationship Between German and Foreign Young People Level of Integration

Germany is known as a country with a fairly high rate of yearly immigration, but also as a country with great difficulties to accepting and adjusting to this fact and for all to organise the social, cultural and political integration of the immigrants.

Of course we find a lot of indications for a growing normality and a trouble free living together of domestic and foreign young people. For instance: far more young people say that Germans and non-Germans can learn from each other (73\% Germans, 85\% Italians, 80\% Turkish). And the most important condition for interethnic marriage is for all groups "love and nothing else" - and not "conversion to my religion" or "readiness to immigrate into my motherland" or things like that.

But against this, we find a fairly high percentage (in total 62\%) of German youth who state: "The proportion of foreigners in our country is too high". Those who have no contacts and connections with foreign peers tend to be even more aversive; $78 \%$ of them estimate the proportion of non-German inhabitants as being too high. So we find a close relation: the more contacts exist the lower is the tendency to judge the number of foreigners in Germany as a problem (only 48\% of those who have high level of contacts).

Still, we find an strong tendency for separation and exclusion from each other. $68.9 \%$ of the German respondents stated that they have never or less often contacts with non-German peers. While almost all Germans ( $94.4 \%$ ) live in homogeneous German neighbourhoods, less than half of the Turkish (43.8\%) live with German neighbours, and $55.3 \%$ of them live in quarters where predominantly foreign families reside.

## Religion

In the context of religious orientations and practises we find three central outcomes: (1) our data reports a drop in the acceptance of dogmatic creed, and a falling performance of religious or church rituals and practises such as participating in services, having a church wedding, etc.; (2) we find growing disparities in respect to religious creeds and practises between German and foreign youth; while the traditional differences between the Christian denominations have disappeared, and even the differences between baptized and non-baptized become smaller, the differences between the German (and more or less Chris-
tian) and the foreign (and in the case of Turkish, mostly Islamic) youth grow very fast; (3) in the case of protestant and catholic young people we find no differences in respect to characters like lifestyle, values, biographic preferences; a particular 'religious milieu' cannot be found; whereas on the part of the Turkish, we find a (not too small) group of adolescents who live in a 'religious milieu'.

Occult or spiritual practices among youth are on a very, very marginal level. The so-called 'private beliefs' (e.g. "there must exist a higher being", "in the end there will be a higher justice", "everything is predetermined") play a greater role than dogmatic creeds or church teachings.

## Summary

Altogether, we mainly face a critical young generation with a clear understanding of the coming challenges, but also with a strong readiness to make the best out of them. On the other hand we find a smaller group, particularly with regard to foreign youth, which apparently is less open-minded, has less access to resources and opportunities, and lesser prospects to cope with life.

## Conclusions for Youth Research

From the very beginning Shell Studies tried to influence and serve practitioners as well as politicians in the field of youth work and youth education. The practical applicability of the investigation however depends on methodological preconditions: first of all, it is necessary to follow a subjective approach, i.e. not to look towards the young generation from the perspective of adults (the public, politicians, teachers etc.) but to follow their own view and opinion of society, and the situation of youth from within. This is called the "subjective turn" in methodology, which is significant for the Shell Studies since the 9th study of the year 1969. Consequently Shell Studies include a variety of qualitative approaches as well as quantitative scales and instruments to investigate the relevant questions and topics within this "subjective" perspective. This methodological standard is responsible for the intensive dissemination of the findings and importance in the context of youth policy and practice. Shell Reports can thus be used as an example to analyse the preconditions of public and political influence and effects of youth research in modern societies.

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Notes
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يتوقف على بعض المتطلبات المنهجية الأولية، حيث يتعين أو لا اتباع مدخل الـا "ذاتي" أو من منظور الفئة قيد الدراسة بحيث لا يتم دراسة جيل الشباب في ضو الم الم



 المنظور "الذاتي". تعد المعايير المنهجية هي المى المسئولة عن نشر النتائج أهمية تلك النتائج بالنسبة للسياسات والأعمال المال المعنية بالشباب. من هن هنا تعد دراسات المات شل نموذ ج
 الحديثة.

الألمان، قل الاعتقاد بأن وجود أجانب بألمانيا يشكل مشكلة (\%48 فقط من الشباب الذى يتواصل بصورة مكثئفة مع غير الألمان). غير أننا نلاحظ أيضأ ميل الشباب الألمان إلى الانفصال عن الشباب من المنسيات الأخرى
 غير الألمان بين الحين والحين، وبينما يعيش أغلبية الألمان تقر يبا (98.4\%) بمناطق ألمانية متجانسة، يعيش حوالى نصف الأتراك (43.8) مع جيراهم الألمان، و\%55.3\% منهم .عناطق تأهلها أسر أجنبية بالأساس.

الدين
فيما يختص بالتوجهات والممارسات الدينية تتضح ثلاثة نتائج أساسية وهى كما يلى يلى: 1- تشير

 متز ايدة بين الشباب الألمان وغير الألمان فيما يتعلق بالمعتقدات والطقوس الدينيا المية، وبينما الخسرت الاختلافات التقليدية بين الطوائف الدينية المسيحية، بل وأيضا الاختلافافات بين هؤلاء لاء منـ تم تم تعميدهم وهؤلاء من لم يتم تعميدهم، تزداد أو ألمهه الاختلاف بين بين الشباب الألمان مُن يعتنقو




 مثل "ضرورة وجود ذات عليا" أو أنه "فن هاية المطاف سيعم العدل الأسمى" أو أن "كل شى المى معدد منذ البداية" إفا تلعب دورا أكبر من المعتقدات المتشددة أو الطقوس الدينية التى تغرضها الكنيسة.

## ملخص

نواجه بوجه عام جيلاً من الشباب لديه فهم جيد للتحديات المستقبلية، وعلى استعداد تام للاستفادة من تلك التحديات. وعلى الجانب الآنر بند فئلات أصغر من الشباب، لا لا لا سيما من
 يستطيعون التكيف مع الحياة مثل أقرافهم الألمان.

## خلاصة خاصة ببحوث الشباب

 والتأثير على الأنشطة والسياسات المعنية بالشباب. غير أن امكانية التطبيق العملى للدراسة

أن هناك اختلافات بين الجنسين بالبحموعات الأخرى مثل بجموعة الشباب الأتراك)، كمما لا








 كل من الجنسين أنشطة كانت فن السابق تعتبر أنشطة يمارسها أساسا الجنس الآخر . غا غير أنه حتى







 اجتماعى معقد إلى درجة ما.

## علاقة الشباب الألمالن مع الشباب من الجنسيات الأخرى - مستوى الاندماج

 من المعروف عن ألمانيا أهنا من الدول التى تستقبل عدداً كبيراً من المهاجرين سنو يا، وأها توا واجها الاجتماعى و الثقافى والسياسى ويلاحظ بطبيعة الحال أن حياة المهاجرين بألمانيا قد باتت حياة طبيعيعية، وأن تعايش الشباب


 وآخر غير ألمانى هو وجود عنا علاقة حب بين الطرفين "ليس إلا"، وليس "تغير الانير الديانة" أو "الاستعداد للهجرة إلى البلد الأم" أو مثل تلك المك الشروط.


 الأجانب الآهلين لألمانيا. ومن الجدير بالملاحظة أنه كلما زاد التواصل بين الشباب الألمانان وغير
"السياسة" وساحة المؤسسات والأحزاب السياسية والإجراءات المتبعة فـ التفاوض بشأن المصالخ،
 ويعايشونا و كأفا شىء بعيد كل البعد عن حياتهم اليومية وما يواجهون من من مشكالات،
 من ننأى بعيدا عن السياسة وإنما الساسة هم من لا يهتمون بنا بنا.
 والتضامن، والمشار كة، وحصول الأقليات على الحقوق مثلهم مثل سائر فئات الجتمعم، والعولمة، واستغلال الدول النامية، وحقوق الانسان، وغير ذلك الكّ من القضايا. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن الأحز اب السياسية والمؤسسات السياسية لا تحظى بثقة الشباب، فمن بين قائمة المؤ سسات التى تنال يقتهم تأتى المؤ سسات والأحز اب السياسيا السية فن فاية القائمة. من الأهمية بكان ادراك أن أن تلك التغيرات والاتجاهات لا تنطبق فقط على الشباب التاب ولا تعا
 هو الصحيح، ذلك لأن آراء الكبار لا تختلف كثيرا عن آراء الشباب فيما يتعلق بالابتاهات السياسية أو الثقة فـ المؤسسات السياسية، فعدم الانخراط فـ الحياة السياسية إنما هى ظاهرة تنسحب على كافة الأجيال. غير أن ذلك ينطبق أكثر ما ينطبق على الشباب، حيث يفضل الشباب قضاء أوقاقم مفـ
 تحقيق الديمقراطية، مثل حر كات البتمع المدن،، والغئات التى تعتمد على ذاهاها، والمشاريع الهلية والمؤقتة.

آراء الشباب في اتحاد الدول الأوروبية


 الأوروبيين كو اجهة فقط لا يوجد ائد من ورائها أى مضمون، وأن الأغنياء دون غيرهمه هم الذين يستفيدون من الفرص التى يتيحها الاتحاد. إن المزايا أو الفرص التي يتيحها الاتحاد الأوروبى إنما تعم فقط على هؤلىألاء كمن يتمتعون
 تتو افر لمم المؤورد والتعليم الجيد، أو من يفنتقرون إلى الثقة بالنفس فيخافون منا منا قد يخلفه هنا
الآتحاد من نتائج سلبِية.

ومن الجدير بالذكر أن الشباب عادة ما يتسم بالمدوء و بعدم الانفعال أثناء مناقشة الجوانب
الحاصة بالاتحاد الأوروبى.
أوجه الاختلاف بين الجنسين
ييدو أن الاختلافات التى عادة ما بخدها يين الشباب والشابات لا توجد بصورة شاليا بائعة مثلما يتتقد البعض، بل ولا تكون بالحدة التى يصفوفا على الأقل فيما بين الشباب الألمان (بينما بُد

## التوجه القيمى لدى الشباب







 القيمية المعروفة والتقليدية. وعند دراسة التوجهات القيمية لدى الشباب قمنا بإتباع أسلو بين جديدين، حيث الديث عزفنا عنا استخدام أسلوب نطاقات الدر جات والذى ينطوى على مقارنة يبن انتشار قيم معينة مقابل قيم
 الخ....)، وحاولنا بدلا من ذلك وبواسطة المواد الوصفية ودراسة أولية (تحليل للعوامل) إعداد نطاقات جديدة تضع أبعادا قيمية فـ سياق مفاهيم الحياة والأهداف الحياتية، وتوانولنا إليا إلى ثمانية
 والتعاطف الانسان، والحداثة، والأصالة، والاستقلالية، والجاذيبة، وإدارة الـارة الذات.

 العملية بخد أنه من الطبيعى أن يتم التمسكك بيعض القيم التى تبدو وأنها متضار التياربة (مثل التعاطف
 وتتسم بالتجر يد والبعد عن أرض الواقع، وهو ما يتجلى فن علاقات الارتباط الوثيقة نسبيا بين تعد قيم التعاطف الانساند والحداثة من القيم الهامة بالنسبة للشباب بالمانمطقة الغربية من ألمانيا، بينما تعد قيم الجماذية (والتى تنطوى على النجاح الاقتصادى) والأصالة والاستقالالية من
 عند مقار نتها بالقيم الأخرى، فالمداثة (مبعنى المشار كة فـ التكنولو جيا وفيا وف الحياة السياسية) إما
 ومستوى الأداء. غير أن الاهتمام المفرط بالتكنولوجيا (الحاسب الآلى، وشبكة الالنترنت) لا يعىن
 التكنولوجيا والانترنت والأوساط الألكترونية الأنخرى جانبا هاما من حياة الألوا التماعية تتسم
 بالتكنولوجيا (من منظور الحداثة) لا يماثل الجلوس ومشاهدة التلفاز طوال الوقت.

## الاهتمام بالسياسة

يتراجع الاهتمام بالسياسة والقضايا السياسية فيما بين الشباب، وهو ما يلاحظ على كافية الجموعات الفرعية بعينة البحث، ويرجع أساسا إلى أن معظم المستجييين يربطون بين مصطلح
 بكيف تريد أن تعيش حياها، فالحياة العملية والأسرية بالنسبة لما من المسلمات العانـا العامة التى لا تخضع للميول الشخصية. ور.ما يغسر ذلك الانغفاض النسبى فـ الدرجات الخاصة بالتوجه الى الحياة الأسرية. وتبرز أهمية الأسرة والأطفال فـ حياة الفتيات من خلال اجاباباتن على السؤال الخاص بعلا بلا

 \%2\%)، أشارت 56\% من الفتيات الألمانيات الى رغبتهن فـ ابكاب طفلين و12\% منهن الم




 من الشباب الأتر اك عن قبولمم لذلك.

## علاقة الشباب مع الآباء

ان التطور الذى طرأ على القيم التقليدية الخاصة بالأسرة يين الشباب قد الألد طرأ أيضا على العاقاقة



 لطالما شاع الاعتقاد وذهبت الدراسات الى ألنه من الطبيعى أن تؤدى التغيرات التات التى تطرأ على المراهقين اللى صراعهم من أجل الانفصال عن آبائهم)، وكان من المتعارف عليا عليه في علوم



 سعيهم نو الاستقلال الاقتصادى والثقان وانيا والاجتماعى. لقد شهدت ألمانيا فن الفترة من أواخر الستينات إلى مستهل السبا


 قد يرجع أساسا الى أن أفراد هذا البيل قد باتوا آباء اليوم وأصبحوا يمار سون أساليب جديدة فـ التر بية.

الفتيات والفتيان. ومرة أخرى بند أنه ثمة اختلافاتات بين اجابات الفات الفتيات الألمانيات والايطاليات والأتراك، فأنماط حياة الفتيات تختلف تبعا للأعراف الثقان الثقافية والتى تغرض عرف اتو اتو جه الفتيات

 أكدت 41\% من الفتيات الألمانيات على استلى الاتعدادهن للبدء فـ مشروع مقارنة بالفتيات الايطاليات (\%28) والأتراك (23\%) اللائى أعربن عن استعدادهن لذلكـلك.




 حققوا أعلى الدرجات وهى 30 الى 24.5 و 24.4 على التوالى (الحد الأقصى لدرجات هـات هذا النطاق

 و كزوجة)، حيث باتت الفتيات تطالب بتحقيق المساواة بين المنسين فن الخصول علمى الفرص،

 سائر الشباب، وهو ما ينطبق أكثر ما ينطبق على الفتيات الأتراك، واللائى لا يضعن هذا
 الأدنى للنطاق: 6). ففى هذه الفئة بند أن النظرة التقليدية لدور المرأة لا تزال هى النظرة السائدة.
وعلى الجانب الآخر تختلف النتائج عند تحليل نطاق "التوجه الى الأسرة". فالحياة فن الوقت





 أن الفتيات يعطين أهمية أكبر الى قيمة الأسرة الـيا وبتدر الاشارة الى أن التفاوت بين الفتيات الـيات والفتيان الفيان أكثر بروزا فيما بين الشباب الأتراك، كما تبين من خلال الدرجات ألنا الفتيات النات الأتراك يعطين نفس الأهمية تقر يبا لقيمة الأسرة مثلهـن


 التر كية تعطى قيمة أكبر للحياة الأسرية، وبالتالى فهى لا تعطى نفس هذه الأهمية الى الحياة

## التوقعات المستقبلية

ان أحد أهم مقتضيات التخطيط للحياة هو القدرة على تحديد الخطوات التى يتعين اتخاذها فـ
 اجابات الشباب الألمان عن اجابات الأجانب منهمَ، فالفتيات الايطاليات كن أكثر تحديدا وثقة عند الاجابة على السئال الخاص بخططهن المستقبلية، بينما كان الشباب الأتراك اك من الجنسين مترددين وعلى غير ثقة من ذلك. وقد يعود ذلك الى عدد من الأسباب، فعلى عكس أصحاب الماب المنسية الايطالية مُن يتمتعون برية الحر كة والمشار كة فن سوق عمل الاتحاد الأوروبى، يواجه الشباب الأتراك مُن لم يَصلوا




 يتعذر عليهم تحديد الخطوات التى سوف يتخذوهنا فن المستقبل. اضافة الى ذلك يعد مستوى التعليم المتوسط الذى يناله الشالـو الشباب الأتراك أقل من مستوى
 بالاستعداد للمستقبل، من هنا بند أن 15\% فـلمط من المستجيبين الأتراك على اكلى استعداد "كامل" أو "على استعداد" للتكيف مع الهيكل التنافسى، ومبدأ الابخاز، ومتطلبات الماتر المرونة والكفاءة، وسائر متطلبات البحتمعات الحديثة.
 على قناعة بأنه يستطيع تخطيط مستقبله الشخصى طبقا لرغباته، و تتوقف هذه القنا لاعناعة -بطبيعة
 الفتيات الايطاليات هن أكثر فئات الشباب ثقة بالنفس. وفيما يتعلق بالسؤال التالى وهو : هل
 "بالتأكيد نعم" أو "فى الأغلب نعم" (بدلا من "فن الأغلب لا" أو "بالتأكيد لا")، وبند مرة أخرى أن الشباب الأتراك -لا سيما الفتيات منهم - مترددون وعلى غير يقين، وحتى يتسن فهم الألم
 تتمسك بالتقاليد يخضعن لدر جة عالية من الحماية والرقابة، ويو اجهن أعرافا وا وأنماط ثقافية لا تتيح لهن تخطيط مستقبلهن بصورة مستقلة.

## الأهداف فى الحياة والمنظور الحياتى

ان مثل هذا التردد لا يتعلق فقط بالجوانب البحردة أو العامة وانما أيضا بالقرارات الحياتية الحيوية،
 كأصحاب أعمال، حتى وان كان على مستوى متواضع، بخد أن الاجابات متفاوتة فيما بين

البحوث طرح أسئلة لمعرفة اذا ما كانت توجهات الشباب الخاصة بالقيم، أم أهدافهم فن الحياة، أم ابتحاهات جيل الشباب تتفق مع توقعات البحتمع أو الأعراف المتفق عليها معجتمع الكبار. فهذا
 آراء الشباب، وتقدير اهتم الشخصية فيما يتعلق بالجوانب الاجتماعية، والسياسية، وتوقعات عالم الكبار، وغير ذلك من الموضوعات الكات عند اجر اء الدراسة الثالثة عشر لشر كة شل المر المعنية بالشباب، قمنا باجراء 30 مقابلة بحثية، و32 مقابلة خاصة بالحياة الشخصية، ومناقشتين. وقد استخدمنا تلك المداخل النوعية لاعندا نطاقات القياس.






 الشباب أنفسهم و كيف يعبرون عن وعيهم بذاهـمـم. وعند اعداد المسح تح الاستعانة ب450 من المن المتخصصين فن اجراء المقابالات من منظمة معاهد البحوث استطلاوعات الرأى الألمانية.

## نظرة عامة على النتائج الرئيسية

## التعرف على أهم المشكلات التى تواجه الشباب

من المالاحظ فن المتمعات الحديثة أو تلك الىت تتحول الى الحمداثة نشا نشوء أوضاع




 خلال الالتحاق بو ظائف جيدة الدي
 يعانى منها الشباب فن الوقت الحالى؟ ، وقد أشار معظم المستجيبين (248) المى ألى أن "البطالة" هى المى


 مر حلة اعداد وتأهيل الذات الى مرحلة الدخول فن سوق العمل.

# الاطار النظرى والمنهجى 

نقاط البداية النظرية واعداد موضوعات ملموسة
تستند نقطة البداية النظرية الى الوضع الاجتماعى، والمشاكاكل الميكلية التى يواجهها الشباب منذ بداية القرن الحادى والعشرين. نلاحظ أنه فـن معظم الدول المال الغنية، والصناعية تنشأ أوضاع
 الشباب الحديث". انه منظور للتنمية ينطبق على الدول الأخرى التي تتطور فن نفس هذا الإتاها. ويتصف نمط الشباب الحديث بالصفات التالية: - اطالة مدة التعليم.

- مرحلة جديدة فف حياة الشخص بين مرحلة الشباب والرشد: المرحلة اللاحقة للمر اهعة. - انتشار ثقافة بين الشباب تنأى عن الثقافة السائدة وتتسم بالطقوس والجمماليات وأنماط السلوك الماصة هـا
- الازدوواجية فن الحالة الاجتماعية بين الاعتماد الاقتصادى على الأسرة من جانب، ويين الاستقلالية الاجتماعية والثقافية من الجانب الآلخر الانر
 الثقافية (مثل الفتيات والشباب بالمناطق الريفية والعالملين من الشباب).
(أهمها فشل بعض الشباب فـ الخصول على مستوى عال من التعليم).
 الرضاء عما تُقق بالفعل) وذلك بغضل التغيرات الاقتصادية العالمية (ارتفاع معدل البطالة حت فيما بين الحاصلين على مؤهلات عالية).


## تصميم منهج الدراسة الثالثة عشرة

لما كانت هذه الدراسات النظرية بالغة التجريد، يتعين البحث فيما يلى: - اذا كانت ضمن بجموعات كبيرة و كيف يوا اجهرها الشباب. - ما هو معنى الموضوعات المذكورة من المنظور الشخصى للشباب، ومُثلى يختلف فئات الشباب. من الجدير بالذكر أنه منذ اجراء الدراسة التاسعة (1981) تم العمل على وضع معيار علمى،
 directive
 اعداد اختيارات غختلفة للأسئلة من خلال تلال تحليل العوامل بواسطة دراسة مسبقة. لقد أصبح الأسلوب الذى يفسح المال للشباب للتعبير عن رؤ يتهم الشخصية أحد الألساليب الأساسية بالمنهج المتبع فن دراسات شر كة شل المعنية بالشباب، وذلك منـلـ عام 1981، 191 و كان له أثر بالغ على التوجهات الأساسية للبحوث المعنية بالشباب بألمانيا. ما اذ من هنا لم تعد مهمة

# دراسة أوضاع الشباب بألمانيا: الدراسة الثالثة عشر لشر كة شل المعنية 

بالشباب

ريتشارد مو نشميير

## تقليد متبع

ان اجراء "دراسات شر كة شل المعنية بالشباب" انما هو تقليد تح اتباعه لقرابة الخمسين عاما تم نشر أول تقرير فن عام 1953 وفـ عام 2002 تم اصدار العدد الرابع عشر من التقرير . لقد
 واللذان تم نشر هما فـ عام 1997 و2000 على التواء الى. من هنا الما فان الملاحـلاحظات التى سوف أسوقها فن هذه الو رقة انما تتعلق هكاتين الدر استين على وجه التح التحديد.

 ، حيث بلغ ابجالى المبالغ المخصصة لاجراء الدراء اساسة الثالثة عشر 750 ألف دولار الار أمريكى، وهو ما أتاح للعلماء القائمين على الدراسة امكانانات هائلة مكنتهم من الاستعانة بكل ما ها هو جديد
 دراسات شر كة شل المعنية بالشباب هى من أهم الدراسات الخالياصة بالشباب بالقارة الأوروريبية،
 الأساليب الكمية، والنوعية، وعادة ما تكون الديراسة الألما الميلية عبارة عن استمارة استبيان تمثل كافة قطاعات الئيات المستهلدفة بعينة واسعة النطاق


 الدراسات كانت بمثابة قاعدة بيانات تغطى التوجهات العنات العملية، والسياسية لكافة هؤلاء لاء من


 العرض. بعد ذلك يتم نشر الدراسات، وتوزيعها بوالئ بواسطة قطاع الكتب. على سبيل المثال، قام بائعو الكتب ببيع حوالى 85 ألف نسخة من العدد الثالث عشر من الدراسة.

وعلى الرغم من الميل إلى الفردية بالأسرة ورغبة الطالاب فـ الاحتما لألماظ بهياتم الشخصية لأنفسهم، فافهم ما زالوا يلجأون إلى أسرهم لدعمهم فـ الألمور المتعلقة عسستقبلهم مثل دراستهم ومسار اتمّم المهنية. وبينما تبرز استقاليلية الشباب فـد دائرة الأصدقاء والأقران، فإن ذلك لا لا يمدث . ويأتى عزوف الشباب فـن عالاقاتم بالجنس الآخر كمؤش شر لرفض قاطع للقيم الحديثة، وبل ويكشف عن مدى ميل الشباب الى اتخاذ موقف متغير ومتردد فيما يتعلق بأى شـكل من أشكال
 والتر كيب الإيديولوجي "bricolage" الذي يتجلى فـ العديد من أشكال التوفيق بين الثقافة

 الازدواجية نظاماً ثقافيا، وأصبح التفاوض أسلوباً أساسياً للتكيف والتعامل في الجتمع.

## موقف الشباب من عمل المرأة خارج المزل

كما هو الحال بالأسئلة السابقة يختلف موقف الجنسين بصورة كبيرة من هذه القضية أيضا. البلمو ل رقم (6): موقف الشباب من عمل المرأة خارج المتزل (حسب الجنس)


على الرغم من أن 83.3\% من الطلبة بو جهه عام يؤيدون عمل المرأة خارج المترل، هناك الم الم بعض







 المتزل ولكن استنادا إلى طبيعة الأعمال المتاحة للمرأة، والحقوق والمكانة التى تقترن هـا.

## الخلاصة

على مدار العشرين سنة المقبلة سوف تنخغض نسبة سكان المغرب مُن هم دو دون سن 15 سنة،

 تلبية هذا الطلب الهائل على مناصب الشغل ؟ ذلك أن قضية البطالة تمثل أهم تحديات العقدين المقبلين.
لا شك فن أن الشباب لم يعد يتفاعل اجتماعيا داخل الأسرة فحسب، وانما داخل





 أفر ادها، وذلك لأغهم قد تشكلوا بفعل قو الب مؤسسية أخرى.

في الجانب الآخر يواجه الطالاب تعقيدات أقل فيما يتعلق بممارسة الجنس. فنظرا لوعيهم بأفم لا

 أن ممارسة البنس تتوقف فقط على طبيعة العلاقة بين الطرفين (أى يكفى أن يكون يكن هن هنا
 الضغوط الاجتماعية والإيديولوجية التى تتعرض لما الفتيات، بل ولن ينظر لذلك كإساءة لسمعة عائلاتّم. وتبرز هذه الازدواجية من جانب الرجال عندما يرغب أحد الشباب الشباب فـ اقامة علاقات
 الجنس قبل الزواج. فبينما ينظر للحياة الجنسية للرجل كشيء "طبيعى وضرورى"، ينظر للحياة





 شخص آخر، وأهنا يمكن أن تعود وتكرر ذلك فـ المستقبل .

## موقف الشباب من تعدد الزوجات

لقد جاء السؤال الخاص برأي الشباب فن تعدد الزوجات كثاين سؤال اختلفت حوله الآراء يين الطلاب والطالبات.

البحدول رقم (5): موقف الشباب من قضية تعدد الزوجات (حسب الجنس) (\%)


إذا ما أجريت مقارنة بين نسبة الشباب مُن يرفضون تعدد الزوجات (59.4) ونسبة أولئك



 يحدث ذلك لمن شخصيا ويؤ كدن على صعوبة تعدد الزو جات فن المتمعات الإسلامية المعاصرة.

الجحدول رقم (3): آراء الشباب حول مدى الطاعة الواجبة على الزو جة بتحاه
زو جحها (حسب الجَنس) (3)


يوضح الجلدول أنه بينما يعتقد 49.4\% من الطلاب بأنه يتو جب على الزو جة طاعة زو جها، فإن 18.8\% من الطالبات فقط هن من يتفقن على ذلك. و النى حين يود أكثر من نصف الطلاب الاحتفاظ .ميزة التحكم فن الزوجة، فإن الط الطالبات يفضلن الطاعة المتقطعة للزو جه، ويملن إلى الحد من درجة الطاعة وليس رفضها تماما.

## آراء الشباب حول شروط الممارسة الجنسية

آراء الطالاب والطالبات متباينة فيما يتعلق بشروط الممارسة الجنسية. يوضح ابلدول التالى إجابات الطلبة:

البحلو ل رقم (4): شرو ط محارسة المنسية (حسب الجنس) (\%)


يرى 39.6\% من الطالاب و86.2\% من الطالبات أن الجنس يبب أن تمارس فن اطار الزواج. ان
 إطار الزواج، فضلا عن أن تلك العلاقة هدد سمعة الفتاة وفرصها المى المى الزواجه، وتنال من شرف العائلة. من هنا يجب على المى المرأة أن تمارس الجنس فن إطار الزواج، وذلك لكا لوعيها الكامل بأن البمتمع لن يعاقب شريكها فن تلك العلاقة. إن معظم الفتيات يعرفن ألمنا أن ممارسة الجنس قبل


 الأمر - يحترمون فقط المرأة الىت لا تستجيب لشهواتهم.

 على التوالي. غير أنه عند مواجهتهم لمشاكل شخلا (41\%) وليس مع أفراد الأسرة. وييين الجدول أيضا أن 17.1\% من الطلبة لا يلجأون إلى أي شخص على الإطلاق. فعلى الرغم من أن الأسرة تساهم بصورة كبيرة فـ كافة منا متطلبات
 الاستقلال اذاً ما كان الأمر يتعلق بالمشاكل الخاصة بالمشاعر والعلاقات الحميمة .

## تباين علاقات الطاعة

من المؤشر ات التى تؤ كد على ميل الطلبة إلى الفردية آراءهم الخاصة حول الطا الطاعة الواجبة عليهم
 الراشدين. فقد تأكد على كافة المستو يات أن هناك ابخاها خا خو المز يد من الاستقاليالية.

الجلدول رقم (2): آراء التالميذ والطلبة حول مدى الطاعة الو اجبة عليهم (تبعا لنوع العلاقة الأسرية)

| صغار/كبار |  | زوجهة/زوج |  | أبناء/آباء |  | العلاقة الأسرية |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \% | التكرار | \% | التكرار | \% | التكرار | مدى الطاعة الو الجا |
| 2.1 | 18 | 0.6 | 5 | 0.2 | 2 | بدون جون العوباب |
| 21.5 | 186 | 31.4 | 272 | 50.6 | 438 | نعمّ غالبا |
| 67.1 | 580 | 62.2 | 538 | 47.3 | 409 | نعم، فن بعض غالبا لأحيان |
| 9.4 | 81 | 5.8 | 50 | 1.8 | 16 | لا يحدث أبدا |
| 100 | 865 | 100 | 865 | 100 | 865 | البحموع |

ما لا شك فيه أن أغلبية الطلبة يممعون على أهمية طاعة الآباء. فمن بين 865 طالبا بند أن 9.4 منهم فقط هم الذين يرفضون طاعة الراشدين، و5.8\% يرفضون طاع ونسبة ضئيلة جدا من الطلبة هم من يرفضون طاعة الآباء بصفة مطلقة (1.8\%). وعندما يتعلق بعلاقة أفراد الأسرة ببعضهم البعض بند أن الطلبة ما زالوا متأثرين بالنمط التقليدي للطاعة داخل الأسرة.
بيد أنه يتعين التمييز بين الطاعة المستمرة والطاعة المتقطة، وبين الطاعة بصفة عامة فـ الحياة
 في الحك. فعلى الرغم من ميل الطلبة الم رفض تدخل الآباء فن حياهمم الشخصية، فإنا
 لقد أوضحت الدراسة أن الطلبة يشعرون بأنه يتو جب عليهـم دائما طاعة آبائهمه، وإن كانـانت
 يبدر طرح التساؤل التالى: ما هى، إذن، "آراء الشباب فيما يتعلق بعلاقاقاقم بالطرف الآنخرفي العلاقة الزو جية ؟ وما هو مدى الطاعة الواجبة فـ العلاقة بين الجنسين ؟

فيما يتعلق بشر يك الحياة المثالى، لوحظ أن 18.7\% من الطلبة يرغبون فـ أن يكون شريك
 ما يعكس تطلع الطلبة إلى نموذج بلمتمع يضم العديد من الأفكار والاتحاهاتات، ويفسح البحال أمام



 أن 88\% من الطلبة يؤيدون استخدام وسائل منع الحمل، وهو ما يدل على مدى الما اهتمامهم . بتحمل المسؤولية وإعطاء طابع شخصي ومنا كما يبرز الميل إلى الفردية أيضا ف؛ الأسلوب الذى يرغب الشباب الشاب فـ اتباعه فف تر بية أطفالهم
 ويفضل 6.5\% منهم إعطاء كامل الحر ية للأطفال ليفعلوا ما ير يدون. إن أسلو أسلوب الإقناع يستند

 بغض النظر عن أو جه الاختالاف بين الأفراد.

## تفضيل الاستقلالية عند مواجهة المشكلات الشخصية

 التى يواجهوهنا ما اذا كانوا سيلجأوان الىالى مساعدة فرد من أفراد الأسرة أو الى شخص آلخر . يوضح الجدول التالى استحابة الطلبة:

الجلدول رقم (1) :أول شخص يلجأ اليه الطلبة عند مو اجهة مشكالوات

| المستوى الشخصي |  | المستوى المادي والمهين |  | الشخص الذى يتم الاتصال به عند مواجهة مشكلة |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \% | التكرار | \% | التكرار |  |
| 1.6 | 14 | 0.6 | 5 | بدون جواب |
| 17.1 | 148 | 5.3 | 46 | أى شخص |
| 1.3 | 11 | 36.1 | 312 | الأب |
| 14.2 | 123 | 19.2 | 166 | الأم |
| 10.2 | 88 | 11.2 | 97 | الأخ/الأخت |
| 41.0 | 355 | 6.6 | 57 | صديق آلان |
| 1.8 | 16 | 2.2 | 19 | آخرون |
| 12.7 | 110 | 18.8 | 163 | العديد من النحر |
| 100 | 865 | 100 | 865 | البحمو ع |

غير أنه وعلى الرغم من استقلال الشباب عن الآباء وعدم خضوعهم لسلطتهمم، والصعبوبات التى

 الحيرية، يعتقد الشباب أن الأسرة هى المؤ سسة الجلديرة بثقتهم، وهو ما أبمع عليه 78\% من الطلبة الذين تّت استشارگّم.

## الأسرة والميل إلى الفردية

لقد أوضحت البحوث الاجتماعية التى أجريت أن الجتمع المغربى يشهد ظهور سيرورات فرات فردية
 على هذا التحول داخل الأسرة.




 والأجداد، وأولاد العمومة. كما بات اختيار شريك الحياة إلى حد بعيد اختيارا إلخار شخصيا، والآباء
 فإن معرفة الشباب بشجرة العائلة لم تعد تتعدى معرفة أجدادادهم باستثناء الأسر التى كانت قد وثقت شجرة العائلة وتاريخها.
على الرغم من اعتيادنا النظر إلى الأسرة كوحدة متجانسة ومتماسكة إليانية إلا أن العنصر الفردي يعد مكونا هاما لبنية تلك الأسرة. فكا فلألمك فرد بالأسرة لديه علاقة متفردة مع أبويه


 الأسرة تمارس سلطتها بصورة تغرض إرادة فرد والحد واليا على فرد آخر
 التى لطالما كانت تفرض على تلك العلاقة، حيث باتت الأبعاد الفردية لتلك العلاقة ذات أهمية بالغة.

مؤشرات دالة على الميل إلى الفردية فيما بين الطلبة
لقد لوحظت بعض المؤشرات الدالة على تحول الطلبة المتز ايد نو الـو الفردية. فنظرا لأن ثلثني آباء
 تبني الابجاهات الفردية. فالتوجهات والمسارات المات الفردية تكون أكثر بروزا بالمدن الكـبرى مقارنة بالمّدن الصغرى أو بالمناطق الريفية.

وي أربع ثانويات بالر باط. كما تح إجراء مقابلات شخصية للحصول على المزيد من التفاصيل والايضاحات الخاصة بالبار البيانات الكمية.



 جمعه من بيانات حول الشباب والعلاقات الأسرية.

## الطلبة والأسرة: أدلة من الميدان

لقد زادت نسبة غير المتزو جين من المنسين بالمغرب العربى بصور رة ملموسة فيما بين عام 1960 و 1998، حيث زادت نسبة غير المتزوجين من الذكور بنسبة تتراوح ما ما بين 35\% و 55.6\%، ونسبة غير المتزوجات بين 17\% و 44.8\%. ويفوق عدد غير المتزوجين من الذين الذئور غير المتزو جات. وتعد الإحصاءات الخاصة بسن الزواج هامة هامة أيضا. ففى عام 1998 بلغ متوسط سن الزواج بالنسبة للذكور 32.5 عاما بالمناطق الخضرية، و29.3 عاما بالمناطق الريفية. بينما بلغ بالغ
 وبجدر الإشارةٍ الى أنه لم يسبق أن كان المان الفرق بين سن الزواج بالمناطق الريفية ومثيله بالمناطق الحضرية متقاربا إلى هذا الحد. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن هذه الز يادة فن فترة اعتماد الشباب على أسرهم لا تر ترجع إلى رغبة



 في سن متأخرة مقارنة بسن زواج آباءهم. بل وبخد أن قيمة المهر الذى عليهم تقديمه إلى العروس قد ارتفعت، هذا فضال عن التكاليف المائلة التى يتحملوهنا لإقامة حفل الزفافـ الألما الأمر الذي يقيد
 الأوضاع الاجتماعية والسكانية بالمتمع المغربى على الشباب مسؤولية بلى بالماه أسرهم. فنظرا
 رعاية آبائهم وإخوانهم آخذ فـ الز يادة قد يرجع هذا الشكل الجديد فـ العلاقة بين الأجيال إلى أن الآباء لم ينالوا نفس مستوى


 الآباء مصدر المعرفة لأبنائهم مثلما كانمان الحال بالمالماضى، بلم وقلد ولد فقد الآباء أيضا قدرا كبيرا من سلطتهم الأخلاقية والدينية على الأبناء.

# الطلبة والأسرة والميل إلى الفردية: حالة المغرب العربى 

المختار المرس

## مقدمة

كان للتغيرات الاجتماعية المطردة التى طرأت على الجتمع المغربى فـ أعقاب مرحلة الاستقلال أثر




 وضوح الآفاق اللذين يميزان حاليا أوضاعه وظروفها
 يفعلون فـ الماضى. وحت يتسن لمم التكيف مع نمط الحياة الجديد بما يفرض من قيود وتحديات الميات،
 الأسرة. كما أن التعر يف الشائع لمرحلة الشباب كمر حلة ينتقل فيها الإنسان بصور المبارة طبيعية





 ومن ثمة اقتصر دور الآباء على بحرد إعطاء صبغة رسمية لما قد ألحا أصبح واقعا فعليا. وعلى الجا الحانب الآخر، يتبع الآباء غتتلف الأساليب لفرض سلطتهم، وذلك للاعتبارات الخاصة بالعلاقة بين البنسين.

## منهج الدراسة


 بالأساس إلى معرفة موقف الطلبة من المبادىء الدينية والثقافة الغر بية، وتحديد أو وهه الاختالاف أو التشابه بين الثقافة السائدة، والثقافة الشعبية والمديثة.
وقد تم التوصل إلى نتائج الدراسة من خلالل الاستعانة باستمارة تم توزيعها على 865 من الشباب، 60\% منهم طلبة جامعة عحمد الخامس بالر باط، و40\% منهم يدر سون في السنة النهائية

9 المقابلات: الباحثة الأولى: 25.9\%، الباحثة الثانية: 13\%، الباحثة الثالثة 1.6\%، الباحثة الرابعة : 0.5\%، الباحث الأول \%، الباحث الثاني: 13\%، الباحث الثالث:12\%، الباحث الرابع:18.3\%.
 السياسية، 6) الأنشطة التى يتم مز اولتها أثناء وقت الفراغ، 7) الموقف حيال المُلكاكة. 110 11 11 من المستجييين يمتلكون سيارة، و7\% منهم يمتلكون دراجة.




 الإنسان، والمنظمات غير الـكومية الإسامامية، وكبرى المنظمات غير الـكومية.
 15 تم تضمين نغس السمات بالسؤال 55 ، وذلك للتعرف على ما إذا كانت سمات الحسن الثانن فن رأى المستجييين كختلف عن سمات محمد السادس.

 الأسئلة المعنية بتأثير الأقر ان على بعضهم البعض، والتى تتطلب الاستفسار عن أسماء وعناوين أصدقاء المستجييبن مما قد يثير شكو كهم فـ عدم الوفاء بالتعهد بعدم الإفصاح عن هويتهم . (أوزوالد 2004) 18 أشار 47.2\% من المستجييين إلى أن سلطة الملك مستمدة من كونه شابا. 19 كان من الممكن لكل مستجيب اختيار أكثر من إجابة.

20 أشار 26.1\% من المستجييين إلى أفنم لا يعرفون. 21 برجاء الرجو ع لكتابات كاتوس وفاير ل لعام 2003.

وفيما يختص بعلاقة المملكة بالمواطنين، تقوم المملكة فی الوحقت الحالى بالاستى ولاستعانة بسياسة الإقناع بدلا من الإجبار وهو ما يعد جزءا من عملية الإقناع ع، وهذا يعتبر في حد ذاته









 و ولك بسبب دوره ابلديد والذى أصبح أقرب إلى الو اقعية عما ذى قبل.
الحو اشى

1 مسف يتناول المؤلف نتائج الدراسة بالمزيد من التفصيل فـ مقال سوف يصدره فـ عام 2006
2 لقد تم نشر حوالى 12 دراسة معنية بالشباب بالمغرب، وذلك منذ صدور مؤلفات آندرى آدامز فـ عام 1962 تحت عنوان "'Une enquête auprès de la jeunesse musulmane du Maroc'"، والتى تم من خحالما إجراء مقابلات مع 1500 طالب بالمرحلة الثانوية. حت مؤسسة مثل "مشروع الاتحاهات العالمية" "The Pew Global Attitudes Project" على سبيل
 خار ج مدينة القاهرة، وذلك عندما كانت تقوم بإجراء مسح فـ عام 2003 حول "الآراء حيال عالم متغير "، وذلك الك
بست دول عر بية.

4 المخزن: كلمة مستخدمة فـ اللغة العربية وتعنى المكان الذى يتم فيه تخز ين الأشياء، ويقصد هِا فـ سياق هذا البحث المؤ سسات الملكية
5 لقد تم إجراء الاختبارات الأولية فـ كل من مارس وإبريل من عام 2002، وقام د/ادريس مغرووى بتوزيع استمارة

6 كُن قاموا بإجراء المقابلات، وذلك لاعتبارات سياسية.
 سفر، والذى لم أكن لأحصل عليه دون مساعدة الجمعية الأهلية. 8 تم بكث إمكانية ترجمة إستمارة الاستبيان إلى لغة البربر، وهو ما تعذر عمله بسبب ارتفاع تكلفة عملية التر جهة.
41.3 الإصلاحات التى أدخلت على مدار الثلاث سنوات الماضية أعرب 9.2\% منهم عنم رسن رضاهم
 على الإطلاق بشأن تلك الاصلاحات. وعند سؤ ال المستجييين عن السياسات المات الملموسة أشار
 و30.6\% منهم إلى أفمم يتوقعون من الملك أن يعمل على تحقيق المساواة بين البحنسين فـ الحمقوق
 الاجتماعية النصيب الأكبر من توقعات المستجيبين حيث توقع 59.4\% من المستجيبين أن يسعى الملك إلى الحد من البطالة و56.9\% منهم أن يعمل على توفير خديرمات المات الاسكان والتعليم والحندمات الصحية و49.1\% منهم أن يسعى نو المو الحد من النقر. كما كان البعض (41.8\%) يتوقع من الملك أن يسيطر على الحر كات الإسامامية. وفيما يتعلق بثقة المواطنين فـ غختلف المؤسسات السيان المياسية مثل الأحزاب الماب السياسية والحكومة والقضاء والنقابات العمالية والمنظمات غير الـكـومية تبين أن ما من تلك المئ المؤ سسات تخظى بثقة
 10.2 \% وحسب من المستجييين. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن منظمات حقوق الإنسان قد حظي
 و سائل الإعلام) على ثقة حوالى 10\% وحسب منهم.

## الحلاصة



 على نمط المملكة المغر بية فن هيمنتها وسعيها إلى الشرعية. فالملك المكا عحمد السادس لا يلا يعتمد فتط
 في الجوانب السكانية واتساع الموة بين الأغنياء والفقراء وتوقعات الشعب والئ والتحديات العالمية




 أفراد البتمع وفن التأكيد على السلطة الدينية للملك " وذلك كما يذهب ليون بسكتز (2003:
 "الجديد" قد تُكن من خلق صورة ختلفة له وللملك وهى حقى حقيقة تؤ كدها كلمة "الجدديد" والتى أصبحت كلمة شائعة الاستخدام بالمغرب.

السادس بأييه فـ صفة العدل يرى المستحيبون أن عمد السادس أكثر عدلا من أييه (39.8\% مقابل 30.6\% لصال الملك الحسن الثان). وبييما يعتقد 76.4\% من المستجييين أن الملك المسن الثاني "مستبد" يعتقد 29.9\% منهم أن الملك عمد السادس مستبد أيضا. أما فيما يتعلق بصفة اللباقة يكد 83.1\% أن الملك الـسن الثاني يتصف باللباقة مقابل \%2.1 من المستجييين مُن وصفوا الملك عمد السادس باللباةة. كما وصف 47.3\% من المستجييين الملك الحسن الثان بالتعسف مقابل 26.6\% من وصفوا الملك عمد السادس بذلكّ. وقد كان ينظر للملك الحسن الثان طوال فترة حكمه للبلاد كملك يتمتع بقبول كبير من الشعب حيث أيد ذلك حوالى 74\% من المستحييين بينما وجد 42.2\% نقط من المستجيين هذه السمة فُ الملك عمد السادس. وبينما يصف 57.8\% من المستجييين الملك عمد السادس بصفة bien faiteur حسن الطلعة أو الما(مح يصف 30.3\% منهم الملك حسن الثانين بكذه الصفة. ومن السمات الأخرى التى يتم الإشارة إليها فـ الكتابات الثانوية حول المغرب العربى هى سمة البر كة حيث تشير الكتابات الثانوية أن تلك السمة من الر كائز التى يقوم عليها الهـم بالعغر ب. من هنا تم تناول هذه السمة فـ هنا البحث وأن كان عدد من المستجييين كانورا قد
 أفعالمم أن المئات المستهلذة بالبحث تنتقد أن منهوم البر كة إنا هو منهورم قديم. وقد جاء أحد
 لقد أوضحت الإجابات على الأسئلة من 42 إلى 55 أن "المفهوم الجديد للسلطة" الذى أتى به الملك عمد السادس قد أقتع الكثير من الشباب وأنه مفهوم قد أقتر ن بمحمد السادس دون
 وأقل أبوية من أيهـ. فعلى سبيل الثمال كان 70.4\% من المستحييين يؤيدون إلغاء عادة تقيبل أيدى الملك. وقد كتب ريمى ليفو فـ عام 2000 أن عادة تقبيل أيدى الملك إنا هى العقبة التى
 التقليد الملكى وإن كان لا يزال يتم تقبيل يدى الملك فـ الهافل العامة. وقد أربع 74.5\% من اللمستجيين استمرار عادة تقبيل يدى الملك إلى التقاليد الراسخة بالمملكة (أشار \%4.8\% إلى أنه لا يز ال يتم إتباع هذه العادة داخل الأسرة اللمكية) بينما أرجع 62.8\% من المستخييين هذه العادة إلم الحوف من الملك، و63.9 منهم إلى الوصولية و 58.5\% إلم احترام الملك و47.2\% إلم احترام الللك بصفته أمير المؤمنين. 19 لقد أوضح البحت أن إلغاء تقليد تقبيل يدى الملك جاء

 تُسين العلاقات العامة أو إلم أى ضجة إعلامية وهو ما يتضح عند سؤال أى أى مواطن مغربى حول التغيرات التى طرأت منذ أن تولى الملك عمد السادس السلطة. فالناس على يختلف خلفياقم يتنقون على أفم يستطيعون الآن التحرك كـرية ئ أكربر وأن دولة "الميبة" قد انتهت وأفم يتمتعون بدر جة أكبر من حرية التعيبر.
لقد أشار 51.7\% من المستجييين إلم أن المواطن المغربى بككنه اليوم أن يتنقد المخزن. وعند سؤالمم حول ما إذا كانت العالقة بين الدولة والمواطنين قد باتت علاقة أقل سلطوية أجاب

الجلمدول رقمم1：فـ اعتقادك، ما هو الأساس الذى يستمد منه الملك الجمديد

|  | $\begin{array}{cc} \begin{array}{l} 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ y \\ y \\ y \\ y \\ y \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 5 \\ 7 \\ 3 \\ y \\ y \\ z \\ 3 \\ y \end{array} \end{array}$ | "rro s. | $\begin{aligned} & 3^{3} \\ & 9 \\ & 0 \\ & \bar{y} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & \vdots \\ & \vdots \\ & N \\ & 3.3 \\ & 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & i \\ & 3 \\ & =3 \\ & =3 \\ & 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 4 \\ & 3 \\ & \frac{3}{3} \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \cdots \\ \cdots \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ \vdots \\ 3 \\ 3 \\ 3 \end{gathered}$ | السبب |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36.8 | 30.7 | 18.7 | 22.1 | 37.7 | 40.2 | 47.2 | 44.6 | 45.9 | 42.1 | مهم للغاية |
| 21.6 | 18.8 | 12.2 | 20.2 | 24.8 | 17.9 | 15.5 | 15.7 | 14.9 | 13.4 | －0 |
| 13.4 | 15.1 | 16.8 | 20.4 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 13.9 | 13.3 | 14.1 | 12.4 | أقل أهمية |
| 28.2 | 35.4 | 52.4 | 37.3 | 21.8 | 27.4 | 23.4 | 26.5 | 25.1 | 32.1 | غير مهـم |

كما هوضح الجدوول فإن السؤال الخاص بمدى أهمية تمتع الملك بروح الشباب قد نال أعلى تأييد． 18 ومن الغريب أن عنصر جهود الملك لتحسين المستوى المعيشى للمواطنين المين لم يمظ بأولوية
 بدور الملك كرئيس للجنة القدس فلم يمظ بأهمية تذكر（52\％：غير مهمم، 18\％：مهم）و كذا العنصر الخاص بإرساء سيادة القانون．كما جاءت قدرته على على إدارة الدارة الحكم فـ ظل العولمة كعنصر غير مهم نسبيا بينما جاءت عالاقاته الطيبة مع الاتحاد الأوروبى كعنصر بالغ الأهمية بالنسبة إلى 37．7\％من المستجيبين．أما العنصر الخاص بكهود الملك الرامية إلى الإلصالح الديمقر اطى فقد نال استجابات متفاوتة حيث اعتبر 40\％هذا العنصر عنصر الماه الما للغاية و18\％ اعتبروه عنصر ا هاما و14\％اعتبروه عنصرا أقل أهمية وأخيرا اعتبره 27\％من المستجييين عنصر ا
 كأمير المؤمنين فكانت عناصر مهمة للغاية فـن نظر 42．1\％و45．9\％من المستجيبيين على التوالى وهو ما ينطبق أيضا على أهمية قربه من الشعب． إن 54\％من المستجييين كانوا ينظرون إلى الملك الحسن الثاني كأب للأمة بينما لا ينظر إليه \％6 \％هذه النظرة．أما بالنسبة لمحمد السادس فالعكس صحيح حيث ينظر إليه 46\％كأب للأمة．وفيما يتعلق بالاختلافات فـن الصفات التى يتصف بها كل من الملكين فهى كما يلى：بينما وصف 78\％من المستجيبين أن الملك الحسن الثاني يتسم بالقسوة 22．9\％منهم وصفوا الملك عمد السادس هنا الوصف．كما يوصف الملك المسن الثانين بالسياسى الخنك（89．1\％）بينما يتر ك الملك محمد السادس هذا الانطباع على 31．1\％فقط من المستجييين．وعند مقارنة محمد

أجيب على الأسئلة باستخدام الحبر السرى". وقال العديد منهم أفمم مستعدون للإجابة على
 بعض الأحيان كان موضع شك من جانبر إنهم. 17 وقد سألىن بعض الطلبة إذا كنت أمثل السفارة الألمانية أو إذا كانت إجاباهقم سوف تؤثر على على فرص حصولم على تألى تأشيرة دخول ألمانيا
 لو كنا قد تر كنا استمارات الات الاستبيان لليلة واحدة مع المستجيبيين و وم بنمعها فورا الما لكا لكنا فقدنا
 معهد جوتة كثيرا فن البداية ولكن بعد ذلك طالبنا المزيد والمز يد من الطلبة إذا كان من المـكن أن نتو جه إلى فصو لمم أيضا. جاءت بعض ردود الأفعال لاسيما بالمناطق الريفية بتاناكوب كما يلى: "لا نستطيع الإجابة على تلك الأسئلة بصدق بسبب ولائنا للملك. غير أنه بفضل الجمعية التى ساعدتنى وأنشطة جمعية تارجو بالمنطقة (حيث كانت فن هنا اليوا اليوم تعمل على تطيميم الماشية) تح التمهيد لكسب ثقة السكان ودفعهم إلى الموافقة على المشار كة فـ البحث من جانب آخر عبر معظم المستجييين للاستمارة عن سعادقّم لطر ح أسئلة من هذا النو ع


 نتائج البحث كوسيلة لاجراء مناقشات كانت سوف تكون منا مناقشات تعسفية بل كان سوف ألما يتعذر إجراء المناقشات فـ بجموعات مثلا. فقد اتضح أثناء إعداد البحث أنه لن يتأتى الخصول على فكرة جيدة عن آراء الشباب واهتماماقمّ إلا عند الجمع بين الأساليب الكمية والناء النوعية فـ إجراء البحث.
لقد لاحظ الباحث الثاني أنه بعد وقوع المجمات الإرهابية أصبح الناس أكثر اهتماما


 .محمد السادس "بنعم" أفصحوا عن آرائهم الفعلية لاحقا (مثلا عادل أو غير عاني عادل). وحقيقة ألما أن

 أناسا غريى الأطوار مُن يتجولون فـن ألناء ألناء البلاد ويطرحون أسئلة غريبة. كما كما أشار البار الباحث الثانى إلى أن سكان المناطق الريفية لم يمسنوا فهم الأسئلة مقارنة بسكان الدار البيضاء.

النتائج
\%0 \% من المستجبين تقريبا أجابوا على السؤ ال الرئيسى والخاص بالمرجعية الأولى لسلطة الملك الجديد. وقد طلب منهم اعططاء درجات المات أهمية ( من 1 أى مهم للغاية الى 4 أى غير مهـم على الاطلاق) عشرة عناصر (أنظر الجدول رقم 1)

## نظرة عامة على المستجيبين

 تم إجراء البحث فـن الدار البيضاء والر باط وشطاط وتر وتناكوب وفاس وناس ومكنس واليموزير وأجادير

 النسبة بالمدن الصغيرة والمناطق الريفية 17\% و16.8\% على على التوالم. وقد كان المشار كين من النساء مقابل 64\% من الرجالـ ولما و كان معظم المستجيبين فـ الفئة العمرية التى تتراوح بين 25 و29 عاما (29\%). وقد تحدث 80\% اللغة العر بية باعتبارها اللغة الأم بينما تحدث 19\% من المستجييين لغة البربر. إضافة إلى ذلك، بلغت نسبة غير المتزوجين 70 المار والمتزو جين 28\%.16 وفـ 67\% من الحالات قمنا بإجراء المقابلات فـ الاماكن التى ولد فين فيها

 والعاملين بالأعمال الحرة 7\% وربات البيوت 6\% والعاملين بقطاع الصناعة أو الزراعة 4\% والعاملين بالقطاع الخدمى 5\% والعاملين بالمالمارين بالماريع التجارية الصغيرة 5\%. ويعد معظم المستجييين (52\%) من الحاصلين على شهادة جامعين و12 و1 مكن أتموا التعليم الثانوى و9\% من انتهوا من التعليم O-level و10\% مُن تعلموا بمدارس تعفيظ القر آن و\%\% من أتموا السنة السابعة و66 كانوا من غير متعلمين. وفيما يتعلق بالأنشطة التى يياشرونا أثناء وقت الفراغ ونقد أتضا أتضح أفمم يمضون معظم أوقات فراغهم مع الأسرة والأصدقاء بينما أشار 5\% فقط منهم أفمم يقضون أوقات ألوات فراغهم بالجامع و\%7.4 منهم أفمت ميضون تلك الأوقات أمام شبكة الانترنت. وقد تبين من خلالال المقابلات أن
 يودون أن يحجوا إلى بيت الله). و 91.6\% منهم لم يكونو ألما أعضاء بأى أحز اب اب سياسية وإن كان


 11.9 \% منهم الحزب الإسلامى للعدالة والتنمية فإن 11.9\% آخرين قد انتر انتخبوا مرشحين مستقلين 7.3\% تر كوا ورقة التصويت خالية أو أبطلوا أصواتمّ.

## ردود الأفعال

لقد واجهت عدة مرات ردود أفعال قائلة: "أستطيع فقط الاجابة على الأسئلة لأن البحث لا
 والدعابة قائلين: "قد يز ج بى فـ السجن إذا ما أجبت على هذا السؤ ال" أو "لا أستطيع إلا أن

لقد كان هناك من الأسباب المعروفة ما أدى الى اختيار العنوان الحيادى التالى لاستمارة
 أجزاء. ${ }^{10}$ وبعد الاشارة إلى الظروف التى أحاطت بعملية إجراء المقابلات (أين ومتى) كانت الأسئلة من 1 إلى 9 تتعلق بيبيانات شخصية أساسية خالئي الماصة بالمستجيب. أما الأسئلة 10 و11 فقد
 .مدى تحسن الوضع الاقتصادى لأسرة المستجيب أى ما إذا كان كان كما هو أم ازداد الماد سوءا. و وما يثير الدهشة أن 44.7\% من المستجييين قد أشاروا إلى أن الوضع الاقتصادى لألما ألمرهم قد تحسن بينما أشار 32.2\% إلى أن الوضع الاقتصادى لم يتغير و23.1\% إلى أن هذا الوضع قد ازداد سوءا.
أما السؤال 13 فيحدد الوضع الاقتصادى للمستجيب بصورة أكثر دقة حيث كان السؤ السؤال يستوضح ما إذا كان الشخص يمتلك دراجة ألوا أو دراجة بخارية أو سيارة أو شيئا من هذا القبيل. وقد تبين من خلال الاجابات على هنا السؤال أن 75\% من المستجو بيين لا يمتلكون وسيلة مواصلات خاصة هم وهو ما أوضح أننا لم نكن نتعامل مع الطبقة العليا بابلجتمع. ${ }^{11}$ وقد تعلقت الأسئلة من 14 إلى 17 بالبقاء خارج البلد وأسباب ذلك. وأتضح أن 8 ألم \%6.9 لم يسبق لهم السفر خارج المغرب . أما الأسئلة من 18 إلى 21 فتتعلق بكوانب خاصة بالمساواواة بين الزو ج

 الخ....). أما الأسئلة من 29 إلى 31 فتتعلق باستخدام وألما وسائل الاعلام. بعد ذلك تأتى الأسئلة المناصة بالأنشطة التى يتم مباشرةًا أثناء وقت الفراغ ألما





 السادس. 14 وقد توقفت الكثير من المقابلات عند هذه المر حلة وذلك لأن المستجييين شعروا أفهم لا يستطيعون الاجابة على الأسئلة بصراحة. وفن احدى الحالات قامت امرألمألألان بامساك الاستمارات من الباحث الثاني وتزي يقها.

 والقاعدة الرئيسية التق تستند إليها سلطة الملك. أما أخر سؤال باستمارة الاستار الاستبيان فتغسح البحال للمستجيب لانتقاد الاستمارة وتقديم ملاحظات إضافية.
 السكان أن هذا البحث لا يشكل أى خطر عليهم وأخيرا وافقوا على الاجحابة على أسئلة البحث بفضل تأييد الجمعية النظيرة بلمعية تارجو الى لـا تؤدى رحلة تستغرق 12 ساعة بالسيارة إلى قرية أونين بجنوب الرباط وبا وهى وهى قرية تعمل هـا جمعية (تارجو) فن توصيل الطاقة الكهربية. وتضم القرية 72 دوار يسكنها 10.000 ونـا








 ضروب المستحيل.

## فكرة عامة حول الرقابة الذاتية

كان هذا هو السياق الذى بدأنا العمل من خالاله والذى جعل مع من عملية تدريب الباحثين قبل إجراء المقابالات -وهو ما كنا غخطط له- أمرا مستحيلا مع كل باحث على حدة مشيرة إلى ما قد يو اجهون من صعو بات وبات وبعض المفردات غير الواض اضحة













 البحث والذى لم يكن ليرى النور دون البهجد الذى بذلوه.

ووزعتها على الطلبة بأحد
 الطريقة كنت أسعى الى بتحاوز التحيز للنخبة والوصول إلى الفئات منـخفضة اللـي الدخل. وقد تو وهه الباحث الألو الون إلى بعض مقار العمل بفاس وأعد تقرير مفصال حول المقابالات ومن ونال خلاله تُكنت من مقابلة رئيس المكتب المحلى
 العاملين (سيشار إليه فن سياق هذه الورقة بالباحث الثاني) وهى منظمة ضغط متميزة بالمغرب العربى والذى النى



المناطق التى تدخل فن إطار البحث الواقعة بين الدار البيضاء وسطاط.
تعد الدار البيضاء العاصمة التى يتر كز فيها النشاط الاقتصادى وتقع فن غرب البالاد، بينما تعتبر شطاط مدينة متو سطة الحجم تقع فن مقاطعة بالوسط غربا وذات أهمية من الناحية السياسية. ولا ولا



 مواقف سيارات الأجرة والأكشاك للتححدث إلى الما الشباب. وفن رأيى الشخصى تمكن البا



 بجبال الريف شرقا ومنطقة أو نين على مرتفعات أطلس ألم الو اقعة

 تم إهماله و كذا معارضة سكانه للملك. ولا يلا يزال يتحدث الـا سكان الران منطقة الريف اللغة الأسبانية
 عارمة من قبل سكان منطقة الريف ضد الحسن الثار الثانى بالسبعينات والثمان المانينات إلى تعبير هؤلاء


 (تارجو) وتمكنت فن هاية الأمر من الذهاب إلى تناكوبا (تارجو). وفن هناية اليوم تقابلنا مع بحتمع الرجال بالمنطقة فن أحل مقاهى قرية صغيرة حيث

تختلف المصادر الثانوية للمعلومات أو الأدبيات حول قضية تزايد أو انخسار السلطة المستندة إلى

 الإهتمام بتلك الأاششياء بينما تستخدم الجما المع في مباشرة أنواع من الأنشطة تحت اسم الدين فتد



ويف طرح آخر يبدو متعارضا مع الطرح السابق يؤ كد بحث ميدار وني أجراه فريق مكون من





 . مـا يعي لنا تحوّلا بارزا في مفهوم الشرعية ومكو ناها de-sacralization of power

## تكوين فريق البحث.

فن أثناء زيارتى للمغرب فن عام 2002، قمت بالاتصال بعدة طلبة يدرسون علم الاجتماع ع هلدف تكوين فريق يتكون من ستة أو خمسة من الباحثين وذلك لمساعدتى فـنى استخدام استمارة الاستبيان. كما قمت أيضا بإجراء اختبار أولى يتكون من 43 سؤ الا (تثانية منهم أسئلة مفتوحة). وقد تح إدخال بعض الإجابات وال بالاختبار الأولى فن استمارة الاستبيان الأخيرة كعنصر
 الفائدة التى تحققها ${ }^{5}$ وعندما عدت ات فـد سلطة الملك من الموضوعات الحساسة التى لا يفضل الطلبة التحدث عنها. إضافة إلى ذلك، كان




 الرباط وهى العاصمة الإدارية الغنية بالمغرب؟



 إلى طالبة شجاعة (سيشار إليها فن سياق الورقة بالباحثة الثالثة) سبق لما وا وأن سمعت عـا علا واقترحت أن تقوم صديقتها .مقابلة الشباب .مكنس وفاس وأخذات نفسها عشر استمارات

الإستعانة بالتحقيقات السنوية التي أجريت في الفترة من عام 1998 إلى 2001. إن مألماء مساعي




 بين سن 18، 35 عاما وحيث تمثل هذه الفئة العمرية نو كو 30\% من تعداد السكان فـان فمن المنترض أنان تقوم بدور سياسي مؤثر في تحديد مدى استقرار و كذلك استك استمرارية الملكية.

 استبيان تضم 59 سؤلا أغلبها من الأسئلة متعددة الإختيارات، أردت أن أعرا ألمرف من الشباب
 لا يزال الملك يمثل أعلى سلطة دينية وأعلى قوة فين الدولة












 كحقيقة ثابتة، بل كأحد التغيرات في الجوانب الما الإجتا الإنماعية. من حالال اتباعي لمذا المدخل أسعى الى الإبتعاد عن النظريات التي تذهب إلى ألى أن "انصياع"







 جميعها تؤ كد على الصفة الدينامية والفعالة والمتحولّة لمفهوم الشرعية.

## اتجاهات الجتمع ازاء السلطة: استطلاع آراء 622 من الشباب بالمغرب

سونيا حجازى
يلقى هذا المقال الضوء على عدة جوانب من بحث نوعي قامت به المؤلفة عن علاقات الشباب بالسلطة في المملكة المغربية تم إجراؤه هي الفترة من مايو 2003 إلى يناير 2004 بثماني مناطق غختلفة من البلاد. لقد شملت عينة البحث 622 من الشباب بين سن 18 و 35 عاما وهي الئية العمر ية التي تشكل نو 30\% من تعداد السكان بالم المغرب.
 السادس والرعية / المؤمنين / المو اطنين هي علاقة آخذة في التغير من كونا علا علاقة تتسم بالأبوية والاستبداد إلى علاقة قائمة على العقلانية أو الر شادة، وذلك نتيجة مشار كار كة الشباب التحديث والعولمة كما ان مساعي المملكة في العمل على تغيير تلك العلاقة حت يخظي الملك
 بخحت إلى حد كبير في أن يستطيع عمدد السادس الإحتفاظ بكل من البِوانب التقليدية والحدثية لشرعيته.

## مقدمة1

في بلدان الشٍرق الأوسط هناك , من نـا مناحية، بجتمعات صغيرة السن يكثل الشباب منها موقعا كميّا وكيفيا هاما بدأ، بما لديه من تطلعات وآمال , يلج عصر العولمة بما يتيحه، بدور ره، من
 إجمالا، الجيل الثالث منذ الإستقلال عن الإستعمار الأوروبي بدأ يصل إلى السلطة السالياليالياسية
 السياسية الجديدة في الشرق الأوسط. إننا نعتقد أن دراسة أولية، على ألى المملكة المغر بية مثالا، قد تغتح الباب أمام دراسة أشمل وأعمق كدر الماسة مقارنة بين دول المنطقة. إن السؤ ال الرئيسي هنا يتعلق بالبحث عن مانماهية الولاء من من ناحية و شرعية الحكام من الناحية

 ببساطة، تعبيرا عن ذلك الجال المفتوح، على نوو غير مسبوق، حيث تتفاعل القيم والأفكار كما هي السلع لثقافات شتى وجدّ متنوعة


 للشباب بصورة سنوية. وقد جاء البحث الذي أجراه بيرنارد سابيلا (2004) حول التنال التاعل الاجتماعي في الجوانب السياسية فيما يين الشباب الفلسطييز كشيء فريد من نوعه حيث تم

أو قد يقع صراع بين المستفيدات من البرنامج ؤبين سائر أفراد البمتمع، الأمر الذى يتطلب بذل بعض المهود للحيلولة دون وقوع تلك التبعات أو الحد منها.

الحو اشى
1 استعانت تلك المكونات بالنسخ المعدلة لمنهج "تعلم أن تكون حرا" للقراءة والكتابة التابع جلمعية كاريتاس، ومنهج "أفق جديدة" المعن بالمهارات الحياتية التابع ل CEDPA، ومنهج رياضى وترفيهى تم تصميمه بواسطة
 الأطفال" بتنفيذ البرنامج بوجه عام.
فن نفس الوقت كشفت متابعتنا للمواقع التي تدخل فـ نطاق البحث عن أن التوقيت الذى يتم فيه اجر اء عملية
 مبكر، بينما يتم اجراء العملية بقرى أخرى وقت بلوغ الفتيات، أو قبل الزواج مباشرة.

بالإعجاب، لا سيما وأن برنامج إشراق قد نجح فيما فشل فن تحقيقه التعليم النظامى. وعلى الرغم من أن المؤشر المركب المستخدم فن البحث قد قد أوضح أن النظرة إلى دور الجنـسين قد
 العناصر بصورة متساوية. فالفتيات لا يزلن يتسمن بالتشدد فـ تأييدهن للفصل بين دور كل كل من الر جل والمرأة بالمزل ل. ومن النتائج الأخرى التي توصل إليها البحث هى ألما أن الممارسات الخاصة بالفتاة المراهقة

 الإناث، والزواج المبكر، لم يترك البرنامج أى أثر على معدلات وقوع عالعنف المنا تنحسر مع تقدم الفتيات فن العمر . فلما كانت الفتيات يتمتعن المتا بسيطرة محدودة على ملى ما إذا كن



 البرنامج مهارات واتحاهات جديدة ساعدت على تغيير آرائهن فن ختان الإناث والمات والزواج المبكر؟



 المزيد من البحث حت يتم فهم تلك العمليات بصورة أفضل. غير أنه بغض النظر عن آليات التغيير فقد بنح البرنامت بو جه عام فـ احد المداث بعض التغيير.


 بيانات المسح أن قريت التحكم تتمتعان بتفرد ديميز هما وهو ما يعيق القدرة على فلى فصل أثر بر برنامج




 مؤشرات التغير بعد مضى عدة أشهر فقط على انتهاء البرنامج وهى الفترة التى يكون فيها للبرنامج أكبر أثر. أنخيرا، تثثل الموة بين الابتاهات والسلو كيات التى توصل إليها البحث معضلة ألماليالوقية يتعين
 إشراق بتوعية الفتيات حول أهمية المساواة يين الجنسين ، قد لا يتفق ذلك ولك والبيئة الاجتماعية الخيطة والتى تستمر فى تسكها بالقيم والأعراف المتضاربة. فقد تشعر المستفيدات من البرنامج بالإحباط إذا ما أحالت تلك البيئة الخيطة دون مباشرة حيامّن وفقا لتلك القيم المكتسبة حديثاك،

أما آخر سلوك هام فيتمثل فن تعرض الفتيات للعنف المترلى مثل الضرب، أو الدفع، أو غير ذلك


 تعرض الفتيات للضرب من قبل أحد أفراد الأسرة. يستعرض الجدرول (6) النتائج الخاصة

 أخرى، ييدو أن وقوع العنف ضد الفتيات لا يرتبط ببرنامج إشر اق، إنما يتضاءل تعرض الفتيات له بكافة الجموعات مع تقدمهن فن السن. وقد ألبّت ألتّت نتائج التحليل متعدد المتغيرات هذه النتيجة (لا يتم استعر اض تلك النتائج فن البحث).


مناقشة واستخلاص النتائج
عودة إلى الأسئلة التى طرحها البحث من البداية يتضح من النتائج الواردة أعلاه أن الأعراف

 تطبيقها من خلال التعرض المكثف أثناء مرحلة المر اهنقة. فنظر المنرة الفتيات الريفيات إلى دور كلم
 القضايا. كما تتغير تلك النظرة بصورة كبيرة بعد تعرض الفتيات لبرنامج إشراق، وذلكّك من خلال المشار كة بصورة أكبر فن البرنامج بما يؤدى إلى تغيير نظرة الفتيات إلى دور كار كل من الجنسين نو نظرة أكثر عدالة. وتعد هذه النتائج الإيمابية وذات الأهمية الإحصائية جديرة

فن هذا البحث). وعلى الرغم من تلك النتائج المشجعة فقد كشف التح أتحليل متعدد المتغيرات أن

 أو على الأقل تأجيلها هو الاحتفاظ بالما المشار كات المات غير المتزو جات المات







 هنا. المد من احتمالات زواج الفتيات قبل سن 18 سنة، مع استبعاد العوامل الأخرى غير الواردة


ومن الجلدير بالذكر أنه ثمة آثار أخرى بالقرى حيث تبين أن معدل الزواج كان ألما أقل بعض الشىء


 دراستهن بالبرنامج ترجع جزئيا إلى حقيقة أن الفتيات قد تخلفن عن المشار كة بالبرنامج عند زواجهن.

من ابلدير بالذكر أن ختان الإناث إنما هو ممارسة تشكل مخاطر صحية بالغة، وتؤثر على تسعة
 بحموعة من بحموعات المراهقات قبل تنفيذ البرنامج. غير أنه عند الأنـ انتهاء البرنامج


 أنفسهن هن صاحبات القرار فن هذا الشأن.


يوضح الجدول 4 أن العكس هو الصحيح، حيث تزيد معدلات ممارسة ختان الإناث بكل الألر
 يتم فيها إجر اء العملية للفتيات، ${ }^{2}$ ومثلما هو الحال بالمؤشرات الأخرى يشير الجدو المدل (4) الى إن

 وعلى الرغم من أن ذلك يعيق قدرتنا على استخالاص بعض الاستنتاجات حول الار أثر أثر برنامج





 على انحسار تلك الممارسة عند هـاية البرنامج. (لا يتم الإشارة إلى معدل انخفاض ممارسة الختان

يشار كن فن برنامج إشراق. إن التحليل متعلدد المتغيرات إنما يفسح البحال للتعرف على تلى تلك

 ومواقف الفتيات من دور كل من الجنسين، مع استبعاد العوامل الأخرى التى قد تؤثر الانر على تلك ولك المو اقف مثل القرية الت تنتمى إليها الفتاة، والحالة الاجتماعية- الاقتصادية، والسن، وابتحاه هذه

 هذا الارتباط على جانب كبير من الأهمية حتى بعد أخلذ عوامل أخرى فى الحسبان. الجلدول (3) معاملات التراجعات الطولية المتعددة والخناصة بدر الماتحات مؤشر النوع الاجتماعى عند انتهاء البرنامج حول مست مستوى المشار كة فن بر نامـج إشر اق

 عوامل السن، والقر ية، والحالة الاجتماعية-الاقتصادية، وهى عوامل الامل ليست على الما p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001*** فهـى غير متضمنة فـ الجلدول

## السلو كيات المتعلقة بأيديو لوجيا النو ع الاجتماعى

إن التعرض لما يقدمه البرنامج من فرص قد يؤدى إلى تغيير النظرة إلى قضايا النوع الاجتماعى فيما بين الفتيات المراهقات، ولكن إلى أى مدى يمكن ألن يؤى المى ذلك إلى تغيير فعلى
 بعض الافتراضات الثقافية حول دور الفتيات والنساء، وقيمتهن فن البحتمع، و بينما قد نتو المات ونع أن
 السلو كيات، يتعين أن يقترن ذلك بموقف مناهض لتلك المُ الممارسات من قبل الآباء و سائر أفراد

 المسوح التى أجريت لم تتعرف على آراء الآباء بصورة مباشرة مبرة، يمكن استنتاج مواقف هؤلاء لاء الاء
 المبكر وختان الإناث والعنف.

هنا يدور التساؤل التالى: كيف تغيرت ابتحاهات الفتيات الخاصة بدور كل من الجنسيين مع مرور




 برنامج إشراق، وبعد تنفيذ البرنامج ، وذلك حتى يتسنى لنا تقييم أثر البرنامج.


يوضح الجدول (2) أثر النضو ج على ابتاهات النوع الاجتماعى لدى الفتيات. بعبارة أخرى فإن
 ونضوجهن. غير أن أكثر الفتيات اللاتى أظهرن موقفا أكثر عدالة هن الفتيات التات اللاتى شار كن بصورة كاملة فـ برنامج إشراق. وند أند حصلت الفتيات بمجموعة "المشار كات بالكامل" على متوسط درجات 4.6 قبل بدء البرنامج و8.2 عند انتهائه، وذلك فيما فيما يتعلق بمؤشر النظرة إلى

 دور كل من البنسين، وذلك قبل تنفيذ البرنامج حيث ايث يبدو أن أن الفتيات اللائى يؤهولن مواقع التحكم كن يتبنين موقفا أقل عدالة فيما يتعلق بدور كل من الجنسين مقارنة بالئن بالفتيات اللائى يؤهلن مواقع المعالجة. فمن بين الفتيات اللاتى ينتمين إلى قرى المعالجة يبدو ألهن المن يتبنين موقنا أكثر إيجايبة إزاء أدوار كل من الجنسين قبل تنفيذ المشروع هن الفتيات اللاتى غالبا ما سوف

النتائج

## الاتجاهات الخاصة بدور كل من الجنسين





بتحديد إذا ما كانوا يوافقون أو لا يوافقون على كل بيان من البيانات الموضحة بالمدول (1) بلماني

 ما تعذر على الأسرة تحمل تكاليف الدراسة. إضافة إلى ذلك، اتفقت 72\% من المان الفتيات على أنى إذا ما عملت المرأة خارج المتزل فإن على زوجا

 من البداية على أن الفتاة يجب أن تطيع أخاها حت وان كان يصغرها سنا. الجدول (1) نسبة الموافقة على البيانات الخناصة بالنظرة إلى دور كل من البجنسين


مرة أخرى بنظام التعليم الرسمى، وأخيرا الدعوة لنشر قيم وأعراف اجتماعية إيمابية تتعلق
 الاجتماعى التقليدية، ولكن لما كان البرنامج يضخ العانـ العديد من الرسائل الخاصة بالمساواة بين الجنسين، كان من المتوقع أن يتحقق هذا المدف فـن فـن فـاية المطاف. لقد سعى برنامج إشراق إلى تحقيق الأهداف المذكورة أعلاه من خلالول برنامنج للتعليم غير



 على التعليم الثانوى. وكانت كل بكم أسبو ع، وذلك على ملـى الـار سنتين ونصف. ولما كان بحلس السكان هو الشريك البحثى فـ المشروع فقد تم تكليفه بمهمة تقييم الأتر الاجتماعى للبرنامج على المستفيدات. وعلى الرغم من الاستى


 التحكم تلك، والمشار كين فـ البرنامج تحديد ما إذا كانت التغيرات التى طرأت مع مرور الوقت ترتبط بالتدخلات التى جاء هِا البرنامج.
كما سبق الإشارة، تم توزيع الاستمارات على نفس بجموعة الفتيات عند مر حلتين زمنيتين غختلفتين، وفن بداية البرنامج تم إعداد عينة البحث من كل قل قرية من خلال الال اختيار كافة الفتيات المتسربات عن الدراسة فـ الفئة العمرية من 13 إلى 15 عاما. وبعد مرور سنتين ونصف تم الحن الجراء مقابلات مع نغس الفتيات مرة أخرى. وقد قامت 582 فتاة ملء استما استمارات الاستبيان فن كل
 148 منهن بعض الوقت ثم تخلفن عن البرنامج قبل التخرج منه. إضافة إلى ذلكّ تلما تُنلفت 200

 استخدام بمموعات التعرض الأربع تلك وهى "بكم "الكوعة التحكمم" و"بمموعة غير المشار كات" وبحموعة "المشار كات لبعض الوقت" وبحموعة "المشار كات بالكامل" فـ عرض نتائج التحاليل الواردة أدناه.
تشتمل الأساليب المتبعة بالمسح على عدد من المتغيرات المثيرة للاهتمام. لقد جاءت الماء تقارير

 وذلك لمعرفة ما إذا كان التغير الذى طرأ على الاتحاهات قد اقترن بتغير فف السلو كيات أيضا ألما لا. فهذه السلو كيات تعد مؤشر لابتاهات الفتيات أنفسهن، بل والأهم التاهاتات آبائهن وهم أحد أسباب هذه الممارسات.

فيما بين المراهقات اللاتى يأهلن المناطق الريفية بصعيد مصر؟. وسوف يركز التحليل عليلى على


 السياسات وجهود البرامج فن السنوات الأخيرة، إلا أنه قلما ير كز القطاع البحثى بكمر على


 تغيير الأعراف المتعلقة بالنوع الاجتماعى من خلا الال البرامتج؟ فعلى الرغم من الاهنما الاهتمام المتز ايد



 الضوء على بعض التحديات المنهجية والأخلاقية التى تنشأ عن دراسة التدخلات، وهو ما سوف يتم بكثه فـ خاتمة البحث.

## البرنامج والمنهج المتبع فـ تقييم أثره

لقد أتيح بلس السكان فن الفتر الفترة بين عام 2001 و2004 فرصة ملاحظة بعض التغيرات الاجتماعية التى طرأت من خلال برنامج تنموى يسمى "مكان آمن للفتيات"، أو "إشراق"، وهو برنامج يجرى تنفيذه مكحافظة المنيا. وتحدر الاشارة الى ألن عافيا





 معدلات الالتحاق بالمدارس، فطبقا لDHS لعام 2000 تصل نسبة الفتيات فـ الفئة العمرية من 11 إلى 15 عاما اللائى يلتحقن بالمدارس بالمناطق الريفية بصعيد مصر 68\% (مقارنة بنسبة
الفتيان والت تصل إلى 89\%).
 المراهقات الريفيات بصعيد مصر، والتق تتخلف عن فئة المراهقين فـن العديد من من الجون الموانب مثل
 وتحسين قدركّن على الانتقال، وتشجيعهن على إقامة صداقاتات مع أقراهن انهن، ورفع وعيهن حول حقوقهن وأجسادهن وحالتهن الصحية، وتنمية مهاراتنن الخاصة بالقراءة والحساب، وإلحاقهن

# التأثير على اتجاهات النوع الاجتماعى لدى المراهقات بالمناطق الريفية: نتائج مشرو ع بكثى بمصر 

رانيا سالم

## مقدمة ومراجعة للكتابات فـ هذا الجال



 الأيدولو جية التى تغسر الاختلافات بين الجنسين تحدى يؤرق منارسى التنمية، وصناع السياساسات وعلماء الاجتماع ع فن مصر. لقد تُت الإشارة فن بعض الكتابات إلى أن ابتحاهات جيل الشباب الحالى بمصر بتاه دور كل من الجنسين لم تتغير عن اتباهات الجيل السابق. فأوجه المانيا الاختالاف بين الابتاهاهات الحالية للشباب






 يثير التساؤل التالى: ما هو إذا التدخل الذى سوف ينجح فـن تغيير هذه الأيديولوجيا الخاصة بدور كل من الجنسين. تبحث هنه الورقة اتجاهات النوع الاجتماعى لدى لانى الفتيات المراهقات بالمناطق الريفية بصعيد مصر من خلال تحليل لبيانات مسح مأنخوذة من عينة تشتمل على لـلى حوالى 600 من
 بواسطة بجلس السكان بالتعاون مع عدد من المنظمات غير الـكومية المصرية. ومن خلا
 خلال اتاحة فرص التعليم غير الرسمى لمن، ورفع وعيهن، ومكافـافحة الممارسات التقليدية الضاريارة.
 بصورة صريحة ، إلا أنه تم تضمين هذا المدف من خلال نقل بعض الرسائل التى تعزز مبداً المساواة يين الجنسين.
يسعى هذا التحليل إلى طرح عدد من الأسئلة البحثية التى تتعلق بنظرة المر اهقات الر الريفيات المات إلى دور الجنسين .لقد قمت أولا بطرح السؤ ال التالى: ما هى أعراف النوع الاجتماعى السائدة

على متحدث ف الماتف غير مرغوب فيه! إن هذه الأوضاع قد باتت معقدة، وهو ما يؤر


 اللازمة للتصدى لما والعمل على مواجهتها بشكل إيبابى.

> الحواشى

1 ع اعداد الدر اسة قيد التناول ف عام 2000، وذلك بتمويل من منظمة اليونيسيف، والتّ قامت بنشر كافة النتائج باللغة الانيليزية والعربية.

كما قالت طالبة بالمرحلة الثانوية بمحافظة المنصورة: من السلو كيات الشائعة بالمنطقة هى الزواج
 يسيرون سويا بكل جرأة فن الشار ع، وإذا ما علق أحلد على ذلك فإن الفىت يرد قائلا: إذا

زوجتى. وبتدر الإشارة هنا إلى أن السلو كيات المذكورة أعلاه لا تشمل كافل المافة السلو كيات الخطرة

 بالمرض، وعدم توافر معلومات عن كيفية الحماية والوقاية منه.

## الحلاصة والتوصيات

لقد أوضحت هذه الدراسة بعض الحقائق الهامة، فيما يتعلق بالمشكالات و التحديات التى تواجه





 تغيير موضوع الحديث لدخول أحد "الكبار" إلى الغرفة، بينما يظل الأب متعججبا من سبب شعور ابنه بحرارة ابلجو فن منتصف فصل الشتاء!


 التواصل الفعال مع المراهقين، الذين يشعرون بالإِحباط مرة بعد الأخرى، إلى ألى أن ييأسوا
 للأسف عملية غير سليمة فالكبار يسخرون من من آرائهم، أو لا لا يستمعون إليها من الألمان وناس. من






 بل وعدم اكتساهمم لبعض القيم الضرورية التى تساعدهم فـ مشوار الحياة، وهو ما يرجع جزئيا

 أو الآباء الذين ينصحوفم بعدم الكذب، بينما يطالبوفم أحيانا بإنكار وجودهم بالمتزل عند الرد

السجائر، ونتشارك فن تدخينها. كل طالب يأخلذ "بوسة" بمعن أنه يتم تمرير السيجارة على البجموعة كلها.







العلبة تحتوى على مائة قرص، فإن هؤ لاء الطلبة يكققون ربكا الطا يصل إلى سبعين جنيها.




 سيما الأنواع الى تحتوى على الكتحول. أن هذا السلوك الخطر لا لا يهدد فقط هؤلاء الما النين يشار كون الما فيه، وإنما يهلدد الآخرين أيضا.


 شراء هذه الأقراص. و يبدأ الشباب فن سرقة الأموال من منازهمه، أو أخلذ أموال من آبائهم بحجة





 الأقر اص، فإنه يصبح فن حالم قالة قد بتعله يغتصب أية فتاة تمر أمامه صدفة. وقد جاء موقف الفتيات بالحمافظات الثلاثة الىى تغطيها الدراسة مماثالا إلى حد ما لموقف الفتيان، حيث أشارت الفتيات إلى أن التدخين، وتعاطى المخلدرات (الأقراص والبا والبابنو والخشيش) من السلو كيات الخطرة التى قد تتبعها الفتيات. وقد أشارت أشارت فتاة تبلغ من العمر 12 عاما إلى ذلك قائلة: هناك فتيات تدخن. وأضافت زميلتها وتبلغ من العمر 13 عاما قائلة: قاموا
 وهن تتعاطين مخدرات عن طريق الحقن. لقد أشارت بعض الفتيات من المنيا والقاهرة إلى أنهن تعرفن بعض الفتيات اللاتى تشاهندن

 بالمدر سة. أعلم بعض الفتيات بالنادى أيضا على علاقة بفتيان.

فَ دراسات لاحقة، حت يتسنى إجراء المزيد من البحث حول هذه القضية الحساسة، والخاصة بالتواصل فيما بين الأجيال.

## السلو كيات الخطرة

لا يعد التدخين مشكلة فن حد ذاته بالنسبة للشباب، ولكنه يعد حافة الماوية، أو الحافة التى يهوى منها المرء إلى مشكالات أخرى أكثر خطورة على مستقبل الشباب، والمختمع بوجه عام.







 يدخن الطلبة البانخو أيضا بالفصل، ولحر الكنهم لا يتعاطون الأقراص. غير أن أن أحلد الفتيان
 متشددة للغاية، فإذا ما تح اكتشاف أى طالب يتم طرده من المدرسة على الفور . الم رلم ردا عليه قال




 أن يكونوا "روشين". يبدأ المراهقون فن التدخين بالمرحلة الإعدادية. قال شاب يبلغ من من العمر 14 عاما: لقد

 بالمر حلة الإعدادية قائلا: يدخن الطلبة البا علنا أثناء فترة الامتحانات، لأن الان ما من أحد لديه سلطة عليهـم أثناء فترة الامتحانانات




 مقابل جنيهين. وأضاف صديقه (س) قائلا: لقد عرض على ألى أصدقائى بالفصل سجائر، وقال وال طالب آخر (15 عاما) ينتمى لأسرة منخفضة الدخل: فـ المدرسة نقوم بإضافة البابنو إلى

أحب أن يقول لم أحد ذاكرى. أحب أن أقوم بذلك بنغسى. وقالت أخرى: عندما تجربرن أمى على المذاكرة، فأنتن أخبئ بجلة تحت الكتاب المدر سى وأدعى المذاكرة.

 أسلوب تفكيرنا، ويدنورنا إلل القـام بأثشياء، بدلا من عاولة التقرب منا. وأضافت فتاة ثّالثة قائلة: هم يعتقدون أننا لا نزال أطفال، ولا يؤمنون أننا نستطيع التوصل إلما أفكار لـل المشكلات. يبب أَن يفهموا أننا قد نضحنا، وأننا نستطع التوصل إلم حلول أسهل من تلك التى
يتوصِلون إليها.

كما غتنلف الفتيات كلية مع آباءمr، حول نوعيات الملابس والأحذية التّ يرتدينها ويشترينها. فالآباء عادة ما يفضلون أنواعا من الأحذية لا تكبها الفتيات، ويفرضوا عليهن شرراءها. وبند أن الفتيات يثرن على الأسلوب الذى يتبعه الآباء فـ دفهـن إلم القيام بيغض الأشياء رغما عنهن، وعادة ما يفكرن فن أساليب جلنهـن القيام بتلك الأشياء. وقد اعترفت فتاة من القاهرة فـ الثالثة عشرة من عمرها بالكّك قائلة : لا أطيق احتساء شوربة الخضروات. فـ أحد الأيام كنت أريد زيارة عمتي، وقالت لل أمى أفنا لن تسمح لـ بالذهاب إذا لم أحسىى
 تشتكى العايد من النتيات من أن الآباء لا يقضون وقتا كافيا معهن، وأنه يليدر وأنمـ لا لا يهتمون كنى، أو لا يرغبون فـ الاتتمام كن. وعبرت فتاة تبلغ من العمر 12 عاما عن ذلك قائلة: عندما أسأل أبى عن شيء ما فإنه عادة ما يكون مشيغو لا، ولا يستطيع التحدث إلا ولم، وف بعض
 مضرا. وتسأم الفتيات سماع إجابات الآباء المتكر رة مثل: "بعدين" و"بعد شوية"، وأنا مشغول الآن، وعلقت فتاة قائلة: تتمن تلك الإجابات أفمّ سوف ينسون الأمر تامام. كما تشتكى النتيات من تشكك آبائهم الدائم فـ علاقاقن حت مع صديقاقنى، فإذا ما اكتشفت الأم مثلا أن ابنتها تصادق فتاة تتحدث إلم البنس الآخر، فإفان تطالبها بعدم الاستمرار فـ تلك الصداقة، وذلك على الرغم من علاقة ابنتها الوثيقة بصديقتها. ومن البدير بالذكر أن الشباب قد لـئوا إلم أساليب خاصة بـم للتكيف مع التوتر الذى هياخيم على علاقاقم بالآباء، وعدم تفهم الآباء كم. فقد أتنق الجانبان على ألا يتفقا، ويمد الشباب أنفسهم كبربين على تقبل هذا الوضع، وذلك بسبب إنفاق آبائهم عليهم. بيد أن الموة يين البيلين فـ الفهم المتبادل والتو اصل البيد تتسع يوما بعد الآخر. ويترتب على ذلك نشوء جيل من الشباب فـي يئة اجتماعية غير سليمة لا تفسح لمه الجال للفكر الر, وكتيجة لذلك يلجأ هؤلاء الشباب إلى بعض المندع للتكيف مع هذه اليئة مثل الكذب، والنفاق، والمداع. ومنا لا شك فيه أن القارئ على وعى تام بأثر كل ذلك على النظام القيمى بالختمع، وعلى هذاً الجيل تحديدا.

 التواصل هع آبائهم، وأن آباءهم يفهموفم ويساندوفم عاطنيا. غير أن هؤلاء المرامقين إما يمثلون الأقلية وليس الأغلبية. وهناكُ حاجة ماسة إل تغطية ختلف الئيات والطبقات الاجتماعية

أشار إلى أى موقف تدخل فيه الأخصائى الاجتماعى لحل مشكلة واجهها هذا الطالب، أو الطالبة بالمدرسة.

## ب- علاقة المر اهقين بالأبرين

تتسم علاقة الفتيان المراهقين مع آبائهم أثناء فترة المراهقة الأولية (12 - 14 عاما) بالتوتر . لقد


 الآباء هو المذاكرة، وذلك فن الوقت الذى يرغب فيه هؤلاء الفتيان إلى الاستمتاع بألوقاتمّم والخروج", والاجتماع عع أقرافهمم. وقد وصف بعض الفتيان بالعينة آبائهم بأفهم من "العصر



 قائلا: يريد الأب من ابنه أن يتبع تعليماته ويطيعه، وذلك بألن ئن يصلى ويكون مهذنبا وعلى درجة
 يمكن أن يكمل مطواة، وأن ينضم إلى بمموعة من الأقر ان لا لا تتحمل أى مسئولية.
 لذلك إصرار الأب المستمر على قيام ابنه بالمذاكرة، بغض النظر عن ألما علية عقبات قد يوا باجهها ابنه، مثل عدم توافر مكان هادئ للمذاكرة، ووجود العديد من الأخوة لا لا سيما الصغار منهم مكن
 عندما يطلب الابن من الأب إذنا لز يارة صديقه للمذاكرة، وذلك ولا لأن الآباء عادة ما يرفيا يارفون
 ويضيف أفراد عينة البحث أن من أسباب توتر العالاقة بين الأبناء والآباء هو الموقف المتعنا
 أبناءهم على الالتز ام بأية لعبة رياضية، لأن ذلك ينتقص من وقت المنا المذاكرة. وقد حكى المى أحد




 الأمر الذى يسبب توترا كلما تطرق الحديث إلى هنا الموضونوع.


 الفتيان، فإن الفتيات أيضا قد اشتكين من هوس الآباء بالمذاكرة حيث قالت إحدى الفتيات: لا

المدرسين، لدينا مدرس فـ مادة الحساب دائما ما يتحدث إلينا حول أهمية حسن السلوك، ولكن للأسف لا أحد يستمع إليه. وفن بعض الأحيان يتسبب الطلبة أنفسهم فـ سوء العانلاقة مع المدرس، حيث قال أحد الفتيان: كان لدينا مرانـا مرة مدرس جيد ولكن الطلبة لم يعطوه الفرصة، فكانوا يطرقون على مناضدهم كلما تما تحدث


 إضافة إلى ذلك فإن الفتيات اللاتى لديهن علاقة قر ابة مع أحد المدر سين، أو العاملين بالمدر المدرسة، أو اللاتى تأخذن دروسا خصوصية لا تتعرضن لنفس العقاب الذى تلتع التعرض له سائر الفتيات. لقد





 أننا "كوم زبالة". وقالت رابعة: بعض المدر سين يتلفظون بألفاط ونا نابية، يمب ألا ولا تسمعها أية فتاة،
 سيدات متزوجات، "ربنا ياخده"! وأضافت صديقتها (هـ) أه): هو ينظر إلينا بطريقة دنيئة، ونـن
 البكاء. وقالت فتاة من المنصورة: إن المدر سين يجلسون طون ألمال الئنا الوقت يكتسون الشاى الشاى والقهوة،
 قائلة: أثناء الدروس الخصصوصية يشرح المدرس الدرس بالتفصيل، بينما يكتفى بالحديث المديث عن نفسه
 سيارة مكيفة. لقد رسبنا جميعا فن أولى الامتحانات الشهرية لأننا لم نكن نأنا نأخل دروسا
 لقد أدى تراكم تلك المشكلات والتجارب السلبية إلى فقدان الثقة فن المدرس. فعندما تشجع إدارة المدرسة الطالبات على الإفصاح عن مشكالاقن للأخصائية الاجتماعية فإلهن لا لا تفعلن ذلك. وقد عبرت إحدى الفتيات من القاهرة عن ذلك قائلة: أننى لا أثنق فيها، حتى أتحدث معها عن مشكالتى الشخصية. فكيف لل أن أعرف أنها لن تفشى أسرارى أثناء حديثها
 المدرسين، ومن الأفضل التحدث فن ذلك مع صديقاتى، أو أخت الكبرى، فهن لن تفشين أسرارى.
لقد أوضحت الدراسة أن المدارس تنتقر إلى خدمة تقديم المشورة إلى الطلبة، وحتى لو تواجد
 أن الأخصائيين الاجتماعيين لا يقومون بدور ذات قيمة، فما من طالب، أو طالبة بالعينة قد

وقد أشارت بعض الفتيات من المنيا إلى أفن على علم بفتيات أخريات لديهن علاقات مع
 إن الفتيان ينتظرون الفتيات خارج جبوابات المدارس لمقابلتهن، وذلك على على مرأى من الجميع،
 السهل على الفتاة والفتى أن يتقابلا بالأماكن العامة، وذلك بسبب ما قد يفعله الأب أو الأخ إذا رآهما معا.

## مشاكل المراهقين وطموحاتم وآراؤهم

يتحدد وضع الفتى بين أقرانه بناء على عدة عوامل. فالفتى الذى ينتمى لمستوى اجتماعى

 التى يرتديها، أو مقدرته المالية على دفع مصاريف الأطعمة، أو المشروبات النى التى يتناولها ألما أقرانه.


 بإعجاب الفتيات، واللاتي يفضلن الفتيان الذين يتمتعون بروح الدعابة، والمسئولية، وحسن السلوك، والتنوق الدراسى. أما الفتيات فيتحدد دورهن القيادى بناء على مدى قلى قلى اتّن على إسلىاء النصيحة الجيدة،
 الفتيات إلى أن القدرة على الاحتفاظ بالأسرار إنما هى احدى سمات الفتاة الى تـى التمتع بشخصية قيادية.

أ- علاقة المراهقين مع المدرسين
تتصف علاقات المراهقين بالمدرسين بالسلبية، طبقا لما جاء على لسان الفتيان والفتيان

 وبطبيعة الحال تتحسن علاقة الطالب مع المدرس إذا كان المان المدرس يعطي هذا الطالب درسا خصوصيا، حيث يصبح المدرس أكثر توددا للطالب، بل وقد يصل الأمر بينهما إلى تبادل السجائر . وقد أوضحت الدراسة أن العديد من المدر سين يتعدون بالضرب، والسب على الطلى البة، وهو ما يتعرض له الفتيان أكثر مُا تتعرض له الفتيات المدات ويعتقد بعض الفتيان أن علاقاقمّ بمدرسيهم قد تدهورت بعد إلنا
 الامتحانات فقط، الأمر الذى أدى إلى عدم اكتراث الط الطلبة بمدر سيهم، ودفع المدر سين إلى الشدة التى تبلغ حد السب والضرب. غير أن أحد الفتيان كان له رأى غختلف حيث قال: ليس كل

يين الفتي والفتاة، ولكن أهل الفتاة لا يشجعون على ذلك لأفم ينظرون إلى هذه الصداقة بنظرة كختلفة. أضاف زميل له: إذا مشيت فـ الشار ع بصحبة فتاة سوف يهاجماك أحكا أحدهم قائلا: "أليس لديك أخت تخاف عليها"؟ فالبتمع ينظر إلى تلك الصداقة باعتبارها علاقة غير بريئة. لقد اتفق كل من الفتيات والفتيان على أنه لا يمكن أن تنشأ علاقة صداقة الـا حقيقية بين فيا فتاة وفتي. فالفتيان يعتقدون أن الفتيات لا يستطعن الاحتفاظ بسر، مثلما يكتفظ الفتيان يلتان بالأسرار،

 أو زيارته فن متزله. وأشارت بعضهن إلى أن الفتيات أكثر عقلانية وأكثر نضجا من أقرافن من الفتيان.
فن منتصف مر حلة المراهقة يكون هناك ضغط من جانب الأقر ان لإقامة علاقات مع الجنس الآخر، سواء كانت علاقات صداقة، أو علاقات حب. ولما وقد عبر أحد الفتيان من المنصور رة عن ذلك قائلا: أن الصداقة بين الفت والفتاة أصبحت شيئا عاديا هذه الأيام، حت أن الفتاة المان التى لا
 عن إقامة علاقات مع الجنس الآخر، أو حتى التحدث إلى إلى الفتيان عبر الماتف. الما
 أنا هى التى تقرر إلى أى مدى تتطور العلاقة، وأن الفتاة التى تسمح بتطور العاقاقة إلى علاقة

سبق لما ذلك مع آخرين، ولن يفكر ف الزواج منها أبدا.
 الفتاة مع إحدى صديقاها، أو قد يضع الر سالة فـ حقييتها أو درجها. ويستا ويستخدم بعض الفتيان الماتف، ولكن تتم مراقبة الفتيات عند استخلدامهـن للهاتف، باستثناء بعض الحالاتلات القليلة. لقد أشارت فتاة من المنصورة أن أمها تسمح لما بالتحدث مع فتى معجب هِا مرة ورا واحدة فقط فف الأسبوع، ولعشر دقائق فقط. إضافة إلى ذلك فإن الفتيان والفتيات يتقابلون أثناء الزيارات بين الأقارب، أو الجيران، أو أو بالنوادى الاجتماعية أو فن الدروس الخصوصية. وعند بلوغهم للمر حلة الأنخيرة من سن المر المراهقة (15 - 17 عاما) فإفهم غالبا ما يتقابلون فف النوادى، أو حتى بالشوار ع، أو ألوا الأماكن العامة الأخرى. لقد ذكرت بعض الفتيات من المنصورة أن هناك شارعا معا معينا بالمدينة يتقابل فيه الفتيان

 العالاقات لأسرهن خوفا من أن تطلب أمهاتّن المزيد من التفاصيل، أو أن تضغط عليهن من أجل إعلان خطبة رسمية، فالفتيات يفضلن الانتظار حتى يمين الونا الآخر على استعداد للتقدم بطلب يدها، وزيارة أسرةًا مانـا مع عائلته.


 يقترح ألا يتقابالا بالشارع مرة أخرى حتى لا تتعرض بجددا لمثل هذا الموقف الخر ج.

مختلف مع الفتاة. يجب معاملة الفتى بطريقة صارمة، ومعاملة الفتاة بعطف. كما يجب عدم معاملة الفتيات والفتيان نغس المعاملة. لا يمكن إنكار أن الفتيات يشعرن بالدو نية نتيجة لاعتيادهن على التفرقة فن المعاملة ، فهن لا يأملن حت فـ أن يعاملن نفس المعاملة التى يعامل بها الفتيان، بل أن كل ما تأمل فيه الفتيات أن يحصلن على بعض الحقوق التى يتمتع هِا الفتيان. لقد اتفقت معظم الفت الفتيات من من محافظة المنيا


 بيب أن تتصدى لمعالجة شعور الفتيات بالدو نية.

 يكون الأخوة أكثر تحكما من الآباء. وتطيع معظم الغتيات أوامر الأخ، إلا فـ الحالات الات الى يتحدث فيها إليهن بأسلوب غير مهزبـ.
 تحصل هى عليها، ويعد استخدام الهاتف مثالا على على ذلك. تقا تقول (أ) من القاهرة: أن الآباء


 ذلك. وأضافت أها لا بتد أى عيب فن تحدث الفتاة مع فتى عبر الماتف ولكن الآباء لا يفهمون

لقد أوضح التحليل السابق أن الفتيات لا تتمتعن بنفس الحقوق التى يتمتع هـا الفتيان. وقد



 العسكرية. وقد ذكرت الفتيات المشار كات فن النقاش إلى الحق فن العمل، وأشرن إلى أن البحتمع

 أن الآباء يمنعون بناهتم من الذهاب إلى المدرسة بعد السنة الثالثة، وقال آخرو إلما
 أن هذا لا يحدث للفتى حيث لا يفرض عليه الزواج بمن يُختاره له الآباء.

## العلاقة بين الجنسين

عادة ما تكون العلاقات بين البنسين علاقات بريئة فن بداية مرحلة المراهقة (12-14 عاما).
 العلاقات بين الجنسين خارج إطار المدرسة. يقول (ك) من الجيزة: من الممكن أن تنشأ صداقة

أههلن دراستهن. وقد برر أحد الفتيان (16 عاما) .مححافظة القاهرة ذلك قائلا: أن الفتاة فـ فاية المطاف سوف تتزو ج حتى لو لم تكن متعلمة، أما الفتّ فلا. وأضاف فتى آنخر أن الآباء دائما ما
 متوسط ثم تمكث بالمزل إلى أن تتزوج، بينما على الفتى أن يحقق نتائج أفضل، حتى يتسنى له الخصول على مسكن خاص با به وإعالة أسرة. ومن ناحية أخرى فقد أششار عدة فتيان إلى أن اتجاهات الآباء واء ومعاملتهم لأبنائهم تختلف تبعا للمستوى الاجتماعى والثقافى للأسرة، فنجد أن الأسر ذات المستوي الاقتصادي والاجتانمائمي المرتفع لا تفرق فن المعاملة يين الفتيان والفتيات.
 أشارت إحدى الفتيات من عافظة المنيا إلى أن هناك مثلا يقول: "إذا كسرت للبنت ضلع الِّع يطلع لما ميت ضلع". كما قالت الفتيات: أن الآباء يلبون كل مطن ألمالب الفتيان، ولا يفعلون الشيء نفسه مع النتيات. فعلى مبيل المثال إذا طلب فتى من أبويه سروالا جحديدا، وطلبا ولبت فتا فتاة تنورة جديدة، فإن الأبوين سوف يلبيان طلب الفتى فقط. وأشارت فتاة ألخر ألخرى إلى أن الآباء دائما ما ما

 نريد أن نكون أكثر تقدما فـ فكرنا. وقالت زميلاتحا: أن ما يقومون به خـن خطأ كبير. لماذا أتوا بنا

 أنا أختلف مع الجميع وأعتقد أن الفتيان يعاملون معاملة صارمة حت يصيرون أكثر شدة وقدرة على التحمل. غير أن (م) أصرت على أن الفتيان يتمتعون بهقوق لا تتمتع هـا الفتيات، وأشارت إلى أن

 لاسيما أن أنخى هذا يصغرن أين فـ السن. واختتمت (س) النقاش قائلة: إن بعض الآباء يدللون الفتيان، فأى زيادة فـ الطعام أو المال أو الملبس تعطى بصورة تلقائية إليهم.
 الابن هو الابن الأكبر. قالت فتاة من القاهرة تبلغ من العمر 13 عاما: فـ الوا حالة إذا ما ما كا كان
 تدليل الفتى على سبيل التعويض. إن أمي لا تفهمني عندما أخبرها أنها تعامل أخخى معاملة أفضل

غير أن ما يبعث على الاستياء هو أن عددا كبيرا من الفتيات تقبلن تلك التفرقة فـ المعامنلة



 ضر بته هى. وقالت (ك) من المنصورة: لو كان لل أبن لـاولت أن أجعل منه رجالا، ولكن الأمر

## حوار مع المستقبل. ${ }^{1}$ دراسة عن المراهقين فـ ثلاث حافظات مصرية

فرج الكامل

هُدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحديد مشكالات المراهقين المصريين والتعرف على آرائهم وطمو حاهِم.
 منهج يناسب البحوث المعنية بالموضوعات الحساسة، مثل تلك الموضوعات قيد البحث المُ وقد اشتملت العينة على 24 بحموعة، تتكون كل منها من ستة إلي ثمانية أفراد. و كانت نصف
 المراهقين الأصغر سنا (12 - 15 عاما)، والمراهقين الأكبر سنا (16 - 18 عاما 18 عاما). من هنا تح
 كمحافظة الدقهلية، والثالثة خاصة بمنطقة القاهرة الكبرى (وتشمل محافظيت القاهرة والجيزة). وقد تطلب منهج الدراسة أن تقوم باحثات بإدارة بحموعات النقاش الخاصة باصن بالفتيات، وأن يقوم باحثون بإدارة بحموعات النقاش الخاصة بالفتيان، وهو ما تح بدون أى استثناء. وأجريت هناه المناقشات بمنازل أحد المشاركين، باستثناء بحموعتين اجتمعتا بإحدى قاعات الـاع النوادى

# نتائج الدراسة 

المساواة بين الفتى والفتاة
لقد اتفق كافة الفتيان تقريبا على أن معاملة الفتيات ثتختلف عن معاملة الفتيان فـ حالتين على








 وبالإضافة إلى الاعتقاد بأن الفتيان يستطيعون تحمل العـيا العقاب البدن ألكّ أكثر من الفتيات، فقد
 يعاقب الفتيان بدنيا إذا ما أهملوا دراستهم، بينما يكتفى الآباء بإهانة الفتيات لفظيا فقط إذا ما

أدوات البححث
تنقسم أدوات البحث الى ثلاث بحموعات تخص كل بحموعة مرحلة من مراحل جهع البيانات، وهی كما يلى: الجمموعة الأولى: وتشتمل على أداتين، الأولى هى القوائم الحرة free-listing tool، والثانـانية



 وغير التقليدية .
البجموعة الثانية: وتتكون من أربع استمارات استبيان تلائم كل واحدة المد حالة من أربع










 للمستججيب سواء كان غير متزو ج أو سبق له اله الزوا الج الجمموعة الثالثة: و تتكون من اثنين من الاستبيانات شبه المبن المنات



 ، أو اهاء الزواج، ونتائج الزواج العرفى، وتقييمهم الشخصى لتلك التجربة.

الاستجابة، وتصل نسبتهم الى 11\%، ومنهم من كان بمقر العمل، أو خار المارج المتزل، وتصل نسبتهم 12\%، و17\% على التوالى (أنظر الجدول 6) لا لقد تم حساب الأوزان بناء على معدلات الاستجابة طبقا للنوع، ونوع منطقة الاقامة، والحالة الاجتماعية.

الجمدول (5): معدلات الاستجابة طبقا للنوع، ومنطقة الاقامة، ونوع عحل الاقامة، والحالة الاجتماعية

| معدلات الاستجابة |  | المتغيرات الخلفية |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| الاناث | الذكور |  |
| 62.5 | 52.7 | المحافظات الحضرية |
| 78.9 | 55.6 | حضر الوجه البهى الحضرى |
| 78.9 | 56.0 | ريف الو جهه البهى البحى |
| 87.5 | 80.2 | حضر الو جهه القبلى |
| 87.1 | 76.3 | ريف الو جه القبلى |
| 68.6 | 55.3 | الحضر |
| 83.3 | 62.7 | الريف |
| 72.3 | 63.8 | غير متزوج/غير /غير متزو جهه |
| 84.9 | 55.2 | متزو ج/متزو جا جا |
| 81.8 | - | أرمل/أرملة- |
| 72.2 | - | مطلق/مطلقة |
| 76.7 | 59.3 | الاجمالى |
| 68.1 |  |  |

*: تدخل وحدات المعاينة الأولية كمحافظة البيزة فن نطاق الهافظات الحضرية
الجمدول (6): توزيع الشباب الذين تم حصرهم بالأسر المؤهلة طبقا للنوع، ونتائج المقابلة (تمت أو لم تتم))، وأسباب عدم الاستجاب المابة.

| الاجمالى | اناث | ذكور | أأسباب عدم الاستجابة |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10.9 | 10.7 | 11.2 | الرفض |
| 12.5 | 8.6 | 16.6 | عدم الوجود بالمّل |
| 7.2 | 2.8 | 11.8 | في العمل |
| 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | أسباب صحية |
| 0.1 | - | 0.2 | بالسجن |
| - | - | 0.1 | هارب |
| 31.9 | 23.3 | 40.7 | بكمل نسبة المقابِلات التى لم لم |
| 68.1 | 76.7 | 59.3 | بحمل نسبة المقابلات التّ تمت |
| 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | الاجمالى |

الجمدول (4): اجمالى عدد الأسر والأفراد المؤهلين والمسجلين بالقوائم ، وعدد الأسر والشباب في الدراسة، وعدد الأسر والشباب خلار ذلك.


معدلات الاستجابة وبعض الأسباب وراء عدم الاستجابة

 ومنن يمكثون بالمزل معظم الوقت. وقد ولد لوحظ -بو جهه عام- أن معدلات الـات استجابة الشباب


 يترددون عليها. غير أن هذه القيود لا تفرض على الشباب من الذئى الذكور فن الفئة العمرية ين 18 الينا

 لأى مسئوليات أو لمسئوليات محدودة.
كما يوضح الجددول (5)، يلغ ايلغ ابمالى معدل استجابة شباب العينة 68\%، ومعدل استجابة


 الذكور سواء المتزوجين، أو الذين يألهلون المنا المناطق الحضرية. فعادة ما يعمل هؤلاء الشباب لساعات طو يلة، وعندما يعودون من العمل يكو يكون الوقت غير مناسب لاجنراء مقابابلات معهمم.

وبالتالي فإن الأمر لا ييعث على الدهشة أن أقل معدلات استجابة كانت بالعافظات الحضرية. وفِيما يتعلق بالاناث، يرجع انغفاض معدلات استجابتهن بالأساس الى رفضهن (10\%)، أو انشغالمن بقضاء بعض الحاجات، أو الزيارات (9\%). أما الشباب فهناك منهم من رفض

مقسمة الى طبقات، واجراء مقابلات مع كافة المستجيبين المؤهلين والذين تح تحديدهم مسبقا. غير أن طبيعة تصميم الدراسة قد فرضت نوعا من التحيز، وهو ما يرجع للأربعة أسباب التالية:
 الاجتماعية-الاقتصادية. وعادة ما تكون فئة "النخبة" فن أى دولة -مثلما هو الحال المال مكصر - فئة محدودة ومر كزة فن مناطق جغر افية بعينها. ولا يمكن لعينة عنقودية احتمالية أن تحقق المستوى
 ومعايير اجتماعية-اقتصادية فن تقسيم الاطار الأصلى قبل تطبيق عملية الاختيار، وهو مو ما كالمان سيتطلب موارد هائلة تتجاوز تلك المتاحة للدراسة.
ثانيا، تستهدف هذه الدراسة فئة شباب مصر فـن المئة العـة العمرية من 18 الى 30 عاما، والى تضم بحموعات فرعية مثل الشباب الذين يؤدون الخدمة العسكرية، والعاطلين مُن يسافرون الى الى


 هؤلاء الأفراد الى الأسر الواردة بسجل العينة الى الى بينما هم فـ واقع الأمر غائبين، وهو ما يؤدى الى قصور كبير فن تمثيل هاتين الفئتين.
 وذلك بسبب الغياب شبه الدائم عن المترل. تضم المُموعة الأولى الشباب مُمن يغادرو

 ساعات العمل. وحت يتسن مقابلتهم بلممع البيانات قمنا بتكثيف العمل أثناء عطلات هناية الأسبو ع والأجازات الرسمية الرية.
وأخيرا ير جع التحيز بالعينة الى استخدام قو الائم الأسر المتاحة من مسح سابق و لم يتم



 تلك العينة باحدى المتمعات الغر بية لكان هذا العامل قد أدى الى الختلال كبير فـى العينة ، ذلك لأن الشباب فن تلك الجتمعات عادة ما يتر كون متزل الأسرة و ينضمون الى عالم الم الم الراشدين عند


 عدد المستجيبين المؤهلين بسجالات الأسر، والذين انتقلوا من محل اقامتهم الى مناطق أخرى فـى الفترة بين المسحين. يقدم الجلدول 4 معلومات حول حـلم المّ بحموعات الشباب غير الممثلين فن عينة المسح، بالاضافة الى اجمالى عدد الشباب المسجلين بالقوائم، وهؤلام مُمن تح مقابلتهم فعلا.

اختيار المشار كين فن بمموعات النقاش بواسطة أساليب معاينة احتمالية وإنما استنادا الى بعض السمات الشخصية مثل السن، والنوع، والحالة الاجتماعية، والدرجة التالـاليمليمية، وعل الاقاقامة، والديانة، والخلفية الاجتماعية-الاقتصادية.
 مقننة تم تصميمها بناء على نتائج الدراسة الكيفية التى أجريت الميت فـ المرحلة الأولى. وتم تم تطبيق تلك الاستبيانات على عينة احتمالية قومية تضم شباب من الجنسين فـلى الئى المئة العمرية من 18 الى 30



 ذلك، ثبتت أهمية زيادة الحد الأعلى لسن المئات المستهدفة لتصل الى سن ال 30 عاماما، وذلك
 التى تخلف آثارا طويلة الأجل على تكوين الأسر الجديدة.
المرحلة الثالثة: تم فن هذه المرحلة اجراء دراء دراسة كيفية متعمقة تم من خلالالما اجراء مناء مقابلات



 كرات الثلج حيث يقوم كل مبحوث بتعر يف الباحث بمبحوث أخر ا با وقد وصل علـ عدد المقابلات المتعمقة التى تم اجر اؤها الى 18 مقابلة.
تصميم العينة الخاصة بالمسح الميداني للأسر

استهدف المسح الشباب من الجنسين فن الفئة العمرية من 18 الى 30 عاما. وقد تم اعادة


 الزمنية يين المسحين فـ الحسبان، و تحديد الأسر المؤهلة، والتّ وصل علمد عددها الى 5743 أسرة. وقد كان من المتوقع أن يتيح هذا الاجراء عينة تمثل المستجييين الشباب تثيشالا شاملا نوعا ما ما،
 هِا، كُن كانوا فن الفئة العمرية من 18 الى 30 عاما فـ النترة التى أجريت فيها المقابلات.
أسباب التحيز بالعينة

تُدف الدراسة الى التعرف على ابتحاهات ومارسات الزواج داخل عين عينة تمثل كل الشباب من الجنسين .مصر، ومن أجل تحقيق هذا المدف، كان يكفى أن يتم تصميم وسحب عينة احتمالية

- ما الذى يقدره الشباب فف الحياة بعد الزواج، وما هى عيوب الزواج فـ رأى المتزوجين
- 

 - ما هو مدى تطور العلاقة، وoا هو دور الأسرة فـ عملية الزواج؟ الجلدول 3: توزيع السكان طبقا لبيانات تعداد عام 1996، وتوزيع الأفراد بكافة الأسر بالعينة طبقا للمتغيرات الحنلفية


تصميم الدراسة والخطة المتبعة ف أخلذ العينة
 سياق العلاقات بين الجنسين التى قد تؤدى أو لا تؤدى الى الـا الزواج، وجوهرهر تلك العالاقات، ووصفها، والمداولات، والاعتبارات التى تقوم عليها.

وقد تم اجراء البحث على مر احل ثلاث وهىى:
المرحلة الأولى: تم فيها اجراء دراسة كيفية لنطاق واسع من الموضوعاع المات، والتى كان يتعين دراستها من منظور الشباب أنفسهم. لقد تم الما الاستعانة فن هذه المرحن الملة بعدة أساليب مثل أسلوب القوائم الحرة (33 من المستجيبين)، وبجموعات النقاش البؤرية (17 بُمموعة تضم 87 من الشباب المصرى)، واجراء مقابلة متعمقة مع أحد الأشخاص العارفين، والذى الذي كان يتو اصل بصورة يومية مع حوالى 900 من الشباب من كالا الجنسين. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه لم يتم

المدول (2) : الفروقات فن معدلات استجابة المراهقين الذين تم اختيارهم بصورة عشو ائية من أجل اجر اء المقابلة الرئيسية على انغراد تبعا لبعض المتغيرات الخلفية المختارة


ويتمثل المدف العام من الدراسة فـ تزويد المعنيين هِذه القضية بكافة المعلومات الضروروية لمساعدقّم على تحسين البيئة الاجتماعية والثقافية والاقتصادية، بما يعزز من من اتباع المنباب لالماب لألماط سليمة للزواج وتكوين الأسرة، وذلك من خلال الططالبة بالاجابة عن الأسئلة التالية: -- ما هى المتطلبات المادية التى يكتاجها الشباب لتكوين أسرة جديدة، وما هى العقبات التى تقف حائلا أمام ذلك؟
-

 - هل لا يزال زواج الأقارب مغضلا ؟

الجِلو ل (1): معدل الاستجابة، ووعدد المراهقين مُن تم مقابلتهمم بنجاحاح، و العدد الذى كان قد تح اختياره طبقا للأداة البحثية، وونوع المستحجيب، وطبيعة محل

الاقامة (منطقة ريفية/حضرية)


يتم حساب معدل الاستجابة كنسبة من العينة التى اجتازت المقابلة الخاصة بالحالة الصحية بنجاح

الشكل(1): التوزيع العمري للمراهقين منن يبلغون من العمر ما بين 9 و 20 عاما بالأسر التى تم حصرها



 معدلات الاستجابة بالمناطق الريفية أعلى منها بالمناطق الحضرية، واستجابة الفتيات أعلى الما من استجابة الفتيان. ومن بين كل أربعة من المراهقين المؤهلين استكمل ثلاثة منهم اختبارى مادة

 بالمناطق الريفية مقارنة بالمناطق الحضرية. يوضح الجلدول 2 الفروق فن معدلات استحابة المابة المراهقين مُن تم اختيارهم بصورة عشو ائية لاجراء المقابلات الرئيسية وذلك طبقا للنوع، والعمر، ومدى الالتحاق بالتعاق المعليم، والحالة الوظيفية.
يوضح المحدول 3 توزيع الأفراد بكافة الأسر التى تدخل فن نطاق العينة طبقا للنوع، والعمر،


 المافظات الحضرية نظرا لعاملين أساسيين، الأول أن معدلات المات الاستجابة أثناء عملية المالية حصر الأسر المعيشية كانت أقل بالمناطق الحضرية منها بالمناطق الريفية، والثانى أن عدم الاستجابة الذي يعزي إلي أسباب أخري غير أسلوب المعاينة المستخدم كانـت ألمان أعلى أيضا بالمناطق الخضرية مقارنة
 الخضرية، مقارنة بالمناطق الريفية.

كانت هناك بعض العوامل الايمابية التى ساعدت على تحسين مستوى الاستجابة لمذا المكون بالمسح، مثل التأكيد على سلامة عملية الفحص، وورجود طبيبة لفحص الفتينيات. وعنيا وعند اعادة نتائج الفحص المعملى الى أصحابا من المستجييين تأكد لدى المستجييبن الفوائد التى تعود عليهم

 الريفية بسبب قربه من المنطقة لم يكن قر يبا بدر رجة كافية من بعض المستجييين، والذين المين كان

 وهو ما كان سوف يسرع من العملية، وييسر من عمل البمموعات، ويقلل من الوقت الذى كان يمضيه المستجيبون فـ الانتظار . اضافة الى ذلك تزامن تنفيذ المكون الصحى بيعض الوحدات مع فترة الامتحانانات خلات المالو

 الفحص بسبب ما يصاحب هذا التأخير من تكاليف. خصائص العينة ودقة البيانات


 على جودة العينة وشمولما. يوضح الشكل 1 توزع أعمار الأفراد فن الفئة العمرية من 9 الى 20 عاما بكافة الأسر التى



 بكوالى 700 مراهق. وبافتراض تحقيق نفس معدلات الاتِ الاستجابة، فإن ذلك كالك كان يعني أن حجم عينة المراهقين الرئيسية كان يتعين وأن يزي يد بكوالى 400 الى 500 حالة، يكثلون نسبة ألىا أقل من

 ولتحليل البول والبراز فقد فقدت ما بين 100 و125 حالة نظرا لعدم دقة العمر الذى تم الابلا
 سنوات، والمراهقين البالغين من العمر ما بين 18 و19 عاماما، وهو ما أسفر عن الما النفاض عدي المراهقين فن الفئة العمرية من 16 الى 19 عاما بالعينة الخاصة بالحا بالنسبة للأعمار فوق 20 سنة، فقد كان جليا وجود تر كز لمذه الأعمار عند الأرقام اليت تنتهي بصغر أو ثمسة.

لقد تعذر فـ بعض الأحيان الخصول على موافقة الآباء على مقابلة أبناءهم على انفراد.


 الى عدة أساليب لإثناء الآباء عن ذلك مثل اعادة التأكيد على المدف من المقابلة، واعطاء الآباء





 الى يطمئن الآباء الى شرعية المسح، أو يشعروا بالضا الضحر، ويتر ويتر كوا الغرفة.









هذا المراهق ويتم ادراج اسمه تحت فئة غير المستجيبين.




 حاجة الى حوالى ساعتين ونصف الساعة. وقد تعذر على بعض المراهقين تخصيص هذه المدا المدة للمقابلة بسبب شعورهم بالتعب، وارتباطاهمم الأخرى. لقد جاء النجاح الذى تحقق فن تطبيق المكون الصحى والذي الذي يتسم بالتعقيد كنتاج للمستوى العالى من التنسيق فيما بين أر بعة معاهد بكثية من جانب، ولما و كذا الدعم الصم الصادق من من قبل

 غير أنه عند تطبيق المكون الصحى تم مواجهة أربع عقبات رئيسية:
 والمراهقين أنفسهم باجراء فحص طىى عليهم، وتحليل البول والبراز كانت مهمة صعبة وان

الجزء الثالث- العادات الغذائية: ويشتمل هذا الجزء على أسئلة تتعلق بعدد الوجبات التى ويات يتم

 وغير ذلك من الجوانب الغذائية. الجزء الرابع-الصحة الانجابية والنوع الاجتماعي: تم طرح أسئلة تتعلق بالسن المناسب


 بالعادة الشهرية، و كيفية التعامل معها. وتم طرح عدد من الأسئلة على المراهقين بين سن 16 و19 عاما حول معرفتهم وآرائهم فـن بعض القضايا الخاصة بالصحة الانبابية، مثل الأمراض التى التى

 أن بعض الأسئلة الخاصة بالختان، ودور كل من من النوعين، وسلطة اتخاذ القرار دار داخل الأسرة، والطالاق كان قد تم أخذها من استبيانات المسح السكانـ والصن الصحى الصرى، والتى يتم تطبيقها علي النساء في سن الانجاب الالائى سبق لمن الزواج الجزء الحامس-الزواج: تح سؤال المراهقين فـ المئة العمرية من 16 الى 19 عاما عن


 والعدد المناسب للأطفال، ومدى التواصل بين الزوجة والزوج، و نتائج مرات الحمل.

تقييم للحالة الصحية العامة
لقد اشتملت التحاليل المعملية على تحديد نسبة الميمو جلو يين بالدم ودراسة للطفيليات. كما كما تم قياس وزن وطول 1999 مراهق طبقا للاجراءات المقترحة من قبل جيليف. ومن أجل تقليّ الميم

 وفيما يتعلق بمؤشر الطول بالنسبة للعمر، فقد تم الاستعانة بالبيانات الواراردة بمراجع منظمة

 الجسم بالنسبة للعمر (الوزن بالكيلو جرام/مربع الطول بالمتر) فيعد أفضل مؤشر لمعانـاناة المراهقين من النحافة أو من السمنة الزائدة. كما تح تبنى مقياس تانر لتقييم النضوج البنسى للمر اهقين.
الخصائص التى تيز الدراسة

 والاختلافات فن اللكنة بين منطقة وأخرى.

التى سبق لما الالتحاق بالمرحلة الاعدادية فقد طرح عليهم بمموعة من الأسئلة حول غختلف


 الجزء الثالى- الأدوار الاقتصادية: اشتمل هذا الجزء على أسئلة تتعلق بما إذا كان اليان قد سبق

 بعملون مقابل أجر، وذلك حول ولا أوضاع العمل، ويخاطر الوظيفة، ومدى الرضاء الواء عن الوظيفة
 سبق لمم العمل عن أسباب عملهم، والسن السن الذّى بدأو فيه العمل. الجزء الثالث-الحالة الصحية: لقد تم التر كيز من خلال تلالك الكا الأسئلة على مدى الصى استخدام
 الأنشطة الرياضية، أو يدخنون. ألما بالنسبة للفتيات فقد تم طرح أسئلة عليهن تتعلق بالعادة الشهرية، وكيف يتعاملن معها.
الجزء الرابع-العلاقات الاجتمماعية والسمات الشالمخصية: وتم التر كيز من خلالال هذا المكون على مدى التواصل والمساندة التى يتبادلما المراهقون مع أفراد الألما الأسرة والأقران، وتم طرح

 لبعص السمات الشخصية الايمابية مثل الشعور بقيمتهم وقدرتمّ على القيار القيادة، وأيضا مدى


 الجزء الخامس-قضاء الوقت: تم التعرف على كيفية قضاء المراهقين لأوقاتمّم على مدار الساعة، وما اذا كانوا يقضون الوقت فف المذاكرة، أو العمل، أو المساعدة فـلما الأعمال المترلية، أو متابعة البرامج الاعلامية، وغير ذلك من الأنشطة.

الاستبيان الحناصة بالحالة الصحية واتبحاهات الشباب المتعلقة بالجوانب الصحية


 وأسباب اللجوء اليها، ومستوى الرضاء عن الحاء الخدمة أثناء المرض.
 أو أقر اص الحديد بصورة دورية، وأيضا اذا ما كان قد سبق لمم، أو لأقرافم التدخين، أو تعاطى المخدرات.

إن كافة المراهقين مُن تح اختيارهم بصورة عشو ائية، و كانوا ملتحقين بأية مر حلة التعليمية ابتداءا

 مادتي اللغة العربية والحساب. وقد وأد أتم 3713 من المراهقين المؤهلين اختبار مادة اللغةعربى، بينما أتم 3792 منهم اختبار مادة الحساب. ووصل إجمالى عدد المراهقين مُن أتموا الاختبارين 3682.
 الأساسية (نصف العينة الأصلية للمراهقين طبقا للنوع ع في نصف ور المدات المات المعاينة الأولية). وقد







 لا، ووصل إجمالى عدد المراهقات اللائى سبق لهن الزواج، وتح اجر اء اء مقابلات ناجحة معهن الى 317 مراهقة. وقد أدى تصميم المعاينة المستخدم إلى الحصول على عينات مُثلة علي المستوي القومي،
 البحرى، الوجه القبلى)، ونوع محل الإقامة (حضر /ريف)، وأيضا طبقا للنوع.

منهجية الدر اسة والأدوات المستخلدمة فن اعدادها
سجل أفر اد الأسرة المعيشية

لقد تح جمع بيانات ديمغر افية أساسية عن كافة أفراد الأسرة المعيشية طبقا لتعريف محل الإقامة

 التى لم يسبق لها الالتحاق بالمدارس) ، وأيضا بيانات عن الحالة الما الوظيفية.
الاستبيان الشخصي الأساسي والمتضمن غمسة أجزاء:
 الالتحاق بالمدرسة، وأعلي مرحلة تعليمية وصل إليها، والتحاقهم بالمدرسة حاليا، والمان المن الـت

 المراهقون الذين كانوا بالمرحلة التعليمية السابقة للمرحلة البحامعية أثناء اعداد البحث، والبمموعة

الإبحابية. من هنا كان المدف الرئيسي لتلك الدراسة هو إعداد ملف تقريري شامل لأول مرة حول فئة المر اهقين المصريين. لقد شار كت عدة مؤسسات فن إعداد هذه الدراسة، مثل المعهد العالى للصححة العامة بجامعة الاسكندرية، و كلية الطب جامعة أسيوط، ومر كز البحوث الاجتماعية بالمالمامامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة. و كان للمكتب الاقليمى بلملس السكان الدولي لغرب آسيا وشممال أفريقيا دور الريادة فى الإعداد و التنسيق للدراسة.

تصميم العينة
عينة البحث هي عينة قومية عشوائية طبقية متعددة المراحل ممثلة للمراهقين من مختلف ألماء




 "الشياخات". أما بالمناطق الريفية تتكون وحدات الماتعاينة الأولية من القرى والنجوع و القرى التابعة.
لقد تح تقسيم وحدات المعاينة الأولية إلي طبقات تثثل 21 محافظة، ونو ع عحل الإقامة داخلا محافظة (حضر /ريف). وبناء على تقديرات عدد السكان لعام 1996، تم تقسبيم وحدات المات المعاينة





 القطاعات من و حدة أولية الى أخرى، وذلك حتى يتم الخصول على عينة من الأسر تكون فـ

 الأولية عنها بنجاح أثناء تلك المرحلة 13271 أسرة. تم تعريف الأسرة المؤهلة علي أهنا تلك الأسرة التى تضم ضمن ألمر ألمرادها فرد علي الأقل فن الفئة العمرية من 10 الى 19 عاما. وقد بلغ علغ عدد الأسر المؤهلة 7256 أسرة (معدل التأهل






# الاععتبارات المنهجية الخاصة بالدراسات المعنية بالشباب والمراهقين بمصر 

سحر الطويلة

تسعى هذه الورقة الى تلخيص مواطن القوة والضعف بدراستين رائدتين معنيتين بفئة الشباب والمراهقين بجمهورية مصر العربية، والخبرات التى تح اكتسابها من خلال تصل تصميم الدراستين،

 تمتد من سن 10 الى 19 عاما. أما الدراسة الثانية، فقد تم اجر اؤها فـ عام "أنماط الزو اج وتكوين الأسرة بين الشباب في مصر ". وتستهدف الد الدراسة الثا الثانية شباب المصريين
 بلمع البيانات، فقد اعتمدت كالاهما بالدر جة الأولي على الاسلى الاستبيانات المقننة وتطبيقها في سياق
 العينات والتحيز المرتبط بها، و كذا معدلات الاستجابة. وبتدر الإشارة الى أن المواد قيد البحث
 التحول الى سن الرشد: مسح قومى معى بفئة المر اهقين المصريين منذ أن بدأت البُتمعات فن زيادة سنوات التعليم، والتدريب اللازمة لاكساب الشباب المهارات
 كمر حلة فريدة و حيو ية من مراحل حياة الانسان. وتعرف هذه الفترة الانتقالية بين الطفولة وسن الرشد بالعقد الثاني بحياة الانسان، والتى تمتد من سن العاشرة إلى سن التاسعة عشر. وتر كز

 خاصة في الدول النامية، وهى جوانب إما تؤدى الى الحرمان من الان الفرص الحانياتية، أو إتاحة المزيد من تلك الفرص في المستقبل، علي سبيل المثال الانتقال من مرحلة الدراسة بالمدرسة إلى العمل، والزواج

 تعقيدا، تبرز مرحلة المراهقة كمرحلة هامة فى حياة الشباب. فن السياق المصرى يمر الفتيان والفتيات بكرحلة المراهقة بصورة مختلفة، وهو ما يتر جم إلى فرص حمر حياتية مختلفة أيضا مع مع بلو الشباب لسن الرشد. كما تتصف فترة المراهقة بمصر بكوهنا فترة تتبلور فيها الفروق بين

 الجموانب الهامة أثناء فترة المراهقة وذلك بالاضافة الى جوانب أخرى مثل البلوغ ، و الصححة

## الخلاصة

خلصت الدراسة إلى أن إطار الأسرة على صعيد الضفة الغر بية يسهم بشكل جوهرى فـ تشكيل

 الأختلاف إلى درجة كثافة التواصل السياسى أو مدى الترابط الأسرى.


 الحالة التى نحن بصددها، قد تنامت لديهم بوضوح تو جهات ديكات ديمراطية (هنف وسابيالا 1996)،






 أبناء، بتحاه الديمقراطية قيد الممارسة.
الحو اشى

1 عيعد هذا العرض نسخة معللة على غو مبسط للفصل الذى تم إعاده بالتعاون مع مؤ سسة هيلكى ريسستورف تحت نسس المسمى
2 للتعرف على وضع المرأة الفلسطينة وانعكاسات التغير الاقتصادي والسياسي والاجتماعي على دور المرأة


$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { استطاعات CPRS الت ت اجر اؤها فـ شهر أبريل من عام } 1999 \text { وشهر أبر يل من عام } 2000 . \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

 أحد المؤثرات الباعثة على تأييد فكرة الديمقر اطية فن حين أن الحس المعنى بالفاعلية الخار جية لا لا
 لنموذج المعادلة الميكلية. ووع ذلك فإن النموذ ج الإجمالى لتشكيل المواقف يبدو غختلفا بين الأولاد والبنات.
و يعد الشكل 3 هو نموذج المعادلة الهيكلية للتأييد الإجمالى للمراهقين لفكرة الديمقراطية على مستوى الأسر ذات الترابط.

الشکل (3): نموذج المعادلة الهيكلية لعموم المر اهقين بالنسبة لتأييد فكرة الديمقراطية على صعيد الأسر ذات الترابط مرتفع المستوى.

$\mathrm{N}=237, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=0.765, \mathrm{df}=3, \mathrm{p}=0.858$
$\mathrm{GFI}=0.998, \mathrm{AGFI}=0.995, \mathrm{RMSEA}=0.000$
لا يوفر الشكل 3 أى معلومات إضافية تخص تحليل التراجع فن البحدول 6 - فيما عدا النتائج التى
 لدى الآباء له تأثيره على الحس نفسه لدى المى الأبناء.


 يحدث أى جديد، حيث ثبت مطابقة النتائج والأستنتاجات لتلكا لمالك التى تح التوصل إليها بواسطة
 وارتباطات فيما يتعلق بحس الفاعلية لدى كل من أولياء الأمور والأبناء وأيضا بخصر الما
 التفسيرات المرتبطة بتأييد فكرة الديمقراطية (25 - 26\%). ومع ذلك بلك يمكن التعرف بوضو على نموذج تشكيل المواقف. والمساهم الرئيسى فن هذا الصدد هو موقف أولياء الأمور، يعقبه

 الشكل 2 ييين نووذج المعادلة الميكلية لتأييد المراهقات لفكرة الديمقر اطية مع عدم أخذ الخس المعن بالفاعلية الخار جية فن الخسبان.

الشّكل (2): نموذج المعادلة الميكلية فيما يخص المراهقات من الإناث بالنسبة كتأييد فكرة الديمقراطية.

$\mathrm{N}=263, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=1.06, \mathrm{df}=3, \mathrm{p}=0.782$
$\mathrm{GFI}=0.998, \mathrm{AGFI}=0.993, \mathrm{RMSEA}=0.000$

غير مباشر عن طريق التأثير على حس الأبناء. وقد خضع هذا الاستنتاج لِاخلاختبار بواسطة تطبيق
 نو أككثر وضوحا ماك لو كان مستندا إلى تحليل التراجع المبسط الذئى لا يتسنى بواسطته تغسير الاختلافات المشتر كة.


 الحصول على انطباع يخص نماذج تحول المواقف بين الجيلين وأيضا نوذ ج تشايليل المواقف داخل نطاق الأسرة.

فكرة اللـعق (1): تطبيق نوذ جـ المعادلة الميكلية على المراهقين الذكور بالنسبة لتأييد

$\mathrm{N}=208, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=7.2, \mathrm{df}=7, \mathrm{p}=0.408$
$\mathrm{GFI}=0.988, \mathrm{AGFI}=0.965, \mathrm{RMSEA}=$.

وعلى صعيد الأسر ذات الترابط عال المستوى، تشكل الفاعلية الداخلية جانبا من مواقف
 تباينا بلغت نسبته 15\% فيما يتعلق بتأيد المر اهقين لفكرة المير الديمقر اطية.
 عملية تشكيل ردود فعل المراهقين بتاه الديمقراطية مقارنة بالأسر ذات ات التا الترابط الأسرى مرتفع المستوى. وتنبع هذه العملية كلية من مواقف أولياء الأمور فضلا عن انعدام أثر الفاعلية. الجلدول 7: تراجع موقف أولياء الأمور، والحس المعين بالفاعلية الداخلية والخار جية بخصوص تقبل الديمقراطية قيد الممارسة فيّ فلسطين (معاملات بيتا
.(Beta-Coefficients


جميع المتغيرات المستقلة لما علاقة بالتنبؤات المعنية بمشاعر الارتياح لدى المراهقين بخصوص الديمقر اطية التى يمارسوهنا.
وهذه العلاقة هى عند مستوى أعلى بين الأولاد عنها بين البنات وتخص مواقف الآباء والفاعلية الداخلية. و كلما الخفض مستوى الحس المعنى بالفاعلية الداخلية، ارتفع مستوى الشعبور

 أحد العوامل المساهمة ف، هذه الحالة؛ فكلما زادت الثات الثقة فن رجال السال السياسة، يزداد الشعور بالارتياح والعكس صحيح؛ و كالاهما بنغس الدر جة. إلا أن صياغة هذه الأخيرة ركما تا تكون ألقرب إلى الواقع حيث أن شعور البنات بالارتياح إزاء الديمقراطية فف فلسطين هو عند مستوى منخفض بشكل كبير عنه بين الأولاد. (أنظر الجدوليالين 2، 3). و.عراجعة نتائج ابلجدولين 6 و7، يبرز السؤ الل ما إذا كان هناك المز يد الذى يمكن عمله فـ هذا الشأن؟
وإذا كان حس الفاعلية يسهم فن تشكيل موقف المراهقين المؤيد لفكرة الديمقراطية، يموز القول بأن مثل هذا الخس لدى أولياء الأمور يمكن أن يكون له نفس التأثير - على الأقل بشكل

كما تبين وجود اختلاف جوهرى فـ المواقف المتوازية لأولياء الأمور والأبناء المراهقين بغض

 الديمقر اطية ولكن أيضا بخصوص تأييد الفكرة ذاتيانـا وعلى أساس الاختبار وليس البيان التوضيحى كما هو مبين بالجـدين ألمدول، تم الاستدلال على

 والبنات حال التمييز وفق كثثافة التواصل السياسى أو الترابط التا الأسرى.


 إسهامات مواقف أولياء الأمور بالمقارنة مع تلك الخاصة بأبنائهم المر اهقين.
الجدول 6: تراجع موقف أولياء الأمور، الحس المعني بالفاعلية الدانحلية والخنار جية بشأن تأييد فكرة الديكقر اطية (معاملات - بيتا).


رغم أن عامل النوع لا يشكل إضافة لجزئية "تأييد فكرة الديمقراطية"، إلا أن الذين يتنبئون هذذا المتغير يختلفون وفقا للنوع حيث ثبت أنه لمواقف الآباء نصيب أكبر بين الأولاد علاد عنها بين البنات؛
 للمتغير الخاص بتأييد فكرة الديمقر اطية، اختص الأولاد الاد بنسبة 25\% ويقتصر على مواقلى الانيا أولياء
 أن الفاعلية ليس لما أى أثر على الإطلاق، فإن ما يخص مواقف أولياء الأمور مع ذلك لا يتعدى
 الحس المعن بالفاعلية السياسية داخليا لدى الأبناء أقل بكثير عنه بالنسبة لآبائهم. ويمثل هذا الاستنتاج تلميحا أوليا يشير إلى عدم وجود فرق فـو تو تحول المواقف السياسية بين الجيلين بين نفس النوع أو اختالافه.

 السياسات و النوع

 وجود أى فروق جوهرية بين مواقف الآباء والأمهات ومواقف الأبناء - ونقا لاختبار فيشر - Z ألأى

2 الأسر ذات الترابط مرتفع/ منخفض المستوى ومعدل التواصل، كل على حدة، وفقا للمتوسط p<0,001** مستوى 5\% على الأقل ويخضع للاختبار Fisher Z-Transformation (تُول Fisher Z) (بورتز 1999: .(211-209

يؤثر الترابط الأسرى فـ تشكيل المواقف المتوازية لأولياء الأمور والمراهقين فيما يتعلق بتأييد فكرة الديمقراطية. وبناء على ذلك، تباينت أنماط التماسك الأسرى صعودا وهبوطا بلألما بلنسبة لكا الشريحتين إزاء فكرة الديمقراطية الية.
كما نتج عن كثافة التواصل السياسى داخل الأسرة وجود فرق والئ واضح فن مواقف الآباء والأبناء فـ بجال التوافق مع الديمقراطية فـ فلسطين. وعليه، تباينا تاينت أنماط التماسك الأسرى صعودا وهبوطا بالنسبة لكالا الشريتين إزاء تقبل الديكقر اطية الجلاري ممار ستها.

## النتائيج والمناقشة

الجلدول 2: متوسطات المتغيرات المستخدمة - المراهقين وأولياء الأمور

| أولياء الأمور |  | المراهقين |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| الأمهات | الأباء | البمّو ع | البنات | الأولاد |  |
| 3.86 | 3.82 | 3.79 | 3.74 | 3.84 | فكرة الديمقر اطية |
| 2,64 | 2.63 | 2.63 | 2.41 | 2.93 | تقبل الديمقراطية عحل التحبحبة |
| 2.45 | 2.55 | 2.53 | 2.47 | 2.60 | الفاعلية السياسية |
| 2.74 | 2.90 | 2.73 | 2.76 | 2.68 | الفاعلية السياسية |
| - | - | 2.55 | 2.47 | 2.66 | التواصل السياسى بين الآباء والأبناء |
| - | - | 4.5 | 4.05 | 4.05 | الترابط الأسرى |

يظل مؤشر تأييد فكرة الديمقراطية عند مستوى مرتفع جدا مكتوسط يقترب من 4 (بمقياس 5
 المتوسط 3. أما الخس المعنى بالفاعلية السياسية على الصعيدين الدانحلى والخار المى فلا فلا يز ال عند مستوى منخفض؛ والتواصل السياسى مع الآباء وأولياء الأمور أقل أيضا من مقياس المتوسط البالغ 3. الترابط الأسرى الإجمالي عند مستوى مرتفع.
الجدول 3: أهمية متو سطات الفروق حسب النوع (ANOVA):

| الأباء - الأمهات | الأولاد - البنات |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| غير عحدد | غير حددة | فكرة الديمقر اطية |
| غير محدد | 0.000 | الشعور بالارتياح إزاء إلديمّراطية الفعلية |
| غير محدد | غير محدد | الفاعلية السياسية في الحار جا |
| 0.037 | غير عحدد | الفاعلية السياسية في الداخل |

وبالكاد لا توجد أى فروق فـ النوع. وفى الضفة الغربية، بخد أن البنات أقل تقبلا للديمقراطية بدر جة كبيرة مقارنة بالأولاد، أما الأمهات فهن يظهر بالفاعلية السياسية على الصعيد الداخلى.

الجلدول 4: أهمية متو سطات الفروق على أساس مقارنة الآباء والأبناء (اختبارT)

| الأم - الابنة | الأم - الابن | الأب ـ الابنة | الأب - الأبن |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| غير عدد | غير عددد | غير محدد | غير عددد | فكرة الديكقراطية |
| غير حدد | غير عحد | غير عحدد | غير عحدد | الشعور بالارتياح إزاء الديمقراطية الفعلية |
| غير محدد | غير عحدد | غير عحدد | غير عحد | الفاعلية السياسية في الحنار ج |
| غير محدد | غير محدد | غير محدد | 0.004 | الفاعلية السياسية في الداخل |

ابلحدول 1: مؤشرات العينة (ابلمموعة الثالثة)


التدابير المستخدمة فـ التحاليل يمكن سردها كالتالى: تأييد فكرة الديمقراطية، تقبل الديمقراطية على أرض الواقع، والفاعلية السياسية الخارجية والفاعلية الميا السياسية الداخلية كما ورا ورد ذكرها الما ديباجة القسم الخاص بالمواقف الديمقراطية. و يبين جروباك ألفاس صلاحية هذه الموازين
 0815؛ وأولياء الأمور T T 0
 وحدتي قياس تقليديتين: "التواصل مع الآباء وأولياء الأمور بشأن الأن السياسات" و"الترابط الأسرى".
الحديث مع الآباء حول السياسات يقاس عن طريق طرح الأسئلة الأربعة الآتية:
-
-
 الأربعة لتكون مؤشر "النو اصل بشأن السياسات". (وفقا لحرو نباك ألفا، مؤشر 0842). النرابط الأسرى يبرى قياسه بواسطة ثلاثة بنود هى : - سيظل أعضاء الأسرة سويا مهما حدا حـو --
 بالكامل". (وفقا بلجرو نباك ألفنا، الترابط الأسرى عند مؤشر 0759).

السلطة. ومن ناحية أخرى، يمكن تفسيرها على النحو التالى: إذا شعر الناس بانعدام السلطة، من
 شعورهم بأن زوال هذا الإحساس يقترن بإرساء الديمقر اطية، عندئذ سوف يصبحون أنصارا
 الديمقراطية عحل التجربة يمكن أن تكون صلة ثنائية. ويككن افتراض أن حالة النة الشعور بانعدام السلطة مرتبطة بإحساس عدم الرضا بتحاه النظام السياسى القائم، بيثي يكيوز توقع تأثير إيبابى
 صعيد آخر، كلما تنامى الإحساس بالفاعلية السياسية داخليا، تضاعف الشعبور بتقبل النظام. ومن الممكن أيضا أن يشعر الناس بأن لدياريهم سلطة على وجه العمهوم، بيد أن هنا هذا الشعور
 الفاعلية السياسية الداخلية وتقبل النظام السياسى السائد بأنها سلبية. و وكلما زادت الـيا الفاع الفاعلية السياسية الداخلية - وتتمثل هذه الحالة فـ الثقة بالنفس- ترابحع مستوى تقبل النظام. وبالنسبا للضفة الغر بية، تعد هذه الدراسة فف حقيقة الأمر بكثا استكشا اليافيا، وحيث ألنا الن النظام السياسى فيها


 البعض من لديهم حس عال بالفاعلية السياسية الداخلية شعور بعدم تقبل النظام المائلدي المائر أما الإحساس بالفاعلية السياسية على الصعيد الخارجى فهو يعنى الموقف الملموس لرجال
 المعمول به. كيف يمكن لمذه الفاعلية السياسية الخارجية التأثير على حشد النـد التأئيد لفكرة
 زادت ثقة الناس فن ساستهم، تنامى شعور رهم بتقبل بالنظام السياسى لديهـم. كما أنه يو جدل صلة مشاهجة بالنسبة للحالة الأولى. فإذا أولى الناس مثثليهم السياسيين الثقة بعد انتخاكمـ على أساس ديمقر اطى، سيصبح لديهم أسباب وجيهة لتأييد فكرة الديمقر اطية. ومع ذلك، فإن هذه الصلة لا تبدو قوية.

الطريقة
تستخدم البيانات الواردة من الشريحة الثالثة للعينة الفلسطينية فف إلقاء الضوء على مدى بتسسيد


 و215 من الأمهات. ونخن نستخلدم خصائص من واقع البيانات التى تم جمعها (الشريكة الثالثة) فـ عام 2000. وقد بلغ متوسط عمر المر اهقين الذين تغطيهم هذه البيانات من 15-20 سنة،
 و57\% من الإناث، بنسبة 72\% من المتوقع حصولمم على شهادة التوجيهية (الشهادة الثانوية).

يشكل الوضع الذى بنيت على أساسه التوقعات الأولية الخاصة بالسلطة الحاكمة القادمة وما سيكون عليه اداؤها. وقد تكون هذه التوقعات قلد الثـر أثرت فن مو اقف الآباء والأبناء حيال فكرة






 العادلة". (أبوعمرو، 1996).

## فرضيات

بصرف النظر عن التعليقات المشار إليها حول الديعقراطية الفلسطينة وبيئة الصراع ودور الأسرة
 تحول المواقف السياسية من جيل الآباء إلى جيل الأبناء فى الأسر الفلسطينية. نحن نسعى من الـن
 السياسات، والنو ع على هذه العلى العملية. وعلى غرار القسم الفلسطينى فن دراسة براندنبرج، يكمن السؤال ذو الصلة هنا هنا أيضا فيما
 ينتهجون نفس المو|قف. " وتلك الأخيرة مع ذلك لا تعكس بالضرورة التأثيرات أو التو جههات بين الجيلين.
 وتشكيلها وانتقامها، بتدر الإشارة إلى اثنين من الأسئلة، ألا وهما: أ) هل هن هناك مقارنات أو مراسلات تخص المواقف السياسية لأولياء الأمور والآباء والأمهات،
وتلك المتعلقة بالمراهقين من الأولاد والبنات؟

ب) هل تتأثر المكاتبات بخصوص المواقف المبا المياسية لأولياء الأمور والمراهقين بالألمور المتصلة بالتر ابط الأسرى و التو اصل بشأن السياساسات والما والنو ع؟

واستنادا إلى تحليل الارتباط والتراجع، يمكن تحقيق الآليّ الآي


د) مر اجعة الأثر الإضافي للفاعلية السياسية داخليا و خار جيا


 الديمقراطية بشكل سليم حيث أن هذا النظام السياسى يشجع الناس على الاستفادة من هذه

شخصية الفدائى وأخرى شخصية الجندى. ومن البادى ان الأولاد كانوا أكثر خضوعا لظروف البيئة السياسية من البنات. وعند التعرض للمواقف التى يسودها الصراع على غرار التجربة التى تخو ضها التها الأراضى الفلسطينية سواء من خلال الإنتفاضة الأولى التى امتدت من من عام 1988 إلى عام 1993 أو فـى

 الإنتفاضة الأولى، تصدرت العلاقة البينية جليلى الآباء والأبناء للأسرة الفلسطينينية أهم قضايا

 ينتمون إليه فی إهاء هذا الأحتلال. ولذا كان نشاط الشباب فن هذا المضمار يرى أيضا على أنه
 مو اقف الصراع الحالى والمعروفة بإسم الإنتفاضة الثانية. واستنادا إلى تغسيرات أحلام الشام الشباب الفلسطين، أفاد مصلحى (2001) "بأن هويتهم ليست فردية ولكنها جماعية، ذلك الكا أن الأنباء

 مأساوية ولكنها تبرز أثر بيئة الصراعات وتأثيرها على العلاقات الأسرية وبخاصة بين الآباء والأبناء.
ورغم ما تح التوصل إليه من نتائج تشير إلى تحد خطير للدور التقليدى للآباء فن بجتمع يسوده صراع مكثف، يمكن القول بأن دور الأسرة الفلسطينية كالِية كمؤسسة رئيسية فن إطار


 التى خلص إليها كلاهما تؤ كد أن الديناميكيات التي تحكم العلاقات الأسرية الفلسطينية لازالت

 من أعضائها من المتأثرين سلبا ببيئة الصراع ع.
 واحتمالات تأثيرها على التحول البين للمواقف بين الأجيال، يتعين التنبيه إلى الحقيقة التى مفادها
 يكن لديهم حكومة كما أن التجربة التى خاضوها منذ اتقاقيات أو سلو .ما فن ذلك الانتخابابات الحرة التى أجريت لأختيار رئيس الدولة والمجلس التشريعى (البرلمان) فن يناير 1996، لم تسمح
 الإشارة إلى أن الشباب والعديد من الأفراد من جيل الآباء لم يسبق هم وتنظيمات القاعدة الشعبية وتحديدا على امتداد الفترة السابقة على الإنتغاضة الأولى (19881993). و كانت هذه التجربة قد قامت على أساس المشار كة واسعة النطاق والتمكين، وهو ما

وجدير بالتنويه فإن الأسرة الفلسطينية لا تزال تشكل إحلى الثوابت ليس فتط من منظور الموية


 الفرد وذلك من خلال ثقافة تحكمها التزعة الفردية. و كان من نتيجة التغييرات التى طرأت أت على التى

 أجهزة التلفزيون والحاسب الآلى سلعا

 مثلت على مدى العقود الثلاثة أو الأربعة الماضية أحد الأعراف الثابتة حتى فيما يخص المسائل

بيد أن الأسرة لم تفقد بعد محورية مكانتها فن حياة أبنائها. وآخذا فن الحسبان ما تتسم به


وتمثل التر كيبة الخاصة بالنوع عاملا مؤثرا ثالثنا. ومن التعليقات المثيرة للانتباه الفرضية النا التى التى
 إلى الأبناء تكون عند مستوى أعلى بالنسبة لنفس النو ع عنها بالنسبة للنوعين. وعلى النى صعيد البيانات الفلسطينية، يمكن الاستناد إليها فن وضع هذه الفرضية موضع الاختتبار.

## خصوصيات الحالة الفلسطينية

أهم ما يميز الجتمع الفلسطينى هو استمرار تأكيده على دور الأسرة كمؤسسة تتجاوب الدا وع
 الأجياًل. وبفضل هذا التفوق التقليدى للأسرة وتفاعلها لألها على صعيد البحتمع، لا يعزى الترابط


 ملموس من تأثير الترابط الأسرى على التحول فن التوجهات بين الجيلين وتطوير الهوية السياسية للشباب.
وقد ألقى منصور (1990) الضوء على مدى تأثير الوضع السياسي فن بجموعه على النحو السابق الإشارة إليه حيث وضع استبيانا حول السا "الذات المثالية" طرحه على مائلة من صغار اليار


 22 أن تكون لشخصية الفدائى بينما اختارت فتاة واحدة من بين عدد غير معرو ف من المنتيات

# الديقراطية الفلسطينة: مواقف أولياء الأمور والمراهين¹ 

بر نارد سابيلا

تقديم
تولى الدراسة قيد التناول اهتماما خاصا بمواقف المراهقين الفلسطينيين بتّاه الديمقراطية وتر كز



 (1980) إلى أن الأسرة تثثل العنصر الأكثر أهمية فـ إطار تحقيق التجاوب السياسى للأطفال مع
 اللز بية" أى عضوية الآباء وأولياء الأمور فن الطوائف الرسمية لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية. وعند وضع متغير النوع فن الاعتبار، بتحدر الإشارة إلى أنه لا توجد فروق واضحّة فـ الإجابات التى أدلى جها الأولاد وتلك الحناصة بالبنات.
 أخرى والتي مفادها التأكيد على أهمية تحول/نقل المواقف من جيل الآباء إلى جيل الأبناء فـ سياق عملية التجاوب الأجتماعى (التفاعل مع الجتمع) .
 يعتبر الأب هو العامل الرئيسى فـ إحداث عملية التيا التحول بينما تراجعت الأبحاث المعنية بدراسة مدى تأثير الأم فن هذا الشأن". (ويس ومييس 2002). وجدير بالذكر، فإنٍ البيانات المتعلقة بالشباب الفلسطينٍ وأولياء أمورهم تسمح بإجراء
 المعادلات الميكلية، بند أن هذه البيانات تسمح أيضا بالتأتأكيد على كيفية تأثير المواقف التى

 بشأن الأمور المتعلقة بالسياسة. ويغترض ورجوب أهمهية العلاقة الوثيقة بين أفراد اد الأسرة بعضهم ببعض وأيضا يين الشباب المراهقين وأولياء أمورهم وذلك وبية فـ إطار عملية التواصل السياسي
 الأسر التى تربط بين أفرادها صلة وثيقة (جيسلر 1996). كما أن الأثر المعتدل للتواصل المتنامى داخل نطاق الأسرة يرتبط بشفافية أكبر ورؤية منظورة أوسع للمواقف والتو التوجهات السيا وبالتالى للعملية الانتقالية للمواقف السياسية يين الجيلين. وعليه، يجيوز القول بأنه على صعلى صعيد الأسر ذات الارتباط الوثيق وأيضا تلك الت تتصف بالتواصل الفعال فيما يتعلق بالمواقف السياسية، تكون العملية الانتقالية للأجيال عند مستوى أعلى مقارنة بغيرها من الأسر." (ويس وميبس 2002).

يظهر بعض أو جه الاهتمام من قبل النساء. من هنا نتقرح طرح المزيد من الأسئلة التى تتعلق ببعض البحالات التى غالبا ما سوف هتام الا
 والرجل)، وقضايا السلام، والقضايا البيئية، وقضايا الصحة العامة، وسوق العمل.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 1 \\
& \text { السئ ال فـ البحث قيد التناول. } \\
& 2 \text { لقد أوضحت التقارير الصادرة عن المكتب الفلسطين للاحصاءات المر كزية، فـ عام 1997، أن 13\% من } \\
& \text { الشباب البالغين من العمر } 15 \text { عاما مل يمصلوا على تعليم نظامى، بينما أفىى 20\% منهم السنة السادسة، } \\
& \text { و15\% منهم السنة الثالثة عشر. }
\end{aligned}
$$

يقل اهتمام الفتيات بوجه عام بالعديد من الدول بالسياسة مقارنة بالفتيان (تورنى - بورتا



 البحث الثالث، وهو ما ينطبق أيضا على عينة الضفة الغربية، حيث قل اهتمام الفتيات بالسياسة مقارنة باهتمام الفتيان خلال الثالاث سنا لطالما انتقدت كاتبات الحار الحار النـات النسوية الدراسات التي تؤ كد على عدم اهتمام المرأة






 مع اهتمام الفتيان فن بعض القضايا السياسية بعينها.

 والتى عادة ما يتم الإعلان عنها فی أولى صفحات الوال الجر ائد. من هنا فقد ألطلق عليها "سياسة
 جانب الفتيات مثلما تخظى باهتمام الفتيان. غير أن دراسة براند الدنبرج قد أو الو الا

 بالهجرة والقضايا الاجتماعية، حيث نالت تلا تلك القا القضايا نفس الاهتمام من كل من من الفتيات







## خلاصة دراسة تتناول اهتمام الشباب بالسياسة بالعالم العربي:

نوصى بشدة إضافة سؤال العنصر الواحد الخاص بالاهتمام بالسياسة وذلك لأغراض الما المقارنة، فمثلما هو الحال بالعديد من الدول الأخرى سوف الح يشير هذا المؤشر إلى الختلاف الجلنسين حيث يوضح أن الرجال أكثر اهتماما بالسياسة مقارنة بالنساء. غير أن هذا المؤشر لا

البلدول (3): الاختلافات بين الفتيان والفتيات الفلسطينيين فـ قياسات الاهتمام بالسياسة (t-tests)

| p | إلمتوسط | المتو سط للفتيان | المتو سط للفتيات | النطاقات |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.000 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.4 | البحال الأول: سياسة الصفحات الأولى |
| 0.000 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | منظمة الأمم المتحدة |
| 0.000 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.4 | الولايات المتحدة الألمريكية |
| 0.000 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.4 | الأحزابا السياسية |
| 0.000 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.0 | السياسات الأورابور بية |
| 0.000 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.2 | الشئون الخار جية |
| 0.000 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.3 | قضايا الدفاع |
| ليس ذا | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.1 | الشئون الحكومية |
| 0.000 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.7 | الشئون الاقتصادية |
| ليس ذا | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | البحال الثان: السياسات الاجتماعية |
| ليس ذا | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | القضايا البيئية |
| 0.000 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | قضايا النوع الاجتماعى |
| 0.051 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.5 | الجوانبالصا الصحية |
| ليس ذا | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | القضايا السلمية |
| ليس ذا | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | سوق العمل |
| 0.048 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.4 | السياسة المحلية |
| ليس ذا | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.0 | الرفاه الاجتماعى |
| 0.000 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.5 | البحال الثالث: الأجانب، العالم الثالث، التقاعد، الطاقة |
| 0.000 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.1 | الأجانب |
| 0.027 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.6 | حق اللجوء السياسى |
| 0.000 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | العا لم الثالث |
| 0.000 | 2.9 | 3.00 | 2.7 | التقاعد |
| 0.000 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.6 | الطاقة |

التنموى. وقد برزت أهمية تلك الاختلافات بين الجنسين، حيث لم تكن هناك اختالافاتات تذكر
 ييدو أن لدى كل من الفتيان والفتيات اهتماماً متماثلا هِذين البحالين.

## الفلسطينيون بالضفة الغربية

لقد أوضح تحليل العوامل ثلاثة عوامل (أنظر الجدول 3)، وبالتالى تم إعداد ثلاثة نطاقات من
 وتتراوح الألفا الخاصة بكرونباك بين .78 و.90.


 تظهر أية اختلافات بين الجنسين. غير أن الفتيات كن أكثر اهتماما بثلالة جواليانبا وانبا ألا وهى: "قضايا النوع الاجتماعى" (قضايا هامة)، و"القضايا الصحية" (قضايا هامة)، و"القضايا السانيمية" (ليست هامة). وتجدر الإشارة إلى أنه لم تكن هناك الكا الختلافات فن متوسط اهتمام الجنسين
 بكافة العناصر التي تندر ج تحت المحال الثالث وهى "الأجانب" و "العا لم الثالث"، و"الطاقة"، فقد حظيت باهتمام أكبر من جانب النتيانيان بتدر الإشارة إلى أن الفتيات كن مهتمات بالقضايا التى تُمهن مثل "قضايا النوع

 لنتيجة حالة براندنبرج. غير أنه بخلاف حالة ببراندنبرج تبيًن أن الفتيان والفتيات الفلسطينيين مهتمون بالشئون الحكومية وسوق العمل على حد سواء.

## الملخص والخلاصة:

كما هو متوقع ارتفع متو سط الاهتمام بالسياسة ببراندنبر جلى مدار الثالاث سنوات التى أجرى فيها البحث، والذى تح قياسه بواسطة مؤشر العامل الواحد كما هوا هو متبع فن العديد من العا الدراسات. وقد يرجع ذلك الى المرحلة العمرية لأفراد عينة البحث، وأيضا إلى ألى أثر الحملة
 بالسياسة. أما بالحالة الفلسطينية فقد تبين أن بعض الظروف وليأ والأحداث قد تؤدى إما إلى تلى تنامى،




 الاهتمام بالسياسة لدى الشباب.

الاهتمام بقضايا سياسية ححددة: أوجه الاختلاف بين الجنسين
حتى يتسن درِاسة مدٍى الاهتمام بقضايا سياسية محددة تم سؤال المراهقين حول مدى اهتمامهم بعشرين بحالا سياسيا، والاستعانة بتحليل العوامل البحثية with varimax rotation لتحديد كختلف عوامل الاهتمام بالسياسة. وتستند التحاليل الواردة أدناه إلى البياناتات التى تم الخصول عليها من المرحلة الثالثة بلجمع البيانات، وذلك عند بلوغ المراهقين الألمان والفلسطينيون سن 17 عاما.

## الألمان فى براندنبرج

لقد أوضح تحليل العوامل بالعينة الألمانية وجود أربعة عوامل وهى: 1- سياسة "الصفحات الأولى" والتى تتعلق بالقضايا السياسية الرئيسية (مثل الشئون الخانياصة بكلف شنمال الأطلنطى،

 يذهب بعض خبراء الحر كة النسوية، 2- "السياسات الاجتماعية" واليا والت تشتمل على القضايايا الاجتماعية- الاقتصادية (مثل القضايا الخاصة بسوق العمل، والتقاعد، والصحة العامة، والرفاه

3- "السياسة الجديدة" وتشتمل على القضايا السياسية المتصلة بما يطلق عليه "الحر كات
 "سياسات المجرة الخار جية" والتى تر كز على الأجانب واللاجئئين (عنصران). وقد تخخض تحليل العوامل عن إعداد أربعة نطاقات (سياسة الصفحات المات الأولى، والسياسات
 درجات كل من تلك النطاقات. وتعتبر الدقة الداخلية لتلك النطاقات عاتلياء عالية نوعا ما. وتتراوح الألفا الخاصة بكرونباك بين .74 و.88.


يوضح الجدول السابق أن الفتيان أكثر اهتماما بسياسة الصفحات الأولى مقارنة بالفتيات.
 أكبر بمجال "السياسة الجديدة"، أى بالقضايا السلمية والبيئية وبقضايا العالم الثالث والدعم

## تطور الاهتمام العام بالسياسة مع مرور الوقت(العنصر الواحد)

 كما هو الحال بالعديد من الدراسات الأخرى التى أبريت بدول مختلفة قمنا بطرح سؤال واحد ألا وهو: (1) لا أهتم على الإطلاق، (2) أهتم قليلا، (3) أهتم بصورة معتدلة، (4) أهتم كثيرا، (5)
أهتم بصورة مغرطة.

لقد اتضح من خلال القياس بواسطة مؤشر العنصر الواحد أن هناك زياك زيادة ثابتة و كبيرة فن الاهتمام بالسياسة ببراندنبر ج، وذلك فلك فيما يتراوح بين 2.85 بالمر حلة الأولى فن المتوسط (سن


 كل من الفتيان والفتيات على حد سواءى الأمر الذى يتفق والتوقعات النظرية بالدراسات الأخرى الى أجريت فن هذا الجمال.



 هذا التر اجع إلى الأحداث التاريخية، ووقوع الانتفاضة الثانية، وفشل عملية اللانلام فيما بين عام هو 1998 و 2000. لقد أوضح الاختالاف فن النتائج بين كل من الحالة الألمانية والفلسطينية ألسا أن زيادة الاهتمام بالسياسة لا يرجع فقط إلى التطور فن تكوين الموية كما يذهب أريكسن (1968)، وإنما يرجع
 الثانية إلى المر حلة الثالثة قد يرجع جزئيا إلى اقتراب انتـا



 بالحياة السياسية أثناء فترة المراهقة.

|  | الإقليم <br> الضفة الغربية العينات متعدد |  | $\varepsilon$ | طبقا | بالسيا | الجلدول (1) الاهتما |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | بر اندنبرج العينات متعددة الثقافات |  |  |  |
| p | الفتيات | الفتيان | p | الفتيات | الفتيان |  |
| 0.030 | 3.02 | 3.22 | 0.000 | 2.72 | 3.09 | متوسط المرحلة الأولى |
| n.s | 2.86 | 3.05 | 0.000 | 2.75 | 3.12 | متوسط المرحلة المرحلة الثانية |
| 0.011 | 2.79 | 3.08 | 0.000 | 2.85 | 3.25 | متو |
|  | 334,244,297 | 447,227,194 |  | 591 | 335 | N |

(57\% من الفتيان و43\% من الفتيات)، بينما تم مقابلة 573 من الشباب فـ ثالث مرحلة لمـمع البيانات (40\% من الفتيان و60\% من الفتيات). وقد تم جمع البيانات من كن من من المناطـ والخضرية بالضفة الغر بية وهى كما يلى: أريا (\%) (\%)، الخليل وجنوب اليا الخاليليل (32\%)، بيت لـم (27\%) نابلس والشمال (21\%)، القدس الشرقية (14\%)، وراماملالاه (\%3). وبتدر الإشارة إلى أن العينة الخاصة بأول مرحلة بلمع البيانات قد اشتملت على 89\% من المسلمين


 كيف أن الانتماءات الدينية ومستوى التدين من العوامل التى تؤثرعلى مستوى المشار كة السياسية.
من أجل أغراض الوصول الى المستجييبن بالعينة كان من الضرورى أن يقتصر الاختيار


 المراهقون أكثر تضررا من الأوضاع المعيشية السائدة بالضفة الغر بية مثل عدم تور توافر فرص العر العمل
 والتحرك بالضفة الغربية. فكلما أرتفع المستوى التعليمى للشخصى، شعر بالالافتقار إلى فرص




 إضافة إلى ذلك، كان يتعين العزوف عن طرح أسئلة خاصة بالتأتأتير فيما بين الأقران تماما بالضفة الغربية، وذلك لأنه كان سوف يتعناء الماءن المانظ على معيار السرية إذا ما طالبنا الحصول على أسماء وعناوين أصدقاء المستجييين.

## النتائج

يدل أول جزء بالنتائج على الاهتمام السياسى من جانب الفتيان والفتيات (بين سن 15 و17

 بين الجنسين، حيث أظهر ت الفتيات اهتماما أقل بالجوانب السياسية مقارنة بالمارين بالفتيان، وذلك بكل الانكل من عينة براندنبر ج (الحالة الألمانية) وعينة الضفة الغر بية (الحالة الفلسطينية) فـ الجزء الثان من النتائج قمنا بتبنى نقد الحر كة النسوية حت نوضح أنه بخلاف الاعن الاعتقاد السائد، فإن الفتيات يهتممن بالسياسة، وإن كن يهتممن بيوانب سياسية غتتلفة عن تلك التى يهتم هكا الفتيان.

بعد إنتضاء يوم الانتخابات. وقد اقتضت خطة البحث طرح أسئلة على كافة الفصول الدراساسية


 لقد قامت الأستاذة كارين ويس من كلية العلوم التطبيقية بيامعة بوتسدام بامبام بإجراء دراسة متوازية مع طلبة Real-/Gesamtschule، ومعظمهم ينتهون من الدراسة بالمارم المدرسة بعد إمتام
 أدخلت هذه الدراسة الثانية الجو انب الخاصة بالتدريب المهن والتدريب العملى كعوامل إضافيا للاندماج الاجتماعى. وقد أفسح الجمع بين البمموعتين من البيانات الباليال لتغطية بجموعة الناخبين لأول مرة ببراندنبر ج بالكامل، ومقارنة سلوك الطلبة الِّة بمدرسة جيمناسيين عند ادلا الاءهم

 طرحها بداية من المرحلة الدراسية العاشرة، وذلك فن عام 1996 للامتامتفسار عن تطار الطور الاهتمام

 كتاب حول الناخبين لأول مرة ببراندنبرج (كوهن وويس وأوزوالد لعالد لام مراحل مجع البيانات ثم مقابلة 2633 طالب (41\% منهم من الطلبة و59\% منهم من الطالبات)،


 وبجموعات البيانات، والأدوات المستخدمة، برجاء الرجوع ع إلى مؤلفات كوهن وويس وأوزوالد لعام 2001 وريبنستور فـ لعام 2004.
لا كان اطار هذه الدراسة يغطى أكثر من ثقافة فقد تم اجراء اء دراسة متوازية بواس باسطة المؤلف
 الغر بية. وقد استعانت هذه الدراسة أيضا بتصميم متشابه لعينة الدراسة الدامة الأولى وتم جمع البيانات على ثلاث مراحل. فن الفترة ما يين عام 1998(T1) وعام 2000 تم (T2) إعداد قائمة ائمة بكافة
 مدن وقرى ومعسكرات للاجئين. و وم يكن فن الإمكان مطان مالبة الطلبة بالمدارس العامة بملء استمارة لاستبيان أثناء الدرس مثلما كان الحال بيرانداندنبرج بسببب رفض وزارارة التعليم لذلك.


 الأم وليس كلاهما. كما لم يكن فن الإمكان إعادة إجراء البحا
 الجال لإجراء تحليل للاتحاهات. وفن أثناء أول مر حلة لجمع البيانات قمنا بمقابلة 804 من الطلبة

لقد أوضحت الدراسات العملية التى أجريت حول علم الاجتماع السياسى والثقافة السياسية



 المشار كة بين الجنسين. وقد خلص كل من هايز وبين (1993) في مقارنة دولية إلى أنه على الرغم من الخسار الاختالافات بين الجنسين فن المشار كة السانين السياسية التقليدية بالنسبة للنساء الأكرك
 يتتمى إليها الشخص، أو أصله، أو خلفيته الاجتماعية. هنا يدور التساؤل التا التالى: هل يتعلق ذلك بعدم قدرة بعض الفتيات المراهقات على التواصل الاجتما الاجتماعى؟
 أساس البحوث التى تتناول الاتحاهات السيات السياسية والمشار كة فن الحياة السياسية. ووفقا لمذا
 سياسية. فالحر كة النسوية ترى أنه لدى النساء فهم خترا للمشار كة السياسية عن الرجال (جاكوب 1995). ويدور الفكر السياسى لدى النساء ولنـياء حول






 بالمؤ سسات السياسية فقط. فالمرّٔة تفضل الأشكال غير التقليدية للمشار كة السياسية (هايز وبية 1993، جاكوبى 1995، ميير 1994، ويسل 2001). نخلص من ذلك إلى أن خبراء الحر كة النسوية يذهبون إلى أن الفتيات والنساء ألسن غير
 الرجال، وإن كن يهتممن بمجالات سياسية يختلفة عن الجالات التي يهتم بها الرجال.

الدراسة

لقد جاءت هذه الدراسة الطولية حول الاندماج السياسى أولا من قبل أول مؤلف لهنه الورقة

 الولايات الألمانية الجديدة. ومن أجل هذا الغرض كان من المخطط البدء فن إحراء الدراس اسة مع
 مر حلتين أخر يين مع طلبة المر حلة الدراسية الحلادية عشرة والثارينانية عشرة على التى التوالمى، ثم الانتهاء بالمر حلة الر ابعة والأخيرة من مراحل جمع البيانيانات، والتى تغطى طلبة المر حلة الثالثة عشرة، وذلك

# أو جه الاختلاف بين الجنسين فى اهتمام المراهقين الألمان والفلسطينيين 

 بالسياسة - نتائج دراسة طولية تتناول ثقافات متعددةهانز أوزوالد و بير نارد سابيلا وهيلك رييينستورف وهانز بيتر كوهن

تتناول هاتان الدر استان الاستعداد المتز ايد لدى الشباب للمشار كة فـ اللياة السياسية، وفغ
 الأولى على الاهتمام بالسياسة فحسب.

مقدمة نظرية

يعد الاتتمام العام بالحياة السياسية هو الأساس الذى يقوم عليه إمان الشخص بالنظام الديعراطى وثتّيق الذات كنتاج لعملية تحديد الموية. فيما يتعلق بعلم الاجتماع السياسى يعد الاهتمام بالسياسة هو المكون الرئيسى للحافز السياسى، وهو متغير يشير إلم القدرة على الخروج بعفاهيم أيديولوجية للمشار كة فـ العملية الديعراطية (كلينجمان 1979). من هنا يعد الاهتمام بالسياسة أحد الشروط الأساسية من أجل استيفاء أى مواطن مسئول ويتمسك بالديعراطية لعدة سمات ألا وهى: الولاءلاء، والقدرة على الششار كة السياسية، والاستعداد لنلك. لطالما أوضحت الدراسات العملية أن الاهتمام بالسياسة إنا يؤثر بصر رة كبيرة على تنمية تلك السمات (كاس 1984). من هنا تتضح أهية الاهتمام بالسياسة من أجل وجود هوية سياسية ديعراطية. غير أن الاهتمام بالسياسية لا يعد أمرا هاما من أجل وجود الموية السياسية الديعقراطية فحسب، وإثا من أجل نشوء هذه الموية. ويتطلب خلق هنه الموية البحث وأيضا الالتزام (أريكسن 1968، مارسيا/آرشر 1993). ويعد الاهتمام بالسياسة هو القوة الدافنة للبحث والذى بدونه لا يتم تعقيق للهوية. فالاهتمام يثير العديد من التساؤلات حول العملية السياسية، والنظام السياسى، ومؤلاء ءمن يتقلدون المناصب السياسية. فالاهتمام بالسياسة يدفع الناس إلم ورن مواقفهم الأيديولو جية، وتقيبم مزاياها وعيروبا، وأخيرا الالتزام وتعيق الموية السياسية. ودون الاهتمام بالسياسة تبقي الموية السياسية غير واضحة المعالم كيث لا يعرف الشخص ما يجب أن يفكر فيه، وما يكب أن يؤمن به، وما هِ هي التز الماته. من الجدير بالذكر أنه من المتوقع أن ينمو الاهتمام بالسياسة مع تقدم الإنسان فـ العمر بوجه
 حيث تتصف تلك المرحلة ،عاناة المرامت من الأزمات، ورغته فـ الاستكشاف، وذلك طبقا لـا جاء فـ نظرية أريكسن الحاصة بالتطور (أريكسن 1968). كما تصف نظرية الاندماج
 التزامات ناضجة تستند إلى المنطق والعقانية (دو سن/بريويت 1969، نيمى/هييرن 1995).

وإذا اعتبرنا التعليقات الخاصة بتطور البختمع المدنى (2/5) توصيات عمل فن إطار التعاون على
 آفاق تخطيط طويلة الأَجل هدفا منشودا.


 سنرتب لوضع هذا الأمر بوضوح أكثر ضمن منظومة مشرو عنا من حيث منـي منهومه وتصميمه.

> الحو اشى


 2 أرقام مصدرها عبد الظاهر الهنداوى المتحدث باسم وزارة التخطيط من خلال حديث إذاعى أحرى معه فـ صيف . 2004
3 وردت هذه الأرقام على لسان عبد الظاهر هنداوى المتحدث الصحفى باسم وزارة التخطيط أثناء حديث إذاعى أجرى معه فن نوفمبر 2004.
4 وليس من باب النقد، فإن تصوير "أفراد من الشعب" على أنمـ مثاليون يعرض للخطر المهود الرامية إلى مواجهة الماضى و الإقدام على عمليات المصالحة اللازمة.
 ذاتى، منا ترتب عليه أن يكون نطاقه مدوودا.
 الأخرى تحت ضغوط الأزمات الاقتصادية، والفرد حينذاك يتصرف ويتعامل على أنه وحدة مستقلة قائمة بذاته.

وليس هذا فقط، بل يتابع تحقيقها بثقة وحب (القسم 2/4). علاوة على ذلك، يمكن للمرء أيضا
 الفردى، وعلى نفس النحو، يعهد .مسئولية تطوير مستقبل البالد إلى "الشعب". ولن ولن يتأتى تحقيق





 على طريق حياة بمنأى عن مؤ سساتاها. 6 ووفقا للأبحاث الى أجريت فن بحال العلوم السياسية، ينظر إلى انعدام الترابط بين هيا هياكل الدولة وتصميمات الحياة الفردية (كما ورد ذكره فن القسم 3/1/4) على أنه يمثل مشكلة تتعلق


 الدولة والمختمع المدنى/ المدنيين يمكن احياؤه عن طريق تنفيذ آليات تعمل كمـحور تواصل علملى المى أساس من العالقة التبادلية. وعليه، ففى حالة الإستعانة هذه الدراسة بو صفغها أساسا للنظر إلى مستقبل البختمع المدنى على أنه مشارك متكامل فن عملية التطوير عبر الجمتمع ككل، يتعين الاهتمام بمعايرة البِوانب

 والأمنية؛ و2) إلى أى مدى ستخوض الدولى بلم بلمربة التغييرات الفكرية المكملة وأن تعاصر انخراط الما الجْتمع المدن كشريك، أو ممعنى آخر، تطور مستوي التجاوب الواجب توافره؛ و3) وما إلذا


$$
\text { 2003، صــ } 23 \text { 25). }
$$

## آثار التعاون



 الاعتبار ودبحه فن خططنا. وعلى صعيد مشرو ع الإشراف على الانتخابات، على سبيل المثال، عمل 20 مراسل من 12 إقليم عراقى ببرنامج إذاعىى يومى قام
 المرحلة التحضيرية مدة 4 أسابيع!

الشعب العراقى نفسه. ${ }^{4}$ وثمة مفهوم خاطئ مماثل للحجية العراقية التى مفادها أن الصراعات الدائرة بين الأكراد و الشيعة والسنيين هى فن الواقع من صنع وتخطيط و سائل الإعلام الغربية.

وعند هذه النقطة، أود أن اختتم عرض الفتر الت ات والنتائج المستخلصة وأنتقل إلى بعض

 أو لا فيما يلى تعقيب موجز على جلدوى النتائج من الناحية المنهجية:

## ملاحظة أولية بشأن الجدوى المشار إليها

جدير بالذكر أن الدراسة البحثية قيد التناول والتى تتعلق بتشكيل السير الحياتية للعناصر الشابة





 من عدمه. وبالإضافة لذلك، تقاس هذه الصالحية أيضا بما تُققه التوصيات التى تقتر حها هذه النتائج من استفادة. ورهذا المشرو ع البحثى قد تم تصميمه بغرض الوصول إلى فهم أعمق لنماذج العمل والتقويم والحفز على صعيد الشباب فـ بغداد وبالتالى استيعاب العمليات التى يتسنى لمم من خلالها الما خوض
 شُكل المز يد من التدقيق والتمحيص لمذه النوعية من الدراسات والأبحاث وذلك بواسطة تطبيق الأساليب والطرق الكمية إن الأحاديث قد جرت فـ شكل مقابلات عامة بما أسفر بالتأكيد عن التعبير بصورة أقوى عن المثاليات التى تخص الذات والشعب والثقافة وما إلى ذلك. والإتحاه المؤيد لتقديم أجوبة

 في سياق البحث الإجتماعى يرتكز الاعتماد فيها على إجراء مقابلات مع الناس باعلاع النبارها وسيلة
 نتيجة البث عبر وسائل الإعلام العامة لمذه المقابلات، بات هذا الاتحاه رغم ما سبق عسووسا
علّى غو موسع.

## إرساء الجتمع المدلن

أثناء المقابلات، صادفنا، من ناحية، جيلا من الشباب النشط، الموجه الذى، من منطلق ريادته للمجتمع المدنى، ييعث الأمل؛ فهو لديه مصالِ ويعمل على تطويرها،

أما "كٍ." فقد كانت له وقفة أكثر انتقادا ولكنه مقتنع بالنتيجة النهائية نفسها: "أننى لست


 مستوى التنمية الاقتصادية والخلل الأمنى. ولكن كلٍ ذلك سوف يتغير أيضا فـ الأِّجل المتوسط وعندئذ سوف تنبت التربية السياسية للشباب مزيداً من الثمرات. وعندئذ أيضا سوف نرى نرى الشباب من الشعب العراقى وهو ينخرط
 استطاعة الشباب العراقى التظاهر هنا، والخروج إلى الشوارع فـ مظارهرات بـرات بشأن قضايا تخص دولا أخرى تقع على مسافة بعيدة.







 اعتقاد أكيد بأن العر اق سوف يكون مفتاح هذه التغييرات والإصلاحات. وإنا وأذ أقول ذلك، فإنىن


 وسوف نكافح ضد الإرهاب حتى الموت."




 تصنيفهم من الناحية الو اقعية كمنقذين مثاليين للوطن".





 في صراعات وعنف وتطورات سلبية لا ينتمون إلى بمموعات فـ المارج فحسب، بل هم من

إلا أن عدداً كبيراً من الاتصالات كانت تحمل طابع الأعمال، وذلك عندما ينظر إلى .Welle
 و كما تبين بوضوح الأمثلة الواردة فن النقرة 1/3/4، فإن العديد من العلاقات المتطورة هنا هي


 عن مسألة المجرة، أن اهتمام العراقيين بالبقاء فن بلدهم يفوق أى رغبة ألمبة فن الرحيل عنه. والواقع أن الرفض الحماسى للهجرة من قبل هؤ ألاء الصاء الصامدين المصممين على البـلى البقاء فن بلدهم


 من أعمال الخيانة أو إدارة الظهر، وإنما هى بتحلب أيضاً للوطن المز يد من خيبة الأمل والإفقار.

## كيف يتم تقويع حاضر ومستقبل العراق كجزء من الحطط الحياتية للمواطن؟

من الممكن تلخيص السمات الت ميزت الموقف فن بغداد خلال صيف/خريف 2004 بأفا
 الأمن وتدهور مستوى الإمداد بالسلع التموينية ( انظر التفاصيل فـ الفقرة 1/3) . وليس مستغر با
 فـ بغداد ووصفهم لكلا الوضعين بأنها مشكلات " عسيرة " و" قاسية " وصعبة " " و" مؤلمة ".
 مو جزة وعامة: وأيضا فيما يتعلق بالسياسا المات الأمر يكية فإنها لم تناقش بعمق.
 إرساء الديمقر اطية فن هذا البلد. وعلى عكس التقويم السلبى المتوقع للموقف الحالى على

 والتغيير تفصل بين الحاضر الكئيب والمستقبل المشرق. و كما يتضح من المتتطفات التالية فإنا








 تزرع فن الماضى سوى الأشجار الشائكة ".

أنكرورها كأمر ممكن فن حياهـم. وهذا المفهوم تمثل بحموعة pop التى قابلناها استثناء . بما أهنا قررتٍ بشكل جماعى الهجرة إلى لندن. أما الآخرون الذا الذين علقوا على هـلى هذه المسألة فإفـم ينظرون

 على أذهم أداروا ظهورهمم للشعب، بالضبط مثل حكمهمم على الفنانين المو الين للنظام الذين




 الأشكال التى تثثل الثقافة العر اقية كما أن أعمالمه لا تقرأ بتاتاً \} . .. من أفراد الشعب عن سبب عدم وجود مظفر النواب هنا فـا فن العرٍ اق؟


 التناقضات التى ببساطة يتعذر على " فهمهـا " الهجرة مرفوضة كخيار حياتى كما تؤ كد ذلك العـى العبارات التالية التى وردت على لسان المنتج السينمائى R: " كان موضوع فِيلمى الثانى فـاية ثقافة الخنافس فن العراق واستخرق الفيلم تسع دقائق


 كاليفورنيا وقد دأب على دعوتى لزيارتى على ولى ولكنى شعور يستحوذ على بأن ثمة تغييرات جوهر هورية سو


 غادرت العراق لأول مرة هذا العام فتط لخضور مهر جان برلين السينمائى ".

## التعليق

بنح الكثيرون من الأشخاص التى شثملتهم مقابلاتنا فن إرساء علاقات تعاون مع مؤسسات أحنبية واضعين بذلك هاية للعزلة المؤلمة التى فرضت على على العر اقيين أثناء حقبة الحظر . وباء واتباعهمم هذا النهج يكون العر اقيون قد حصلوا لأنفسهم فن إطار هذه العلاقات المات المتطورة على ولى وضعية المتلقى

 للالتحاق بدورات تدريبية تنظمها وسائل الإعلام الغربية مثل Deutsche و BBC و
-

 هناك. والفيلم يعرض حالياً فـ مهر جانات السينما العنا العالمية. - تقدم العديد من الصحفيين العراقيين بطلبات التحاق بدورات تدريات وهنذا النحو صاروا يعملون مراسلين لو كالات أجنبية. وجدير بالتنوٍٍه فن هذا الصدد أن ستريممينستر (streamminister) على اتصال بمار با لا يقل عن 30
 تنغذها streamminister-media والمشار إليها آنفاً.

 من مساعدة العراق فف أن يصبح مكاناً يز يد فيه عدد مستخدمى لينو كس على عدد مستخدمى ميكروسوفت. - أجرى رياضيو سباق جرى المسافات العراقيون تدريباهةم استعداداً للألعاب الأوليمبية فف كولونيا (Cologne) منذ أن تحسنت الظروف هناك، كماكِ الما استعدوا أيضاً لمسابقة الألعاب العر بية فن العإصمة الجز ائرية.
 ورو سيا، وأيضاً من الدول العـر العر بية كافة.
وف وقت إجراء المقابلات، تبين أن الغالبية العظمى من الذين قابلناهم لمم اتصالات نشطة تتعلق بالعمل مع اللارج - وهو أمر يثير الاندهاش إذا أخذنا فـا الحنا أحاطت بعملية نسّج هذه الاتصالات والحفاظٍ عليها.
 بعض الفقرات السابقة، فإن العر اقيين ينتقدون فـ المقام الأول الختيار الصور التى تبث علـت عن طريق


 أنشطتهم فن الحيلولة دون حدوث مثل هذه التطورات لا سيما وأن بحتمع البلو جرز العـر العراقى
 .(www.riverbend.blogspot.com

الهجرة

 الأخص مع الغرب كما أن الأفكار المستو حاة من الخار جا لا تلا تلا ال عحل ترحاب.

 قراراً غير محذ. وقد أعرب الكثيرون مُن قابلناهم عن نبذهم ورفضهم للهجرة، أو على الأقل

وهو ما عبر عنه بوضوح أكبر Sصانع العود الذى بدأ فـ مُارسة هذه المهنة وهو لا يز يزال فـ

 يمكن لأحد أن يصنع العود إلا إذا أحب الآلة أيضاً. كما أن الألمر يكتاج إلى وقت لكى تكا لكتسب

 وقبل أى شىء، يجب أن تكون عاشقاً لكاكلة ".

 أقضيها فف الاستوديو ".

التعليق
عند مقارنة الدوافع والاهتمامات المشار إليها فن هذه الدراسة بالظروف المعيشية فن الوقت الذى أجرينا فيه المقابلات، يمدا المرء نفسه إزاء تناقض ظاهر الما


 عن سيرهم الحياتية وضح أنٍ الحرية كمثلِ أعلى لما لما الغلبة على النقص فـلى الماديات والمشكاتلات


## مدى أهمية العالم الحارجى فى عملهم؟

منذ سقوط نظام صدام حسين سِجلت الاتصالات مع الـارِّارِّارج زيادة كبيرة، رغم أنه من الناحية



 صارت أيضاً أكثر تفاعلاً، فبدلا من أن تكون بحرد استيعاب للثقافة الغر بية أثمرت عن تُقيق تبادلات بتارية وثقافية.

التعاون

 ذ لندن سيقوم بإنتاج ألبومها الجديد هناك ويتولى ترويبه في السوق الدولية.

ولقد عثرنا هنا على موضو ع ثان وثيق الصلة مكفهوم إحياء الفن عن طريق التركيز على ولى



 الإعلام منذ سقوط نظام صدٍ مام. وهذه الرغبة تلعب دوراً كبيراً بين البلوجرز العراقراقيين، وهو ما ما يعبر عنه البلو جر بقوله: " إننا
 الإعلام العالمية، وما نخا



 سمحت لنا بنشر وترويج صورة مغايرة عن تلك التي تطالعنا عادة عبر وسائل الإعالام أو تبثنها






 كما تلاحظ وجود تغير آخر على صعيد هذا الشق من الاهتمامات الاتِ بين بعض الصِ الصحفيينٍ الذين يطالبون بإعادة إدراج الحقيقة عبر وسائل الإعلام العر اقية، الما باعتبارها مقياساساً وهدفاً
 أولا وأساساً، مهـمة معنو الصية: " الشىء الذى أتمناه حقاً فن عملى كصحفى هو أن أتمكن من عرض الحقيقة، بدقة وبدون تحيز، بغض النظر عما إذا كانت تتعلق باضطهاد الى أى شخص عادى المى، أو تتناول حقوقاً انتهكت فن الماضى، أو تكشف حقائق يريد السياسيون حجبها عن الشعب ".
 الز بون/السوق/الصورة، تتخذ قرارات العمل على ألى أساس عاطفى؛ أى أن العوا الطف هى می مصر
 الأنشطة.

إلا أنه من المعروف بصفة عامة أن المرأة تخضع لضو ابط أسرية وبحتمعية أكثر صرامة من تلك التى تفرض على الرجل، ومن الثنابت أيضاً أنه منذ منتصف التسعينيات خضر ألمعت المرأة بشكل متعاظم لمزيد من التهميش و القيود.

## ما هى الدوافع والاهتمامات التى تلعب دوراً ف عملهم؟

 وف الخططوة الثانية من التحليل تح الاستقصاء عن الدوافع وراء وراء القرارات المتصلة بالعمل والاهتمامات الخر كة لما. وقد برزت فن السير الحياتية الدوافع التالية:
## السوق والعملاء

فو سياق شرحهم وتفسيرهم للقرارات المتصلة بالعمل أشار من قابلناهم إلى احتياجات واهتمامات العمالاء والسوق. وعلى غرار ما هو قٍائم فن أى مكان المان من العالمَ، عندما تصِبح



 البختمع. وقد أعربوا عن أسفهم إزاء التعاون بين الفن والنظا النظام السابق وأيضاً فيما يتعلق بسوء استخدام الفن لأغراض الدعاية بما أدى فن النهاية إلى تدمير الفن ووظيفته فن البتمع. وينظر
 وقد انصرف الشعب عن الفن لدرجة أنه حتى بالنسبة للفن المصطبغ بطابع المعارضة فـ طبيعته والبعيد عن شبهة الانحياز أو الانتساب للنظام فإنه فقد بدوره قابلناهم رفضهم للفنانين الموجودين فن المننىى والمستبعدين، و كذلك اللك الفنانين المو الين للنظام
 الجمهور عن طريق تناول القضايا والموضوعات ذات التأثير المباشر على أفراد الشعب.



 مغايرة تتسق مع رؤية ومنظور العامة. و.عما أن هذا الوضا الون الون استمر لعقود طويلة، تعود الشع الشع على إزدراء الشعراء لما كانوا يكتبون عن صدام وعن أحِداث فـا
 العراقى \} .....
 العر يض من الجماهير قصائد تر تبط بأفر احهم ومعاناهـم وتكون بعيدة تماماً عن الــكم والـلكام ".

## التعليق

فإذا أردنا تطبيق هذه الملاحظات بشأن المياكل والظروف البِتمعية فن صيف 2004 (انظرٍ





 والإشر اف والرقابة. ولكن كيف تمكن الشباب فن بحتمع فاشى وقمعى من تطوير قدر اكّم على









 الهيكلى، الانتقال من الديكتاتورية إلى الفوضى لا يمثل بالضرورة تغييرا كبيراً. وسوف ألعوا أعود لتناول هذه النقطة فـ القسم الخامس.
الأسرة والنوع (الذكر /الأنثى)








 الشباب و تتعلق بالعمل. و ون الوقت الذى أعرب فيه هؤ لاء الذين عقدنا مقابالات معهرم وأيضا

 المنهج يمكن تمييزه على النحو نفسه فن حياة الفتيات الشابات، هى غير مشمولة فن هذا البحث.

الصحفٍى S الذى يعد حالياً رسالة الدكتور راه، يعمل فن عدد من الو كالات والصحف، ويكتب

 لنفسك هدفاً وتنسى ما عدا ذلك. أى لا تفكر إلا فـ هذا المدف ون وكيفية بلوغه. وفن تقديرى أنه لا يكون عليك سوى أن تضع هذا المدف نصب عينيك باسِتمرار وألا تسمح لنفسك ألا أبدا

 أستطيع الإقدام على أى خاطرة وأن أتحدى أى قوة فـ العالم"." . R
 أدرس ف، بغداد بكلية الإعلام. وقد أنشأت قهوة الأنترنت الوحيلى الاتيدة فن هذا الجزء من المدينة , ...\}
 أن يفعلوا أى شىء. ولكن ذلك لم يمدث معى ". O هو منتج أفلام من بغداد قام بتصوير فيلم هناك بعد انتهاء الحرب بو بوقت قصير. . وقد


 بيع سيارتينا بلع عل عملنا مكناً.

 أعمل خبازاً بأجر يومى يعادل يلى حوالى دولى دولارين.
 الصحفى بعض الأسئلة وبتلقائية أجبته بأنه الآلن وبعد تغير النظام سوف يتغير وضتى أيضا، وفى هذه اللحظة بالضبط قررت أن أكون صحفياً ".
 مشاءر الثقة بالنفس والشجاعة. ويقدم الأشخاص أثناء المقابلة أنفسهم على أفمّ عناصر سيادية وأفم يتفاعلون مع التغيير فن عموم معطيات الموقف لا بسلبية وإنما بنشاطاط. وهم لا يلتمائمسون مساندة مؤ سسية إلا أفم يعولون على مساعدة الأصدقاء والأقارب.
 الشخص أنشطة رياضية تكون امكانياته فن مزاولتيا ألتا عرضة للتقييد من قبل ألجا



 ذاتى للمهارات وإعداد تر كيبة السير الحياتية.

ومن المسلم به أن مثل هذه السيرٍ الحياتية غير الخطية هى الأرجحع حدوثاً بالنظر إلى الـى التوزيع
 نظام صدام حسين. وفن هذا الصدد يكون جلياً أن اختيار نوع التدريب لا يتم اليا على ألى أساس اهتمامات الطالب ومقوماته وإنما هو يفرض عليه بواسطة آلية تضعها النا الدولة ويلة ويقر ر بمو جبها أنماط معينة من التعليم وفق مستوى الدرجات. وفـ حالة الأشخاص الذين قابلناهم، فقد نتج عن

 وهذا النوع من الاختيار الوظيفى غير الخطي يرتبط أيضاً بالتحصيل فـ إطار التعلم الذاتى

 الأصدقاء والكتب وأيضا، منذ 2000، بواسطة الانترنت كمصدر للمعلومات. والمثالان التاليان يو ضحان هذه الطريقة للتعلم؛ بالنسبة لمالك عحل لرسم الوشم فإنه لا يعلم نفسه فقط كيفية رسم الوشم ولكانكه هو أيضاً
 عام 1996 و كنت وقتذاك أجيد بالغعل فن الرسم و كان أدائى للعملين على أكممل وجهه. وفـى




 كيفية إنتاج فيلم سينمائي: " كل طالب كان عليه إلنـي


 ماثلة. وبعدئذ أخذت أنتج الفيلم تلو الآخر لمؤلاء الطلبة، وهو ألمو ما مثل لى طريقة مثلى لتعلم فن إنتاج الأفلام - واستطعت أن أحرب كل شل شیء فن هذا الخصوص ".

الثقة فف صنع القرار والسرعة فـ التنفيذ

 الثقة بالنفس دون الأخذ في الاعتبار بشكل كبير للمخاطر أو المساؤى الختملة أو الخرص على الما


 عائلاقم أو غيرهم. وفيما يلى نورد بضعة أمثلة تبرز هذا المنهج .عز يد من التفاصيل:

التوقعات بالنسبة للمشار كة السياسية
إن خارطةٍ الطريق التى فرضها ساسة الولايات المتحدة لم تعد فقط بانتخابات فـر يناير 2005
 مؤقتة وإعداد دستور فـ 2005/8/15، وتنظيم استفتاء حول الديلى الدستور وأخيراً إجراء انتياء انتخابات



 2005 يظل يمثل بجرد خطة، إلا أن مصطلح " الديمقراطية " بالنسبة لمم لا زال يز يخر بالأمل.

## عرض النتائج

وفقاً لا أشير إليه فـ بداية هذه الوثيقة، فإن تحليل المقابلة ركز على مسألكة كيفية تشكيل السير

 2/2 استخدمت هنا لميكلة العرض.

ما هى وظائف ومهام الذين شملتهمم المقابلات وما هى كيفية أدائهم هلا؟
 مشروعاتمم الخاصة. وما بين 28، 6 منهم هم فقط من العاملين باعلين بأحر بينما يعمل اثنا عشر منهـم



 بقية أفراد الجمموعة ف، برامج الكومبيوتر والأنشطة الرياضية وكعاملين فـ منظمات غير حكومية أو فـ ابلجامعات.

## تر كيبة السير الحياتية والتعليم غير المؤسسى





 الحياتية التى اطلعنا عليها اتصفت بتغييرات متكررة فن بكالات العمل وتعدد الوظائف فن غختلف

حكومة مؤقتة برئاسة إياد علاوى الذى نظر إليه على أنه قيادى له نزعات الـكم الشمولي. وهذا التطور صاحبه تطلع إلى توضيح سريع للموقف.

انعدام الأمن
إن الانعدام المفاجىء لأى مظهر من مظاهر الأمن على صعيد الحياة العامة يكاد أن يكون الملمح




 بشكل متصاعد وبدأت تستهدف ليس فتط قوات الاحتلال وإنما أيضا هؤلاء الذاء الذين يتعاونون معهم. وفى تلك الأثناء، تحولت المعارك فـ الفت الفالوجة إلى رمز لعدم قدرة قوات الاحتلال على تقو يض المقاومة.

نو الحرية
إن الحرية التى تولدت عن سقوط النظام بدت واسعة الأبعاد وجذرية؛ ودليل على ذلك العدد



 الفضائيات. وأيضاً تأسست الأحزاب السياس الساسية وبات من الممكن التعبير علناً وبريرية عن وجهات النظر والآراء السياسية. ومنذ سقوط نظام صدام حسين تح إنشاء ما 700 الما 70 الما
 والذين عادوا الآن إلى وطنهم (فن يونية 2005 ضم العراق حوالى 6000 منظمة غير حكومية).
تزايل حجم الفقر
 جعلته أكثر خطورة وتفاقماً. والانقطاع المتواتر للتيار الكهربائى فـ ظل حل حرارة
 ذلك المستوى المتدنى للخحدمات الصحية والنظافة العامة داخل المستشفيات وات والحالة المالة المتردية للطرق الما


 تحت خط الفقر وأن 44\% من هذه العائلات تعيش باللكاد فوق هذا الخط و2\% \% فقط هیى التى تنعم .كستوى معيشى معقول أو حتى بقدر من الرفاهية.

الحياة التعليمية والمهنية





 الذى أجرته وزارة التخطيط فن صيف 2004 بيّن أن 20\% من شباب العراقيين تحت سن الــ الإلى

 مكافحة الأمية وقت إستحداث نظام التعليم الإلزامى، عاد إلمى معدل الأمية وسجل 2003 ارتفاعا إلى 30\% بين الذكور و55\% بين الإناث (اليونسكو، 2003).
حروب الخليج

عاصر الذين شملتهم المقابلات ثلاثة حروب خاضها العر اق فـ ظل ولاية نظام صدام حِسين:



 السادسة عشرة كان يصاحبهم باستمرار شعور بالخوف من ألنار أن يستدعوا للالتحاق بالخدمة
 والمقابلات التى وفرت المادة لمذا التحليل تمت فـ صيف وخريف عام 2004، أى بِعد عامٍ ونصف من غزو قوات التحالف بقيادة الولايات المتحدة. ويتضمن القسم التالى عرضاً موجزاً عن الملامح الرئيسية للموقف فن بغداد فـ تلك الحقبة.

## العر اق فى صيف 2004

حل الهياكل
فش ظل الاحتلال تم حل هياكل الدولة واستبدلت ها مؤ سسات مربّلة مؤلة مؤقتة خولت سلطات وصلاحيات قضائية ظلت فن البداية مبهمة بعيدة عن أى شفافية. وموازاة لذلك، فإن البتمع
 الهوية الشخصية والمجماعية، حيث مثلت الانتماءات الديا الدينية والسياسية والعرقية والإقليمية نقاط

 على التسلح بالعقيدة الدينية الخالصة ضد الفوضى الاجتماعية المتزايدة. وفن 28 يونية شكلت

 الإمدادات التموينية والمتمع طغت عليه صبغة الظلم الاجتماعى ( على 2003).

الظرو ف السياسية
بشكل تقريى يمكن القول بأن الأشخاص الذين شملتهم المقابلات ولدوا فـ السبعينيات بينما كانٍ حزب البعث الاشتراكى يتولى الحكم بالفعل. وفن 1979 تولى صدام حسين رئاسة العراق خلفاً
 والشمولية: رغم التحديث فن السبعينيات المشار إليه آنفاً، لم تـتح أمام المختمع المدنى أى الى فرص للانخراط فن المشاركة السياسية، كما لم تكن هناك حرية رأى أو صححافة أو ألما إعلام. والما العنف





 الأهداف المنشودة، فإن العقوبات التى فرضت على على العراق بمو جبب القرار رقم 661 الصادر عن الـن

 الغذائية والأدوية، فإن الحكومة تسلحت بالمزيد من الآليات الرقابية على الشعب، ليس هذا فقط و إنما استعادت شرعيتها داخل العراق.

التنمية الاقتصادية

فن تلك الحقبة، اتسمت التنمية الاقتصادية بأقصى قدر من التناقضات وبدوران تقدمى هبوطا.
 البترول الذى تح تأميمه فن وقت مبكر من عقد السبعينيات حقق زيادة بلغت حو اللى ثلالة أمثال فن الفترة 1965-1979، إلى جانب ارتفاع متوازى فن الأسعار النفطية. وفن خلال الفل الغترة ما بين




 ومنذ 1990 استمرت الزيادة فن معدلات وفيات الأطفال (4000-5000 شهرياً) وحالات سوء التغذية و اللو كيميا والإصابة بمرض السرطان (العلى، 2003).

وقد ركز البحث على مسألة كيفية بناء السيرة الحياتية والعوامل التى تؤثر على هذه العملية، مع الاهتمام بو جه خاص الي بالإجابات على الألى الأسئلة التالية: - ما هى الأعمال التى يقوم ها الأشال الأحاص الذين تمت مقابلتهم وما هى الكيفية التى يؤدون بـا هذه الأعمال؟
-

الشخصى؟
الإجر اءات



 ثانية، بتحديد الموضوعات ــ ما ها هى المسائل التى تم وصصغها وشرحها وتا وتقويمها؟ وهو ما قاد بالتالى إلى الأسئلة الرئيسية المشار إليها سلفا.


 وتو ويحها من خلال فقرات من الم المقابلات فن القسم 4.


 للمجموعة ككل. (بخصوص صحة النتائج، انظر 1/5)

## الخلفية الاجتمماعية



 متقدمة نسبياً فی قطاعات التدريب والعمل، بينما أحاطت .مستوى التعليم العام سمعة متمازة فـ العالم العربى. والصورة الذاتية للعراقى تظل مطبوعة حتى اليوم .مفهوم الانتماء إلى طلائع


 نعمت به البالاد فن الماضى. وفى حقيقة الأمر فإن عقد التسعينيات كان .مثابة خطوة للوراء إلى

وأيضاً مخاوف وأمانى المستمعين. والواقع أن النتيجة التى ظهرت من خلال هنا المنشرو ع تمثلت فن برنامج عام من العرض والأفكار المستلهمة والمناقشات المات المهمة. وقد استهلت شر كة ستريممينستر (streamminister) المشرو ع فن وقت مبكر من ون عام




 وأدرج فن الجلدول اليومى كإلإذاعة. والمشرو ع بالكامل تموله وزارة الخار النارجية الألمانية وتدعمه مؤسسة فريدريش إيبيرت. ومنذ ذلك التاريخ تو الى عدد من المشروعات، مثلم
 إجراؤها فن شهر يناير والعملية الدستورية البحارية ( من ديسمبر 2004 حتى ديسمبر . 2005

- برنامج عن المسائل الثقافية خطط لبثه فن خريف 2005 ويتضمن تقارير عن حـر الم الة الفن

 العراق، وبو جهه خاص، صياغة مسودة الدستور العر اقى الجلديد (www.niqash.org)


## المقابلات والأشخاص الذين تت مقابلتهم

فش أثناء بث برامج Telephone FM"، أجرى فريق التحرير ما يزيد على 100 مقابلة حول موضوعات متنوعة، وعلى الأخص مع عناصر من الشباب العراقى المقيمة فـ العراقـ اقـر وهذه
 ستوديو برلين (اسمه الآن _ Telephone FM"). أما عملية البحث عن الأشخاص لعقد مقابلات معهمم، فقد تولى مسئوليتها أعضاء الفريق بالكامل ومعهم شر كاء المشرو ع المساندين للبحث. وقد كان هناك اهتمام خاص بالأشخاص المنبثقين عن فئتين من الشعب: الخبراء فـن موضوع معين - مثل الإعلام، والتعليم، والثقافة....أخ، والشباب المعنيين .بشروعات ألمات أو



 الموسع والت تستند إلل مقابالات أجريت مع 28 عراقياً تُتراور ح أعمارهم بين 18 و و35 سنة ويعيشون فف بغداد. وتضمنت المادة: - 13 مقابلة قصيرة مدة كل منها 10 دقائق.

- 12 مقابلة طويلة (مدة كل منها حوالى 20 دقيقة). - 3 مناقشات استمرت كل منها ما يقرب من الساعتين.


# توجهات ودوافع الشباب فى بغداد بعد سقوط نظام صدام حسين 

آنيا وولنبرج

## المقدمة

نيابة عن مؤسسة فريدريتش إيبرت، تتولى شر كة ستريممينستر (streamminister) منذ أبريل
 تشغيل ثلالثة مشروعات قامت فرق ألمانية-عراقية من خلاولما بإلنا


 الارتقاء .كستوى الكفاءة والعمل بالشبكات على المات صعيد الصحفيين العراقيين. وتتولى وزارة الخارجية الألمانية تمويل جميع المشروعات المات ومن أجل المضى إلى شوط أبعد من بحرد التر كيز على هذه المشروعات اتلى وتناول الماول مسألة قيم ودوافع ومواقف الشباب فـ العراق، شرعت ستريممينستر (streamminister) فـ تُ تليل 28 مقابلة تُت فن إطار المشروع ع الإذاعى الأول، تليفون اف.إم/Telephone FM، لماولة التعرف على التأثيرات والقيود التى شكلت روايات التات الأفراد وسيرهم الحياتية بعد سقوط صدام املام حسين. وقد تم عرض النتائج فن 2005/6/20 أثناء مؤتمر " تغير القيم بين الشباب: تجّارب ألمانيا، ومصر
 Moderner Orient)، وهى النتائج التى نوردها فن هذا الملخص.

## الوسائل التجرييبة وموضوع البحث

البرنامج الإذاعى "Telephone FM" كاع
"Telephone FM"
 وبث من خلال إذاعة الشباب فـ بغداد على مدى فترة امتدت ثلالثة أشهر ونصف خلال صيف وخريف عام 2004.
ور كزت الحلقات فن بجموعها (70 حلقة) على مشاغلى، مثل الكيفية التى يتصور بها الناس حياتمم فـ الحاضر والمستقبل، والأهداف التى يسعون إلى تحقيقها عٍلى الصعيدين الشخصى الشا والمهن، وماهية مشروعات الشباب فـي بغداد بعد مرور ثمانية عشر شهر اعلى اعلى سقوط نظام صدام المدام حسين. وقد تثثل أحد أهداف المشرو ع فـ بلورة صورة شاملة لمواقف واهتمامات وأنشطة بل

سونيا حجازى وإيلكة كاشل

لنا قبول وزير الشباب السابق والعالم السياسى الشهير البروفسير دسوقى كتابة كلمات النقديم فن صدر الكتاب. و كنتيجة أثمر عنها مؤترنا المعقود فن يونية 2005، استطعنا جمع عدد من الدراسات الاس الاجتماعية حول الشباب فن الشرق الأوسط أعدها أشابِ أشخاص لم يسمع أى منهم عن الآخر من قبل . وقد أدرجت القائمة فن الملحق، ونتمىن أن تفيد كنواة لشبكة مستقبلية من الباحثين فن بحال الشباب.

> الدعهد جتورة إيلكة أبو ظبى

الد كتورة سونيا حجازى
مركز الشرق الحديث، برلين

مايو 2006
الحو اشى

1 يتوجه الخررون بالشكر الى أ/فردوس فتفوتة وأ/ جمال عبد الناصر لاجراء المراجعة اللغوية للكتاب ، وأ/توبياس جولدشميت لتجميع السير الذاتية.
2 سونيا حجازى، 2004: الدراسات التجرييبة حول الشباب فـ العالم العربي: الشرق، الكتاب 45، رقم 1، صفحات 179 - 184 .
3 رببنستورف، هيلك، 2004: التطور الديمقراطى! على صعيد المراهقين ف، ألمانيا الشرقية، وإسرائيل وفلسطين. ويسبادن.
4
5 لأسباب تتعلق بالشق التظيمى، لم يتضمن الكتاب قيد التناول لسوء الخظ ورقة العمل الخاصة به.

 الاجتماعي-السياسي الذى أجريت فيه الدٍراسات، والمستوى العاتِيا
 السياسية والاستراتيجية عرضا للظروف الإجتماعية والسياسية الحالية للشباب البالغين فـن



 تُتفظ هذه الدراسات بصفة الريادة فـ هذا الجالـ ولما وقد قدمت سحر الطويلة وصفاً بالغ
 والمعالجات الدولية التى تناولت موضوع ع المراهقين " أغفلت فـ معظم الأحيان جوانب مرانب مهمة "
 خاصة.
ومن جهة أخرى لخص فرج الكامل عميد كلية الإعلام بكامعة القاهرة نتائج دراسة
 وقد ركزت هذه الدراسة على غختلف جوانب التفاعل الإنسانى بين المراهقين و" الآخرين


 ولعل أهم نتتٍة توصل إليها هى التى أفادت بأن الشباب الماب استطاع أن ينمى ثقافة خاصة به وبات منصرٍرفا عن عملية التواصل مع الكبار . الكار
 مشرو ع بحث قائم على العمل المتعلق بمواقف المراهقين من الجنسين فـن المن الوسط الريفى
 وقد انطوى على هذا المشروع البحثى على إدراج منظور الممارس فـ المناقشات. وتمثنلت
 (الأبوى) حيال دور الجنسين بكيث لا يوجد اختلان الِاف جوهرى فـ المواقف يين الذين توقف تعليمهم عند مر حلة التعليم الأساسي وأولئك الذئ الذين حصلوا على مؤى مؤهل جامعىى.



 " فـ فييسبادن لسماحها بإعادة طبع وتر جمة مساهمة بر نارد سابيلا "Sozialwissenschaften" إلى العر بية. وأود التنويه بأن هذا الإصدار يقترن هـدف مهم آخر ألا وهو جعل جما بميع أوراق العمل متاحة للاطلاع عليها من قبل المتحدثين باللغة العر بية. كما كان شرف عظيم بالنسبة

المضمون لتحديد النماذج الذاتية للعمل والدوافع. ونتائجها التّ جاءت فن شكل ملئ مزيج من السير الحياتية والتعليم غير المؤسسى فـ العراق هیى بحق مثيرة للاهتمام، وذلك الكا رغم كوها تقترن ف، هذه النقطة .مساحة زمنية عحدودة. وعلى عكس الافتراضا
 بكماس تقرير المصير والاستعداد لاتخاذ قرارات ات جذرية المارية.


 وخلصت الدراسة إلى " أن قواعد وأفكار الأجيال السابقة فقدت فعاليتها وصالما ولا وليتها بالنسبة للجيل الحالى ". وقد شدد الأستاذ المراس على أن الشباب فـ كل من الريف والحضر هو
 الذى ير جعله فـ جزء منه إلى الفجوة فن المعرفة بين الأبناء والآباء، باعتبار أن هؤلاء لاء لم يعودورا
 سلطتهم المعنوية والدينية. ويشير المراس إلى أن " انتقال التفاعل الاجتماعياعي للشباب نواب مؤسسات تعليمية خارج نطاقٍ الأسرة يسهم بالتأكيد فن الاستقالال الذاتي للشباب ".
 أرسيت فن البتمع المغربى ونمط الموية المركبة التى تخول الشبباب ناحيتها. وتؤ كد نتائج الدراسات حول المغرب والعراق وفلسطين أن السلطة الأبوية تفقد أرضية فن الشرق
 يمثل مفاجأة أو أمراً مثيراً للاستغراب مثراب مثلما هو قائم بالفعل داخل دول دول هِا أنظمة حكم متسلطة مثل العر اق والمغرب.


 ملاحظات استندت إلى خبرة فن بحال عملية المسح (الماصة بإجر اء الدراسراسة) التى اصطيمت خلالما بالعديد من القيود. بين أن الدراسة نفسانٍ الريف والخضر فـن المغرب مع مشار كة 622 فرداً من الشباب البالغين تِتر او ح أعمارهم بـر بين

 واستمرارية الملكية المغر بية. وفن تقدير حجازى أنه من المكمة أن يتم فهم مواقفهم بتحاه ملك
 عاهل الأمة.. واستلهاماً منا أسماه كليفورد جيرتز " القديس المارباربي " " ـا أو " الرجل التميمة " حسب قول ألفريد بيل (1938) - استكشفت كيف ينهج الملك لتأمين حكمه فـ القرن الحادى والعشرين رغم انكمماش الأبعاد الروحانية والدينية والبطرير كية والإلمية
 والسمات الفردية بغرض إضفاء صبغة الشرعية على السلطة المذكورة.

وبينما يقدم بحث مينشماير نوذجاً لبحوث الشباب فن السياق الألمان، فإن إسهامات

 المواقف تجاه الديمقر اطية يين الشباب البالغين فيأور أوروبا الشرقية وفلسطين وإسرائيل، صدرت
 تخرك المواقف بين الأجيال بتحاه الديمقراطية داخل الأسر الفلسطينية، استناداً إلى الترابط الأسرى وتو اتر الاتصال بشأن السياسات ومسائل الجنسانية. وفـ الوقت الذى صارت الارت فيدٍ كلمة " دمقراطية " فن الصدارة من الكلمات الشات الشائعة الاستخدام، تمثل دراسة سابيلا إسهاماً مهما يعيننا على فهم تصور الشباب الفلسطين للمشار كة الديمقراطية فـ ظل سياق يتصف
 الديمقر اطية أمرا مُكنا رغم الظروف البالغة القسوة.









 بينما هى أكثر اهتماماً بالسياسات البحتمعية( الصحة، مسائل الجنسانية، السالام). وبدلاً من




 العرب؛ فمنذ صيف 2004، أتيتحت لآنيا وولنبر ج أخصصائية علم النفس فر فرصة نادرة للتحد
 تولت وولنبيرج مع كلاس جلينيو يكيل قيادة فريق عراقى-ألمان من مر اسلى الإذاعة الشبان،





 على الأساليب النوعية مع عدم الزعم بأن لما صفة تثيلية. وتستخدم وولنبيرج منهج تحليل

كما أن جوهانس إيبرت المدير الإقليمى لمعهِدِ جوتة القاهرة/الإسكندرية ومعهه انزيو ويتزيل


 بالقاهرة بدأ يتعاون مع المنظمات الشبات روبابية العاملة فن بحال " الفن والثنقافة من أجل التنمية "،

 الفائقة لخلفية المعلومات التى يمكن الوثنوق فن صحتراو
 المستهلدفة والتصدى للمسائل عحل الاهتمام.



 أجل التحرك إلى مسافة أبعد من نطاق المناقشة النظرية البحتة، فإن المؤتمر لم يستضف المانِ فقط
 الشباب المصرية ومنظمات الشباب للانضمام إلى المناقشة حول كيفية التوصل إلى استخلدام عملى لهنه الرؤى. وفن إطار فعاليات المؤتمر قدم عدد من دارسى علوم البيئة بــ FU FU المبالئلين نتائج عملهم الميداذن فن مصر. وجدير بالتنويه أن نقطة الانطالوق فن هذا الصدد تمثلت فن تقرير شل الألمانن عن الشباب، وهو عبارة عن دراسة أجريت فن ألمانيا على مراحل منتظمة شنملت الخمدسٍِ سنٍ


 الأولى استخدمت هذا التقارير من قبل قطاع عريض من الن الناس فن بحالات السياسة والاقتصا والماد



 مناقشة على نطاق واسع التعبير الشهير "أطفال جعة الربيع التافهين/ Null-Bock-Kids"،




 أن لديه استعدادا قويا للتصدى لفذه التحديات وبذل قصارى جهلده فن هذا الصدد.

مقلمة

سو نيا حجازى وإيلكة كاشل1
ما الذى نعرفه حقا عن شباب العالم العرب؟؟ الواقع أنه فـ أغلب الأحيان، ينظر إلى هؤلاء


 ينص »...."،، وأطباق الأقمار الصناعية عظورة „...."، وشبكة الإنترنت أيضا خاضعة

 بواسطتها هذه القضية التق شكلت نقطة البداية للمؤتر الذى نظمه مر كز الشرق الشـر الحديث Zentrum Moderner Orient / مؤسسة كونراد اديناور فن يونيو 2005، والذى استهدف تنمية التبادل بين الباحثين الألمان والمصريين و غيرهم من العرب حول حول مسأللة دراسة قيم ومواقف الشباب. والثـ والثابت أن الدراسات الخاصة بالثباب البالغين تمثل بجالا بكثيا غير متقدم، ورغي
 الشباب فن أى دولة عربية. أما البحوث المتاحة فإنـا بعضها، كما أهنا تر كز إلى حد كبير على موضوعات متا متخصا من 70\% من السكان العرب تقل أعمارهم عن 35 سنة ومعرفة المز يد عن هذه " الأغلبية الصامتة " فيما يتعلق بالقضايا الاجتماعية والسياسيا

 المغرب ومصر وفلسطين والعراق وألمانيا ـ وقد انصب التر كيز على عملية الميا المح والمنهجية أكثر منه على تحليل البيانات. وننوه فن هذا المقام بأن Zentrum Moderner Orient الذى ترألمّأسه الأستاذة أولريكة فر ايتاج، هو المعهد البحثى الو حيد فف ألمانيا الذى يكرس نشاطه المّا لدر اساسات مقارنة نظامية بينية
 حظيت باهتمام عورى على صعيد النشاط البحثى بالمر كز خلال السنوات ات الأخيرة؛ فنى أكتوبر 2003 عقد Zentrum Moderner Orient مائدة مستديرة ببرلين حول
 تتناول المواقف السياسية للشباب البالغين فـ شمال أفريقيا. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك تمت لألوا لأول مرة
 الألمانية حول الثشباب فـ العالم العربـ.









 الحقيقى يكمن فن التوصل الى كيفية مؤازرة هؤ لاء الشباب، ومسساعدهِّم على التحكم فـ مصائرهم وتكوين مستقبلهم.

> دأستاذ العلى هـلوم السياسية دسقى
على هلال دسوقى

هناك مدخلان للتعامل مع قضايا الشباب، الأول ينظر للشباب "كمفعول به" يتم تشكيله

 فينظر كلشباب كأطراف فاعلة لهم طمو حاتّم، ومشاكلهم، وآمالمم، ويخاوفهم، ورؤاهم المستقبلية. وتجّدر الاشارة الى أن لكل من المدخلين. فـ التعامل مع قضايا الشباب، العديد من التبعات


 الاجتماعى كعملية يقوم البتمع من خلالالها بنقل قيمه الأساسية الم الشباب، ثم افساح البالِّال ألمام الشباب ليعيد تعريف تلك القيم. من هنا يعد هذا الكتاب اضابفة قيمة لبحوث الشاب الشباب, حيث يضم بين صفحاته خلاصة

 المداخل الكمية والنوعية. ان أكثر ما يفيد هو التعرف علم على أو جه التشابه، وأو جيه الاختلافلاف،



 وشعورهم بالغضب، وذلك فـل ظل مناخ يخيم عليه التردد والحيرة. فن الحالة الألمانية ترجع تلك
 المشاعر فن مصر والمغرب بحالة القلق واللايقين المصاحبة للتغيرات الاجتماعياعية المطردة، وبالعراق وفلسطين الى عدم الاستقرار السياسى. لقد لوحظ فن بعض الأحيان وجود تباين فـ ابتاهات الشباب وسلو كياتمّ، وهو ما قد يتعذر تفسيره من المنظور الأخلاقى، وانما فـن ضوء تضار اليارب المواقف التى يواجهرها الشباب.
 هنا بخد فن المغرب أن الازدواجية قد باتت هـى النظام الثقافن السائد، وأن التفاوض قد الـد أصبح هو

 يكشف عن عدم ثقة الشباب فـ الراشدين، وافتقارهم لرؤى مستقبلية (طبقا لورقة د. فرج
سونيا حجازى
المختار الهر واس الأسرة و الميل إلى الفردية: حالة المغرب العربى

در اسة أوضاع الثنباب بألمانيا: الدر اسة الثالثة عشر
ريتشارد مونشميير

# محتويات الكتاب 

أوجه الاختلاف بين الجنسبن فى اهتمام المر اهقبن الألمان و الفلسطينيين بالسياسة - نتائج در اسة طولية تتتاول ثقافات متعددة هانز أوزوالد و بيرنارد سابيلا وهيلك رييينستورف وهانز بيتر كوهن

الاعتبار ات المنهجية الخاصة بالدر اسات المعنية بالثنباب
و المر اهقين بمصر سحر الطويلة
$75 \quad$ حوار مع المستقبل: در اسة عن المر اهقين فى ثلاث محافظات مصرية فرج الكامل

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# Zentrum Moderner Orient Geisteswissenschaftliche Zentren Berlin e.V. 

Studien 22

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { القيم المتغيرة بين الثباب } \\
& \text { أمثلة من العالم العربي والمانيا }
\end{aligned}
$$

# Studien des Zentrums Moderner Orient Herausgegeben von Ulrike Freitag 



## أمثلّة من العالم العربي و المانبا


[^0]:    $\mathrm{N}=263, \mathrm{CHI}^{2}=1,06, \mathrm{df}=3, \mathrm{p}=.782$
    $\mathrm{GFI}=.998, \mathrm{AGFI}=.993, \mathrm{RMSEA}=.000$

